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"The extent to which the state was responsible for 
the economic 'miracles' of East Asia is a matter of 
considerable debate, of course, but what is more 
important [. .. } is that a great number of Chinese 
policy-makers believed it to be true in the early 
1990s."(Eric Thun) 1 
1.1 The context - putting China in perspective 
"Beijing, not Washington, increasingly takes the decisions that affect workers, 
companies, financial markets and economies everywhere." 2 This statement can be 
found at the be-ginning of a special report on China and the world economy issued in 
The Economist. Not every economist would agree with this statement, especially if it 
is to be interpreted literally. However, there exists broad agreement that during the 
last two decades, China has become one of the key players in the world economy. 
In 1978, the Chinese government began to shift its focus from political struggle to 
economic development. Compared with the economic transitions initiated in the early 
1990s in several states of Eastern Europe and in parts of the former Soviet Union, 
China's approach to economic reform appears to offer crucial advantages. Since the 
introduction of its opening up strategy China has experienced rapid economic growth. 
The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of China's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was 16.3 percent between 1986 and 2006.3 Its robust economic growth, which 
brought the country to the status of the fourth largest economy in the world in 2005, 
has dramatically reduced poverty.4 More than 400 million people have been lifted 
above the 1 United States Dollar (USO) a day poverty level in the last 20 years.5 
Chinese companies are competitive global players in many industries, especially 
those that are labor intensive. According to Shenkar (2005), "China-based factories 
make 70 percent of the world's toys, 60 percent of its bicycles, half of its microwave 
ovens and one-third of its television sets and air conditioners etc." 6 In some other 
product categories, such as textile and garments, China's share has been held back 
by quotas and tariffs. However, these barriers to trade have been released after 
Thun (2004a), p. 457. 
The Economist (2005), "From T-Shirts to T-bonds", Internet Edition, reviewed 18.09.2006. 
Refer to China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
In 2007, the Economist Intelligence Unit wrote: "China will ve,y soon (if it has not done so already) 
overtake Germany as the world's third largest economy at market exchange-rates". Refer to 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2007), "China Economy: Pushing Past Germany", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 02.11.2007. 
The net per capita income of rural residents increased at 6 percent during 2001-2006. Refer to 
World Bank (2007), "China Quick Facts", Internet Edition, reviewed 21.09.2007. 
Refer to Shenkar (2005), p. 3. 
23 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
Introduction 
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Concerning the product 
mix, China is increasingly leaving the state of the world's workbench - a rising share 
of capital- and technology-intensive production indicates China's march up the value 
chain. To give an example, at the International Motor Show in Germany in 2005, 
Chinese automotive (later: auto) manufacturers presented their models for the first 
time. 
1.2 The state of research and aim of the study 
After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and subsequently in the Soviet 
Union, political democratization and economic liberalization were widely regarded as 
recipes for prosperity by neoliberals in the West during the 1980s. However, the 
economic success of the East Asian states (which were almost all former Stalinist 
countries) challenges the fundamental principles of liberal political economy which 
emphasizes minimum state intervention for economic development. The East Asian 
development path has posed the question of why some states such as Japan, South 
Korea (later: Korea) and Taiwan have been able to play a more effective role than 
others (such as Eastern Europe and Russia) in coordinating industrial change.7 
Various economists and political scientists, among them advocates of statism 
(statists) such as Johnson (1987), as well as neoliberal institutions like the World 
Bank (1993), argue that an activist state has underpinned the growth of the East 
Asian miracles. Government policies and bureaucracies have not only promoted 
economic growth, but have been essential to it.8 However, as most poorly performing 
economies in Latin America, Africa and also Asia have activist states too, state 
activism per se does not contribute to growth. If governmental activism has 
supported the economic growth of the East Asian developmental states, one has to 
ask how governments do effectively promote growth, and which industrial policy 
instruments they use. 
A range of studies analyze the positive role of the state in economic transformation. 
Stiglitz (2002) has analyzed how the governments of developing countries can 
improve the outcome of economic transformation by well-chosen interventions. White 
and Wade's (White and Wade 1988; Wade, 1990) concepts of the "strong state", 
Johnson's (1987) study of ''administrative guidance·; Amsden's (1989) approach to 
"getting prices wrong" and Evans' (1995) analysis of "embedded autonomy" have 
become classics in the field of East Asian transformation.9 
24 
In some analyses also Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand are regarded as East Asian 
developmental states. 
For further information refer to Johnson (1987) and the World Bank (1993). 
For further information refer to Stiglitz (2002), White and Wade (1988), Wade (1990), Johnson 
(1987), Amsden (1989a) and Evans (1995). 
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While the economic slowdowns and the financial crises in much of Asia in the late 
1990s abated some of the blind admiration of the "East Asian Miracle", China's 
economic growth in the post-Mao period has revived attention on the positive role of 
the state in promoting transformative economic development. China's industriali-
zation has been in the focus of academics and policy-makers alike; however, the 
reasons behind its economic development are still poorly understood. China's current 
industrial policies have various unique features. The country has confounded free-
market theorists' expectations in many ways, because its economic policies and 
public institutions do not conform to orthodox prescriptions for creating the conditions 
for high growth such as minimal government intervention and private companies. The 
clear overlap of economic and political spheres in China inevitably goes back to the 
centuries-old theoretical debate on the appropriate role of the state. Accordingly, one 
of the most interesting questions in the field of economics and political economy, and 
the central interest in this analysis, is whether the rapid growth of transforming China 
can be attributed to the emulation of certain mechanisms of the East Asian 
transformation. This results in the research question: Is China the new development-
tat state? 
As China's development, similar to that of the East Asian Newly Industrialized 
Countries (NICs) (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, often referred to as 
"four little dragons"), contradicts the expectations of neoutilitarian arguments, and is 
in measurable terms of economic development and social change unprecedented in 
speed, scale and scope, it is surprising that almost no analysis of China has been 
conducted within the context of the East Asian developmental state theory. The 
studies that have analyzed the developmental role of the Chinese state are, among 
others, Breslin (1996), Nee et al. (2005), So (20036, Unger and Chan (1995, 1996), 
White (1988, 1991 ), Xia (2000) and Zhu (2004). 1 While these studies have paid 
attention to China incorporating the East Asian developmental state concept, none of 
them provides a clear-cut specification of the defining institutional features and 
economic policies of a (Chinese) developmental state. They rather focus on specific 
criteria and single determinants of China's transformation approach. 
This study's focus is on China's development path and the role of the state in its 
transformation process. China's economy can only be understood if the 
concomitance of economic development (industrialization) and economic transforma-
tion (from planned- to market-economy) is taken into consideration. This is done by 
specifying conditions and measures that a developmental state has to fulfill in order 
to transform its backward domestic companies into internationally competitive 
players. As a point of reference, the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese models of 
development are examined. China's development approach is compared with these 
former developing countries' transformation in order to come to an assessment of the 
'° For further information refer to Breslin (1996), Nee et al. (2005), So (2003), Unger and Chan 
{1995, 1996), White (1988, 1991), Xia (2000) and Zhu (2004). 
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uniqueness of the Chinese model of economic development and thus fill the 
academic gap. Hence, the study is relevant to the "transformation theory", general 
questions on development economics, and the current policy debate about a role 
model for transforming countries' reform approaches. 
Moreover, not only the uniqueness of the Chinese model of economic development is 
in the focus of this study, but also its effectiveness. In order to gain insight into the 
effectiveness of the Chinese model of economic development, the study uses the 
auto industry as a means of understanding the performance outcome of state-
guidance. The development of the auto industry is a classic example of China's 
efforts to transform inefficient and technologically backward Chinese companies into 
powerful national and international champions. This effort began in the 1980s, long 
before similar efforts in other industries, when the auto sector was chosen as a 
"pillar" industry and became a primary target of government industrial policy. 
Until 1978 there had been almost no passenger car production in China, and cars 
were the prerogative of a relatively small number of high-ranking officials. Since then, 
many of the world's most powerful original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and 
suppliers have staked their future on the Chinese auto industry. It is thus important to 
understand its evolution in the context of China's economic development and 
transformation: 
• The auto industry has traditionally spearheaded organizational and industrial 
change affecting all other industries, because sophisticated products have to 
be manufactured in high volumes. 
• The auto industry is playing an important and unique role as a system 
integrator of a number of important other industries (electronics, steel, glass). 
Products manufactured by these and other industries are used in the design 
and production of modern autos. 
• Although the analysis is sector specific, it is representative of sectors that are 
technology- and capital-intensive, and in which foreign direct investment (FDI) 
is motivated by market access rather than cost-cutting. It is possible to 
investigate problems not only of industrialization in general, but also of 
economic integration and technology transfers, because the Chinese auto 
industry has encompassed domestic and foreign economic and decision 
processes. 
This is not the first empirical analysis based on the Chinese auto industry. Studies on 
the Chinese auto industry have been conducted by Mann (1989), Harwit (1995, 
2001 ), Thun (2004a, 2004b, 2006), and Noble et al. (2005).11 However, none has 
pursued a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese auto industry, examining its 
11 For further information refer to Mann (1989), Harwit (1995, 2001), Thun (2004a, 2004b, 2006) and 
Noble et al. (2005). 
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development approach according to the criteria that characterize the East Asian 
developmental states' economic transformation. 
1.3 Methodology and available sources 
The underlying premise of this study on China is that industrial development is multi-
faceted. It is well known that focusing on only one aspect of the process of industrial 
development may result in misleading conclusions and simplistic policy 
recommendations. It is hence essential to consider multiple dimensions of industrial 
development in order to discover whether China is the new developmental state. 
Accordingly, various methods are applied within this study:12 First, the study uses a 
secondary analysis approach to gain general information on the Chinese model of 
economic development, evaluating secondary statistical data as well as abundant 
material of Chinese and international authors, institutions and organizations. Second, 
an empirical analysis of the Chinese auto industry is conducted. Insights into state-
guidance in the auto sector come from secondary analysis, as well as qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. Thus, theoretical arguments can be underpinned by empirical 
evidence. The period of examination is from China's early reform years (late 1970s) 
until November 2007. 
(1) Secondary analysis of the Chinese model of economic development: 
Secondary analysis is the (re-)analysis of data. Pre-existing data is used either to 
investigate new research 9uestions or to re-examine primary study questions for 
purposes of corroboration. 3 Information is gained from the (re-)analysis of the 
following sources with special focus on the subject: 
• Official documents of Chinese political agencies and leaders: The research is 
based on the examination of official documents from Chinese sources. Most 
official regulations, laws and statements are available in English. Due to the 
evaluation of these documents, political and economic indicators that are 
decisive for China's reform process can be isolated. Furthermore, the review 
of official documents from the beginning of the reform process until 2007 
provides an insight into the characteristics of the Chinese transformation 
approach in the course of reform. Among those documents are statements 
from China's political leadership, five-year plans and industrial policy 
documents of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
regulations of the Ministry of Commerce, and the homepage of the Chinese 
central government etc. Furthermore, on the local government level, 
12 The theoretical foundation of this study, the state's role in (East Asian) economic development, is 
based on literature review. The review describes, summarizes, evaluates and clarifies this 
literature. It gives a theoretical base for the research. Works which are irrelevant are discarded 
and those which are peripheral are looked at critically. 
13 Refer to Glass (1976), pp. 3-8. 
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documents on foreign investment schemes which are available on the 
homepages of e.g. the municipalities of Beijing and Shanghai, are evaluated. 
• Official statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics of China: The evaluation 
of statistical yearbooks provides relevant information. Various issues of the 
"China Statistical Yearbook", the "China Compendium of Statistics", the "China 
External Economic Statistical Yearbook" and the "China Statistical Yearbook 
on Science and Technology", as well as the "Beijing Statistical Yearbook" and 
the "Shanghai Statistical Yearbook" are used. China's membership in 
international organizations such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund since the beginning of the 1980s, has generally contributed to 
the qualitative improvement of statistical data. Moreover, international 
classifications have been adopted successively and an approach towards 
international standards can be registered. 14 Nevertheless, different reports 
(such as Holz 2001, 2005) are skeptical of the quality of Chinese official 
statistical data.15 The problem of official data inconsistency has directly 
affected the results of commercial, academic and policy studies alike. Due to 
these reasons, this study covers national development trends. The inaccuracy 
of specific data may be accepted, because the reliability of official data can be 
verified by comparing it with alternative sources. In consequence, the data 
used is suitable for the method and aim of this study. 
• Articles from the national and regional Chinese daily press: The freedom of 
the press is still restricted by the Chinese central government. Accordingly, 
articles from the Chinese national press might be colored by political 
statements. Qualitative improvements of press statements can be seen in 
recent years, however. Furthermore, the daily press is the only medium which 
allows the researcher to incorporate up-to-date developments as well as the 
latest reform results. For this reason, the researcher uses various internet 
publications from relevant Chinese and other daily presses. 
14 Refer to Opper (1999), p. 28. 
15 First, some data such as data on GDP may have been intentionally misreported. Second, a 
quantity of data is of dubious economic meaning due to the way in which it is constructed (for 
example, data on fixed assets and farm employment). Third, economic variables and enterprise 
categories have frequently been re-defined without revision of the variables or category names. 
This has caused statistical breaks, as in 1993 and 1998 for reference and severe comparability 
problems in both time series and cross-sectional data. Fourth, detailed data that is in line with 
Western national income accounting standards is available for the 1990s. However, 
inconsistencies due to periodic adjustments still abound. While far less data is available for the 
1980s, when industrial statistics were constructed in accordance with the Material Product 
System, this data is somewhat more consistent. Fifth, enterprises and local governments alike 
have varying incentives to manipulate and misreport data which obviously resticts its quality. 
Enterprises for reference may underreport value added in order to avoid tax payments. However, 
the National Bureau of Statistics is working hard to reduce its reliance on questionable data 
provided by other government departments, and to bridge the central-local divide. Refer to Holz 
(2002), p. 52 and Holz and Lin (2001 ), p. 30 ff. For further information refer to Rawski (2001 ). 
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Although remarkable information can be gained from the evaluation of these sources, 
the basis of the analysis is extended by sources from various international authors, 
institutions and organizations. The analysis concentrates on scientific publications 
such as books, reports, review articles and other reference-type materials.16 
International secondary literature is analyzed to complement Chinese secondary 
statistics in English language and to counter biased, politically or ideologically 
colored interpretation of Chinese sources. 
(2) Empirical analysis of the auto sector (incorporating a mixed methods approach): 
In social research, the term "triangulation" 17 (or mixed methods approach) is used to 
refer to the observation of the research issue from at least two different points.18 The 
application of different methods becomes essential in the study of complex fields of 
investigation. Triangulation allows one to exceed the limitations of a single method by 
combining several methods and giving them equal relevance. Thus, a highly 
synergistic combination of data types can be achieved. Only the variety of different 
methods reveals the necessary ran~e of information to gain a complete picture, and 
to validate all items of information.1 Triangulation allows multiple confirmation of the 
findings of secondary analysis, as well as qualitative and quantitative analysis (refer 
to Figure 1 ). 
Figure 1: Triangulation. 
Research topic: Chinese auto Industry 
Emplrlcal analysis: Triangulation (mixed methods analysls) 
j_J. j_J. j_J. 
Secondary Analysis Qualitative Analysis Quantitative Analysis 
Units of analysis: Units of analysis: Unit• of analysis: 
Evaluation of secondary statistical Expert interviews with representatives Statistical evaluation of the 2001 
data (e.g. Automotive Industry of OEMs and suppliers as well as Wo~d Bank sample Including 1,500 
Yearbook) as well as material of Chinese, German and European Chinese companies (216 auto 
Chinese and international authors, institutions. companies). 
institutions and organizations. 
D 
Multlple confirmation of findings 
Source: Own illustration. 
16 This mainly applies to data and regulations from the early reform period. 
17 For information on "triangulation" refer to Webb et al. (1966), Smith (1975) and Denzin (1978). 
18 Refer to Flick (2004b), p. 179. For further information refer to Flick (2004a) and Jick (1979). 
19 Refer to Flick (2005), Internet Edition, reviewed 05.02.2006. 
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Figure 1 shows that the empirical analysis of the auto sector uses a secondary 
analysis approach that concentrates on the re-analysis of industrial policy 
documents, laws and regulations with special focus on state-guidance in the sector. 
Moreover, secondary statistics from the China Automotive Industry Yearbook 2006 
and various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook provide a fact base for 
conclusions about the sector's development since the early reform years. 
In addition to secondary analysis, qualitative analysis reveals the dynamic process of 
industrial development as well as the role of changing government policies and 
institutional settings. Expert interviews were conducted in China. Interviews provide 
targeted and directly-focused approaches, and give insightful causal details on the 
research topic.20 Among the experts are managers of foreign auto companies (OEMs 
and suppliers) as well as experts from German, Chinese and European (government) 
institutions located in Beijing and Shanghai. The qualitative researcher uses complex 
reasoning that is multifaceted, iterative, and simultaneous.21 The qualitative analysis 
focuses on the institutional framework and the national industrial policy design for the 
auto sector. 
The quantitative analysis uses data from the World Bank survey "Competitiveness, 
Technology and Firm Linkages in Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). The sample 
includes 1,500 Chinese firms (of which 216 are auto companies). The statistical 
evaluation of the survey data bases conclusions on the state-directed development 
approach in the auto sector on quantitative evidence. 
1.4 Line of action 
The analysis of the Chinese development path is presented in five chapters. The 
state's role in economic transformation with respect to the East Asian developmental 
states is analyzed in Chapter 2. This serves as the theoretical foundation for the 
analysis of the Chinese economic transformation approach (Chapter 3) and also 
provides a benchmark to assess its effectiveness on the basis of the Chinese auto 
industry (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 answers the question of research, and gives lessons 
on other transforming countries' development paths. 
The study analyzes the subsequent details: Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical debate 
on the appropriate role of the state, and thus establishes the theoretical groundwork 
for this study. The chapter examines the economic and institutional arrangements for 
development in three East Asian countries, namely Japan, Taiwan and Korea. The 
analysis is based on the classic works on the state's role in economic development in 
general, and the most influential studies on the developmental state theory in 
particular. The rapid economic growth of the East Asian economies raises the 
question of the policies and institutional factors that contributed to growth. The 
20 Although the interviews are essential evidence, interview data can be corroborated with additional 
information when necessary. Refer to Eisenhardt (1989b), p. 538 and Yin (1994), p. 86. 
21 Refer to Creswell (2003), p. 182. 
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analysis of the three East Asian states suggests that their development approach 
should not be perceived as a unique, cultural or regional phenomenon, but as an 
alternative model of development that offers an important policy option for developing 
countries. From this, a model of East Asian development is created. The East Asian 
Developmental State Model serves as an analytic research framework. The model 
includes conditions and measures a developmental state has to have and implement, 
respectively, in order to accelerate economic growth and transformation. 
In Chapter 3 the model of East Asian development is used as a basis to analyze 
China's development path. First, the question of whether China fulfills the conditions 
"dictated" by the East Asian Developmental State Model is explored. As this can be 
confirmed, the Chinese transformation path since 1978 is analyzed with respect to 
each criterion of the model. The focus is on determining the defining elements of the 
Chinese development strategy. The mechanisms used by the Chinese government to 
promote transformative economic growth are clarified and specified using a 
secondary analysis. Thus, the question is answered as to whether China is a mere 
follower of the best practices of the East Asian states or whether the Chinese model 
of economic development is unique.22 The distinctiveness and innovative character of 
the Chinese model of economic reform unveils similarities and differences between 
the East Asian developmental states' and China's approach to economic 
development. 
The empirical analysis of Chapter 4 focuses on the development of the Chinese auto 
industry, and uses a mixed methods research approach. The chapter examines 
whether the development of the auto sector reflects the uniqueness of China's 
transformation strategy. The policy and bureaucracy framework of the auto industry 
is analyzed to identify the inherent characteristics of the Chinese model of economic 
development in the auto industry. Only by starting from a full picture at the macro 
level of the auto industry in China (analysis of the institutional settings and the policy 
documents guiding the sector's development), can appropriate in-depth analyses at 
lower levels (expert interviews, World Bank sample, secondary analysis on firm 
performance etc.) be conducted in order to obtain convincing evidence. The chapter, 
moreover, analyzes the performance outcome of China's development approach to 
the sector. Secondary statistics, as well as information gathered from qualitative and 
quantitative research, form the basis of evidence. The study intends thus to fill the 
gap between theoretical and empirical approaches and increases the 
"persuasiveness" of evidence. 
22 When analyzing development strategies as the object of analysis, the following methodological 
problems arise: First, "strategy" is usually associated with clearly intended state action. As 
strategies may also emerge by default, trial-and-error or compromise, imputing a central design 
requires caution. "Strategies" often take years to crystallize and are often plagued by internal 
inconsistency. Second, strategies generally consist of packages of policies, and different policies 
involve different political cleavages and conflicts. It is thus useful to disaggregate "strategies" 
where possible. Third, development strategies are not unambiguously given by factor 
endowments, but also by natural endowments such as interest groups seeking to maximize their 
rents. Those usually influence the decisions of policy-makers. These limitations of analyzing 
strategies have to be considered when conducting this study. Refer to Haggard (1990), p. 23. 
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Chapter 5 draws conclusions from the previous analysis on China's economic 
development, and assesses whether its development path corresponds to that of the 
three East Asian states. Answers are given as to whether China is the new 
developmental state, and whether China's distinctiveness has been conducive to 
economic growth. The findings seek to help economists and political scientists, 
policy-makers and businessmen to understand China's transformation process with 
its conditions, institutional settings, industrial policy mechanisms and limitations. This 
contributes to fact-based decision-making at both the industrial and national level. 
The analysis concludes with broader lessons for the role of an activist government 
concerned with economic development and the transition from a socialist economy. 
The study's line of action with its detailed design is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Line of action. 
Chapter 1 Research question: Is China the new developmental state? 
I Research aim end me1hodoloy I 
-LL 
Chapter2 Analysls : The East Asian developmental states 
I East Aal•n developmental state theory I ..n 
I E1111 Allan Developmonlal Slate Model I 
r7 
Chapter 3 Analysls : A new model of economic development 
I Conditions ot the Chln•H economic transformation approach I 
~ 
[ Measures ol the Chinese economic tran1form1tlon approach I 
I 7 
Chapter4 Analysis : The auto Industry In the light of the 
Chinese development approach 
I 5econd•ry •naly• ls at the bureaucratic framework end auto lnduetrlal policies I 
I Expert lnlervl-• In Beijing and Shsnghal I 
I Stallallcal ev• lu•tlon of the World Bank survey I 
_J ,_ 
I Outcome of the development of the Chinese •uto Industry I 
r1 
Chapters Evaluation and 
lessons from China's model of economic development 
Source: Own illustration. 
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2 The East Asian developmental states 
In the post-World War II period, the leading economies of the East Asian region have 
experienced a historically unprecedented rate of economic growth and commercial 
expansion. Some of the emerging economies in the region achieved higher growth 
rates than those of Western economies in comparable periods of the development 
process. Today, Japan and the East Asian NICs have levels of GDP per capita 
comparable to those of the richest nations of the world. Their largest companies are 
engaged in a phase of dramatic regional and, in some cases, global expansion. The 
"recent" cases from East Asia have come to exemplify the modern concept of the 
developmental state. Knowledge of the developmental state is largely derived from a 
number of descriptive studies which each focus on one case or another rather than a 
general model. Although it might be questionable whether it is possible to treat the 
East Asian countries as a whole, for the purpose of this study, the similarities 
between Japan, Taiwan and Korea are highlighted, while still acknowledging that 
there are significant differences between them. From this, a distinct model of East 
Asian development can be derived. 
2.1 Debate on the beneficial role of the state 
By the end of the 1970s, statists acknowledged the economic success of Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, as the result of proactive state 
involvement.23 Except for Hong Kong, the governments of all these states have 
actively used industrial policy to accelerate and direct economic development.24 
Distinct from trade policies, industrial policy is defined as ·~overnment efforts to alter 
industrial structure to promote productivity-based growth". 5 Industrial policy aims to 
promote technological innovation and to catch up with international best practices.26 
Far from being a novelty of East Asia, industrial policy has been an integral part of 
the economic policies of many advanced capitalist countries during the post-war 
period.27 In the United Kingdom (UK}, industrial policy was discussed controversially 
when the Labor government introduced industrial policy programs in the late 1970s.28 
The de-industrialization debate in the UK perceived industrial policy as one way to 
stop the progress of de-industrialization and revive the economy.29 During the 1980s, 
studies of various European countries' policy approaches to overcome the industrial 
23 Refer to Evans ( 1989), p. 563. 
24 Refer to Robins (2002), p. 293. 
25 Refer to World Bank (1993), p. 304. 
26 Refer to Naseem (2003), p. 636. 
27 Refer to Chang (1994), p. 56. 
28 For further information refer to Blackaby (1979) and Matthews and Sargent (1983). 
29 For further information refer to Singh (1977) and Rowthorn and Wells (1987). 
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crisis of the late 1970s emerged.30 The issue of industrial policy, however, was 
debated most strongly in the United States of America (USA). In the early 1980s, the 
Harvard Business Review served particularly as the major forum.31 Strategic-trade 
policy literature has also been influenced by (and has influenced) the industrial policy 
debates.32 
Despite successful state-led growth in the East Asian countries, by the end of the 
1970s, economic theorists as well as practioners demanded free market and laissez-
faire policies which soon became the dominant view of international bodies such as 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.33 For the neoclassicals, 
economic success is achieved by the efficiency of market mechanisms and policies 
emphasizing openness, private enterprise and the minimal role of government.34 
Since Smith (1776), liberal political economy has contended that the government 
should not directly intervene in firm's decisions, but monitor and enforce the 
regulatory environment in which firms compete for survival and profits. Public choice 
theory adds that politicians and bureaucrats should not directly intervene in firms' 
business activities, because they will use their power to further their personal 
interests, such as the maximization of political support and re-election, rather than 
the firm's efficiency. 35 Kornai (1980) furthermore warns that risk-sharing between 
government and enterprises (via state ownership and state guarantees) may lead to 
inefficiencies, as state officials might impose political interests (such as job creation) 
on the firm. The firm expects external financial assistance from the state (subsidies, 
preferential credit, and reduced tax rates) and builds it firmly into its behavior. This is 
known as the "soft budget constraint" problem.36 
Consequently, the neoliberals contend that governments should only intervene in the 
economy to overcome inherent market failure. Hayek (1945) argues that it is 
impossible for governments to have the necessary information to plan and coordinate 
economic activities effectively, even if their bureaucrats possess the best knowledge 
3° For further information refer to Pinder (1982), Jacquemin (1984), Cox (1986) and Duchene and 
Sheperd (1987). 
31 For reviews of the debate refer to Norton (1986) and Thompson (1989). 
32 Forfurther information refer to Kirzkowski (1984) and Krugman (1988). 
33 For further information on the recent politics of the World Bank refer to e.g. Easterly (2001 ). His 
book combines modern growth theory with experiences from his fieldwork for the World Bank. 
34 For further information refer to Ricardo (1817). 
35 For further information refer to Buchanan (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Krueger 
furthermore postulates that political decision-makers tend to pursue rent-seeking activities instead 
of maximizing societal welfare. Rents are defined as excess returns over opportunity costs. Rent-
seeking is the attempt to redistribute the rights or entitlements to such returns through political 
action. Refer to Krueger (1974). 
36 Kornai differentiates between the hardness and softness of budget constraint. For further 
information refer to Kornai (1986, 1990, 1998, 2001). 
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available.37 The government's proper role is to help create and maintain an 
environment in which resource allocation is effectively determined by price signals. 
This entails a policy regime that sets the framework for the functioning of the market 
and a small public sector. Influenced by this line of argumentation, government 
failures in the 1980s led to dere~ulation, liberalization and privatization in a large 
number of developing economies. 8 
The World Bank, being an adherent of the neoclassical theory, has been tardy in 
extending praise to the East Asian model. In 1992, however, it emphasized for the 
first time the role of the state and its institutions in general, and good governance in 
particular. However, not until the World Bank's publication of "The East Asian 
Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy" in 1993, was the decisive role of the 
governments of East Asia with their active state interventionism acknowledged by 
some neoclassicals.39 
In 1997, the debate on the beneficial role of the state revived as the Asian financial 
crisis revealed an institutional shortcoming of Asian capitalism.40 Despite ample 
evidence of decisive government industrial policy in the region of East Asia, 
economists remained divided in their interpretation of the developmental role of East 
Asian governments for a long time. The economists disagreed on whether it is 
government initiatives or market forces which have constituted the primary causal 
factor in stimulating modern economic development and productivity growth.41 
Accordingly, the development debate was mostly framed in terms of stark, simplistic 
alternatives, as a kind of contest between the power of the state versus the power of 
the free market. 
The Asian financial crisis cannot be used to discredit the whole model of East Asian 
development. While the crisis revealed the risks of politicizing the economic system, 
this does not imply that economists and politicians cannot learn from the East Asian 
experience. The questions that must be addressed are: under what circumstances is 
37 For further information refer to Hayek (1945). Nee et al. add that it does not make any difference 
whether the government unit is a central ministry or local government bureau. No individual 
government official has the requisite knowledge to outperform the market mechanism in general. 
Refer to Nee et al. (2007), p. 22. 
38 Refer to Yue (1995), pp. 76-79 and Minns (2001), pp. 1025-1026. 
39 The World Bank (1993) study "The East Asian Miracle" had to be sponsored by the Japanese 
themselves as they wanted to highlight the role of the state behind the miracle. Additionally, at the 
annual meeting of the World Bank/International Monetary Fund in the fall of 1991, Attila 
Karaosmanoglu, at this time vice president and managing director of the World Bank, said that the 
East Asian NICs and their successful emulators are a powerful argument that a more activist, 
positive governmental role can be a decisive factor in rapid industrial grow1h. He added, what is 
replicable and transferable must be brought to light and shared with others. Refer to Stiglitz 
(2002), p. 91. The view of the World Bank is manifested in the "World Development Report 1997: 
The State in a Changing World". 
40 Refer to Edin (2000), p. 19. 
41 Refer to Robins (2002), p. 292. 
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state intervention likely to be successful, and which factors determine the 
effectiveness of industrial policy? More specifically, how can the state remove the 
privileges of particular firms, and ensure that the rents created by state intervention 
encourage productive activities? What is needed is clarification of the quality of state 
involvement in industry promotion. Therefore, the necessary conditions and 
measures for successful state-led economic growth have to be specified. The key 
issue then becomes not whether, or how much, states should intervene, but rather 
what makes some states more effective than others in developing their economy. 
2.2 The developmental state theory 
The growth of some East Asian states has exemplified the active role of the state in 
economic transformation. The principal idea behind it may yet be traced to much 
earlier times. A long tradition of scholarship has focused on the historical role of the 
state in industrialization, and defended the proposition that an active and effective 
state apparatus is an essential element in successful industrialization.42 
2.2.1 Early recognition of the state's role in industrialization 
List (1885) emphasized the strategic role of the state in harnessing domestic and 
international market forces in the national interest. He examined how Germany had 
been able to develop a manufacturing industry at a time when British manufacturers 
were far in advance.43 He was one of the pioneers of the infant industries 
conception.44 Even more important was his idea of a national system of political 
economy.45 It attacked Smith's unlimited freedom of trade and the liberal principle of 
laissez-faire.46 List and the German Historical School essentially argued, based on 
the concept of historicism, that universal economic laws were non-existent, and thus 
states had the right to intervene in the economy.47 Especially in the case of late-
developing countries, the promotion of national economic development was regarded 
as being critical to their success in "catching-up" with the industrialized, developed 
42 Refer to Evans (1989), p. 566. 
43 Refer to List (1885), p. 39 ff. 
44 The infant industry argument says that developing sectors of the economy need protection 
against international competition in order to establish themselves. Refer to List (1885), p. 224 ff. 
45 Refer to List (1885), p. 259 ff and p. 347 ff. 
46 Decisive for Smith's laissez-faire approach is the following quotation: "The statesmen who should 
attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only 
load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be 
trusted to no council and senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the 
hands of man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it." Quoted in 
Hayek (1976, reprinted in 1994), p. 63 and Smith (1776), Book Four, Chapter V, p. 540 ff. 
47 Refer to List ( 1885), p. 172 ff. 
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world.48 On a theoretical level, not simply mere exchangeable value, but productive 
forces account for the wealth of a country. List formulated a theory of economic 
development that was based on the promotion of "productive powers" 49 through the 
state which contrasted with Smith's free enterprise system. 
Weber (1911) called attention to established market societies, and argued that the 
operation of large-scale capitalist enterprises depended on the existence of the kind 
of order that only a modern bureaucratic state could provide. Weber emphasized that 
capitalism and the bureaucratic state apparatus belong intimately together.50 He 
argued for the fundamental value of bureaucracy as one of the institutional 
foundations of capitalist growth.51 Weber pointed out that bureaucrats were only 
concerned with fulfilling their assignments and contributing to the achievement of the 
goals of the apparatus as a whole. For him, use of the privileges of office for 
maximizing private interests was a feature of earlier prebureaucratic forms. The 
bureaucracy needs to be a corporately coherent entity in order to support markets 
and capitalist accumulation. In this coherent entity, individuals see the promotion of 
corporate goals as the best means of maximizing their individual self-interest. 
Individual incumbents have to be insulated to some degree from the demands of 
society in order to achieve corporate coherence. The enhancement of insulation is 
achieved by conferring a distinctive and rewarding status on bureaucrats. Also 
central to the bureaucracy's effectiveness is its concentration of expertise through 
meritocratic recruitment and the provision of opportunities for long-term career 
rewards.52 Altogether, Weber stressed the fundamental role of an authoritative 
bureaucracy as a prerequisite to the operation of markets, and thus as one of the 
institutional foundations of capitalist growth. 
Polanyi (1957) too elaborated on the positive attributes of state intervention in 
economic life and addressed state intervention in the economy from a sociological 
point of view. He discussed Smith's "natural propensity to truck, barter and exchange 
one thing for another" 53 and criticized the proposition that exchange was a "natural" 
activity that required only minimal institutional underpinnings. As he conceived it, the 
48 List was a liberal nationalist and his concept of economic nationalism - which was often but 
unjustifiably regarded as •neo-mercantilist" - together with the ideas of the German Historical 
School, provided an intellectual stimulus for Meiji Japan. Consequently, Japan's leadership 
systematically fostered economic growth and industrialization, and turned Japan into a state, 
where national economic development was the prime objective. Refer to Sohn (1998), p. 17. 
49 List takes up Smith's expression of "productive powers" which in sum, according to Smith, causes 
the condition of nations and develops this term further. Refer to Smith (1776), Introduction, p. 
XXIV ff and List (1885), p. 133 ff and p. 163 ff. 
50 Refer to Weber (1911), p. 973 ff and pp. 1394-1395. 
51 This thesis always had to contend with the historically prior and ideologically powerful classical 
view of Smith's laissez-faire government role. 
52 Refer to Weber (1911 ), pp. 958-960, p. 974 and pp. 978-979. 
53 Refer to Smith (1776), Book One, Chapter II, p. 14 ff. 
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successful rise of the market in the UK required intervention by the state: "The road 
to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in 
continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism".54 From the 
beginning, the market was intertwined not just with different kinds of social ties, but 
with the interventionist policies of the state. 
Gerschenkron's work (1962) on late developers complemented Weber. Asserting that 
late developers faced different conditions than the early industrializers,55 
Gerschen_kron illustrates why a stron~ state is likely to push industrialization forward 
in particularly backward countries. 6 Whereas individual entrepreneurs largely 
contributed to the industrialization and development of the UK, in the first "late" 
industrializers - Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France, Austria, the Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire and Belgium57 - universal banks played the major role in kickstarting 
industrial expansion. Banks stepped in, because entrepreneurs in these countries 
had little capital with which to build up large firms. The banks provided not only 
funding for industrialization, but also took key investment decisions in the firms in 
which they invested, and limited competition among their financial offspring. In the 
even more backward Hungarian and Russian states, the state stepped in as the chief 
investor in industry due to the weak financial system. The state incorporated the role 
of entrepreneur and banker alike. The state created, funded and directed much of the 
new industrialization. In order to catch up in their economic development, late 
industrializers were forced to rely on the power of the state.58 While in Weber's 
model, the government simply provides a suitable environment, Gerschenkron's state 
is actively organizing a crucial aspect of the market. 
Altogether, in Gerschenkron's reasoning, the more backward a country, the greater 
the role played by the state in increasing the supply of capital to the nascent 
industries and in providing guidance. As a consequence, active state involvement is 
seen to be of little importance to early developers, or once a country has 
industrialized. 59 
Hirschman (1958) analyzed the state's entrepreneurship. Based on his observations 
of the "late late" developers of the 20th century Third World, entrepreneurship in the 
sense of willingness to risk the available surplus by investing it in productive activities 
is lacking, namely, "the ability to make and carry out development decisions" and "the 
54 Refer to Polanyi (1967), p. 140. 
55 According to Gerschenkron, " .. . [l]n several very important respects the development of a 
backward country may, by the very virtue of its backwardness, tend to differ fundamentally from 
that of an advanced country."Gerschenkron (1962), p. 7. 
56 Ibidem, pp. 5-30. 
57 Ibidem, p. 16. 
58 Ibidem, p. 11 ff, p. 14 ff and p. 19 ff. 
59 Refer to Weiss and Hobson (1995), p. 2. 
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perception of investment opportunities and transformation into actual investments". 60 
The state therefore has to lead entrepreneurial activities in order to transform 
(potentially) existing savings into available productive activities. By providing 
"disequilibrating" incentives the state induces private capitalists to invest and, at the 
same time, to be ready to alleviate bottlenecks that are creating disincentives to 
investment.61 
Altogether, by puncturing the myth of the original industrial revolution as a purely 
private process, these interpretations have brought the state to the fore in the 
analysis of European industrialization.62 The outlined comparative historical visions 
were the beginnings of a positive vision of how an effective state might act and be 
organized. 
2.2.2 Origin of the East Asian capitalist developmental state theory 
Developing these visions of an active state further and laying special focus on East 
Asia, in 1981, Johnson introduced what was to become a focal point in future 
debates over the role of the state in industrialization.63 It was only with the publication 
of his work on the East Asian states and Japan in particular that the phrase 
"developmental state" made its formal debut, and that a serious attempt was made to 
conceptualize it. 
Johnson argued that Japan's developmental state and its changing of industrial 
structure was a central element in explaining the country's post-World War II 
economic miracle.64 Johnson traced the emergence of Japanese industrial 
development back to 1868 and the Meiji era (1868-1912), where Japan first began to 
be "plan rational and developmentat".65 He distinguished the "developmental 
orientation" of such a ''plan rational" state from both the ''plan ideological" state of the 
Soviet-type command economies and from the "regulatory orientation" of typical 
liberal-democratic or even social-democratic states.66 
Johnson can be regarded as the "father" of the developmental state approach. He 
discussed in detail the attributes and qualities of the developmental state,67 but did 
not, however, offer an isolated definition. As this seems necessary at the beginning 
60 Refer to Hirschman (1958), pp. 35-36 ff. 
61 Ibidem, p. 65 ff. 
62 Refer to Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985), p. 44. 
63 Refer to Johnson (1981 ). 
64 Refer to Johnson (1982), pp. 9-10, p. 311 and p. 31 ff. 
65 Ibidem, p. 23. 
66 Ibidem, pp. 18-19. 
67 Ibidem, p. 17 ff. 
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of the analysis, the definition of Leftwich (1995), who examined features of different 
developmental states,68 delivers insight: 
"Developmental states may be defined as states whose politics have 
concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the center to shape, 
pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, 
whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of 
economic growth, or by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of 
both." 69 
Developmental states are mainly the states in East Asia, above all Japan, and 
additionally Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. Japan, Korea and Taiwan are 
the most typical cases in terms of wide state intervention among Asian countries, 
compared with more laissez-faire Hong Kong and, to a lesser degree, Singapore, 
and the resource-rich countries of Southeast Asia. Hence, as Hong Kong and 
Singapore are special cases of developmental states,70 here, only Japan, Taiwan 
and Korea are examined. 
The developmental state's capacity refers to the ability of policy-making authorities to 
pursue domestic adjustment strategies. These strategies are set up in cooperation 
with organized economic groups and intend to upgrade or transform the industrial 
economy.71 Accordingly, the idea of the developmental state is indicative of the role 
of the state and its policies as well as the internal relationships that constitute the 
state itself. The state has an important legitimate part to play in determining the 
course and content of national economic development. In addition, the 
developmental state is suggestive of a particular constellation of political and 
economic relations. This implies relations amongst the personnel that constitute the 
state, and between the state and society and the business sector, respectively. 
The East Asian capitalist developmental states - although they are neither communist 
nor laissez-faire - exhibit characteristics of the neoclassical minimalist state and the 
centrally planned Leninist state.72 Neither a pure state-centered nor market-centered 
explanation takes into consideration the East Asian experience. The developmental 
state plays an activist, rather than minimalist, role and is characterized, above all, by 
the synergy of state and market, or "guided markets" (refer to Figure 3). 
68 Leftwich is one of the few authors who attempted to build a general model of the developmental 
state which is not confined to the East Asian region. In his model, six major components define 
the developmental state model: a determined developmental elite; relative autonomy; a powerful, 
competent and insulated economic bureaucracy; a weak and subordinated society; the effective 
management of non-state economic interests; and repression, legitimacy and performance. As 
developmental states Leftwich includes Botswana, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Malaysia. Refer to Leftwich (1995), p. 405. 
69 Leftwich (1995), p. 401. 
7° For further reading refer to Perkins (1994). 
71 Refer to Weiss (1998), p. 4. 
72 Refer to Oi (1995), p. 1132. 
40 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
The East Asian developmental states 
Figure 3: The state's role in development. 
Neocl1ulc1I lalssez-lalre Centrally planned 
mlnlmallst state . Leninist state 
I/ ' An approach to economic policy that advocates a - / '-' V An economic system in which economic decisions 
very limited role for the government, confining its are made by centralized planners who determine 
activities to national defense and the enforcement of what sons of goods and services to produce and 
laws. how they are to be priced and allocated. A centrally 
planned Leninist state may include state ownership 
of the means of production. 
JI JL 
E•st Asian cspHallst 
developmental state 
An approach in which the state plays an activist role and is 
characterized above all by the hybrid of stale and market, namely 
"guided markets". The developmental state approach emphasizes 
the state's capacity to implement economic policies sagaciously and 
ettectively. 
Source: Own illustration. 
2.2.3 Different developmental state approaches 
Various scholars have based their analysis of developing countries' transformation 
processes on the developmental state theory. The three most influential concepts are 
Johnson's developmental state approach as well as its enhancement by Amsden 
(1989) and Wade (1990).73 
Johnson's "capitalist developmental state": 
As Johnson (1982, 1987) analyzed, the foremost and single-minded priority of state 
action is economic development in terms of growth, productivity and 
competitiveness.74 In order to avoid a conflict of goals, no commitment to equality 
and social welfare is made.75 The developmental states' goals are rendered concrete 
by comparison with external reference economies which provide state elites with 
models for emulation. State intervention is firmly committed to private property and 





'1 S]erious industrial policy must be long-run in focus, consistent in its various 
aspects (monetary, regulatory, environmental and so forth), and operated 
through mutually supportive policy instruments. " 76 
For further information refer to Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990). 
For further information refer to Johnson (1982, 1987). 
Refer to Johnson (1982), p.19 and p. 306. 
Johnson (1987), p. 151. 
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Industrial policy has to be aimed at cost and price competitiveness in world markets, 
not just the domestic market. As it directs some resources to high-priority sectors, 
industrial policy must have the power to demand from these high-priority sectors to 
meet performance goals. In addition to his concept of industrial policy, Johnson 
bases his approach of the "capitalist developmental state" 77 on institutional 
arrangements common to high growth East Asian capitalist countries. 
According to Johnson, the combination of strategic industrial policy with a specific 
institutional setting leads to the successful economic transformation of the 
developmental state. Johnson established crucial features of the developmental state 
such as market-conforming state intervention in the economy and a small 
depoliticized elite bureaucracy organized in a pilot organization.78 
Amsden's approach of ''getting prices wrong": 
Amsden (1989) suggests that Korea grew rapidly because it got prices wrong, but in 
ways that nurtured firm-level learning and innovation.79 Her analysis runs parallel to 
Johnson's, however, she introduces new aspects of the developmental state 
approach. 
In line with Gerschenkron and Hirschman, she conceives that in backward countries, 
the level of international competition, the technology gap, the investment barriers and 
savings deficiencies, are so problematic that government intervention is needed to 
address these hurdles.80 She adds that "late industrialization" 81 East-Asian style 
requires state intrusion beyond Gerschenkron's state that has the role of an 
investment banker or Hirschman's "disequilibrating investments'82 . According to 
Amsden, 
''The first industrial revolution was built on laissez-faire, the second on infant 
industry protection. In late industrialization the foundation is subsidy which 
includes both protection and financial incentives. The allocation of subsidies 
has rendered the government not merely a banker, as Gerschenkron 
conceived, but an entregreneur, using the subsidy to decide what, when and 
how much to produce." 3 
77 Johnson ( 1982), p. 312. 
78 Ibidem, pp. 19-23 and pp. 315-324. 
79 For further information refer to Amsden ( 1989). 
80 Refer to Amsden (1989), p. 148. 
81 It should be noted that what Amsden labels "late industrialization" is the mid-twentieth-century 
industrialization that Hirschman called "late late industrialization", as distinct from Gerschenkron's 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century "late industrialization". 
82 Hirschman (1958), p. 65 ff. 
83 Amsden (1989), p. 145. 
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In late industrializing countries, the state is to mediate between market forces. Its role 
is to intervene in order to address the needs of both savers and investors, and of 
exporters and importers, by creating multiple prices. For reference, some interest 
rates are higher than others and importers and exporters face different prices for 
currency. Hence, in striking contrast to the logic of neoclassical development theory 
("getting prices right'J, a high degree of government intervention occurred in the 
developmental states to distort relative prices (''getting prices wrong") in favor of 
economic growth.84 By this policy, the desired level of investment was directed 
towards greater investment and was able to materialize in the strategic sectors.85 
"Getting prices wrong" therefore contributes to a successful industrial policy and rapid 
economic development. 
Wade's ''governed market" theory: 
Wade (1990), like Amsden, builds upon the original formulation of Johnson. He 
brings into focus the Taiwanese industrial policy.86 Wade makes significant 
contributions towards understanding the nature of strategic industrial policy and its 
impact on industrial performance. He proposes a "governed market theory of East 
Asian success" 87 which specifies Johnson's model of the developmental state.88 
Taiwan's industrial success can be ascribed to the "governed market", a series of 
policies that 
"enabled the government to guide - or govern - market processes of resource 
allocation so as to produce different production and investment outcomes than 
would have occurred with either free market or simulated free market 
policies. " 89 
Subsequently, the role of the state in Taiwan's development has been to guide the 
market, rather than "follow" it.90 The essence of the governed market theory can be 
ascribed to three proximate causes: very high levels of productive investment, 
making for fast transfer of newer techniques into actual production; more state 
investment in certain key industries than would have occurred in the absence of 
84 Refer to Amsden (1989), p. 8 and pp. 13-14. 
85 Due to these price distortions, the state generated an industrial structure different from what the 
market would have produced on its own. Refer to Amsden (1989), p. 14 ff. 
86 For further information refer to Wade (1990). 
87 Wade (1990), pp. 24-29. 
88 Wade bases his findings on case studies. 
89 Refer to Wade (1990), pp. 26-27. 
90 Ibidem, p. 303. 
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government intervention and the exposure of domestic firms to international 
competition (in foreign markets if not at home).91 
Altogether, the classic case studies, using the developmental state approach, 
focused on different aspects of government-led economic transformation. It is thus 
important to elaborate on the institutional organization in the developmental states as 
well as the measures of state-led growth, and build an integrative model of East 
Asian development. 
2.3 The developmental states' institutional and bureaucratic organization 
The developmental states' industrial policy was supported by specific political, 
institutional and organizational arrangements pertaining to the state apparatus, 
private businesses and their mutual interaction. The political elites in the 
developmental states aimed at rapid economic development and had far-reaching 
power and authority to plan and implement efficient policies. 
2.3.1 Depoliticized elite bureaucracy 
As Public Choice Theory states, politicians tend to seek popular support in the short 
run as their goal is to win the next election; and there will never be a shortage of 
private claimants on the government, regardless of their economic performances and 
prospects.92 Industrial policy and the state's abstaining from social welfare are thus 
difficult to implement by politicians. If political leaders want to pursue a successful 
long-term industrial policy, they have to depoliticize in part their key economic 
decisions. Hence, in the developmental states, a nonpolitical elite was appointed 
which was to some degree sheltered from direct political pressures.93 
Depoliticization was achieved through an implicit division of labor within the polity: 
"The politicians reign and bureaucrats rule". 94 In the East Asian developmental 
states, the politicians set broad goals and provided the space and power for the 
bureaucrats. They legitimated and ratified the decisions taken by the bureaucrats. In 
addition, they took the heat when corruption scandals were uncovered (according to 
Johnson, ''such scandals are unavoidable when government plays any role in 
economic affairs').95 It was the official bureaucracy that did the actual planning, 
91 These proximate causes were the result of the government's deliberate economic policies of 
market guidance which in their turn, were supported by authoritarian and corporatist 
arrangements. Refer to Wade (1990), p. 26. 
92 Refer to Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Olson (1965) and Downs (1957). 
93 Refer to Johnson (1987), pp. 151-152. 
94 Refer to Johnson (1982), p. 316. 
95 Refer to Johnson (1987), p. 152. 
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intervention and guiding of the economy. Only by this separation, could "a political 
system in which the bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take initiatives and 
operate effectively" be provided. 96 
The role performed by the executive or the political elites in the context of postwar 
Japan was similar to the task performed by the military in Korea and Taiwan. The 
(military) elites were committed to developmental goals as an instrument of securing 
national survival and independence.97 This was a key factor in ensuring the effective 
deployment of bureaucratic power. 
2.3.2 Cohesiveness and autonomy of the elite bureaucracy 
A prerequisite for successful economic transformation is an elite bureaucracy which 
is able to produce sizeable effects on the economy and control the direction of the 
effects.98 According to Weber, the bureaucracy needs to be able to act as a 
corporate entity with broadly collective goals, rather than as the sum of the individual 
strategies of the functionaries. They are thus able to support markets and capitalist 
accumulation and promote development. This internal cohesiveness secures the 
state's capacity to carry out stringent policies, and is therefore a crucial precondition 
for successful industrial transformation.99 
Furthermore, the bureaucracy needs to follow the goal of economic transformation 
rather than personal gain. The politicians, even when they are public-minded, have 
no more power than to monitor the bureaucracy according to the criterion that the 
total costs of state expenditure should not exceed total benefits. Bureaucrats, 
however, might act as selfish agents.100 Generally, the theory of self-seeking 
bureaucrats is based on the postulate that bureaucrats are in no sense different from 
other individuals in pursuing their own interests. It is assumed that bureaucrats are 
budget-maximizers, following Niskanen's (1971) argument that 
'1A]mong the several variables that may enter the bureaucrat's utility function 
are the following: salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, 
patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes and ease of 
managing the bureau. All except the last two [ ... ] are a positive monotonic 
function of the total budget of the bureau during the bureaucrat's tenure in 
office". 101 
96 Refer to Johnson (1982), p. 315. 
97 Refer to Onis (1991 ), p. 115. 
98 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 343. For further information refer to Tullock (1985). 
99 For further information refer to Weber (1911 ). 
100 Refer to Cullis and Jones (1987), p. 127. 
101 Refer to Niskanen (1971), p. 38. For further information also refer to Niskanen (1973). 
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In the three developmental states, norms of comportment for state functionaries and 
structural organization ensured state cohesiveness and a reputable, rule-committed 
civil service: 
• Rules: The bureaucracy and its functionaries had to follow clearly specified 
rules. The institutional framework of the bureaucracy ensured that the 
functionaries' decisions were guided by such rules instead of individualistic 
and predatory interests.102 
• Merit-based recruitment: The commitment to rule-following was compounded 
by a mechanism crucial for state cohesiveness, namely, the adherence to 
precise norms of recruitment. Functionaries thus pursued their work duties 
rather than personal gain. Bureaucrats recruited according to meritocratic 
criteria generated a kind of "esprit de corps" within the bureaucracy. The 
knowledge that they belonged to a highly selected "club", with similar 
qualifications and rare skills, created a corporate culture among functionaries. 
This in turn ensured state cohesiveness which would not be possible through 
meritocracy alone.103 Common educational backgrounds of the bureaucratic 
and business elites and their significant cross penetration played a key role in 
generating extraordinary degrees of elite unity. 104 
• Career prospects: One requirement for a successful bureaucracy is a well-
defined, competitive career path with a substantial prize for those who make it 
to the top. 105 In the East Asian developmental states, the top decision-makers 
in industrial policy generally reached their positions after they had gained work 
experience from several agencies or public enterprises. In these years, they 
also built close working relationships with a stable core of colleagues. 106 In 
Japan, retirement comes early, and the rewards to a successful bureaucrat 
are substantial, extending beyond the pay, perks, and prestige.107 
• Remuneration: The institutionalization of meritocratic recruitment patterns and 
predictable career paths was accompanied by the provision of sufficient 
resources, such as remuneration, to make careers in the state competitive 
with careers in the private sector.108 In general, the more favorably the total 
public sector compensation package compares with compensation in the 
private sector, the better the quality of the bureaucracy. In economies where 
public sector wages are at least decent, prestige, job security and other 
102 The predatory state is a state in which the bureaucracy is not immune to rent-seeking and state-
society relations do not happen between organized groups and the state as an institution, but 
between individuals. There is no functioning bureaucracy in a Weberian sense. Refer to Evans 
(1995), pp. 29-30 and 48-49. 
103 Refer to Evans { 1995), p. 49. 
10• Refer to Onis (1991), p. 115. 
105 Refer to World Bank (1993), p. 178. 
106 Refer to Wade (1990), pp. 224-225. 
107 Refer to World Bank (1993), p. 178. 
108 Refer to Evans (1989), p. 582. 
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advantages of public employment will persuade some talented individuals to 
forgo higher earnings in the private sector. By the beginning of the 1990s, the 
World Bank (1995) also acknowledged that high-performing East Asian 
economies (in contrast to the Philippines, Uruguay, Argentina and Somalia) all 
provided their bureaucrats with wages comparable to those in the private 
sector. The World Bank analysis showed that bureaucratic salaries in the state 
sector in East Asia were as high as, or even hi~her than, in the private 
business sector, particularly at the senior level. 1 9 Lower salaries in the 
bureaucrat sector than in the private sector aggravate the danger of rent-
seeking in states, where salaries cannot prevent bureaucrats from predatory 
behavior. 
• Size of the bureaucratic apparatus: As in the developmental states, the 
functions of the elite bureaucracy were carried out by only a small economic 
general staff. There is no obvious correspondence between effective market-
augmenting state intervention, on the one hand, and the size of the 
bureaucratic apparatus or the public sector on the other. The East Asian 
developmental states testified that highly effective forms of market-
augmenting intervention could be consistent with relatively small bureaucratic 
structures and public sectors. Small public sectors had nevertheless embodied 
highly productive and profitable public enterprise sectors. Economic policy-
making in Taiwan was dominated by scarcely more than a dozen people.110 
Economic policy-making in Taiwan was intensely centripetal, carried out entirely in 
Taipei within the executive branch. Only some input from the top of the party 
occurred. Few individuals dominated this process of economic policy-making. They 
ranged from the president, to a number of relevant cabinet ministers, to senior people 
in several government ministries or commissions, to managers of the largest public 
enterprises, to a few private businessmen who were well connected to the party. 111 
Indeed, from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, just five men had a preponderant 
voice in economic policy, including monetary, fiscal, industrial and trade policy. 112 
Most of the personnel graduated from the same two or three elite universities, mostly 
Taiwan National University in Taipei. 113 Almost all belonged to the Nationalist Party 
and many held concurrent party posts. Mostly, they held the latter because of their 
positions in the economic hierarchy. The combination of party ties, common 
educational background and, most importantly, long-standing working relationships 
with colleagues, resulted in high personal and professional empathy among top 
109 Refer to World Bank (1993), pp. 176-177. 
110 Refer to Onis (1991), pp. 122·124. 
111 Refer to Wade ( 1990), p. 195. 
112 Ibidem, p. 217. 
113 An examination of personnel records suggests that at the "lowest" ranks (not further defined) of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs about 40 percent are graduates of Taiwan National University. 
About 80 percent of Japan's higher-level civil service in the 1960s graduated from Tokyo 
University. Refer to Wade (1990). p. 217. 
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officials. This helped to create a broad consensus among them on the general 
growth-oriented goals of Taiwan's economic policies. A highly competitive 
examination had to be passed for recruitment to the economic bureaucracy. A 
sizeable proportion of the graduates who passed the government examination 
actually joined the government or public enterprises. Government service attracted a 
substantially higher proportion of university graduates than college graduates. As 
Taiwan's educational system was intensely meritocratic, this implied a higher 
proportion of the more able students.114 
Overall, in the developmental states, startling post-war economic growth occurred 
with the help of this powerful, talented and prestige-laden economic bureaucracy. 
However, none of the East Asian developmental states was immune to clientelism 
and corruption. Bureaucrats used some of the social surplus for the benefit of 
incumbents and their friends rather than those of the citizenry as a whole. In certain 
periods, their regimes appeared more rapacious than developmental (e.g. the KMT in 
Taiwan, the Rhee regime in Korea). The exploitation of personal gain by state 
functionaries, however, happened less than in other transformation states. In 
addition, the consequences of their actions promoted rather than impeded 
transformation. This was essential to the bureaucracy's effectiveness. 115 
2.3.3 The pilot agency 
Within the bureaucracy of the East Asian developmental states, "pilot agencies" 
played a key role in policy formulation and implementation. For Johnson (1982), the 
pilot agency was the "greatest concentration of brain power".116 It was a powerful and 
autonomous agency able to solely formulate industrial policy and coordinate 
economic development. The authoritative pilot agencies were charged with the task 
of planning, guiding and coordinating industrial policies. 
The most well known government institution of this kind is Japan's Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). MITI is the classic example of a pilot agency 
functioning like a superministry. 117 Evans (1989) acknowledges MITI and its policies 
by contending that "the administrative apparatus that oversaw Japan's industrial 
transformation was as impressive as the transformation itself".118 
MITI held several functions to promote the industrial structure and enhance the 
nation's international competitiveness. It performed think-tank functions, decided over 
strategic industries and high-priority sectors and prepared the environment for 
114 Refer to Wade (1990), pp. 217-218. 
115 Refer to Evans (1989), p. 563 and p. 571 and Evans (1995), p. 49. 
116 Refer to Johnson (1982), p. 26. 
117 Compared with the pilot agencies of Taiwan and Korea, MITI has been the most powerful and the 
Taiwanese counterparts the least so. Refer to Chan (1990), p. 49. 
116 Refer to Evans (1989), p. 572. 
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economic development.119 It obtained a consensus for its plans from the private 
sector, acted as a "gatekeeper" for contacts with foreign markets and investors and 
provided positive government support for private economic initiatives.120 
Korea's Economic Planning Board and Taiwan's Council for Economic Planning and 
Development followed Japan's blueprint of a pilot agency.121 Before its restructuring 
in 1994, the Korean Economic Planning Board had planning, budgetary and 
economic management functions. The Economic Planning Board was able to provide 
a strong coordinating role, as it stood outside and astride the individual ministries. 
Individual economic ministers were required to consult with the head of the Economic 
Planning Board, the deputy prime minister, before they could initiate major policies. 
The Economic Planning Board resisted having close identification with any particular 
sector or group and thus protected its institutional insulation and its broad political 
mandate. During its 33 years of existence, it never had direct relationship with the 
private sector. However, conflict and confusion over the structure and role of Korea's 
system of national economic management within the bureaucracy emerged which 
finally led to the dismantling of Korea's key pilot agency in late 1994.122 This 
subsequently comprised the state's transformative capacity. 
The Council for Economic Planning and Development in Taiwan also operated 
independently of the ministerial bureaucracy and similarly had its own planning and 
budgetary functions. The Council for Economic Planning and Development integrated 
the leadership of the individual ministries. In this way, they were forced to act as a 
unit rather than to represent client interests. The Council for Economic Planning and 
Development acted relatively insulated from special interests and fulfilled its 
coordinating role. Although its importance as center of economic decision-making 
was unquestioned, its power relative to that of particular ministries varied over time 
and across issue areas.123 
2.4 State-led economic growth 
The developmental states have been doing more than the neoclassical accounts 
recognize to increase supply responsiveness and steer the direction of industrial 
growth. State-led economic growth includes strategic industrial policy to promote 
"winner industries", a dualistic trade policy that protects certain infant industries and 
encourages domestic companies to export on a large scale, as well as the controlled 
inflow of foreign investment. 
119 Refer to Johnson (1982), p. 19. 
120 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 195. 
121 Of these, MITI has been the most powerful and the Taiwanese counterparts the least so. 
122 At this time, bureaucrats were often trained in a neoclassical perception in the US. 
123 Refer to Weiss (1998), p. 53. 
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2.4.1 East Asian industrial policy 
Like most developing countries, the East Asian developmental states had multiyear 
development plans. In Taiwan, the first plan, covering four r:ears from the beginning 
of 1953 was called "The Plan for Economic Rehabilitation". 24 Industrial policy in the 
East Asian developmental states has been strategically targeted towards the long-
term development of selected industries. These have enjoyed competitive advantage 
through state support. 
Industrial policy directed towards long-term development goals: 
According to the developmental statists, the elite bureaucrats in the pilot agencies 
can have an advantage over the private sector when it comes to information and 
data-gathering due to excessive resources such as personnel and money to conduct 
research on market development.125 Subsequently, they might have good overall and 
long-term views of the economy. Furthermore, as governments pool and disseminate 
technical, commercial and market information, they can he~ to improve private 
sector decision-making and minimize their investment risks. 1 6 Scholars, however, 
have applied relatively little research to the question of how individual sectors are 
chosen for high-priority treatment in particular countries and times. 127 Consequently, 
there is only a little information available. In Taiwan, domestic and international 
research institutes and consultancy firms have worked on identifying sectors and 
products of interest for foreign investors.128 Moreover, particular industries were 
chosen for special attention by looking at outside reference economies. Japan looked 
to the USA and Europe, Korea and Taiwan to Japan and to each other.129 
Sometimes policies were even copied in detail. 
Generally, in the developmental states, the basic criteria for the choice of strategic 
industries involved high income elasticity of demand in world markets and the 
potential for rapid technological progress and labor productivity growth. Sectoral 
industrial policy was adjusted to the long-term goal of industrialization rather than 
short-term profit maximization on the basis of current comparative advantage.130 The 
124 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 81. 
125 Hayek, however, argued that planners will never have enough information to carry out allocation 
of ressources reliably. The efficient exchange and use of resources, Hayek claimed, can be 
maintained only through the price mechanism in free markets. For further information refer to 
Hayek (1945). 
126 Refer to Yue (1995), p. 86. 
127 This aspect is further elaborated in Chapter 2.7.1. 
128 Refer to Edin (2000), p. 26 and Wade (1990), pp. 188,211 ff. 
129 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 334. 
130 The essence of Japan's, Taiwan's and Korea's industrial policy was that they all were cases of a 
guided market economy in which market rationality has been constrained by the priorities of 
industrialization. 
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economic bureaucrats acted in anticipation of future comparative advantages rather 
than in accordance with them. Thus, the governments of the developmental states 
have "made the winners". 131 
Japan's MITI shifted from labor intensive light (textile) to capital intensive heavy 
industry (steel works, harbors, dockyards, airports, autos etc.) already in the early 
1950s, although this was contrary to their comparative advantage, cheap labor, at 
that time. 132 This may be considered as one of MITl's most important decisions. MITI 
officials believed that products with higher income elasticities of demand like 
appliances and electronics offered a way out for Japan from its position of 
dependency. In the 1960s, before the period of liberalization, synthetic textiles, 
plastics, petrochemicals, autos and electronics were nurtured and supported.133 Even 
after the economy had been liberalized, the economic officials continued to identify 
such new strategic industries as semiconductors, numerically controlled machine 
tools and advanced consumer goods like videotape recorders and computers. 134 
In this way, Japanese firms were encouraged to move up the ladder of technology 
and pass the less desirable industries where their international competitiveness was 
already declining (those with low technology content, high labor intensity, 
environmental pollution hazards) to follower nations such as Taiwan and Korea. 135 As 
Japan's economy was strongly dependent on exports, these steps were clearly 
designed to encourage continuous industrial adjustment and to stimulate dynamic 
trade competitiveness. In this respect, MITI controlled not only foreigners' access to 
the Japanese economy, but also Japanese producers' access to foreign markets.136 
Preferential treatment only for selected industries: 
Strategic industrial policy implied that preferential treatment of enterprises was 
channeled on a selective basis according to the state's long-term development plan. 
Only certain enterprises of "upstream" industries with the most favorable environment 
for growth were targeted. Protection and assistance such as preferential allocation of 
key production inputs and bureaucratic support for promotion, were given primarily to 
131 For information on Taiwan's promotion of the heavy and chemical industries during the 1960s and 
1970s, refer to Wade ( 1990), p. 11 0 and p. 334. 
132 Similar to the developments in Japan and Taiwan, Korea's transformation from light to heavy 
industry came at the state's command. For a detailed analysis refer to Amsden (1989), p. 81, 
Wade (1992), p. 287, Johnson (1982), p. 31 and p. 240. 
133 Refer to Edin (2000), p. 26. 
134 With regard to MITI refer to Johnson (1982), p. 302. 
135 Taiwan's development path looks very similar, moving up from light to heavy and chemical 
industry. In the early stage, textiles, plastics and the synthetic fiber industry were treated. 
Preferential treatment was later given to petrochemicals, machinery, computer terminals, machine 
tools, semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, robotics and biotech. Reier to Wade 
(1990), pp. 90-99. Korea followed suit with a big push in heavy machinery and chemicals in the 
late 1970s, and targeted, among others, the electronics and the auto industries. Refer to Amsden 
(1989), p. 81. 
136 Refer to Chan (1990), p. 50. 
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infant industries and to those industries perceived to be "sunrise industries" with 
potential future competitiveness. Downstream or "sunset" industries have been left 
much freer. 137 This was contrary to the general policies of mercantilism where the 
domestic industry as a whole was protected. 
The Japanese state, after experimentation with direct and detailed intervention in the 
pre-World War II period, limited itself to strategically selected economic involvement. 
The industries apart from the priority sectors experienced policy intervention only 
from time to time, while the remaining industries were exposed unaided to the rigors 
of market competition. Subsequently, the centerpiece of industrial policy was a high 
degree of selectivity.138 
Instruments of the pilot agency: 
The policy tools the pilot agency's bureaucrats used were manifold: tax incentives 
and breaks, subsidies, preferential bank loans and selective credit allocations, tariffs 
on imported goods, foreign investment screening, foreign technology licensing as 
well as government sponsored research and development (R&D).139 In addition, the 
pilot agencies provided administrative guidance that regulated competition in an 
industry. 14° Control of foreign exchange together with export incentives were the link 
between industrial policy and international trade. 141 The use of selective subsidies 
based on performance was probably the most important of the different policy tools 
MITI had. In this line, in accordance to the neoclassical approach, MITI encouraged 
specialization according to Japan's comparative advantage. At the same time, it tried 
to minimize the country's dependence on, and therefore vulnerability to, external 
suppliers (as advised by the dependency theorists) by import substitution of certain 
products. Besides regulating imports and allocating export quotas, MITI officials 
influenced the geographic location of particular plants. They also issued advisory 
directives ("administrative guidance'7 that attempted to steer firms toward, and to 
prepare them for, future "sunrise" industries like electronics or information systems, 
and to persuade them to abandon unprofitable "sunset" industries like textiles or 
petrochemicals.142 
Through all these measures, the developmental states sought, not always 
successfully however, to bring about mergers or collaboration among firms in order to 
137 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 73. 
138 Among others, refer to Amsden (1989), p. 243 ff. 
139 In Taiwan for reference, in the 1960s, in order to promote technological and managerial upgrading 
in industry additionally to those established in the 1950s, the government established several 
more research and service organizations. For an analysis of these institutions refer to Wade 
(1990), p. 95. 
140 Refer to Edin (2000), pp. 26-27. 
141 MITI in 1952 informally advised ten large cotton spinners to reduce production by 40 percent and 
those who did not heed this advice were told that foreign currency for the following months supply 
of raw cotton might not be available. Refer to Johnson (1982), pp. 224-225. 
142 Refer to Chan (1990), p. 49. 
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profit from economies of scale and pool resources. In this way, the pilot agencies 
aimed to enhance the international competitiveness of selected industrial sectors in 
order to spur the state's economic transformation. 
Overall, the difference between what happened in East Asia and elsewhere cannot 
be ascribed to industrial policy instruments not known elsewhere. 143 Many other 
developing nations have at one time or another tried most of the policy tools used in 
East Asia. What differentiates their efforts, above all, are the pilot agency's consistent 
and coordinated attentiveness to the problems and opportunities of particular 
industries in the context of a long-term perspective of the economy's evolution. 
Another key message is that a powerful pilot agency such as MITI provided important 
strategic guidance in the selection of key industries to be encouraged and also in the 
provision of a stable and predictable environment for private investors to undertake 
risky, long-term investment projects.144 Hence, sector-specific forms of indicative 
planning can be an essential complement of market-oriented growth in the initial 
phase of transformation. 
2.4.2 Trade policy - import substitution and export promotion 
The developmental states protected strategic infant industries from international 
competition. Pursuing this goal, the Japanese government attracted only specific 
imports like production ingredients that Japan either lacked or did not have in 
sufficient quantity or quality. Specifically, these were raw materials and certain 
advanced technology from external markets such as in the aerospace and computer 
sectors. Simultaneously, the government hindered the import of e.g. foreign capital. 
The goal was to encourage national autonomy in strategic industries such as 
computer, telecommunications steel and energy. At the same time, foreign 
penetration and domination of these sensitive sectors was to be avoided.145 
The initial phase of build-up protection in the East Asian developmental states was 
combined with an export-oriented free trade regime which initially paralleled and later 
displaced the previous import substitution policy. The developmental states have 
exposed national companies to international competition by encouraging them to 
export. In general, export-promotion was based on the following arguments: 
• Continued import substitution in the form of protectionism in narrow domestic 
markets requires the production of commodities that involve higher domestic 
costs per unit of foreign exchange saved. Exporting, by contrast, involves the 
143 Reier to Wade (1990), p. 343. 
••• Refer to Onis (1991 ), p. 122. 
1•5 Reier to Chan (1990), p. 49. 
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production of commodities in which the country has a comparative advantage. 
This implies low domestic resource costs per unit of foreign exchange. 
• Exports enable fuller capacity utilization and allow reduction in unit costs 
through the exploitation of economies of scale contributing thereby to efficient 
import substitution. 
• Export orientation not only provides an engine of growth, it also encourages 
domestic industries to become and remain internationally competitive. By 
exporting, enterprises are disciplined because they have to fulfill standards set 
by export markets in order to be internationally competitive. Exposure to 
foreign competition is decisive as it provides the stimulus needed for 
technological change.146 
The protection of infant industries in the East Asian developmental states was unlike 
the policy approaches of other late developers such as Latin America. In East Asia, 
the period of "pure" import substitution industrialization (that is without a significant 
manufactured goods export drive) was generally shorter: in Korea only for a short 
spell in the 1950s and in Taiwan only between 1953 and 1957. Korea and Taiwan 
adopted an outward-oriented strategy in the early sixties, emulating the industrial 
strategy of Japan.147 
Akamatsu's (1962) "flying geese pattern" implies that there is a broad similarity in the 
types of export industries in which countries specialize in comparable development 
stages.148 All developmental states started with a focus on technologically simple 
labor-intensive goods such as clothing, toys, processed foods and so forth, and 
advanced to exports of more capital-intensive, technologically sophisticated items.149 
Obviously, the speed of graduation has varied; however, the moves have been the 
same.150 
146 A number of indirect, but positive effects also result from export promotion. Export expansion will 
ease the foreign exchange constraint, thereby permitting increases of materials and machinery 
imports. For further positive indirect effects refer to Balassa (1981 a), p. 15. 
147 In Korea, the share of exports in manufactured output rose from 1 percent in 1960 to 41 percent in 
1973. In Taiwan, the share of exports rose from 9 percent in 1960 to 50 percent in 1973. Despite 
their poor natural resource endowment, the East Asian countries had the highest growth rates of 
primary exports and thus of total exports, compared to the developing Latin American countries, 
which had mostly chosen an import-substitution strategy of development. Reier to Balassa 
(1981a), pp. 14-15. 
148 The center of gravity of industries shifts from first movers of industrialization to the second-tier 
group, and then to a third group of countries. Refer to Akamatsu (1962), pp. 3-25. 
149 Reier to Weiss (2005), p. 3 and Ito (2001 ), p. 61. 
150 The move of the ladder of comparative advantage can be illustrated with data from Korea. In 
1961, the single largest export item was iron ore (13 percent of total exports), in 1980 it was 
textiles and garments (29 percent of the total) and in 1989 it was electronics (also 29 percent). 
Refer to Weiss (2005), p. 3. 
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Since the 1990s, there has been much less emphasis on increasing and coordinating 
investment for the purpose of export promotion and industry creation in Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan. Instead, stress has been laid on developing and disseminating new 
products and technologies. The developmental states have focused on the R&D side 
of industry policy, namely the promotion and diffusion of technologies instead of 
sectoral promotion of export via investment allocation.151 In this line, trade policy in 
Korea has shifted from import substitution (prevalent in the 1950s) towards export 
promotion (starting in the 1960s) and high-tech industrialization (since the late 
1980s). At the same time, policy instruments have changed from import protection, 
export subsidization and policy loans to investment incentives for R&D and eventual 
financial sector liberalization (refer to Table 1 ). 
Table 1: Timing of shifts in Korea's trade policy. 
Period Priority activities Main Instruments 
1960 · 1973 Initial export take-oft: Promotion of exports in general - key Import protection, export subsidies Including duty drawbacks. 
sectors labor-intensive manufacturers. subsidized credit allocation, export targeting. 
1973 -1980 Heavy and chemical industry drive: selective promotion - Import pro1ection, export subsidies including duly drawbacks. 
priority sectors steel, petrochemicals, non-ferrous metals, subsidized credit allocation, export targeting. Widespread 
shipbuilding, electronics and machinery; priority firms use of policy loans 10 channel funds to priority firms and 
selected large enterprises. sectors. Investment incentives through tax credits. 
1980 -1990 Gradual trade liberalization and move to less selectivity. Phased import liberalizalion, ending ol policy loans. S1111 
Priority on high technology activities. government influence over allocation al credit. Investment 
incentives for R&O. Easing al restricOons on FOi. 
1990 • onwards Trade liberalization and high-tech exports. Private sector- Financial sector liberalization; open capital account. 
led development; restructuring of chaebol after financial 
crisis in 1997. 
Source: Refer to World Bank (1993), p. 124 and Weiss (2005), pp. 3-4 and p. 19.152 
In the East Asian developmental states exports generated "learning-by-doing". 
Exports also improved the quality of capital stock because of the need for products to 
compete in export markets. This in turn raised overall productivity, which then led to 
an increase in average profit rates across the whole economy (not just in exports). 
Real wages could thus rise without inflation.153 The developmental states used 
various measures in order to stimulate exports.154 Among those have been export 
promotion schemes, performance tracking as well as the devaluation of the 
developmental states' currencies.155 
151 Refer to Weiss (1998), p. 33. 
152 For further information refer to Kim and Leipziger (2000). 
153 Refer to Wade (2004), p. 10. 
154 The policy instruments used certainly changed over different periods. 
155 For further information on export incentives refer to Wade (1990), p. 119. 
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Export promotion schemes: 
In order to give positive discrimination in favor of export sales, several export 
promotion schemes were introduced in the East Asian developmental states.156 
Exporting enterprises were free to choose between domestic and imported inputs. 
Exporting enterprises, as well as the producers of domestic inputs used in export 
production, were granted several privileges, such as exemption from indirect taxes 
on their output and in inputs, they were not obliged to pay duty on imported inputs, 
and were entitled to retain a large proportion of their foreign exchange.157 Moreover, 
the broadest functional targeting of credit in the developmental states has been to 
exporters.158 
Taiwan introduced fiscal incentives, such as a five-year tax exemption for a wide 
range of industrial goods. The state granted tax reliefs only if companies' exports 
equaled 50 percent or more of production. Furthermore, only a small percentage of a 
firm's export earnings was made tax exempt.159 The state granted these privileges to 
all ente~rises, as a differentiation among individual export commodities did not take 
place. 16 Altogether, subsidies in the form of tax exemptions and credits at low 
156 One of the most influential models of strategic export policy is the Brander - Spencer model, in 
which it is shown that the home government has a unilateral interest in adopting an export subsidy 
policy if the home firm competes with a foreign firm in quantities (they refer to the example of the 
American and European aircraft manufacturers Boeing and Airbus). The central motive for these 
types of strategic policies is to shift profits from foreign firms to the home country. Refer to 
Brander and Spencer (1985). 
157 Refer to Balassa (1981a), p. 12. 
158 The East Asian developmental states had different characteristics of export credit schemes. 
Japan: Between 1946 and 1972, the Bank of Japan rediscounted export bills at low rates of 
interest (1 to 2 percentage points lower than that applicable to general trade bills). During this 
period, the Bank of Japan directed 10 percent of its loans to export finance (which financed 50 
percent of total export-related bank lending). 
Korea: The Korean Export-Import Bank offered concessional rediscounting of preshipment credit 
based on letters of credit. The differential between loan rates of this export credit and general loan 
rates was between 3 and 20 percentage points until 1982, when this difference was eliminated. In 
1984, the differential was restored at 1.5 percentage points. The Korean Export Import Bank also 
provided longer-term post-shipment finance and export credit insurance. 
Taiwan: Banks offered firms short-term preshipment loans based on letters of credit. After 
products were shipped, firms were eligible for loans based on letters of credit, documents against 
acceptance of payment, and shipment documents. In addition, the Central Bank provided a 
special discount rate to designated domestic banks for export loans, usually at 1 percentage point 
lower than the usual discount rate. The export loan rate was about 3 to 5 percentage points below 
the minimum interest rate for secured loans between 1970 and 1980, and it dropped to 1 to 2 
percentage points after 1980. Refer to World Bank (1993), p. 281. 
159 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 119. 
160 There is evidence that the system of incentives applied affects the country's export performance. 
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export incentives are associated with a rise in the volume of exports. In addition, export incentives 
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interest rates were one of the main incentives the developmental states offered their 
exporting firms. Thus, the disadvantage faced by national firms in international 
competition was offset, and the industrial structure moved up the value-chain toward 
more technology-intensive activities. 
The Korean textile industry gave the national economy its initial push to significant 
growth and it largely accounted for the country's impressive export performance. In 
the late 1960s, subsidies, at that time a new policy instrument, were implemented to 
guide the textile industry. 161 Subsidies were introduced because the cost position of 
Korean manufacturers of cotton textiles was less favorable than that of their 
Japanese counterparts although the income level in Korea was lower. Amsden 
(1989) observed, 
"Subsidies in Korea were necessary not because of 'distortions' [in particular, 
the exchange rate was not much distorted] but because the Koreans could 
not, initially, compete against the Japanese, even in industries such as cotton 
spinning and weaving in which the least developed, most labor-intensive 
countries supposedly have a comparative advantage".162 
Only with the state's subsidies, could the Korean textile industry enter export markets 
on a sizable scale.163 Subsidized credit for working capital was available to any 
exporter, but long-term capital at favorable interest rates was allocated only to 
targeted firms and industries.164 At the same time, import restrictions were applied by 
the government in order to exclude foreign competition. The state also initiated 
mergers of small firms to encourage productive manufacturing and improve 
competitiveness. Drastic growth of exports followed only after the May 1961 military 
coup, and was hence a direct consequence of the new military regime's policies. The 
share of textile and clothing exports in Korea's gross national product rose from 1 .8 
percent in the mid-1950s to 7. 7 percent in the early 1970s. The share of textiles in 
manufacturing exrorts grew from less than 5 percent in 1963 to more than 47 
percent in 1973.16 At that time, the cotton textile industry had become internationally 
competitive in a system of free trade and could be weaned off subsidies.166 
Performance tracking: 
In addition to the government's support for exporting companies, it exerted strong 
discipline on businesses to which it granted subsidies. Firms had to fulfill certain 
performance standards in exchange for subsidies.167 The performance had to be 
161 Refer to Levi-Faur (1998), pp. 77-78. 
162 Amsden (1989), p. 88. 
163 Refer to Wade (1992), p. 286. 
164 For examples refer to Amsden (1989), p. 73. 
165 Refer to Levi-Faur (1998), p. 77. 
166 Refer to Wade (1992), p. 287. 
167 Refer to Amsden (1989), p. 8. 
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accomplished whether the targeted enterprises were public or private. 168 The 
businesses in the developmental states that used subsidies "well" were rewarded 
with further help, and support was withdrawn from those that did not.169 This 
suggests a reciprocal relationship between governments and firms. The conditional 
performance which was imposed on firms located in strategic sectors and the 
discipline exercised by them led to price distortions, such as heavily subsidized rates 
of interest on long-term credits. However, resources were not wasted as in the case 
of many other middle income economies which made extensive use of subsidies to 
declining firms or industries experiencing financial difficulties. As subsidization was 
not dependent on business performance in those countries, subsidies emerged as a 
major avenue for rent-seeking. 170 In the developmental states, the government has 
deliberately refrained from bailing out firms which were badly managed. 
In order to hold enterprises accountable for achievements, the developmental states 
formulated performance criteria. In line with the outward-oriented development 
strategy of the developmental states, success in export markets became the main 
criterion of good use of subsidies, and of the distribution of further subsidies. In 
Taiwan, a firm was entitled to concessional credit on the basis of the previous year's 
export performance and the planned exports for the current year. 171 In similar ways 
protection was made conditional. In 1982, an import ban on videocassette recorders 
was granted by the Taiwanese government in order to assist two domestic 
electronics companies to build up their capacity. Eventually, after eighteen months, 
as their prices were still substantially above those of Japan, the ban was lifted.172 At 
this time the government announced that it was allowing Sony to form a joint venture 
(JV) with a local firm (not one of the two which had already started). The only 
condition was that 50 percent of production should be exported after three years. 173 
168 The distinction between public and private ownership is of subordinate importance, as ownership 
structure has varied from country to country in East Asia. Governments chose which type of 
enterprises they use to implement their economic policies. Taiwan has seen one of the largest 
public enterprise sectors outside the communist bloc, complemented by a large number of small 
family firms. In comparison, most of the enterprise conglomerates, zaibatsu in Japan and chaebol 
in Korea, are private businesses. 
169 Reier to Wade (1992), p. 285 and Amsden (1989), p. 116. 
170 Refer to Onis (1991 ), pp. 112-113 and Amsden (1989), p. 145. 
171 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 142. 
172 Sony was subsequently allowed to form a JV with another domestic firm on condition that, alter a 
3 year period, 50 percent of production was exported. Reier to Wade ( 1990), pp. 132-133. 
173 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 133. With regard to the Korean developmental state, Amsden delivers 
insight from fairly detailed case studies of approximately thirty-live Korean enterprises not only in 
the textile industry, but also in the cement, paper, steel, shipbuilding, general machinery, auto and 
construction industries. Several subsidiaries within a business group were studied (live in the 
case of Hyundai, three in the case of Samsung) to analyze, among other issues, whether 
repeated patronage by the government was justified on efficiency grounds. Reier to Amsden 
(1989a), p. 16. 
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Exchange rate devaluation: 
The East Asian developmental states also maintained an undervalued and thereby 
"distorted" exchange rate against the currency of the main export market, mostly the 
USD.174 This undervaluation, combined with export-exhorting national campaigns 
and competitions like "Japan's Trade Promotion Monthly", provided incentives to 
seek out export markets. The undervalued exchange rate not only provided a general 
incentive to exports, but also provided a measure of protection against imports. In the 
East Asian developmental states, despite the resulting increase of economic growth, 
the undervalued exchange rate remained credible, because it was linked to fiscal 
conservatism. Latin American states, in contrast, often pegged exchange rates, 
which became overvalued through domestic inflation. The loss in credibility then 
resulted in a financial crisis. In East Asia, the profitability of the companies, rising real 
wages and the credibility of the currency peg, attracted additional domestic savings 
and more foreign investments. The quality of capital stock and labor stock rose 
again, due to high rates of investment and re-investment.175 
Altogether, while encouraging exports and simultaneously protecting key infant 
industries, the developmental states strategically pursued a dualistic approach of 
regulating international competition according to its needs. The central role of the 
government's guiding hand is obvious. According to Haggard (1990), export 
promotion is one decisive factor which explains the accomplishments of Asia-Pacific 
industrialization compared with less successful transformation states.176 A short 
period of import substitution led to a less intensive development of industrial-societal 
forces, which demanded protection of the domestic industry in the East Asian 
developmental states. Unlike the East Asian developmental states, in Latin America, 
a long period of import substitution industrialization allowed a strong lobby for 
inefficient firms to develop. 177 
2.4.3 Foreign capital 
One element within the development approaches of the East Asian states appears to 
be contradictory. Japan has been "close to paranoid on the subject of the dangers of 
an invasion of foreign capital" 178 and has eagerly tried to prevent foreign participation 
in its economy. Unlike the Japanese approach, Korean and Taiwanese bureaucrats 
have used foreign and multinational capital extensively. Yet, what is important is that 
they attracted the needed foreign capital without at the same time becoming 
obsequious to it. 
174 On exchange rate regimes in East Asia, refer to Collignon et al. (1999). 
175 Refer to Wade (2004), pp. 9-10. 
176 Reier to Haggard (1990). 
177 Refer to Thompson (1996), p. 631. 
178 Johnson (1987), p. 163. 
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Postwar Japan did not totally exclude foreign investment or foreign borrowings. It 
imported loans from the World Bank and from American commercial banks during the 
1950s, and made use of American offshore procurement contracts and military 
expenditures. It was concerned to separate foreign money and technology, both of 
which it needed from foreign ownership-rights and manufacturing facilities, because it 
aimed to preserve its large domestic market for its new industries. The Japanese 
state aimed to restrict foreign investment. Due to its larger size (in comparison with 
Korea and Taiwan) the domestic market was used for national companies to prove 
their competitiveness, and then successfully export in international markets. Thus, 
high economic growth could be achieved. 
The domestic markets of Korea and Taiwan were too small to generate enough 
domestic savings needed for fast industrialization. Subsequently, they had to attract 
foreign capital extensively. While in Korea and Taiwan, firms exported and developed 
overseas markets, bureaucrats additionally aimed at attracting foreign firms. Foreign 
firms investing in Korea and Taiwan were largely producing for export.179 At the same 
time, however, Korea and Taiwan exercised broad controls over foreign investments 
(such as "unrealistically" high local content requirements) which were decisive in 
avoiding domination of more powerful countries. 180 Essentially, despite different 
strategies of letting foreign capital participate in its economies, none of the East 
Asian developmental states has become "subservient" to it, as the inflow of capital 
has been intensively controlled by the state. 
2.5 Financial system 
The governments of the developmental states were able to wield instruments 
capable of discriminating between industrial sectors in order to lead industrial 
restructuring. One instrument has been the financial sector. 
Generally, financial systems may be capital market-based or credit-based. Each has 
different implications for the influence of governments and banks on business. In a 
capital market system such as the American and British financial systems, securities 
(stocks and bonds) are the main source of long-term business finance. There is a 
wide range of capital and money-market instruments. Furthermore, a large number of 
specialized financial institutions compete strongly in terms of price and service, and 
actively contribute to the financing of particular firms.181 In a credit-based system, the 
capital market is usually weak. Thus, besides retained earnings, firms heavily depend 
on credit. The allocation of credit can be actively controlled either by relatively 
autonomous banks, as in Germany or by banks dependent on the government. 
179 Refer to Johnson (1987), p. 163. 
180 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 137 and Johnson (1987), pp. 162-164. 
181 Refer to Wade (1988a), p. 131. 
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The East Asian developmental states had bank- and credit-based financial 
systems, 182 and the banks were virtually all owned or controlled by the government 
throughout their transition periods.183 In the developmental states, the financial 
authorities adopted a grading system to ensure that money was directed to 
productive investments. Bank loans were approved for business plans in priority 
sectors (e.g. producing textiles for export markets) and were hindered for businesses 
in low priority sectors (e.g. noodle production for domestic consumption).184 In this, 
the attention of the business groups was diverted towards capital accumulation. 
As governments in the developmental states Japan, Korea and Taiwan had control 
over the financial system, they were able to allocate credit at low interest rates to 
strategic industries. The three developing countries, however, had different 
institutional roots and forms of how to mobilize capital:185 
• In Japan, the banks were mostly privately owned. However, in order to expand 
their lending, they depended on the central bank for access to supplementary 
deposits.186 The central bank, the Bank of Japan, has been controlled by the 
government's Ministry of Finance, and the public postal savings system has 
been a key component of the entire system. 187 Subsequently, until the 1970s, 
MITI and the Ministry of Finance were able to re-cycle Japan's high levels of 
domestic savings to targeted domestic industrial sectors and businesses. 
Selected businesses received capital at "artificially" low interest rates. This 
gave them an advantage over established rivals elsewhere.188 Already in 
1982, the Japanese postal savings system controlled more assets than the 
Bank of America, which was the world's largest commercial bank at that 
time.189 The sources of funds for large Japanese companies showed almost 
182 Refer to Whitley (1999), pp. 159 and 171. 
' 03 In Korea, one of the first acts of the government of Park Chung Hee (since 1961) was to 
nationalize the banking system. (The government of Syngman Rhee had to denationalize it a 
decade earlier to appease American pressures.) Although pressures to liberalize in the 1980s led 
the government to privatize commercial banks, thereby strengthening aggregate economic 
concentration and income inequality, the government maintained its control over commercial 
banking. However, the government still reaches far down into the officially denationalized banks in 
terms of personnel policies, appointment of senior managers, range of services and the like. Refer 
among others to Amsden (1989), p. 16 and Wade (1988a), p. 133. 
184 Refer to Clifford (1994), pp. 40-41. 
185 Refer to Pempel (1999), p. 149. 
186 Refer to Wade (1988a), p. 133. 
187 Refer to Pempel (1999), pp. 149-150. For further information on the postal savings system refer to 
Amyx (2005), 'Reforming Government-Backed Financial Institutions, Internet Edition, reviewed 
01.05.2007. 
188 Refer to Beeson (2004), p. 6. 
189 In 2001, the Japanese postal savings system accounted for 34 percent of household deposits and 
held about USO 2.2 trillion in deposits. Still in 2005, it is the largest financial institution in the 
world. Of course, the Japanese save so heavily in postal savings accounts, because, by law, 
these accounts offer the highest rate of interest available to small savers. Refer to FRBSF 
Economic Letter (2001), "Japan's New Prime Minister and the Postal Savings System", p. 1, 
Internet Edition, reviewed 22.10.2006 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung (2005), p. 11. 
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no change during the period 1972-1981 . In 1972, companies obtained 75 
percent of their funds through loans from banks, and only 19 percent from 
shares, and the figures for 1981 were 68 percent and 21 percent.190 
Government control of the domestic banking system ensured that indigenous 
financial institutions cooperated in providing funds to industry. This in turn 
helped to consolidate the close ties between industrial and financial capital 
that was characteristic of Japan during the boom years.191 Although some 
measures of financial "internationalization" have taken place, the 
government's postal savings system is still intact and functioning as one of 
Japan's most important institutional inventions. 
• In Taiwan, only 5 percent of deposits as well as the branches of all 
commercial banks were under private ownership in 1980. Moreover, banks' 
chairmen were either former Ministry of Finance employees or central bank 
officials appointed by the government. Bank boards had little autonomy: all 
transactions had to be reported once a week to the central bank, and all 
foreign exchange transactions had to be reported daily.192 
• In Korea, although almost all banking was privatized, government oversight 
was critical in directing capital to desired sectors.193 The Korean Economic 
Planning Board exerted extensive financial control. It effectively controlled 
Korea's banking sector and credit allocation decisions, as it had supervision 
over the Ministry of Finance. Its authority encompassed several different 
functions such as the appointment of personnel and foreign exchange 
allocations. Since the 1960s when the commercial banks were also 
nationalized, they have had to deposit their funds in the Korean Development 
Bank and to purchase long-term bonds issued by the Korean Development 
Bank. In addition, they were required to extend credit to firms with loan 
guarantees from the Korean Development Bank. The government used policy 
loans to support exports and promote the industrialization of the heavy and 
chemical industries in the 1970s, or to re-structure Korea's auto industry. 
Foreign loans were also channeled via government which implied that all firms 
needed approval from the Economic Planning Board in order to obtain loans 
from foreign banks. As foreign credit constituted an important source of capital 
to Korean firms, the Economic Planning Board had an important leverage over 
Korean firms through foreign credit control. However, as the debt/equity ratio 
in Korea reached 300 percent, the government's credit control was an 
important policy instrument for the bureaucracy. 194 
190 Refer to Johnson (1987), p. 148. 
191 Refer to Beeson (2004), p. 6. 
192 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 161 and p. 264. 
193 Refer to Pempel (1999), p. 150. 
194 Refer to Huang (2002a), pp. 552-553. 
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The developmental states' bank- and credit-based financial system enabled policy 
leaders to support selected industries by credits at below market interest rates 
through the banking system. Japan, during its postwar reconstruction, and Korea, 
during the 1970s, directed large amounts of credit to specific sectors and firms, 
mostly in heavy and chemical industries.195 The Fiscal Investment and Loan Program 
of the Japanese government accounted for about one third of new equipment lending 
in the 1950s. Korea's policy loans were almost 60 percent of the total loans of its 
deposit money banks between 1973 and 1981. Most of Japan's priority lending 
through the early 1960s targeted industries associated with large optimum scales 
and increasing returns to scale. This is in accordance with Korea's lending behavior 
during the heavy and chemical industries period.196 
A well documented industrial policy success relates to the government-sponsored 
Japan Electronic Computer Company. In 1960, MITI decided that Japan should 
establish a domestic computer industry. Between 1961 and 1981, USO 2 billion were 
invested in this sector, because the Japanese government offered low-interest loans 
only for investments in this sector.197 Thus, it decisively helped create Fujitsu, as it is 
known today. The policy mechanisms used have their parallels in the East, but are 
unknown in the West. 
Directed credit in the East Asian developmental states has generally gone to the 
private sector, unlike many other developing economies, where directed credit often 
went to public and quasi-public enterprises. Although the developmental states have 
also directed credit to state enterprises, the proportions of total credit were not 
persistently high, the parastatal banks tended to perform better financially, and the 
interest rate subsidies were not large. Korea can be regarded as an exception, 
because its lending to the ~ublic steel plant, POSCO, was substantial, and widely 
considered a success story. 98 
The analysis revealed that in countries where capital is channeled largely through 
banks, the state is in a position to extend a visible and vigorous hand in the operation 
of the economy. The system of external indirect financing gives the state the power 
to ration credit to banks and channel capital to targeted sectors. This enables the 
state to influence the direction of industrial change. Since capital is the "lifeblood" of 
industrial activity, the state's capacity to set the supply and channel the flow of 
capital, constitutes one of the most effective tools of industrial policy.199 
195 Refer to Okimoto (1989), p. 142 ff. 
196 Refer to World Bank (1993), p. 280. 
197 Refer to Robins (2002), p. 294. 
198 Refer to World Bank (1993), pp. 280-281. 
199 Refer to Okimoto (1989), pp. 142-143. 
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2.6 State-society and government-business relations 
As the economic bureaucracy is itself an elite body "occupying a position of 
preeminence in the society",200 it is important to examine external ties with the rest of 
society. In the following, the connections of the state with the public are divided into 
an analysis of the state's relations to societal groups, and government agencies' 
interaction with industrial capital, namely the private business sector. 
2.6.1 State-society relations 
The strong developmental states were characterized by authoritarian governance. An 
authoritarian regime can be defined by the cooptation of important interest groups 
("limited pluralism"), the renunciation of militant forms of ideology and mobilization of 
the masses, and therefore the promotion of political apathy and passivity.201 
Japan was termed "soft authoritarian", meaning the prewar authoritarianism of the 
Meiji and early Showa eras, and the postwar pattern of the monopolization of political 
power by a single party. This form of organization made possible the implementation 
of a set of economic priorities that seemed unattainable under true political pluralism. 
This also applies to Taiwan and Korea in later phases of their development: Korea 
was ostensibly a democratic country, however, actually had a military dominated 
single-party regime which was close in form, if not in ideology, to Japan during the 
1930s and 1940s. Taiwan differed from both Japan and Korea, as it did not even 
claim to be a democracy. Publicly, Taiwan justified the single-party rule of the 
Kuomintang in terms of the threat from communist China, the political crisis caused 
by its international isolation and the need to maintain stability on the island. Taiwan 
was the most explicitly authoritarian of the three countries.202 
Essentially, democratization in the East Asian developmental states has taken place 
only after substantial economic development was already achieved.203 In Korea and 
Taiwan, authoritarian regimes raised living standards before democratic transition 
took place. When both countries democratized, this political transformation had been 
long delayed.204 
200 Refer to Wade (1990), p.195. 
201 Refer to Linz (1995), pp. 40-43. For further information refer to Duckitt (1989) and Kemmelmeier 
et al. (2003). 
202 Reier to Johnson ( 1987), p. 137 ff and pp. 143-145. 
203 Refer to Thompson (1996), p. 637. 
204 With respect to Taiwan, Wade conceives: " ... what is striking, I think, is how late this (political) 
softening comes - long after the regime was well formalized and institutionalized, long after the 
mainland receded, long after the period of economic breakthrough, long after living standards 
began to rise for everyone". Refer to Wade (1990), p. 254. 
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In the developmental states, the characteristic of authoritarianism was combined with 
a weak society.205 Thus, the authoritarian state organization enabled the ruling elite 
to pursue a strategy of minimizing commitments to the few existing groups and 
preventing counter-elites from defining their opposition in politically relevant terms.206 
The governments prevented emerging groups from acquiring autonomy from the 
state and hindered the formation of independent interest aggregation. Moreover, the 
governments spread threats of adverse consequences should a private party refuse 
to conform to a "suggestion or recommendation" of the ijovernment. MITI is well-
known for having accomplished this with great skill. 20 The elite bureaucracy 
therefore had the necessary autonomy to define, and the power to implement, 
national goals.208 In 1993, the World Bank also stressed the importance of the 
bureaucracy's insularity from society for strategic, long-term policy implementation: 
"Without it [technocratic insulation], technocrats in the high-performing Asian 
economies would have been unable to introduce and sustain rational 
economic policies, and some vital wealth-sharing mechanisms would have 
been neutralized soon after their inception, as was land reform in the 
Philippines. " 209 
In this respect, the nation-building strategies of the ruling elites in the East Asian 
developmental states differed from those used in Latin America. Their ruling group 
(from 1949 onwards for Taiwan, and from the arrival of Park Chung Hee in 1961 for 
Korea) had clear principles of industrialization. The process of industrialization was 
seen and understood in a comprehensive, rather than piecemeal, perspective from 
the beginning. Both countries were under threat from powerful external enemies, 
which made industrialization even more vital.210 The implementation of a 
comprehensive industrial policy by the elite bureaucracy was possible because the 
state was strong enough to turn away demands of different interest groups. Thus, 
these groups were not in a position to pick industrial policy to pieces. 
Some bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America strived to acquire similar 
autonomy, but came to power in situations where many existing groups already had 
205 In none of these countries were peasants united or politically organized, partly because small-
holder agriculture predominated. In non of these countries were labor movements able to 
challenge state authority. Only in Korea and Singapore was labor strong enough to provoke 
repressive measures from the state in the early phases of export development. In addition, in 
neither case was labor's resistance sustained effective. Refer to Deyo (1987), pp. 233-234. 
206 According to Skocpol, the interest-group approach is about "the a/locations of benefits among 
demanding groups". Refer to Skocpol (1985), p. 4. The argument goes, since the most powerful 
groups will be most able to affect the decisions of the state, state economic policies will be 
inevitably biased towards them. The most representative of these theories is the "regulatory-
capture" theory of the Chicago school. Refer to Stigler (1975). 
207 Refer to World Bank (1993), p. 186. 
208 Evans (1989), p. 574 and White and Wade (1988), p. 10. 
209 World Bank (1993), p. 167. 
210 Refer to White and Wade (1988), p. 10. 
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considerable autonomy from the state. The states of Latin America were confronted 
with bargaining and shifting alliances of strong interest groups. These groups 
influenced the policy process of those countries. Macroeconomic populism has 
become a regular part of the Latin American economic environment. Due to the 
missing autonomy, the state operated under constant duress.211 The Latin American 
states became unable to realize their long-term vision for their countries. These are 
examples of such political economies of the "predatory state", in which close 
government-society cooperation has materialized in the context of "weak" states, 
which lack autonomy from powerful groups in society. 
The industrialized countries and the developing countries in East Asia and Latin 
America can be categorized according to their state's and society's strength or 
weakness: the industrialized countries are characterized by strong states and a 
strong society; the East Asian developing countries exhibit a strong state and a weak 
society, whereas the developing countries of Latin America represent the 
combination of a weak state and a strong society (refer to Figure 4). 













Altogether, in neither Taiwan, nor in Japan and Korea, were organized groups an 
important factor in shaping economic and social policy, and their disruptive potential 
was under control. Industrial associations were not important centers of autonomous 
211 Luiz (2000), p. 239. 
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influence on the state. Additionally, in none of those countries was an elected 
legislature important in policy-making.212 The strong and cohesive elite bureaucracy 
was insulated from external demands and was not captured by their interests. Thus, 
the constellation of a strong state and a weak society is a crucial factor for cohesive 
policy-implementation by the bureaucracy. 
2.6.2 Government-business relations 
Okimoto (1989) contends that informational asymmetry between the state and other 
agents can be reduced through institutional design. The willingness of Japanese 
firms to reveal the necessary information to the state and thus reduce informational 
asymmetry, is often attributed to the tradition of a close government-business 
relationship.213 "Business" essentially implies the massive conglomerates in the 
developmental states.214 "Government" in this context, refers primarily to a number of 
key ministries in the state bureaucracy, like MITI in Japan. 
Governments can improve private sector decision-making by minimizing risks as they 
collect, pool and disseminate technical, commercial and market information. 
Nevertheless, they usually do not have a comparative advantage at the micro-level. 
In consequence, while governments may provide special support based on the infant 
industry argument, they are not capable of actually picking national "winners".215 
Therefore, close institutionalized links between the elite bureaucracy and private 
businesses for consultation and cooperation between government and business are 
decisive.216 It enables state actors to base long-term development goals on up-to-
date information gained from direct involvement with key economic agents.217 
Consequently, the state can obtain information on how changing economic realities 
affect entrepreneurial interests. 
212 Refer to White and Wade (1988), p. 10-11. 
213 Refer to Okimoto (1989), p. 156. 
214 Conglomerates in Japan, prewar zaibatsu and post-war, vertical integrated keiretsu, were large 
corporate holding groups. The zaibatsu were closely linked with the military-bureaucratic complex 
of the 1920s and 1930s and were a key element in building the economy's industrial and military 
base. Most of the leading electronics firms in Japan, such as Nippon Electric Corporation, Fujitsu, 
Hitachi and Toshiba, belong to a major keiretsu. For keiretsu firms, membership actually means 
extensive intra-keiretsu stockholding, reliance on the main keiretsu bank for external indirect 
financing, and stable but by no means exclusive business transactions. For further information on 
the Sumitomo keiretsuwhich incorporates Nippon Electric Corporation, refer to Okimoto (1989), p. 
133 ff. 
215 Refer to Yue (1995), p. 86. 
216 Refer to Johnson (1982), p. 23. 
217 Refer to Nee et al. (2005), pp. 7-8. 
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2.6.2.1 Information exchange 
In the East Asian states, there has been far-reaching public-private cooperation. In 
Japan, bureaucrats regularly invited representatives from private industry to discuss 
policy and market trends. Private actors could exchange information with economic 
bureaucrats in "deliberation councils", which were attached to the respective 
ministries.218 Deliberation councils were organized either along functional or thematic 
lines, such as pollution and finance or according to industry, such as autos or 
chemicals. The councils were established by government ministries and were 
generally associated with a specific bureau within the ministry. The private sector 
was represented by people from business, labor, consumers, academia and the 
press. The success of MITl's policy implementation was only achieved with a 
consensus from the relevant deliberation council.219 Through discussions in the 
councils, economic bureaucrats obtained crucial market information from industry 
representatives. At the same time, economic bureaucracies had considerable in-
house expertise.220 Thus, state officials could profit from their extensive linkages with 
industry, and use the knowledge and business experience from private entrepreneurs 
for their policy considerations. They obtained information about specific sectors and 
products from industry representatives. This information was then incorporated in 
their own research. 
In Korea, from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, government and private sector 
relations were close and cooperative, although some might argue that the 
government was too strong handed or even dictatorial. Government and business 
leaders met frequently although less formally than in Japan. Until the early 1980s, the 
most important communication channels were monthly export-promotion meetings 
presided over by Korea's president, at which businessmen expressed their opinions 
on markets, regulations and potential plans. The president then instructed the 
responsible ministers to attend to each important issue and present, at the next 
meeting, a progress report on their assigned tasks.221 
The Korean bureaucracy also established special intermediate organizations such as 
trade associations and industry promotion societies. These were responsible for 
fostering new industries and supporting the private sector in its development. In 
1967, the government established the Korea Electronics Industry Promotion Society 
to promote the electronics sector. Its members were drawn from the leading 
electronics producers. The Korea Electronics Industry Promotion Society was 
authorized by the then Ministry of Trade and Industry as the exclusive body 
representing the interests of the industry. Thus, it became the major link between 
bureaucracy and firms. The Korea Electronics Industry Promotion Society interacted 
218 Refer to Johnson (1982), p. 47. 
219 Refer to World Bank (1993), p. 182. 
220 Refer to Edin (2000), p. 109. 
221 Refer to World Bank (1993), p. 183. 
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with the Economic Planning Board, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and other 
government agencies through its specially constituted deliberation council. Thus, it 
was best informed to fashion and implement development strategies for the sector.222 
Essentially, the councils enabled the bureaucracy to gather information about world 
markets, technology trends and the impact of regulations domestically and abroad. 
The government could then synthesize the information into an action plan. This plan 
was communicated back to the private sector. The repeated nature of the 
collaboration restricted more or less self-interested behavior, and in part helped to 
establish the bureaucrats' credibility. Politically, these councils served as proto-
democratic institutions, because they provided direct channels for business, labor 
and academia to the seat of power. Moreover, because the rules of governing 
industry were established in the council, every member was assured that the rules 
could not be altered arbitrarily.223 
Developmental statists also call attention to the construction and execution of joint 
projects between the state and nascent industrial groups.224 This relationship was 
beneficial to both parties, as Okazaki ( 1997) elaborates, referring to Japan's 
reestablishment efforts of its heavy-industry base. In the 1950s, MITI attempted to 
abandon Japan's textile industry, which was unskilled-labor-intensive and challenged 
by developing countries, and move towards heavy industry.225 The Council for 
Industrial Rationalization (an advisory organization for the Minister of International 
Trade and Industry) was a body wherein co-operation between government and 
private enterprises could create a path to escape coordination failure, which resulted 
from complementarity among industries, economies of scale and incomplete 
information.226 The Council developed the plans for simultaneous investment in 
related industries, helped companies to raise funds, and coordinated industrial 
enterprises with financial institutions. This process can be interpreted as a 
coordinated experiment by the government and private enterprise, which was one of 
the essential aspects of the government-firm relationship in postwar Japan.227 The 
intimacy of interaction was possible in Japan for several reasons: 
• MITI officials were viewed as impartial and supportive. 
• There was no tradition of ideological bias against public-private interpe-
netration. 
222 Refer to Weiss (1998), pp. 57-58. 
223 Refer to World Bank (1993), p. 187. 
224 The idea of "joint projects", which is central to the visions of Gerschenkron, Hirschman, Amsden 
and Wade, makes close ties of key social groups fundamental to developmental efficiency. 
225 Refer to Okazaki (1997), p. 95. 
226 The Council was composed of representatives from the industrial associations and leading 
enterprises of each industry. Refer to Okazaki (1997), pp. 94-95. 
227 Refer to Okazaki ( 1997), pp. 92-95. 
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• Government and industry shared overriding interests. 
• Most industries looked to MITI for some kind of support. 
• The private sector, on balance, was satisfied with MITl's industrial policy. 
• The advantages of long-term cooperation were perceived to outweigh any 
incentives for industry to engage in rent-seeking behavior.228 
In order not to fall captive to specific industrial interests, MITI officials in the vertical 
bureaus and divisions could not develop a strong sympathy for the interests and 
needs of industries under their jurisdiction. Only those businesses that would not 
damage higher-priority sectors and harm the economy were able to pass through 
MITl's policy-making channels without opposition or fundamental revision. However, 
because MITl's horizontal divisions had to find ways of integrating policies advocated 
by all units, the needs and interests of one industry had to be balanced against 
others. This provided built-in safeguards against responding politically to short-term 
industrial demands.229 
Overall, the analysis indicates that the industrial transformation in the developmental 
states was enhanced not by a strong state acting over or against capital from the 
business sector, but by a project-oriented state that has worked in coalition with a 
well-organized private sector. 
2.6.2.2 Embedded autonomy 
Evans (1995) also discusses how bureaucracies provide institutional channels for 
continual negotiation with external groups, regarding economic development goals 
and policies. Evans argues that states which aim to transform economically have to 
be sufficiently autonomous from special interests to formulate their own goals, and at 
the same time also adequately embedded in particular industrial networks between 
bureaucrats and organized business to implement them. "Embedded autonomy•; as 
Evans conceives, "is precisely the mirror image of the incoherent absolutist 
domination of the predatory state".230 According to Evans, the logic of the 
developmental state rests precisely on embedded autonomy, namely of bureaucratic 
autonomy, with an unusual degree of embeddedness in the sense of public-private 
cooperation. Embeddedness links the state intimately and aggressively to particular 
social groups, with whom the state shares the goal of development and 
transformation. Thus, the success of the developmental state depends on the highly 
developed bureaucratic apparatus with interventive capacity that is built on historical 
228 Refer to Okimoto (1989), pp. 156-157. 
229 Ibidem, p. 157. 
230 Evans (1989), p. 574. 
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experience, and well organized private actors who can provide useful intelligence 
and the possibility of decentralized implementation.231 
The embedded autonomy approach intends to solve the puzzle of why highly 
interventionist states like Korea have successfully translated their developmental 
goals into practice, while others like India and Brazil have been less effective in 
economic management.232 Evans' explanation is not based on the form of 
governance such as authoritarian versus democratic, but on the equal importance of 
embeddedness and autonomy. Either autonomy or embeddedness may produce 
perverse results without the other.233 According to Evans, in Korea, a strong and 
coherent bureaucratic apparatus and close ties to private industrial capital were an 
efficient combination in high technology, just as it had been in other industrial 
sectors. The complex ties between the Ministry of Communication, the Electronics 
and Telecommunications Research Institute and the chaebol were used to nurture 
technological entrepreneurship and epitomized embedded autonomy.234 
Unlike Korea, neither the state of Brazil nor India was able to pursue economic 
transformation successfully, as both lacked either autonomy or embeddedness. In 
Brazil, despite the pervasive presence of the state, its apparatus was badly divided, 
and lacked the overall coherence and cohesiveness it needed. This lack of 
coherence made it hard to use ties with local firms effectively. In India, bureaucracy 
was designed to avoid the pitfalls of being too closely tied to society with its 
contradictionary demands. Because of this, however, it was difficult to promote new 
industrial entrepreneurship from the private sector necessary for dynamic industri-
alization.235 
The question remains, whether embedded autonomy is simply a property of 
successful late industrializers, as Evans suggested. While pre-industrial states were 
almost entirely disconnected from their surrounding society, embedded autonomy 
applies, to some degree, to most contemporary industrial states. No modern state 
lacks multiple linkages and connectedness with its civil society, and only few modern 
states are without some degree of organizational autonomy from special interests. 
However, only a few states have also developed these features in a form and degree 
of particular benefit to the industrial economy. In the developmental states, although 
state-economy linkages have sometimes been tight, they have always been highly 
selective, with structured access points for particular groups, and the exclusion of 
231 Refer to Evans (1995), p. 59. 
232 For further information on Brazil refer to Evans (1979). 
233 Without autonomy, embeddedness might turn into capture. However, autonomy by itself does not 
necessarily predict an interest in development, either in the narrow sense of economic growth or 
in the broader sense of improved welfare. Refer to Evans (1995), p. 59. 
234 Refer to Evans (1995), p. 209. Chaebo/ refers to a Korean form of business conglomerate, in its 
core features comparable to the Japanese keiretsu business groups. For further information on 
chaebo/s refer to Amsden (1989), Fields (1995), Janelli (1993) and Steers et al. (1989). 
235 Refer to Evans (1995), p. 209. 
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others from this access. Hence, the core feature has been selective embedded-
ness.236 
Despite the fruitfulness in Evan's work, the notion of embedded autonomy suffers 
from ambivalence. Evans' empirical evidence of embedded autonomy as a 
prerequisite of successful industrial policy is vague, regardless of the right balance 
between insulation and direct intervention.237 The state has to be sufficiently 
autonomous from society in order not to be captured by rent-seeking groups and be 
able to coordinate development. At the same time, the state has to be sufficiently 
embedded in society and be able to established links and ties with social groups. 
Such a state would constantly be in danger of being too little insulated and too tightly 
embedded.238 
Political institution-bound factors in the East Asian region have effectively bolstered 
industrial growth. It is extremely difficult, though, to engineer equilibrium between the 
two apparently contradictory conditions of bureaucratic autonomy and public-private 
cooperation, and to sustain it over time. The equilibrium can easily be disturbed by 
the more rapid growth of private vis-a-vis public power.239 Therefore, embedded 
autonomy, as Evans defined it, is important, but not compelling. Even Evans together 
with Rauch (1999) stresses in later works the bureaucracy's characteristic of 
'Weberianess" for successful economic development and neglects the factor of 
embedded autonomy.240 
The analysis showed that, in essence, effective market-augmenting forms of state 
intervention require both bureaucratic autonomy and close public-private 
cooperation. Both have to be built up gradually through a process of institutional 
reform. Hence, bureaucratic capacity and autonomy, as well as organized and 
institutionalized forms of information-sharing, and cooperation between public and 
private spheres for targeting and prioritizing certain sectors, are important for 
improving the effectiveness of state intervention in a market-oriented setting. 
Political institutions are not the unique product of a particular cultural environment. 
Factors such as traditions of social and political hierarchy and group solidarity have 
played an important role in East Asian industrialization. However, the degree of 
social consensus and cooperation linked to the East Asian developmental state 
cannot be associated purely with cultural explanations. In Japan, the key institutions 
236 Refer to Weiss (1998), p. 36. 
237 Refer to Nee et al. (2005), p. 30. 
238 For further information refer to Weiss and Hobson (1995). 
239 Refer to Liao (2001), p. 38 and Onis (1991), p. 122. 
240 "Weberianness" implies the bureaucracy's characteristics as Weber defined and which were 
examined in the beginning of this chapter. Refer to Evans and Rauch (1999), p. 748 ff. For 
detailed information refer to Evans and Rauch (1999) and Evans and Rauch (2000). 
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underlying rapid economic growth are of relatively recent origin. Similarly, the 
developmental state's characteristics of consensus and cooperation are a specific 
post-war phenomenon. The rejection of the culturalist explanation implies that 
bureaucratic capability and public-private cooperation can be built up over time 
through a process of institutional reform.241 
2.7 Assessment of the East Asian developmental state approach 
Extracting the relevant elements of the institutional context and formulating them at a 
level of generality appropriate for possible transfer to societies with different cultures 
and histories is a formidable challenge. It has to be answered what features of the 
multifaceted East Asian institutional context constitute prerequisites for successful 
policy implementation. This, in turn, requires a characterization of the successful 
policies themselves and an assessment of possible short-comings of the East Asian 
developmental state approach. 
2.7.1 Subjects unaddressed by the developmental state theory 
Among the weaknesses the developmental state's transformation approach might 
have, two aspects need to be pointed out: crony capitalism and the selection of 
priority sectors. These aspects become relevant after the initial stage of 
transformation and endanger the long-term strategic development approach and the 
future stability of the developmental state. 
Crony capitalism: 
The state controlled financial system helps bureaucrats to promote the chosen 
priority sectors and contain the ones which are expected to have no profitable future. 
Yet, a state controlled financial system only has positive results if the state 
possesses a functioning, strict bank regulation system and full transparency of 
business activities. The developmental states have not always been able to do this. 
In Korea, high private savings (amounting to 35 percent of gross savings in the 
1990s) were deposited in banks. The banks in turn lent these savings to large 
chaebols. Especially to the ones which were supported by the government and thus 
had easy access to credits.242 While in the early periods of Korea's development, 
strong discipline was exerted on cheap credits, during the 1990s the supervision 
diminished. Creditworthiness was not anymore determined by the soundness of firms 
- their books were laxly examined - but by the government's political decision of 
supporting the industrial sectors in which the borrowers were active. As the chaebols 
241 Refer to Onis (1991), pp. 122-123. 
242 Korean firms in general had been allowed to operate with 20 percent of equity borrowing at 4/1 
ratio. 
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produced for the domestic and the international market, they borrowed heavily and 
used large amounts of funds in their foreign market ventures. Yet, their profitability 
was often low. Loans thus frequently turned into non-performing ones.24 Krugman 
(1998) even claimed that 
"The success of too many Asian businessmen depended less on what they 
knew than on whom they knew" and "dubious investments[. .. ] were cheerfully 
funded by local banks, as long as the borrower had the right government 
connections''. 244 
Within a state-controlled banking system, the relationship between governments, 
banks and firms may insulate business from market forces. This can lead to an 
encouragement of excessive borrowing despite a weak equity basis. A wasteful use 
of resources is the result. Structural weaknesses such as inadequate bank 
regulation,245 and a lack of transparency in business, together with excessive 
borrowing, may turn into dead debt. Moreover, due to the bank's soft budget 
constraints, the state's deficit spending increases steadily.246 
During the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the negative consequences of dense ties 
between the state and private businessmen came to light. The form of Asian 
capitalism, namely the link between state officials and key families, the military and 
various individuals who have built huge conglomerates is unique. These 
arrangements are called "crony capitalism".247 Crony capitalism consists of close 
business-government networks that are based on trust and patron-client relations, 
which are effective in capital accumulation and development. Policy networks that 
existed between states and societies became a critical channel to drive various 
industries to an investment decision.248 
Despite powerful government institutions, the close coordination between the state 
and the private sectors gave rise to serious problems in corporate governance and 
regulatory forbearance. This experience showed that certain institutional 
arrangements that were effective at earlier stages of development, became 
destructive as market-based arrangements expanded.249 As the state's selection and 
intervention in particular "sunrise" industries is decisive for the successful 
transformation of the developmental state in its early stages, the state depends on 
243 Refer to Carreno (2001 ), p. 2. 
2.. Krugman (1998), p. 70. 
245 Stiglitz conceives that the "The crisis was caused in part by too little government regulation (or 
perverse or ineffective government regulation)". Refer to Stiglitz (1998), Internet Edition, reviewed 
25.5.2006. 
246 Refer to Kornai (1992a), p. 140 ff. 
247 Reier to Krugman (1998). p. 70. 
248 Refer to Liao (2001 ), pp. 38-39 and p. 41. 
249 Refer to Elson (2006), p. 40. 
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information sharing with private enterprises on future trends. Thus the key to 
successful interactive negotiation on policies and goals must be an organized and, 
above all, institutionalized form of cooperation that can hardly turn into the capture of 
the state by private businesses. In this sense, it is quite obvious that, unless 
"autonomy" and "cooperation" requirements are satisfied, attempts to implement 
developmental state style industrial policies will prove to be counterproductive: In 
such an environment, bureaucratic elites will lack the capability to identify dynamic 
industries to be targeted in the first place, and will be in a weak position in terms of 
monitoring and regulating the activities of firms located in strategic industries. 
In the initial phase of the state's development, a state-controlled and bank-based 
financial system may positively support the state's industrial policy. Strict regulation, 
transparency and hard budget constraints are of importance. In the long-run, 
however, a private banking system needs to be implemented gradually, so that credit 
issuing is based on commercial criteria. In addition, cooperation and information 
sharing between the state and private businesses has to happen in an 
institutionalized manner. 
Long-term selection of priority sectors: 
The long-term selection of priority sectors is largely unaddressed in the 
developmental state theory. The state's information problem (the state "does not 
know better" about the future course of events, and such an informational deficiency 
can only be corrected at a prohibitive cost) is a point that was already made by the 
Austrian school in the central planning debate in the 1930s.250 In a market economy, 
the profit and loss system which is based on market prices provides the necessary 
information, as to which industries should expand, and which should contract, in a 
market economy. In the developmental states, this function was largely fulfilled by the 
state. Thus, the question arises how the pilot agencies gained the knowledge that 
was assumed to be superior to the free market. Moreover, once anticipated profitable 
industries are selected, how are the planners' interests to promote only those 
industries that best generate economic growth to be sustained? 
With state industrial planning, the problem emerges that due to the synergism of 
state and market, the market is not replaced with complete central planning, because 
the state requests the information needed for an efficiently functioning economy that 
is guaranteed by the market. The interference with, and distortion of, price signals by 
selectively promoting individual industries undermines, in turn, the process by which 
the necessary market information is generated.251 In this respect, bureaucratic elites 
250 For further information refer to Lavoie (1985) for a discussion of the debate. Another important 
dimension of the information problem is the existence of informational asymmetry, the principal-
agent problem. Refer to Stiglitz (1987). 
251 Refer to Powell (2003), pp. 10-11. 
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are incapable of guiding the developmental process beyond a certain critical point. 
As Gerschenkron (1962) conceived, in the initial phase of development, the "late 
developer", that has enough autonomy and capacity, can "catch up" with the existent 
industrial power by replicating successful strategies, borrowing key technologies and 
generally accelerating the course of industrialization. In the East Asian 
developmental states, the successful and rapid catching-up process was evidence of 
the effectiveness of their industrial policy approaches. At the time when countries 
reach the "technological frontier", and are confronted by fundamental uncertainty 
which characterizes the course of technological evolution, the benefits and capacities 
of the state-led approach diminish.252 State planners are clearly not infallible, when it 
comes to deciding which future industry sectors are likely to be at the technological 
cutting edge, and therefore worthy of government support.253 
Thus, while governments may provide special support based on the flying geese 
argument in the initial phase of development, they are not well equipped, and thus do 
not have the ability to pick national champions in the long run.254 In a later period of 
development, only the free powers of the market can decide on profitable 
investments, and only private enterprises are flexible and efficient enough to be 
competitive in profitable sectors. 
Future stability of the developmental state: 
The stability of the developmental state in the long run is questionable. The 
successful developmental state that accelerates income and the standard of living 
might be "its own gravedigger":255 
• Stronger private firms are in a position to better resist government direction. 
Once the private business sector has accumulated industrial capital, it 
becomes less dependent on resources provided by the state. The relative 
dominance of the state diminishes, and government industrial policies are 
more conditioned by negotiations with private firms and industry 
associations. 256 In the 1980s, powerful emerging domestic forces hampered 
the operations of the Korean developmental state, thus threatened its state 
autonomy, and forced it to retreat step by step. The very success of the 
Korean developmental state undermined the basis of its power.257 
• The general weakness and control of civil society appears to have been a 
general condition for the constitution and continuity of developmental states. 
However, as it did in Japan in the early 1970s, the very success of Taiwan and 
252 For further information refer to Fong (1998). 
253 For further information refer to Callon (1995), p.147ff. 
254 Refer to Yue ( 1995), p. 86. 
255 The unsuccessful developmental state, the one that cannot accelerate economic growth, loses 
the legitimation for its authoritative ruling in the long run as well. 
256 Refer to Wade (2003b), p. 343. 
257 Refer to Minns (2001 }, p. 1031. 
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Korea caused fundamental changes in the relationship of states with 
society.258 The government's economic achievements have promoted the 
growth of an active civil society. Regular participation in modern economic life, 
rising levels of consumption, expanding education provision, the strengthening 
of labor and capital organizations and the functional requirements of economic 
growth have all been achievements of developmental states.259 Rising 
affluence and education make for large middle classes, which demand 
participation in the form of democracy.260 
• The applicability of the developmental state approach to other than 
authoritarian national settings is questionable. Is the East Asian 
developmental state approach desirable and practicable in environments 
where democratic values and institutions, as well as widespread political 
participation, have already emerged as central objectives? Indeed, in 
countries which have experienced a long trajectory of democratic 
development, it would be impossible for the state to withdraw entirely from 
participation and social welfare, and focus solely on growth and productivity 
objectives. In this respect, the question arises, whether the developmental 
state is compatible with emerging political liberalization and participation 
demands, namely a liberal western type political system, as a form of 
governance in the long-run. Thus, while not possible in this study, it would be 
interesting to examine whether, and to what extent, the institutions of the 
developmental state have survived and will survive in the future under 
conditions of popular participation and democratic governance in Japan, 
Taiwan and Korea. 
Despite the shortcomings the developmental state theory exhibits, economists allege 
that only few societies in the modern world will achieve high economic growth rates 
and thus make successful transitions from poverty without states which approximate 
to the model of a developmental state.261 From this arises the question about the 
culture-free lessons to be learned from the examined developmental states. 
2.7.2 The East Asian Developmental State Model 
The focus of the developmental state theory has generally been on East Asia, with 
only few analyses concentrating on Southeast and South Asia.262 Some even argue 
that the developmental state is a product of East Asia's unique historical 
258 Refer to Wade (2003b), p. 343. 
259 Refer to Leftwich ( 1995), p. 416. 
260 Refer to Wade (2003b), p. 343. 
261 Refer to Leftwich (1995), p. 421. 
252 For further information on Southeast Asia refer to Hawes and Liu (1993) and on South Asia refer 
to Chibber (2003). 
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circumstances.263 The knowledge about developmental states is based on case 
study research. The main objective of statists such as Johnson, Amsden and Wade 
was to describe the economic policies that led to success in each of the respective 
countries they studied.264 They integrated the findings of earlier studies on the active 
state, bureaucratic organization and state-society relations from scholars like List, 
Polanyi, Weber, Gerschenkron, Hirschman, Skocpol and others into their own 
research (refer to Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Highlighted features of developmental states by different scholars. 
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Source: Own illustration. 
The analysis showed that the examined works of developmental statists not only 
focused on different countries, but also set different focal points. In addition, although 
the East Asian developmental states have all played a developmental role, there are 
important differences between them. Looking for shared features is the best starting 
point for an understanding of the state's industrial policy, and the organizational and 
structural characteristics that allow the state to play a developmental role. In the 
following, similarities between the three examined developmental states are 
categorized by conditions to be historically given, and measures (policy indicators 
and institutional setting) to be implemented by the authorities. 
263 Refer to Leftwich (1995), p. 405. 
2.. Refer to Edin (2000), p. 24. 
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(1) Conditions: 
• The state's stringent developmental approach could only be implemented 
because of the states' authoritarian structure. Authoritarianism enabled the 
state to contain civil society in the form of public interest groups. Labor was 
disciplined and dissent quickly suppressed. Subsequently, society in the 
developmental states was usually weak, and did not actively participate in 
policy formation. The state's capacity and autonomy from strong societal 
groups was important to East Asia's economic development, and was often 
lacking in Latin America. The developmental states were able to ensure 
insulation of the central decision-makers from interest groups by their 
authoritative state structure. 265 
• The developmental states' intense and almost unequivocal commitment on the 
part of government to build up the international competitiveness of the 
domestic industry arises from their economic backwardness. Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan were all industrial backward states (so called "late 
developers").This can mostly be attributed to geopolitical pressures and 
national security issues.266 Thus, economic growth has been increased, yet 
sometimes at the expense of other objectives, like social welfare.267 
(2) Measures: 
a) Bureaucracy: 
• Decision-makers all pursued growth-oriented goals and had centralized 
structures through which to decide and coordinate relative priorities. In the 
various East Asian economies, there was generally close coordination 
between various ministries. The bureaucracy was depoliticized (separated 
from politicians) which enabled it to implement "unfavorable" policies. 
• The decision-making process was streamlined in a leading government 
agency (pilot agency) which had a strong coordinating authority. The pilot 
agency "translated" national strategic visions of economic development into 
specific policy actions.268 
• Asian governments fostered the development of a professional, merit-based 
civil service tradition. Thus, the decision-making structure was staffed by the 
best administrative and managerial talents. Remuneration of management and 
career paths in the public sector were competitive with those offered by the 
private sector. 
265 These interest groups might for example be the legislature, a farm lobby, a trade union or 
entrepreneurs which tried to lay pressure on the government. Refer to So (2003), p. 18, Wade 
(1988a), pp. 129-163 and Yue (1995), p. 81. 
266 Refer to Weiss and Hobson (1995), p. 184. 
267 Refer to Wade (1990), p. 7. 
266 Refer to Elson (2006), p. 40. 
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• Clearly defined norms of comportment (with regards to recruitment, career, 
remuneration) helped to contain rent-seeking. 
• The East Asian bureaucracies were generally characterized by unity, 
competence and efficiency. Government interventions had a high degree of 
policy and implementation coherence. Interventions pulled in the same 
direction and had cumulative impacts.269 
b) State: 
• The developmental states' economic development was state-led. The 
bureaucracy used strategic industrial policy mechanisms to influence the 
economic development of particular sectors. National bureaucrats identified 
existing market failures, and devised appropriate policy responses. 
• The state only supported selected industries. Protection and assistance were 
given primarily to infant industries, and to those industries perceived to be 
economies with potential competitiveness ("sunrise industries") rather than 
those which had already lost their competitiveness ("sunset industries"). 
• The developmental states in East Asia initiated a dualist trade regime with 
significant focus on exports. The outward industrialization strategy is the 
principal difference between the develoimental states in East Asia and those 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. 70 The regimes of the developmental 
states "made exports a compulsion rather than a choice" for private 
companies.271 At the same time, specific nascent industries have been 
protected.272 To ensure that protected industries became competitive, the 
economic bureaucracy used different ways to do so.273 Often, exports were 
used as an instrument to measure performance, and bureaucrats linked 
subsidies to performance. Subsidies were cut down if no longer needed, or if 
performance expectations were not fulfilled after a certain period of time. 
• Although the developmental states' approach towards foreign capital and 
participation differed in its intensity, FDI inflow has been limited. The state 
strictly controlled inflowing investments, and encouraged domestic companies 
269 Activities that received help through trade controls were also assisted through financial subsidies 
and fiscal incentives. Reier to Wade (1988a), p. 157 and Wade (1988b), p. 139 II. 
270 Refer to Kim (1998), p. 9. 
271 Reier to Amsden (1989), p. 69. 
272 Hence, the import substitution policy was not totally abandoned. The state continuously provided 
financial subsidies to the private firms for the development of domestic technology to substitute for 
imported intermediate goods. Nevertheless, Korea and Taiwan show high levels of export 
dependency in their economic growth. During the 1980s the average trade dependency ratio was 
almost 65 percent in Korea and 83 percent in Taiwan. Putting this in perspective, it was 36 
percent in France, 47 percent in Germany, and 16 percent in America. Refer to Kim (1998), p. 9. 
273 The Korean government strongly encouraged infant industries to export. They were directly 
exposed to international competition, even when exports had to be sold at a loss. Subsequently, 
import substitution did not saddle Korea with inefficient and non-competitive industries. 
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to compete in foreign markets and gain international expertise. None of the 
states has become subservient to foreign capital, and all have strictly 
controlled inflowing investments. 
c) Financial system: 
• The developmental state's financial system played an important role in the 
state's development process. It was largely government-controlled and bank-
and credit-based. 
• The financial system enabled the government to directly influence the sectoral 
and firm-level allocation of credit to promote strategic industries. The develop-
mental states had state-owned banks as well as private banks. Yet, both types 
operated under close government-business guidance. The state used the 
banks as conduits for development and fiscal policies.274 
d) Government-business relations: 
Complementing insulation, the success of the state required a high degree of public-
private cooperation and information sharing. In the East Asian setting, the careful 
construction of policy networks, namely, the organizational and particularly 
institutional links between the bureaucrats of the pilot agency and major private 
sector firms were crucial in order to generate a consensus on goals and to exchange 
information; both of which constitute essential components of the process of policy 
formulation and implementation. Government-business cooperation was institution-
alized in a variety of forms, including state-sponsored industrial associations, export 
cartels and policy consultation bodies. Subsequently, the key to successful cooper-
ation was an institutionalized form of information exchange. 
Altogether, policy consistency and bureaucratic autonomy in East Asian societies 
during their post-war development compensated for the lack of well-developed 
market-based institutions and legal frameworks on which economic development in 
the advanced countries is based.275 Accordingly, the East Asian developmental 
states had an institutional advantage at the governmental level. 
According to the flying geese pattern, developing countries can catch up with 
advanced economies which point to the "right industries" to promote. Comparative 
advantages can be used and the necessary technology can be imported. Korea and 
Taiwan followed the pattern of Japanese industrialization, and moved up the value 
chain starting from light industries to heavy and chemical industries, then to 
electronics, and to high-tech industries. Thus, the difficulty in industrial policy of 
backward countries in the development stage lies not in identifying the right 
274 Refer to Liao (2001 ). p. 39. 
275 Refer to Elson (2006), p. 40. 
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industries to promote, but in designing a system of transformation that is less subject 
to moral hazard.276 This is exactly what defines the required conditions and 
measures of the developmental state in order to be able to conduct industrial policies 
which lead to internationally competitive industries and fast national economic growth 
(refer to Figure 6). 
Figure 6: The East Asian Developmental State Model. 
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Developmental states vary with respect to distinct specifications of the major factors 
outlined above. They have in common, however, that the state is a key factor which 
determines economic development in the region. For a developmental state to be 
successful, not all of the above conditions and measures have to be adopted to an 
equal extent. 
The central lesson that emerges from the examined literature on East Asian 
development is that the transfer of specific policies to new environments will be self-
defeating in the absence of the political and institutional conditions and measures 
required for their effective implementation. Without such states, transitions may be 
slow, and the social costs (rent-seeking, unemployment, low education levels etc.) 
immense.277 The corollary of this proposition is that the same set of policies will be 
counterproductive, or at least ineffective, in the absence of the associated set of 
276 Refer to Ito (2001 ), p. 63. 
277 Refer to Leftwich (1995), p. 421. 
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institutional and political structures or contexts. Hence, the developmental state 
approach points towards the importance of certain interaction between government, 
market and society in the development process. The experiences from the growth 
model of the East Asian developmental states raises the question of the repeatability 
of the developmental state model for transforming countries. 
2.7.3 Emulation of the developmental state model by other developing 
countries? 
The last fifty years have shown both the benefits and the limitations of state actions, 
especially in the promotion of development. Even where governments have 
successfully promoted economic development in the past, the question remains 
whether they will be able to adapt to the demands of a globalizing world economy. 
Along with globalization, developing countries need to integrate their economies into 
the international economy. With integration into the world economy in turn, external 
pressure from industrialized countries arises, which urges the developmental states 
to open their markets to international goods and services, and to stop their "export 
extravaganza". Accordingly, many of the policy instruments of the developmental 
states (used in the 1950s through the 1970s) such as protection, export promotion, 
foreign investment and exchange controls are being marginalized. Japan and Korea 
were welcomed as members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATTJ,278 although they were still violating the free trade principles of GATT at that 
time.27 In consequence, developing countries today are being increasingly 
constrained in their national development strategies by proliferating regulations 
formulated and enforced by international organizations.280 
From this, the question arises as to whether the less industrialized countries can 
mimic the developmental states and use similar policy measures to accelerate 
growth in a liberal economic environment under the guidance of the WTO.281 Is the 
developmental state concept an option available to other countries regardless of the 
integration level in the world economy?282 
States which are more integrated into the international economy may yet still 
influence the development of their domestic economies, and implement industrial 
policy. There continues to be considerable scope for state guidance in national 
economic management, and for government-business cooperation, even - or 
perhaps especially - as economies restructure to meet the new conditions of 
economic openness.283 In essence, the developmental states' ability to foster 
278 Japan became a GATT member in 1955 and Korea in 1967. Refer to WTO, ''The 128 countries 
that had signed GATT by 1994", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.09.2007. 
279 Refer to Perkins (2001 ), p. 248. 
280 Refer to Wade (2003a), p. 621. 
281 Refer to Amsden (2000), p. 105. 
282 Refer to Pempel (1999), p. 147. 
283 Refer to Weiss (2003), p. 246. 
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economic transformation is mostly dependent on the nature of domestic linkages and 
national strategies, and less on the level of economic integration. With economic 
integration, the tasks of developmental states have to change from export promotion 
and industry creation to the coordination of innovation and technology diffusion, as 
well as the management of trade disputes, currency realignments and economic 
integration. The state thereupon constantly creates new tools of industrial polici for 
its new tasks along with the changing domestic and international circumstances.2 4 
Altogether, what makes for an effective state differs enormously across countries at 
different stages of development. Even among countries at the same level of income, 
differences in size, ethnic makeup, culture and political systems exist. This does not, 
however, imply that each transforming country has to "invent" its own development 
strategy. 
284 Refer to Weiss (1998}, pp. 7-8. 
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3 A new model of economic development 
The analysis of China's economic development applies the East Asian 
Developmental State Model as a benchmark model. The chapter contains the 
following cluster: 
• Exploration of whether the conditions set by the East Asian Developmental 
State Model were present in China at the beginning of its economic reforms in 
the late 1970s. 
• Analysis of China's development approach, and the measures used to 
transform its economic system and advance economic growth, with regard to 
the criteria of the East Asian Developmental State Model. 
• Elaboration of whether China has adopted or adapted the measures of the 
East Asian developmental states. 
3.1 Applicability of the East Asian Developmental State Model to China 
China has been attempting to transform its economic system from a planned to a 
market economy since 1978. As in the East Asian developmental states, China's 
development strategy has been characterized by state-guided development. In 1997, 
the World Bank Development Report stated that ''the state is central to economic and 
social development, not as a direct provider of growth but as a partner, catalyst and 
facilitator". 285 For decades, China has been the fastest growing present-day late-
developing country. China might have learned from the positive experiences of the 
East Asian developmental states and adopted their development model, or followed 
a different, "new" development path and created a distinct Chinese model of 
economic transformation. Whether the conditions of the East Asian Developmental 
State Model were present in China on the eve of economic reform is analyzed in the 
following section. 
3.1.1 Conditions of the Chinese economic development approach 
The East Asian Developmental State Model defined two criteria as conditional for a 
country to apply the model's measures necessary for state-led economic growth. The 
criteria are strong state and weak society (authoritarianism) as well as economic 
backwardness and developmental commitment. The following analysis concentrates 
on each criterion, highlighting China's political, societal, economic and industrial 
situation on the eve of economic reform. 
285 Refer to World Bank (1997), 'World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 27.11.2006. 
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(1) Strong state and weak society (authoritarianism): 
The structure of power in the Chinese system prior to 1978 can be characterized as 
authoritarian. Authoritarianism in a Chinese context means the retention of ultimate, 
unlimited authority by the central party state.286 Some scholars even regard the 
Chinese system prior to 1978 as totalitarian, because the influence of the 
bureaucracy encompassed culture, religion and various aspects of family life such as 
the number of children.287 In addition, the power of the bureaucracy was totalitarian, 
as it permeated the whole society and influenced every citizen. Account was kept of 
every resident and employee by the state apparatus, party branches, mass 
organizations, and police authorities of each locality and place of work.288 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dominated the political system, which was 
formally organized on Marxist-Leninist principles. Top leaders, among them Mao 
Zedong289 , wielded enormous power and "ruled by law" (law as an instrument of 
government) as no institutional checks existed to guard against the exercise and 
abuse of this power. Although China had a constitution, its bureaucracy was not 
subordinate to any stable legal system. Laws were formally passed by parliament 
(the National People's Congress), but in practice the party organization and the party 
apparatus decided what the law should stipulate.290 
The public security apparatus maintained social order through the threat and use of 
force. After the land reform in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the strong landlord 
class had been wiped out, labor unions were restricted, and the military was tightly 
controlled by party and senior leaders. Thus, at the outset of reform, senior leaders 
did not foresee an imminent (internal) threat from strong interest groups, as society at 
large was weak. 291 No encompassing organizations had yet emerged, which could 
represent and "deliver" their membership in a comprehensive transition bargain with 
a reform government.292 
The strong Leninist party-state has remained largely intact in the reform era, and the 
Chinese central government has had the power to introduce economic programs, to 
vary the speed and the sequence of reform, and to make corrections or even reverse 
its policy if necessary. Altogether, bureaucratic authoritarian institutions in China 
286 Refer to Hamrin and Zhao (1995), p. xxvi and Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), p. 4. 
287 For further information on totalitarianism refer to Arendt (1951} and Brzezinski and Friedrich 
(1965). 
288 Refer to Kornai (1992a), p. 47. 
289 Mao Zedong (26.12.1893 - 09.08.1976} was the chairman of the Politburo of the CCP from 1943 
and the chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP from 1945 until his death in 1976. Under 
his leadership, the CCP became the ruling party of mainland China as the result of its victory in 
the Chinese Civil War. On 01.10.1949, Mao declared the formation of the People's Republic of 
China. 
290 Refer to Kornai (1992a}, pp. 46-47. 
291 Refer to Li and Lian (1999), p. 174. 
292 Refer to Kornai (1992a}, p. 4. 
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have had the power to process and implement economic policies like governments in 
the developmental states.293 
(2) Economic backwardness and developmental commitment: 
For the first 30 years of the People's Republic of China, the government practiced an 
economically isolated, planned economy system adhering to Marxist economic 
principles.29 Markets and private ownership of productive assets were eliminated, 
and re~laced by non-market, bureaucratic allocation through annual and five-year 
plans.2 5 The CCP and the central government relied on political controls and 
managed all dimensions of production and distribution. In consequence, apart from 
the existence of a few rural markets, the market as a coordinating mechanism of 
production and distribution was virtually nonexistent on the eve of economic reform in 
1978.296 
In addition, fiscal revenues and expenditure were centralized in the Chinese state 
bureaucracy. Profits and taxes collected by local governments were handed over to 
the central government.297 The expenditure of local governments depended less on 
local revenue-generating efforts, and more on bargaining with higher authorities for 
budgetary slack. Local governments would not hesitate to bail out unprofitable 
enterprises because shortfalls in one year became the rationale for bargaining for 
larger allocations the next year.298 This cycle gave rise to the classic soft budget 
constraint syndrome.299 On the macro-level, soft budget constraints led to 
overinvestment and shortages; on the firm level, they caused ex ante and ex post 
inefficiency. 300 
293 Refer to So (2003), p. 18 and Shirk (1993), p. 14. 
294 The economic isolation that results from its self-sufficiency approach was furthermore completed 
by China's scientific and cultural isolation. Refer to Kornai (1992a), p. 18lf and p. 335 and Editorial 
Board of the Progress of China Industry Modernization (1999), p. 139. 
295 For a detailed analysis of the causes of poor plan performance refer to Killick (1976) 1 p. 164. For 
further information on development planning refer to Dobb (1960) and Griffin and Enos (1970). 
296 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 94. For further information refer to Schurmann (1968), Whyte 
and Parish {1984) and Walder (1986). 
297 Refer to Peng (2001), p. 1343. 
298 For further information refer to Walder ( 1995). 
299 Kornai saw this as an incurable disease inflicting SOEs because the state, as the owner, also has 
objectives (e.g., maintaining employment and political stability) other than financial performance. 
Refer to Kornai (1992a), pp. 489-497. 
300 Bailing out poor-performance firms ex post means that the mechanism of "constructive 
destruction" is not at work. Furthermore, because unprofitable companies expect government 
bailouts, firm managers have little incentive to improve productivity and efficiency. Refer to Peng 
(2001), p. 1343. 
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The deficiencies in the system had the result that China's economic development 
was retarded by low micro-economic efficiency.301 The central government did not 
achieve its intended goal of accelerating development, and could not overcome the 
country's economic backwardness. 
Also, China's Great Leap Forward Strategy had left it with poor overall economic 
performance.302 Essentially, the ineffectiveness of the socialist centrally-planned 
economy limited China's growth before the reform in 1978.303 
At the late 1970s, the planning system had been practiced in China for three 
decades. Market mechanisms adopted in neighboring economies, such as Japan 
and the four little dragons, had brought them double-digit annual growth for decades. 
Particularly, the sharp contrast in performance between mainland China and Taiwan, 
between North and South Korea, and between East and West Germany confirmed 
the superiority of the market mechanism over the planning system.304 The 
backwardness of China's industries, in comparison with some of its East Asian 
counterparts, the inefficiencies of the centrally planned economy, agricultural 
stagnation and the need to accelerate growth and provide jobs to reduce widespread 
poverty, propelled the reformers among the senior members of the CCP in the early 
1980s.30s 
The Third Plenary Session of the 11 th CCP Central Committee, held in December 
1978, decided to shift the focus of the party's work from "class struggle to economic 
development''. 306 It started the socialist modernization drive and set the reform and 
opening-up policy. It thereby rejected the Maoist model of development (heavy 
industry-oriented development; leap forward development strategy). This allowed a 
shift of ideology within the CCP and initiated economic reforms. The accepted 
301 Refer to Lin et al. (1996), p. 60. 
302 The Great leap Forward was the name given to the Second Five Year Plan which was scheduled 
to run from 1958-1963, though the name is now generally limited to the first three years of this 
period. Chairman Mao Zedong started the Great leap Forward in 1957 to rapidly advance the 
country's economic development and transform China into a leading industrial power. Mao's plan 
was to massively increase both agricultural and industrial production. Peasants had already 
started farming the land co-operatively in the 1950s. During the Great leap Forward, they joined 
large communes consisting of thousands of people. large-scale irrigation schemes were 
undertaken to improve agricultural productivity. Mao furthermore pushed for the construction of 
steel plants across the country. With local governments' rush to recruit labor for work in steel 
production, agricultural tasks were neglected, leading to a widespread famine in the years 1959-
61. The government also plunged the country into debt by increasing spending on the 
development of heavy industry. 
303 Refer to Chinese Government (2005), "Economic System", Internet Edition, reviewed 28.03.2006. 
304 Refer to Li and Lian (1999), p. 173. For further information refer to Nee and Lian (1994) on why 
communist rulers initiated economic reforms. 
305 Refer to Yusuf and Nabeshima (2006a), p. 4. 
306 Refer to Editorial Board of the Progress of China Industry Modernization (1999), p. 36. 
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ideology at the beginning of reform was the idea of "planning as a principle and 
market as a supplementary part".307 Chinese leaders envisioned accelerating 
economic transformation under strong state leadership, as their East Asian 
counterparts had done.308 Rather than accept the division of labor dictated by 
comparative advantage, China sought to develop industrial sectors and firms that 
would foster entrepreneurial activity and create positive spillovers in the economy as 
a whole.309 
Altogether, China, like the East Asian developmental states, had similar conditions 
when it started its reform policy and maintained these throughout the reform period. 
Similar to the East Asian developmental states, China has been an authoritarian 
state. The CCP has solely reigned and tightly controlled and suppressed all political 
demands. This has hindered the establishment of a strong civil society. In 1978, 
China was an economically backward country, a so-called "late developer", with a 
distorted industrial structure and an inward-looking economy. Furthermore, the 
Chinese bureaucracy, similar to that of the East Asian developmental states, has 
continuously committed itself to economic growth and transformation. The conditions 
of the developmental state model are thus fulfilled. 
3.1.2 Characteristics that distinguish China from the developmental states 
Despite the similarities between China and the East Asian developmental states, 
there are at least three characteristics that differentiate China from its East Asian 
neighbors: 
• Geographical vastness: Not only is China's territory more than eighteen times 
larger than that of the four little dragons and Japan combined, its population 
(1.3 billion) is also almost six times greater.310 Due to its size, the central 
government had already decentralized decision-making to local governments 
during the Great Leap Forward.311 As many of these firms obtained most of 
their inputs from, and also produced for, their jurisdictions, Mao decentralized 
307 Reier to Qian (2000), p. 153. 
308 For understanding the Chinese reform process, it is important to note that according to the self-
conception of the central leadership, China is no transformation country like the Central and East 
European Countries, but rather a developing country. Accordingly, the transformation experiences 
of the Central and East European countries have had less impact on China's economic policy 
than the development path of its successful East Asian neighbors. 
309 Refer to Thun (2006), p. 3. 
310 Refer to Xia (2000), p. 2. 
311 Mao implemented decentralization, because the central government in Beijing did not have the 
information needed to centrally control an industrial sector that included 30,000 large and 
medium-size firms and nearly 150,000 small firms at that time. Refer to Qian and Weingast 
(1996b), p. 11. 
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decision-making to the individual provinces, counties and villages.312 Although 
in the early 1960s, after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the central 
government aimed to recentralize some controls, much planning and control 
activity remained at the provincial level. The Cultural Revolution almost 
paralyzed the central government, and again strengthened decentralization 
tendencies. The rural small-scale industry program in the 1970s also devolved 
further industrial planning rights and control to the county and commune 
levels.313 Along with decentralization, the political system has been 
disaggregated into several constituent levels. Accordingly, China has a 
multilevel political system with five major territorial levels: first, the central 
government, which covers the entire country; second, 22 provinces314 and five 
autonomous regions and four centrally administrative municipalities 
(administratively, they have province-level status); third, 333 cities and 
prefectures; fourth, 2,816 counties; and fifth, 44,016 township level units. The 
townships are themselves divided into villages or neighborhoods and 
communities. 315 
• Communist legacy: Unlike the East Asian developmental states, China's 
economic and political transition process has been carried out under a 
communist leadership. The CCP came to power in 1949 intent on eradicating 
private ownership. Economic reform has thus been guided by the legacies of 
the Mao era and its set of ideological socialist political and economic norms 
like egalitarism, Stalinist bureaucracy and a centrally-planned economy.316 
These Maoist ideological legacies have imposed constraints upon the 
transitional process in the post-Mao reform period. 
• International environment The Cold War provided an unusually benevolent 
context for the East Asian states (and not for China in the 1980s). As part of 
its effort to contain the Soviet Union, the USA donated extensive foreign aid to 
its allies in East Asia. The East Asian states could hence focus solely on 
economic development. Moreover, the USA unilaterally opened its markets to 
goods from East Asia and granted them protection from security threats. At 
that time, the USA did not perceive the rapid rise of Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
as a threat to its economic supremacy. It was even the explicit objective of the 
United States' (US') strategy in the decades following World War 11.317 
These characteristics do not debilitate the conditions a transforming country has to 
fulfill for application of the East Asian Developmental State Model. The following 
analysis on China hence concentrates on the measures of the East Asian 
312 This type of decentralized planning began around 1957. 
313 Refer to Yusuf and Nabeshima (2006b), pp. 49-50. 
314 China considers Taiwan its 23rd province. 
315 Refer to OECD (2006a), p. 6 and Shambaugh (2000), p. 168. 
316 Refer to Xia (2000), p. 2. 
317 Refer to Thun (2006), pp. 4-5. 
90 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
A new model of economic development 
Developmental State Model. Accordingly, the various factors (institutional setting and 
policy indicators) of the model are analyzed with respect to China: 
• Bureaucracy: depoliticized bureaucracy; meritocratic recruitment and minimal 
rent-seeking; pilot agency; coherent state apparatus. 
• State: industrial policy; promotion of selected sectors; marginal foreign partici-
pation; export-oriented industrialization. 
• Financial system: state-dominated, bank- and credit-based financial system; 
government influence and firm-level allocation of credit. 
• Government-business relations: institutionalized cooperation; regular informa-
tion exchange between bureaucrats and business leaders. 
From the analysis of the four categories of the East Asian Developmental State 
Model, one can infer whether the Chinese central government has been committed to 
emulate the developmental state model, which was capitalist in nature, and 
originated primarily in small countries. 
3.2 Bureaucracy 
In economic literature, bureaucratic organization and performance are typically 
addressed by using a principal-agent model. Its origins can be found in the new 
economics of orianization as a theoretical construct devised to examine relations 
within the firm.31 Since then, the principal-agent model has become the dominant 
framework for examining the difficulties that arise from contracting.319 Agency 
relationships are created when the principal enters into a contractual agreement with 
an agent, and delegates to the latter responsibility for carrying out a function or set of 
tasks on the principal's behalf.320 The principal delegates responsibility to the agent 
in order to economize on transaction costs, and thus pursue its goals that would 
otherwise be too costly.321 Governments (the principal) delegate authority to the 
public administration, subnational jurisdictions, and private actors (the agents) in 
318 For further information refer to Moe (1984). For a number of applications refer to Alt and Shepsle 
(1990) and Brobak and Nye (1997). 
319 Refer to Eisenhardt (1989a,b), Grossman and Hart (1983) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
320 The principal can be any individual or organization. In the classic representation, the principal is 
the shareholder of a company that contracts an executive to manage the business on a day-to-
day basis. 
321 As suggested by Coase and developed by Williamson, the organization of hierarchies may 
minimize transaction costs. Coase (1937, 1960) introduced the concept of transaction costs to 
explain the size of firms and suggests that well-defined property rights could overcome the 
problems of externalities. Williamson (1975, 1985) suggests that transaction costs include both 
the direct costs of the transaction and the possible opportunity costs of inferior governance 
decisions. North (1981) explains the political conditions that give rise to efficient property rights 
favorable to economic growth. 
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order to exploit specialization advantages and cope with the complexity of structural 
reforms.322 Delegation, however, might create principal-agent problems that arise 
from the asymmetric distribution of information that favors the agent, including 
adverse selection and moral hazard.323 Delegation bears subsequently the risk that 
the agent does not act in the interest of the principal (the government) and pursues 
its own interests.324 In consequence, governments need to implement systematic 
control over public officials, policy and institutional reforms in order to ensure 
successful economic transformation.325 As in the East Asian developmental states, 
organizations might design appointment and promotion rules to deal with these 
problems. 
3.2.1 Bureaucratic organizational structure 
In the Chinese system, every office usually has a bureaucratic rank assigned to it.326 
One territorial level of government contains several bureaucratic ranks within its 
organs.327 The top of the political hierarchy consists of the Politburo and the State 
Council. The Politburo is the supreme decision-making body which makes all major 
strategic decisions. The State Council translates those into concrete policies. 
Commissions and ministries are below the State Council.328 Commissions are one 
step down and ministries are another step down. Bureaus within ministries are yet 
another step down and so forth. Provincial governments are the same bureaucratic 
rank as their ministerial counterparts.329 
While the commissions have responsibility for the entire national economy, ministries 
are accountable for particular sectors or regions.330 Ministries are therefore organized 
by sector \e.g. agriculture, coal, machinery) or function (education, culture, public 
security).33 Although each ministry's actual influence varies not only with the 
322 Refer to Ahrens and Mengeringhaus (2006), p. 79. 
323 For further information refer to Kiewiet and Mccubbins (1991), Holmstrom (1979), Pollack (1997) 
and Ross (1973). 
324 Economists have focused on incentive structures that discourage opportunistic behavior on the 
part of the agent. The agent might exploit the principal's costs of measuring the agent's 
performance and act contrary to the preferences of the principal. Contractual restrictions on the 
agent"s operational purview or monitoring the agent are possibilities, but can be costly. Their 
effectiveness is limited by the ex1ent to which the agent's actions can be observed. Refer to 
Doleys (2000). 
325 Refer to Ahrens and Mengeringhaus (2006), p. 79. 
326 Refer to Lieberthal (1997), p. 3 and Shirk (1993), p. 93 fl. 
327 Here, government also applies to the CCP's governing structure. 
328 The CCP"s Politburo ranks higher than the State Council. Refer to Huang (2002b), p. 66. 
329 Refer to Lieberthal and Oksenberg ( 1988), p. 143 and Lieberthal ( 1997), p. 3. 
330 Refer to Shirk (1993), p. 93 and Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), p. 63. 
331 Ministries are expected to articulate the interests of their particular sector. When ministers or vice-
ministers are called together to discuss a policy proposal, they are expected to represent the 
perspective of their particular ministries. Refer to Shirk (1992), pp. 69-70 and Shirk (1993), p. 93. 
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prestige of its minister, but also with its function, its control over subordinate 
enterprises and its financial contribution, the formal status of each ministry is the 
same. According to the commissions' higher rank they give instructions to ministries, 
however, only within their respective spheres of competence. Commissions take a 
more comprehensive view of policy approaches than do the narrowly focused line 
ministries. Commissions thus have to equilibrate the ministries' competing efforts in 
favor of the overall national situation.332 
In correspondence to the administrative structure, industrial policies are level by level 
filtered down through plans. Accordingly, the central government assigns local 
governments to draw up their own plans on the basis of national plans and 
appropriate to local conditions. The governments' duties at the local level, however, 
are always to be performed on behalf of the central government. Units of the same 
rank cannot issue binding orders to each other. Accordingly, ministries cannot issue 
binding orders to provinces, even thouih on an organizational chart it appears that 
the ministries sit above the provinces.3 3 Consequently, consensus-building is often 
needed in order to operate effectively, and negotiations aimed to find agreements 
have become a core feature of the Chinese system.334 
Assuming that staff numbers are correlated with administrative functions, the central 
government is unusually small in China: the central ministries and agencies account 
for only about 2 million employees, or 6 percent, of the nearly 33 million in total public 
employment.335 The rest - 31 million of them - are employed in sub-national 
governments and institutions (refer to Figure 7). The central government is too small 
to be able to exert detailed control over the huge number of subordinates. The 
structure of administration in China puts burdens on the core-ministries and state 
agencies at the central level which add up to about 50,000 employees just after the 
1998 downsizing campaign. Besides running the central government businesses, the 
central ministries and state agencies must manage the services provided by central 
public service units that have nearly 2 million employees, and provide a management 
framework for the ~revision of these services at the sub-national levels by some 23 
million employees. 36 
332 Refer to Shirk (1992), p. 71 and lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), p. 63. 
333 The same rule means that ministries cannot issue binding orders to other ministries, provinces 
cannot issue binding orders to other provinces and so forth. Refer to lieberthal (1997), p. 3. 
334 Refer to Edin (2000), p. 86. 
335 The OECD offers some benchmark numbers: central government employees in Germany (1993): 
0.6 million, Japan (1993): 1.2 million, and the UK (1995): 1.0 million. Refer to OECD (2006a), p. 
25. 
336 The decentralized administrative structure is also split up into core governments and public 
service units. Public service units are publicly owned institutions. They provide a variety of 
services such as education and health. They are subordinate to the government and account for 
about 30 percent of budgetary expenditures. Refer to OECD (2006a), p. 26. 
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Public 11rvlce units 
(23.2 million) 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2006a), p. 25. 
Note: Number of employees in brackets. 
Embedded within Chinese organizations and missing from the formal orianizational 
structure charts are the personal ties that interconnect different agencies. 37 In China, 
interpersonal connections are called guanxi. Virtually every Chinese person is 
connected to at least one guanxi network, arising from family connections, common 
geographical origin, joint experience (school or military service ties) or shared loyalty 
toward the same higher-ranking bureaucrat.338 
Walder (1986) notes that "the concept is by no means culturally unique".339 Personal 
connections are particularly important in countries without a stable legal and 
regulatory environment.340 In China, guanxi networks particularly function as 
substitutes for formal institutional regulations. Particularly businessmen cultivate 
personal connections to substitute for a reliable government and an established rule 
of law.341 Guanxi networks can be seen as clubs that may lower transaction costs for 
their members (in the form of contact, and especially control costs) in China's 
institutionally disorderly environment. Thus, guanxi networks guarantee their 
members the enforceability of available property rights.342 Guanxi limits the state's 
337 Moreover, at the top, in many respects power is vested more in individuals than in specific 
institutions. Refer to lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), p. 63. 
338 The Chinese guanxi networks can be understood as institutions that arose centuries ago to 
secure trade relations in an environment that was only insufficiently covered by the formal legal 
system. For further information refer to Carr and Landa (1983) and Posner (1980). 
339 Refer to Walder (1986), p. 179. 
340 Some form of guanxi exists in every society, but it has different manifestations in different 
societies. Refer to Liu and Dicken (2006), pp. 1237-1238. 
341 Refer to Xin and Pearce (1996), p. 1642. 
342 Refer to Schramm and Taube (2002), "The Institutional Economics of Legal Institutions, Guanxi, 
and Corruption in the PR China", Internet Edition, pp. 5-6, reviewed 22.11.2006. 
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capacity for autonomous action, and interpenetrates the state and society, especially 
at the lower levels of the Chinese state.343 Politically ambitious bureaucrats try to 
place people with whom they have guanxi in other agencies to extend their influence. 
Bureaucrats initiate contacts across bureaucratic boundaries through someone with 
whom they have guanxi. The person serves as the entree into another organization, 
and acts as the guarantor of one's merit and seriousness.344 
3.2.2 The civil service system 
Since the 1980s, the term "civil servant" has been used to describe China's 
administrative officers in governmental organizations, known as "state cadres". Civil 
servants are those employed by the state (at central, regional and local level) who 
manage social public goods, exercise administrative power, and carry out public 
functions on behalf of the state.345 Employees of legislative bodies are included in 
government personnel.346 
3.2.2.1 Depolltization of civil servants? 
An important determinant of China's civil service system has been the political 
environment in which it is embedded. The relationship between party and 
government can also be described as a principal-agent relationship in which the party 
has the function of the principal and government agencies represent diverse 
agents.347 Although separating party and state functions was one motivation of the 
reform, the leadership rejected the concept of a politically neutral civil service from 
the beginning.348 Instead, according to the "Provisional Regulations for State Civil 
343 Refer to Nee (2000), pp. 34-35. 
344 Refer to Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), pp. 156-157. 
3• 5 Refer to Cooke (2003), p. 382. 
346 Employees of state enterprises and state institutions (including educational, research, sports, 
health and cultural institutions) are not civil servants. Refer to Chew (1990), p. 773. 
3'7 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 109. 
348 In Deng's speech "On the Reform System of Party and State Leadership" in August 1980, he 
stressed that it was time "for us to distinguish between the responsibilities of the party and those 
of the government and to stop substituting the former for the latter. [ ... ] This will[ ... ] promote a 
better exercise of government functions and powers·. Deng (1984), p. 303. In 1986, Deng 
Xiaoping made the separation of work of party and government the core of his political reform. 
Although separation was promoted in order to improve the quality of decision-making by putting 
the government on a longer leash, authority of the party over the government was never 
questioned. In the same light can Zhao Ziyang's approach at the Thirteenth Party Congress be 
seen: Even while he urged greater autonomy for government, he emphasized that the CCP 
Central Committee would retain its leadership over the government in political principles and in 
major policy decisions and would continue to appoint leading cadres for central state organs. 
Refer to Shirk (1993), pp. 62-63. 
95 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
A new model of economic development 
Servants" of 1993, civil servants are required to adhere to Marxist ideology, support 
socialism and accept the party's leadership.349 
The CCP has always been the source of both civil service empowerments and 
control. According to Chan (2007), the 2005 Civil Service Law affirms the principle of 
party control of cadres. The 2005 Civil Service Law reconfirms that the CCP holds a 
tight control over leadership change and management at various levels.350 According 
to Article 4 of the Civil Service Law, the civil service system shall follow the basic 
premises of the primary stage of socialism; follow the party's line, guiding principles, 
and policies concerning cadres; and adhere to the principle of party control of 
cadres.351 The article in effect provides party committees and their or~anizational 
departments at various levels with the legal authority to manage cadres.35 
The party's authority over the government is based primarily on nomenklatura power: 
The central government, specifically CCP organs, appoints almost all of the leading 
positions in government and administration institutions, among them the top 
provincial officials.353 This nomenklatura system is an instrument of party control.354 It 
is therefore assured that Jgovernment institutions principally follow party instructions 
when making decisions.3 The percentage of cadres in the rank of ministers and 
deputy ministers that were CCP members in 1990 (97 .3 percent) reveals the unity of 
party, state and civil service.356 The Chinese bureaucracy has thus not been 
depoliticized as the bureaucracy in the East Asian developmental states. 
3.2.2.2 Meritocratic recruitment 
Public sector reforms have been considered by researchers and practitioners of 
economic development as one of the major factors contributing to successful 
economic development. Public sector reforms refer not only to market liberalization 
349 Refer to Tong et al. (1999), p. 196 and Cooke (2003), p. 392. 
350 Refer to Chan and Suizhou (2007), p. 390. 
351 Ibidem. 
352 For further information on the 2005 Civil Service Law and the effort to modernize China's state 
bureaucracy, refer to Chapter 3.2.2.2. 
353 Refer to Huang (1996), p. 28. 
354 Furthermore, e.g. directors of SOEs are at the same time party members and are appointed and 
recalled according to the cadre system by the party. Refer to Huang (1996), p. 89 and Breslin 
(1996), p. 697. Fur further readings regarding the Chinese nomenklatura system refer to Burns 
(1987, 1989b). 
355 Reier to Heilmann (2002), p. 88. 
356 The political influence on leadership cadres did not change throughout the reform period. In 1998, 
97.7 percent of the mister level cadres were members of the CCP. Reier to Heilmann (2002), pp. 
96-97. 
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and privatization, but also to reforms of the civil service system. For developing 
countries, public sector reforms are especially important, because the reforms need 
to emphasize efforts to promote professional values and norms on the one hand, and 
to reduce bureaucratic corruption and political influence on the other.357 
As Evans and Rauch (2000) elaborate, making entry to the bureaucracy conditional 
on passing a civil service exam or attainment of a university degree, and paying 
salaries comparable to those for private positions requiring similar skills and 
responsibility, should produce a capable pool of officials. The stability provided by 
internal promotion allows the formation of stronger ties among them. This improves 
communication, and therefore effectiveness. When officials enter the bureaucracy on 
the basis of merit, performance is likely to be a valued attribute among them. The 
long-term career rewards generated by a system of internal promotion should 
reinforce adherence to codified rules of behavior. Ideally, a sense of commitment to 
corporate goals and "esprit de corps" develops.358 
The Chinese transformation path has been characterized by strong economic growth under 
one-party monopoly.359 For the time being, political liberalization toward representative 
democracy and the "rule of law" have been limited. Despite the deficiencies of political 
liberalization, China has benefited from a transformation of its bureaucratic system. Since the 
start of economic reform, administrative reform in the form of rebuilding and modernizing 
China's bureaucracy has been the government's priority. In 1979, Deng promulgated: 
"If we want to do our work according to economic law, we should train people 
to act accordingly. { ... ] We have 18 million cadres but lack technical cadres, 
technicians, managerial staff, and other professionals. "360 
When China entered the post-Mao reform period, procedures for recruitment, 
promotion and appraisal were vague, administrative proficiency low and the 
leadership aged throughout all ranks.361 The bureaucracy's scant expertise became 
an obstacle to continued development along economic reforms in the late 1970s and 
1980s. The government's ability to spur economic growth was decelerating and 
administrative corruption growing.362 In order to promote the process of economic 
357 For further information on the civil service system and its reforms refer to Burns (1989a, 1993); 
Cabestan (1992), Aufrecht and Li (1995), Liou (1997). 
358 Refer to Evans and Rauch (2000), p. 52. 
359 Refer to Li (1998), p. 393. 
360 Deng (1979), "Some Comments on Economic Work", Internet Edition, reviewed 19.03.2006. 
361 Refer to Nolan (1995b), p. 165 and Nee et al. (2007), p. 24. The decade-long tumultuous 
upheaval of Mao's Cultural Revolution had demoralized and crippled China's state apparatus. 
362 Refer to Tsao and Worthley (1995), p. 169. 
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reform, the professionalization of the Chinese bureaucracy became essential.363 In 
1980, major changes in the Chinese bureaucracy were initiated. 
While at the time of the Cultural Revolution political loyalty to the CCP and 
appropriate social class background were more important than expertise (borrowed 
from the Soviet Union in the 1950s), this changed dramatically in the post-Mao 
reforms. Political loyalty was emphasized, but it acquired adherence to the party's 
reform policies. Unqualified party officials in the government administration were 
retired, and political qualities and activities diminished as recruitment criteria.364 New 
selection criteria of the bureaucrac~ emphasized not only competence, such as 
educational credentials, but also age. 65 
As a result of Deng's retirement policy, the leadership structure in various institutions 
and different ranks changed. While in 1980, only 36.2 percent of the leadership 
cadres366 in the rank of ministers and deputy ministers had an academic degree, ten 
years later, 87.7 percent had one. In the same period, the average age dropped from 
64 to 57.367 In 1994, according to a national survey of 55,509 interviewed civil 
servants, civil servants from office staff to division chiefs had attended school for 
more than 11 years. Moreover, while the average age of division chiefs was 51 years 
in 1994, it was 57 in 1990 and 63 in 1980 (refer to Table 2).368 
Table 2: Basic conditions of civil servants, 1994. 
Number of interviewed Average wage Average years of Average age Average seniority Average posl-
civil servants (RMB) education (year) (year) (year) holding (year) 
National 55 509 5823 11.8 42.0 19.7 4.9 
Division Chief 374 8263 12.7 50.8 32.0 4.9 
section Chief 15 239 6452 11.8 48.6 26.8 4.8 
Offk:e Staff 36,895 5,338 11.8 35.0 14.3 5.9 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1996). 
363 Qualified personnel was needed to e.g. make decisions about technology transfer and absorption, 
the expansion of foreign trade etc. 
364 Refer to Howell (1991), p. 131 and Li (1998), p. 3 ff. For further information refer to Manion (1985) 
and Burns (1987). 
365 Refer to Zhou (2001), p. 1042. Also refer to Deng (1979), "Some Comments on Economic Work", 
Internet Edition, and Deng (1992), "Excerpts From Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai 
and Shanghai", Internet Edition, both reviewed 19.03.2006. This effort parallels those of 
Bismarkian Germany and Meiji Japan in the late nineteenth century, or Taiwan and Korea in the 
1950s, in which a key point of the modernisation drive was the creation of a professional 
government administration which was responsible to an unelected executive authority rather than 
to an elected parliament. Reier to Nolan (1993a), p. 77. 
368 Leadership cadres are e.g. leading officials of country leadership level and above in organs of the 
CCP, the People's Congresses, the People's Governments, the Political Consultative Conference, 
the judical organs, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League, the 
All-China Women's Federation, as well as other state-controlled associations. Reier to Heilmann 
and Kirchberger (2000), p. 12 and Li (1998), p. 394. 
367 Reier to Heilmann (2002), p. 96. 
368 Data for the years 1990 and 1980 are from Heilmann and Kirchberger (2000), p. 12. 
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The government officials' education, age and expertise further improved under Zhu 
Rongji's leadership.369 In 1998, 99.1 percent of the leadership cadres (in the rank of 
ministers and deputy ministers) had a college-level education.370 The average age of 
bureaucrats dropped further and bureaucrats shifted from revolutionary cadres to 
party technocrats (study field: engineering and natural sciences) whose 
representation rose dramatically in all high-level leadership categories.3 1 Among 
ministers, provincial secretaries and governors as well as among central committee 
full members, more than 50 percent of the members were technocrats in 1997 
(compared with less than 2 percent in 1982).372 Provincial governors had the largest 
share of technocrats in 1997 (77 percent) (refer to Table 3).373 The younger and 
better educated leaders were generally more supportive of reforms, more adaptable, 
and more pragmatic. 
Table 3: Technocrats' representation in high-level leadership, 1982-1997. 
Ministers Provlnclel S.Cratarle• Provlncl• I Governors Central CommlttN Full Memblra 
Year No. % No. I .,,. No. % No. % 
1982 1 I 2 0 I 0 0 I 0 4 I 2 
1987 17 I 45 7 I 25 8 I 33 34 26 
1997 28 I 70 23 I 74 24 I 77 98 I 51 
Source: Li (2001 ), p. 41. 
In October 1993, the central government adopted the "Provisional Regulations on 
State Functionaries" (inaugurated in March 1994).374 The central government 
officially defined civil servants as those 5.3 million cadres or administrators, 
managers and professionals who worked for government agencies.375 The 1993 act 
intended to provide substantive advancement of routines, rationality and 
professionalism in the Chinese civil service. Chapter 1 articulated the intent of the 
Provisional Regulations: 
369 Refer to Xia (2000), pp. 82-83 and Cooke (2003), pp. 389 ff. 
370 Refer to Heilmann (2002), pp. 96-97. 
371 The elite transformation from revolutionary veterans to technocrats during the post-Mao era has 
been the largest peaceful elite turnover in Chinese history. It is even the most massive, rapid 
change of elites within any regime in human history. Refer to Li (2001 ), p. 41. For further 
information refer to Fewsmith (2001a,b,c), Lee (1991), p. 268 and Lieberthal (1995), p. 236. 
372 Among these were not only graduate students from China's prestigious universities, but also 
returned students from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and from the USA and other Western 
countries. Refer to Xia (2000), p. 82. 
373 Refer to Li (2001 ), p. 41. 
374 Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and 
Other International Organizations in Switzerland (2005), "Building of Political Democracy in 
China", Internet Edition, reviewed 17.11.2006. 
375 Refer to China Daily (2003), "Focus: China embarks on civil service reforms", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 23.03.2006. 
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''[T]o facilitate the scientific management of state functionaries, ensure honesty 
and enhance administrative efficiency"; "to the purpose of hiring people{. .. ] to 
the principle of openness, equality, competition and selecting the best': and 
''that state functionaries perform their duties according to the law and be 
protected by the law".376 
The Provisional Regulations promulgated entry through open, competitive 
examinations and the civil service to be managed according to law. The regulations 
set forth strict and rule-governed performance guidelines with respect to appropriate 
conduct. The reform successfully attained its objective of regularizing performance 
reviews: over 96 percent of the civil servants underwent annual performance 
appraisals between 1994 and 1998.377 The Provisional Regulations furthermore 
enforced public announcement of openings, reliance on scores in civil service 
examinations to recruit candidates, competitive examinations in routine promotions, 
and monitoring by the personnel department. All procedures were institutionalized at 
all levels of the national bureaucracy.378 Yet, the selection of civil servants continued 
to be based on talent and virtue in terms of political and ideological values ( "hiring 
people with both political integrity and ability'879 ), because the Provisional 
Regulations promulgated that the party and the state formed a single, integrated 
authority to which civil servants were politically responsive. No distinction was made 
between politicians and civil servants. Elected senior officials such as the Premier, 
Vice Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers and provincial Governors were also 
counted as civil servants.380 Therefore, the civil service was still politicized to the 
extent that political loyalty was a criterion for selection. 
The open selection of leading cadres was introduced gradually from coastal to inland 
areas, from local to central government departments and from section to department 
levels. Aspects of the open selection are open posts and requirements as well as 
open examination and public promulgation of results. Among commissions and 
ministries, examinations decide on the recruitment of new personnel.381 From 1994 
376 See Article 1, 2 and 4 of the Provisional Regulations on State Functionaries. Refer to Tsao and 
Worthley (1995), p. 170 and Tong et al. (1999), p. 197. 
377 Refer to Chou (2005), pp. 45-46. 
378 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 98. 
379 See Article 2 of the Provisional Regulations on State Functionaries. Refer to Tsao and Worthley 
(1995), p. 170 and Tong et al. (1999), p. 197. 
380 Refer to China Daily (2003), "Focus: China embarks on civil service reforms", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 23.03.2006. 
381 The Ministry of Personnel for reference held a recruitment examination for 22 central level 
ministries and public corporations, including the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Statistics 
Bureau in March 1991. These administrative organs selected 280 from about 10,000 candidates. 
By late 1990, 35 ministries or commissions of the State Council staffed 70 percent of their vacant 
positions through examination. Moreover, until 1993, 61 ministries or commissions and their 
subordinated organizations of the State Council, and 29 provinces, regions and municipalities 
recruited 67,000 state civil service cadres out of 440,000 plus applicants through recruitment with 
examinations. Refer to Liu (2001 ), p. 131. 
100 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
A new model of economic development 
until 2003, China employed more than 700,000 civil servants from 2.4 million 
candidates through the annual civil service examinations.382 Party and government 
institutions have also taken competition as the main form for the promotion of cadres 
since 1998. In 2002, about 180,000 government officials were promoted and filled 
posts via competition, making up 59.8 percent of the total cadres promoted in that 
year.3s3 
Salaries are one component of attracting the best skilled to jobs in the state sector. In 
the East Asian developmental states, the positions of bureaucrats were the best paid 
compared with the ones in the business sector. In China, the well-educated had 
several job opportunities due to the country's integration with the global economy. 
Lower-paid government jobs were no longer the most attractive.384 While government 
administrative cadres were the highest paid of all occupation groups in the mid-
1950s, jobs in the private sector (particularly those that require higher education such 
as a master degree) had become better paid than jobs in government organs until 
1994.385 According to survey results published in the China Statistical Yearbook 
(1996), among 8,050 interviewees at the rank of division chief, the average monthly 
wage in enterprises was Renminbi (RMB) 8,718 and in government organs RMB 
8,283 in 1994. The wage difference between enterprises and government 
organizations becomes clear when grouped according to educational background: 
the interviewed persons who had a master degree (n=258) stated to earn RMB 9,538 
in an enterprise, and RMB 6,138 in a government organ. The same applies to section 
chiefs and office staff, as well as to bachelor and college graduates (refer to Table 4). 
However, civil servants enjoy insurance and welfare benefits in addition to their 
salary. The state implements a labor insurance system to provide material aid to civil 
servants who have temporarily or permanently lost the ability to work. Civil servants 
are also granted benefits in free medical service, pay during sickness and maternity 
leave, home-visiting holiday and welfare subsidies, as well as pension and 
compensation payment.386 Furthermore, secure permanent employment by the state 
as well as high social status serve as incentives for a career within the civil 
service.387 Accordingly, the state has been able to employ well educated civil 
servants, despite lower remuneration. 
382 Alone in Jiangxi Province, more than 600 people nationwide applied to participate in an open 
recruitment examination for the posts of 13 deputy directors of various provincial government 
departments, and 114 of them applied for the post of the deputy director of the provincial party 
committee's policy research office in 1999. Refer to Mu (2001), pp. 20-21 and People's Daily 
(2003), "Exam-based Civil Service Prevails in China", Internet Edition, reviewed 03.10.2006. 
383 People's Daily (2003), "Promotion Through Competition - A Major Way for Party & Government 
Officials", Internet Edition, reviewed 03.10.2006. 
384 Refer to Zheng (1997), p. 214. 
385 This is based on net income of fixed salaries. 
386 Refer to China Gate (n.d.), "The System of Civil Servant", Internet Edition, reviewed 13.07.2007. 
387 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 99 and Chan and Suizhou (2007), p. 395 ff. 
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Moreover, in the Chinese bureaucratic system, the duration of a bureaucrat's tenure 
has been reduced.388 Rotation and turnovers are indirect mechanisms that serve the 
functions of simultaneously overcoming information imperfections and maintaining 
controls in the country's large and complex political system. Educated and well-
trained civil servants combined with rule-governed performance guidelines such as 
public announcements of open positions, annual performance reviews and 
competitive exarninations (affirmed by the Civil Service Law of 2005) have gradually 
improved the transparency and ~redictability of regulations and helped the 
implementation of economic reform.3 9 
Table 4: Monthly wage levels in enterprises and government organizations, 1994. 
Number of clvll aervanta Interviewed Aver1a1 w• ae IRMBl 
Enterprises Gowrnment Organs Enterprises Go-.ernment Organs 
Grouaod bv DDIII 
Division Chief 4,676 3,374 8,718 8,283 
Section Chief 18,105 15,239 7,540 6,452 
Office Staff 43,131 36,895 6,185 5,338 
Grouned bv educatlonal backaround 
Master 105 153 9,538 6,138 
Bachelor 6,011 5,293 7,782 6,048 
Colleae Graduates 17,213 19,197 6,883 5,711 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1996). 
Notwithstanding national reform measures, the quality of the Chinese civil service is 
characterized by a high degree of geographical heterogeneity. The development 
between provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities is uneven. In the center 
and in the richer coastal areas, civil servants are usually selected by meritocratic 
recruitment, rewards are linked to their performance, and corruption is controlled and 
pursued by the judiciary. In the 2006 World Competitiveness Yearbook, the IMO 
ranked Zhejiang province 1 ih out of 61 countries and economic regions worldwide 
with regard to bureaucratic efficiency - ahead of China's overall average (rank 35).390 
In the less developed hinterland, however, not only position and organization 
determine political power, but also prestige and seniority, as well as loyalty of 
proteges and clever political manipulation.391 Thus, formal power of meritocratic 
party- or ministry-positions is often undermined by informal hierarchies of influence. 
388 Tenure in top provincial positions typically is shorter than the mandated term of office for those 
positions. Refer to Huang (1996), p. 115 ff and Lieberthal (1997), p. 6. 
389 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), pp. 97-98. 
390 Refer to IMO World Competitiveness Yearbook (2006), Survey question 2.3.15 ("Does 
bureaucracy hinder/not hinder business activity?'), p. 376. 
391 Refer to Heilmann (2002), p.57. 
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As the civil service sometimes operates as an "employer of last resort", such 
provinces exhibit relatively high levels of indiscipline and corruption among its 
bureaucrats.392 
To sum up, unlike the East Asian developmental states, there is no separation 
between the CCP and the state, and furthermore no separation between the state 
and the bureaucracy, as civil servants are usually party cadres. On the basis of the 
nomenklatura system, important bureaucratic positions are filled by CCP members 
that exert a control system over all levels. Thus, clear depolitization as in the East 
Asian developmental states cannot be found in China. The roles of politicians and 
bureaucrats have been fused. Similar to the East Asian developmental states, in the 
reform period, the average age of civil servants has been reduced and the average 
years of education increased through meritocratic recruitment. This new group of 
officials was eager and able to steer economic reforms.393 This resembles the 
practices of the East Asian developmental states, where the elite bureaucrats were 
graduates of the top universities. However, party- or ministry-positions are still often 
filled according to network and loyalty systems. 
3.2.3 A Chinese pilot agency? 
Developmental statists attribute the success of governments in achieving economic 
growth and industrial transformation to the quality of the bureaucracy in general, and 
to the developmental states' powerful and autonomous pilot agencies in particular. 
The most powerful was the Japanese MITI, which served Korea and Taiwan as a 
benchmark model. The developmental states' pilot agencies had the overall 
responsibility of managing industry, including planning and financing, as well as 
domestic and foreign trade. There were no industrial ministries and industrial 
bureaus.394 In the East Asian developmental states, top-down industrial planning was 
pursued with a high degree of independence of the elite bureaucrats to realize 
392 While the importance of school and blood ties diminishes gradually, school and blood ties were 
important aspects of the recruitment and promotion of civilian and military elites during the reform 
era. Qinghua University could be regarded as China's leading engineering school and was known 
as the "cradle of technocrats". Graduates of Qinghua University occupied a significant portion of 
top party and state leadership posts. Li (2001) contends "belonging to an elite university network 
is even far more essential for politicians than having an elite university degree". Not only school 
ties, but also blood ties (e.g. being the child of a high-ranking official) were important for the 
career advancement of elite cadres: The children or relatives of veteran elite cadres of the CCP 
and the army are called "party princelings". They usually graduate from elite universities and are 
part of a tight network of other princelings of these universities. They advanced quickly with the 
help of their parents or their parents' comrades in arms. As during the nineties, many princelings 
had political or economic leading positions in the coastal areas, political resistance to the careers 
of the princelings became manifested. Refer to Li (2001), p. 16 ff and p. 82 ff and Heilmann 
(2002), pp. 59-60. Also refer to OECD (2006a), p. 28. 
393 Refer to Shirk (1993), p. 64. 
394 Refer to Unger and Chan (1995), p. 42. 
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industrial policy. Unlike the East Asian developmental states, in its strategic approach 
to economic development and interaction with the business sector, China's central 
government relies on various agencies. 
3.2.3.1 The State Planning Commission and its successors 
Among the various commissions, it was the State Planning Commission which came 
closest to an East Asian pilot agency in the reform period.395 The "Outline of State 
Industrial Policies for the 1990s" confirmed the planning institutions of the Mao era in 
office. The outline prescribed that national industrial policy is decided by the State 
Council and that the State Planning Commission was the government agency 
responsible for the promulgation and harmonization of national industrial policies 
(five-year and annual plans).396 On the basis of the "Outline of State Industrial 
Policies", the State Planning Commission promulgated a series of industrial policies 
for different sectors. It approached its task from a long-term, strategic and 
comprehensive viewpoint which meshed with the state's long-term interests.397 It 
concentrated solely on macro-economic coordination instead of micro-managing the 
economy and specific industries. The State Planning Commission was mainly 
responsible for general overseeing and forecasting long-term policies for the national 
economy.398 The implementation of various industrial policies was carried out by the 
administrative agencies of different industries. The government agencies responsible 
for economic management had to coordinate with the State Planning Commission 
before adoptin~ any important policy measures which would influence industrial 
development. 39 
The State Planning Commission also guided and organized the production and 
distribution of commodities. It controlled the production level and allocation of goods 
which were considered crucial for national economic growth (such as petroleum, 
electricity, cement and steel). Through its control of bank credits and prices it could 
influence material supplies, and thus the growth rate of industrial sectors. The State 
Planning Commission provided financing for domestic projects according to its 
national industrial plan, and the Construction Bank released investment funds 
accordingly. The State Planning Commission, however, was not primarily responsible 
for assuring that the government in fact had sufficient funds or supplies to cover the 
cost of the projects in the plan. These tasks fell instead to the Material Supply Bureau 
and the Ministry of Finance. The latter did not always agree with the State Planning 
395 Refer to Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), p. 64. 
396 Refer to State Council of China (1994), "Outline of State Industrial Policies for the 1990s", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 31.03.2006. For further information refer to Wang and Fewsmith (1995), p. 52. 
397 Refer to Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), p. 64. 
398 Refer to Xia (2000), p. 86. 
399 Economic management includes planning, public financing, central banking, taxation, international 
and domestic trade, tariff, securities market regulation, administration of industry and commerce 
as well as state-owned asset management. 
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Commission over investment levels. Meetin£s between these two ministries to 
coordinate their decisions were often needed.4 
The State Planning Commission also played a crucial role in selecting which of the 
numerous proposed capital construction projects were accepted and acted upon. In 
considering new investments, the State Planning Commission determined not only 
the size of investment funds but also their overall geographical and sectoral 
distributions. It also decided on major JVs and key projects in the economy. As a 
supra-ministerial body, it directed the activities of a range of ministries and other 
bodies in bringing new projects to fruition.401 
In the energy sector,402 the State Planning Commission formulated mid-term and 
long-term energy plans that included construction, production and conservation; it 
decided which projects to construct, conducted appropriate technical and other 
feasibility studies and determined the project's size, its speed of development and 
the year in which each effort should begin; and it coordinated the actual construction 
of energy-related projects. The planning effort itself required that the State Planning 
Commission forecast future energy supplies and demands, both sectorally and 
geographically. The Ministry of Coal Industry and the Ministry of Water Resources 
and Electric Power planned the development of their sectors separately. However, 
since most of China's electricity was generated in coal-fired thermal plants, the 
development of both sectors had to be closely coordinated, based on the future need 
for electricity. The State Planning Commission performed this task of coordination.403 
The State Planning Commission relied on the line ministries and the provincial bodies 
to generate most requests for new projects, and to buttress those requests. These 
requests were part of the plans that each of the four energy-sector line ministries 
(Ministry of Coal Industry, Ministry of Petroleum Industry, Ministry of Water 
Resources and Electric Power, and Ministry of Nuclear Industry) and the provinces 
submitted to the State Planning Commission. The plans were supposed to be based 
on the broad guidelines for long-term development promulgated by the State 
Planning Commission. However, most of the times requests exceeded the country's 
capacities for new construction. Thus, the State Planning Commission had to 
determine which proposals were desireable and both technically and economically 
feasible.404 The State Planning Commission finally drew upon an overall balance 
based on repeated consultations with the ministries and provinces in the process of 
400 Refer to Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), p. 64 and pp. 69-70. 
401 Refer to Wang and Fewsmith (1995), p. 61 ff. 
402 The energy sector is taken as an example to illustrate the functions of the State Planning 
Commission. It is representative for other sectors. 
403 Refer to Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), pp. 64-66. 
404 Ibidem, pp. 67- 68. 
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turning their aspirations into a national plan.405 When the draft of the final plan was 
completed, it was sent to the State Council for approval.406 
After the Ninth National People's Congress in March 1998, along with the 
restructuring of government, which included a radical retrenchment of ~overnment 
organizations and employees both at the central and local levels,40 the State 
Planning Commission (which was always resistant to marketization)408 was renamed 
State Development Planning Commission.409 The commission's new name indicates 
the weakened function of state planning and the increased importance of state-
coordinated development along economic structural reform. The State Development 
Planning Commission's members often included the ministers from the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Labor, the State Commission of Science, the President of the 
People's Bank of China and the directors of the State Bureau of Statistics and the 
State Bureau of Prices. It issued directives to the ministries and provinces and was 
the most powerful and most comprehensive Chinese economic policy-making organ 
of its time like its predecessor the State Planning Commission.410 Even during the 
process of marketization it did not lose its relevance to the Chinese national 
economy. 
Despite its influence, the State Development Planning Commission's power was 
limited and its macro-economic control restricted. Hence, it never reached the status 
405 Coordination and construction was a critical task because all ministries have the same rank and 
therefore do not have formal leverage over each other. It requires either the State Council itself or 
a commission, which is higher than a ministry, to make various ministries and provinces (which 
have the same bureaucratic rank) coordinate their efforts. 
406 In general, the State Council in turn submits it to the National People's Congress for examination 
and approval. This gives the plan a legal character. 
407 In March 1998, the number of ministries was cut from from 40 to 29 in order to concentrate 
"power" in a few agencies with broad authority. Moreover, in order to turn SOEs into independent 
legal entities, with operation mostly in the hands of professional managers, many of the ministries 
that managed industries were abolished. The abolished functions of the former ministries were 
overseen by the State Economics and Trade Commission. Refer to Lan (1999), p. 30, Unger and 
Chan (1995), p. 42 and Zhu (2003), p. 157. 
408 The State Planning Commission was established in 1952, according to the Soviet model of the 
centrally planned economy. Planning theory, planning methods, planning content and planning 
organizations were all copied; even the planning tables were imported from the Soviet Union. As 
the organization charged with overall control of the planned economy, the State Planning 
Commission had a strong institutional interest in resisting, deflecting, and enervating the market-
oriented reform policies put forth by reform-minded leaders. Refer to Wang and Fewsmith ( 1995), 
p. 52. 
409 Refer to Ministry of Science and Technology (1998), "Reform Program tor State Council 
Departments", Internet Edition, reviewed 22.01.2007. 
410 Often, the State Development Planning Commission was referred to as "the Little State Council". 
Refer to Wang and Fewsmith (1995), p. 52. 
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of a pilot agency like the MITI in Japan.411 The State Development Planning 
Commission had to consult with the Ministry of Finance over the annual budget plans 
and long-term financial balances and with the Minist~ of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation412 for the foreign trade balance.4 3 In addition, in order to 
determine the national industrial plan, the State Development Planning Commission 
had to coordinate closely with the State Economics and Trade Commission, which 
traditionally served as a counterweight to the State Development Planning 
Commission.414 The State Economics and Trade Commission was concerned less 
with long-term planning and more with coordinating day-to-day enterprise operations. 
The State Development Planning Commission's responsibility was furthermore 
restricted as it had to pass on large-scale projects to the State Council for decision. 
In addition, China's decentralized economic management limited the State 
Development Planning Commission's power. Due to the system of bottom-up 
planning, the State Development Planning Commission simply aggregated requests 
from different ministries. Furthermore, the projects that were below a certain scale 
could be initiated by the line ministries or local governments without item approval by 
the State Development Planning Commission. Thus, the State Development 
Planning Commission was only one part of a large web of organizational 
relationships.415 
In 2003, the State Development Planning Commission was transformed into the 
NDRC. With the new name, the State Council eliminated the word "planning", which 
indicates a further renunciation of planning mechanisms in favor of market 
mechanisms. The NDRC took over the major functions of its predecessor, and was 
assigned new responsibilities along with overall government reorganization. 
411 Refer to Huang (2002a), p. 553. 
412 The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Cooperation was the Ministry of Economic Relations and Trade 
before 1993. The Ministry of Economic Relations and Trade was established in March 1982. 
413 Refer to Lieberthal and Oksenberg ( 1988), pp. 64-65. 
414 The State Economics and Trade Commission was the "'final incarnation° of a body that has 
existed throughout most of the reform period (indeed, throughout much of the history of the 
People's Republic of China), namely, the State Economic Commission. The State Economic 
Commission pleaded for expanded enterprise rights and autonomy, and thus became a force in 
favor of industrial reforms during the 1980s. The State Economic Commission was merged with 
the State Planning Commission, but subsequently separated again under a variety of different 
names, including the State Economics and Trade Commission in the late 1990s. Refer to 
Naughton (2003a), p. 4. 
415 Refer to Huang (2002a), p. 553-554 and Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), p. 65. 
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3.2.3.2 Streamlined government structure 
In March 2003, following the 10th National People's Congress, China restructured its 
key economic ministries.416 The State Council scrapped the approval formalities on 
more than 1,000 items since China's entry into the WTO and thus loosened its grip 
on the economy.417 Unlike the reform of 1998, which mainly focused on downsizing, 
the reform of 2003 (refer to Figure 8) intended to reduce the overlap of the 
government departments' responsibilities, strengthen the coordination between them, 
and define the scope of their duties. 
Figure 8: The restructuring of government in 2003. 
Before 
Stale Economic and Trade 
Commission 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation 
State Development Planning 
Commission 
Office for Restructuring the 
Economic System 
People"s Bank of China 
Slate Family Planning 
Commission 
State Drug Administration 
Source: Fan and Zhang (2003), p. 30. 
After 
1----------tl Slate-Owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) 
Ministry of Commerce 
National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) 
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission 
People's Bank of China 
f------------ot State Population and Family 
Planning Commission 
f------------.i Stale Food and Drug Administration 
The three most important reorganizations (illustrated in Figure 8), that aimed to 
increase the government's efficiency in line with the market system and China's WTO 
accession, are: 
" 16 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2004), 11 Analysis on the Current Situation of Government 
Management System Adapting Itself to the Market Economy", Internet Edition, reviewed 
23.03.2006. 
417 Refer to Fan and Zhang (2003), pp. 28-29. 
108 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
A new model of economic development 
• Bundling different functions in the NORG: The NDRC took on the duties of the 
State Council Office for Economic Restructuring and some functions of the 
State Economics and Trade Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation.418 The NDRC is the macro-economic regulatory 
department under the State Council. It reports on the national economy and 
social development to the National People's Congress and guides the overall 
economic system restructuring. The NDRC was established in order to 
improve macroeconomic control by merging the functions of development and 
reform. It has the sole authority for the planning and implementation of 
industrial policy in order to accelerate the move from interventionist to vision-
based industrial policy.419 
• Creation of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC): According to the "Interim Regulations on Supervision 
and Management of State-owned Assets of Enterprises" (2003), the SASAC 
was created as a special ministerial level institution directly under the State 
Council.420 Its establishment represented a departure from the previous 
situation, where multiple government ministries and other bureaucratic entities 
had a say in state-owned enterprises' (SOEs) daily operations.421 SASAC is 
responsible for the micro-economic coordination and regulation of the big 
domestic state-owned companies.422 
418 Refer to NDRC (2007), "Main Functions of the NDRC", Internet Edition, reviewed 16.01.2007. 
m Refer to Ken'ichi (2003), p. 2. 
420 Refer to SASAC (2007), "Main Functions and Responsibilities of SASAC", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 16.01.2007 and to SASAC (2003), Decree of the State Council of the People's Republic 
of China, No. 378, "Interim Regulations on Supervision and Management of State-owned Assets 
of Enterprises", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.03.2006. 
421 The Ministry of Finance was responsible for the administration of capital, for example, the 
definition and registration of property rights of state assets and the supervision of state asset 
evaluations and transactions, along with the supervision of revenue collection. The Special 
Inspector's Commission was responsible for financial auditing. The State Economics and Trade 
Commission and the State Development Planning Commission were responsible for the 
supervision and control of enterprises' business activities, including financing, investment, the 
sale of assets and internal restructuring. Refer to Tenev et al. (2002), p. 27 and Fernandez-
Stembridge and Huchet (2006), p. 32-33 and Taube (2005), p. 4. 
422 Its task is to separate the government's functions as investor and owner of state assets from its 
function as the public manager of society as a whole. In particular, SASAC was created as an 
instrument to address the problems of debt-ridden SOEs, which by then represented almost 
200,000 companies worth about RMB 10 trillion. As of mid-2006, it oversaw a portfolio of 165 of 
the biggest and centrally controlled SOEs - including those involved in critical sectors of the 
economy such as telecommunications, civil aviation, oil, steel and auto manufacturers - with 
combined assets of about RMB 6 trillion. The overseeing of all remaining SOEs was left to local 
state-asset organizations. Refer to SASAC (2003), "China State-owned Assets Management 
System Reform Entering New Stage", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.03.2006. For further 
information refer to Fernandez-Stembridge and Huchet (2006), p. 33 and Xinhuanet (2006), "Rule 
will require SOEs to submit dividends to government", Internet Edition, reviewed 03.10.2006. 
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• Establishment of the Ministry of Commerce: Some of the functions of the State 
Economics and Trade Commission423 and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation were combined in a new agency, the Ministry of 
Commerce.424 In addition, functions of the former State Development Planning 
Commission were integrated. After China's entry into the WTO, some of the 
functions of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation have 
become less important or even futile. The Ministry of Commerce was 
established to reduce the overlap of responsibilities between the departments 
that used to oversee foreign and domestic trade regulations, and thus to 
increase administrative efficiency. For instance, the State Economics and 
Trade Commission originally determined whether foreign imports had harmed 
domestic firms, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
determined whether anti-dumping or safeguarding measures would be 
implemented. These two functions relevant to China's WTO accession were to 
be combined into one ministry.425 The Ministry of Commerce shares its 
responsibility for FOi-reiated policies with the NDRC. 
The assignment of tasks to various commissions and ministries shows that China 
has no pilot agency in the sense of the Japanese MITI. Although each ministry and 
commission is responsible for a special sector, they have to work closely together. 
Economic policy-making, and particularly the implementation of industrial policies, is 
organized along different central level commissions and ministries, and along central 
and local-level state institutions.426 The developmental states were far more 
centralized, and policy functions were entirely carried out by the elite bureaucracy of 
the pilot agency. Although the State Planning Commission and its successors can be 
regarded as the most influential superministry throuihout the reform period, authority 
has been fragmented by function, territory and rank. 27 
New policy initiatives affect various bureaucratic officials with vaguely defined and 
sometimes overlapping Jurisdictions, conflicting interests, and complex, distinct 
structures of authority.42 In addition, the decentralized structure of the Chinese 
bureaucrac19 has intensified the need for coordination among bureaucratic agencies 
in Beijing.4 9 A number of functions of an East Asian pilot agency are performed by 
423 As the industrial ministries were abolished in 1998, the State Economics and Trade Commission 
took over most of their remaining functions. Refer to Naughton (2003a), p. 4. 
424 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2007), "Mission - Main Mandate of the Ministry of Commerce", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 15.01.2007. 
425 Refer to Fan and Zhang (2003), p. 30. 
426 In a system with multiple principals, monitoring costs are likely higher, because of co-ordination 
costs. Refer to Kassim and Menon (2003), p. 124. Also refer to Mccubbins et al. (1989). 
427 Refer to Lieberthal (1997), p. 4. 
428 For further information referto Lampton (1987a, 1987b), Lieberthal (1991, 1992, 1995, 1997) and 
Lieberthal and Oksenberg ( 1988). 
429 Refer to Shirk (1985), pp. 216-217. 
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local leaders at each level of government.430 According to Singh (1992), policy-
making institutions are fragmented and .groliferation of independent policies at the 
various levels of government is common. 31 This questions the capacity of the central 
state and its autonomy to implement a coherent economic reform policy during its 
transition. 
The fragmented structure of authority means that it is often necessary to achieve 
consensus among several bureaucratic bodies.432 If policies are to move forward, all 
involved agencies have to be consulted and supportive.433 In the telecom sector, to 
give an example, at least ten organizations (including the Ministry of Information 
Industry and the Ministry of State Security) retain a regulatory stake regarding 
telecom decisions.434 Key decisions are therefore often the result of a series of 
reinforcing compromises made in a number of loosely co-ordinated decision-making 
bodies over a long period.435 The consequence is that any major project or policy 
requires a gradual and protracted process of consensus and alliance building among 
competing bureaucracies at each level to gain support both vertically and horizontally 
in the bureaucratic system. 
3.3 State 
Johnson {1987) contends that industrial policy can be distinguished from general 
economic policy by "its penetration to the micro-level, meaning government attempts 
to influence economic sectors { ... ], whole industries[ ... ] and individual enterprises 
within industries".436 Industrial strategists maintain that industrial policy and selective 
state intervention ("picking winners") is necessary to enable industries in developing 
countries to gain dynamic efficiency in the sense of achieving international 
competitiveness within a reasonable period of time. International competitiveness is 
achieved when these industries can compete in international markets without state 
support. Successful state intervention promotes infant industries and rationalizes 
industries that encounter difficulties in competing. The role of government is to 
improve the technological capability of firms by moving them down their learning 
curve.437 
430 This is further elaborated in Chapter 3.3.2. 
431 Refer to Singh (1992), p. 101. 
432 Literature on ''fragmented authoritarianism focuses on the shift from bureaucratic central 
command through the planning apparatus to interunit bargaining in economic governance. Refer 
to Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), pp. 22-23, Lieberthal (1995), p. 169, Hamrin and Zhao 
(1995), p. xxvii, Lieberthal (1992). p. 2 ff and Heilmann (2004), p. 64. 
433 For further information refer to Zhao (1995). 
434 Refer to Pearson (2006), p. 18. 
435 For further information refer to Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988). 
436 Refer to Johnson (1987), p. 159. 
437 For further information refer to Pack and Westphal (1986) and Poulson (1994), p. 388 ff. 
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3.3.1 Industrial policy 
Like the East Asian developmental states, the Chinese government applies industrial 
policy to promote economic development by readjusting the industrial structure and 
the product mix and helping to improve the competitive standing of Chinese firms.438 
Industrial policy - measures that favor one or more industries (or firms) over others -
can take a range of forms, such as export subsidies and preferential loans. The 
positive example of the East Asian developmental states and their execution of 
industrial policy in the form of selective state intervention have influenced China's 
industrial policy-making. The Chinese government has instrumentalized industrial 
policy (which was close to planning in the command economy) in order to maintain 
extensive competencies of economic planning and intervention, at least temporarily. 
In consequence, not only has change of demand been responsible for structural 
transformation, but also economic policy measures of the CCP. Direct intervention in 
the market mechanism, and also the time and sequence of the reform process, have 
influenced structural adjustment processes.439 
Chinese leaders' commitment to economic openness in combination with strong state 
intervention has continued throughout the reform period.44° Central authorities still 
continue to issue five-year and single-year plans which cover strategically important 
aspects of the Chinese economy. With these policies, the central government aims to 
develop industry, guide foreign investment and foreign trade, and establish large 
enterprise groups. The first explicit and detailed official guideline for a national 
industrial policy was the "Decision on the Gist of Current Industrial Policy" that the 
State Council issued in 1989.441 The decision testifies the central government's 
ambitions to guide the process of modernization and correction of China's industry 
structure. The Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) also confirmed the central role of 
industrial policy for economic development. The plan contends: 
'Tlndustrial] planning plays the major role in setting targets for economic 
growth, controlling total supply and demand, readjusting economic structure 
and geographical distribution of major sectors of the economy, and controlling 
other important economic activities. {. .. ] Most production activities and 
operations in enterprises, ordinary technological upgrading and small-scale 
construction projects are to be regulated by market forces. " 2 
438 Refer to Rosen (1992), p. 79. 
439 Refer to Opper ( 1999), p. 69. 
440 Refer to Unger and Chan (1995), p. 32 and Zhu (2003), p. 157. 
441 Refer to Zhang and Long (1997), pp. 264-265 and Lu (2000a), p. 356. 
442 Li (1991), "Report on the Outline of the Ten-Year Program and of the Eighth Five-Year Plan for 
National Economic and Social Development", p. XVII. 
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The scope and role of planning substantially changed during the reform era. In the 
Eighth Five-Year Plan, the central government confirmed its ambition to combine ''the 
planned economy with market regulation" and gradually replace mandatory plans of 
the Mao era by guidance plans.443 The central government used "economic, 
administrative and legal means, especially price control, taxation, interest rates and 
exchange rates" to promote economic development.444 The state's responsibility to 
govern resource allocation by economic-political interventions arises from the central 
government's mistrust of the functioning of markets. Its intervention aims to induce 
changes of the production structure necessary for economic transformation. The 
CCP's and the central government's legitimacy are thus based on the assumption 
that government intervention in the form of industrial policy is a necessary 
precondition for economic transformation. The CCP's legitimation of power could 
thus be retained and even strengthened.445 
In 1993, after Deng's "Southern Inspection Tour",446 the National People's Congress 
issued an amendment to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 
promulgating the "socialist market economy".447 The emphasis of the "Decision of the 
CCP Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist 
Market Economic Structure" 448 was on the changing role of the government from a 
central planning and controlling function for a planned economy to a supporting role 
for a market economy, but without losing its function as a regulator.449 
With the promulgation of the socialist market economy, the central leaders 
emphasized their intention to transform the economic system by an unprecedented 
path of development, and promulgated a new version of the market economy, 
443 Ibidem, p. XVII. 
444 Ibidem, p. XVI. 
445 Reier to Opper (1999), p. 74. 
«s Along his tour Deng recommended that China should learn from the Asian four little dragons and 
proceed in its transformation path. Reier to Deng (1992), "Excerpts From Talks Given in 
Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai", Internet Edition, reviewed 19.03.2006. 
447 Refer to National People's Congress, "Constitution of the People's Republic of China", 
Amendment Two, Approved on 29.03.1993 by the 8th NPC at its 1st Session. In his political report 
to the congress, Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the CCP, stated that "the objective of the 
reform of the economic structure will be to establish a socialist market economy that will further 
liberate and expand the productive forces.• Beijing Review (1992), "Party Congress Introduces 
Market Economy", p. 6. 
448 In November 1993, the CCP passed the "Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Some 
Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure". Reier to Beijing 
Review (1992), "Party Congress Introduces Market Economy", pp. 5-6 and Li (1993), "Report on 
the Work of the Government", p. VIII. 
449 Refer to Cooke (2003), pp. 388-389. 
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namely a "socialist" one.450 The socialist market economy incorporates aspects of a 
planned economy as well as market regulations which correspond to the East Asian 
developmental states (market regulations under the rule of a strong state). The State 
Council confirmed in 1993, that "state planning" was "an essential means of macro-
control" in order to "optimize the economic structure".451 In a country that detaches 
itself from socialism, state intervention is needed in order to build new, capitalist 
institutions and regulations and abandon the central planning institutions of the pre-
reform era.452 The state's economic policies intended to shape the macro incentive 
structure that firms in the economy face. 
With the "Outline of State Industrial Policies for the 1990s", which was promulgated 
by the State Council in 1994, the central government confirmed that industrial policy 
remains an important instrument of economic policy: 
"The formulation of industrial policies is to work as one of the important means 
of the state in its strive to strengthen and improve macro-economic control, 
effectively adjust and optimize the industrial structure, improve the quality of 
industries and promote a sustainable, fast and healthy development of the 
national economy {. .. ]. " 453 
Unlike industrial policy in the 1980s and early 1990s, which lacked clear priorization 
of industries (the 1989 Decision specified solely in the category "encouraged 
production" more than 200 products without order of priority),454 the 1994 Outline of 
State Industrial Policies focused on priority industries and key enterprises. Similar to 
the East Asian developmental states, the outline emphasized to accelerate the 
development of "pillar industries" which were to promote national economic 
450 A major shift in ideology underpins the reforms, with the CCP moving from a dogmatic emphasis 
on the Maoist version of Marxism-Leninism to a pragmatic, market-oriented approach with its 
emphasis on "establishing a unified and open market system". Although the rhetoric on socialism 
and the dominance of the public sector have been retained, the staunch anti-market, anti-private 
initiative, anti-private gain focus has been removed. Since then property reforms in the state-
sector have accelerated. Moreover, the central government emphasized that in the socialist 
market economy prices are set by the marketplace and public ownership dominates but coexists 
with private ownership. Indeed, in 1992, the government freed the prices of 600 industrial 
producer goods. Refer to National People's Congress (1982), "Constitution of the People's 
Republic of China", Article 6, Internet Edition, reviewed 11.09.2006 and Chinese Government 
(2005), "Economic System", Internet Edition, reviewed 28.03.2006. For further information refer to 
Montionola and Weingast (1995), p. 52, Qin (2004), p. 872 and Yusuf et al. (2006), p. 70. 
451 Refer to Li (1993), "Report on the Work of the Government", p. X. 
452 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 93. 
453 State Council (1994), "Outline of State Industrial Policies for the 1990s", Implementation, Internet 
Edition, reviewed 31.03.2006. 
454 Refer to Li (1996), "Report on the Outline of the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development and the Long-Range Objectives to the Year 201 O", pp. I-XVI. For further 
information refer to Opper (1999), p. 85 and Singh (1992), p. 1 ff. 
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development. These include the machinery industry, the electronic industry, 
petroleum processing and the raw chemical materials industry, the auto industry and 
the construction industry. Growth of the pillar industries was promoted through 
government funds and preferential access to resources and materials.455 The central 
government allowed large enterprise groups to directly raise funds abroad. Products 
of the pillar industries were declared as "infant industrial products" and protected 
from international competition through quotas and tariffs. The central government 
moreover declared it would open part of the domestic market so that comflanies in 
the pillar industries were able to import needed technology and equipment. 56 In this 
regard, the central government used the same policy instruments to promote 
selected industries with the aim of increasing their international competitiveness.457 
In order to strengthen market mechanisms, in the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), 
the central government replaced guidance plans, that included enterprise-specific 
requirements, by indicative plans, that set general goals and suggestions.458 In the 
plan, the CCP completely gave up formulating detailed planning targets, but provided 
an overview of the expected developments of particular sectors and businesses.459 
Already in 1993, the proportion of the mandatory industrial production plan in total 
industrial output value, under the charge of the State Planning Commission, dropped 
from 12 percent to 7 percent.460 Since then, plans have mostly formulated 
development goals and informed economic agents on economic developments that 
have been envisioned by the CCP and the central government. Nonetheless, through 
five-year plans, the central government continues to exert impact on the top 
management of China's leading enterprises.461 
In its "Report on the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development (2001-2005)", the Chinese government confirmed its support for 
the declared pillar industries.462 Unlike former five-year plans, in the Tenth Five-Year 
Plan the government no longer supervised all matters, but focused its attention on 
455 Refer to State Council (1994), "Outline of State Industrial Policies for the 1990s", Chapter 111, 
Internet Edition, reviewed 31.03.2006. For further information refer to Zhu (2003), p. 150 and Oi 
(1999), pp. 117-118. 
456 Ibidem, Chapter IV. 
457 State promotion of selected sectors is further elaborated in Chapter 3.3.3. 
458 Refer to Opper (1999), p. 70 and Taube (2005), p. 3. 
459 Refer to Kennedy (2005), p. 47. 
460 Also materials distributed under the unified state plan decreased from prereform figures of 256 
kinds to 19 kinds. State planning control was manifested mainly in the examination and approval 
of investment projects, the use of foreign exchange as well as the planned distribution of bank 
loans. Refer to Su (1993), p. 110. 
461 Refer to Taube (2005), p. 3. 
462 Refer to NDRC (2006), 11Strengthen the Integration of Science, Technology and Economy 
Enhance Independent Innovation Capability", Internet Edition, reviewed 18.12.2006. 
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working out development strategies and plans.463 The Tenth Five-Year Plan became 
simpler and shorter. The number of indices of the Tenth Five-Year Plan was reduced 
to 39 from 105 in the Ninth Five-Year Plan, and with only 1,500 characters devoted to 
industry.464 The Tenth Five-Year Plan stressed market requirements, and attached 
greater importance to the efficiency of economic development.465 The Tenth Five-
year Plan did not include any directives, but relied on indicative planning and indirect 
means of control and regulation. 
In the context of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, NDRC stated that the government's 
"general guidance and coordination of reform" will persist, and even be 
strengthened, throughout the next five years.466 The new economic plan includes 
more than just the general outline of economic development goals.467 The plan for 
the period 2006-2010 is much more flexible than the directives issued in former 
periods. The promulgation of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan indicates that, despite the 
expansion of free market mechanisms - completion of price reform in 2003,468 
domination of the private sector (about two thirds of China's GDP) and the 
prevalence of foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) which contribute about one third to 
China's gross industrial output469 - the state's influence on the market through 
industrial policy is still prevalent. China is reviewing and formulating new industrial 
policies which are mainly divided into two categories: directional industrial policy (e.g. 
"Outline of State Industrial Policies for the 1990s") and differentiated industrial policy 
for specific industries (such as the auto industry, the electronic industry, and the 
telecommunications industry). 
Overall, according to Taube (2005), the central government sees itself as the 
strategic mastermind of national (economic) development, although at the same time 
upholding the premise that market forces should be the dominant coordination 
mechanism for day-to-day business interaction.470 The central government is still not 
463 Refer to People's Daily (2001), "NPC Deputies, CPPCC Members Interpret New Five-Year Plan", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 04.08.2006. 
464 Refer to Ken'ichi (2003), p. 2. 
465 Refer to People's Daily (2001), "NPC Deputies, CPPCC Members Interpret New Five-Year Plan", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 04.08.2006. 
466 Refer to Ma (2006), "The Eleventh Five-Year Plan: Targets, Paths and Policy Orientation", 
19.03.2006, Internet Edition, reviewed 14.11.2006. 
467 Refer to Taube (2005), p. 3. 
466 In 2003, price reform was nearly completed, leaving only a few strategic goods in the control of 
state agencies. 
469 Precise measurement of the size of the private sector is difficult. Defining as private all companies 
that are controlled neither by state nor collective shareholders suggests that the private sector 
was responsible for 57 percent of the value-added produced by the non-farm business sector in 
2003. Refer to OECD (2005), "Economic Survey of China 2005: Improving the productivity of the 
business sector", Internet Edition, reviewed 02.01.2007. 
470 Refer to Taube {2005), p. 3. 
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abandoning its function of formulating economic targets, and does not leave the 
development of the economy to market forces, because in China - even more than in 
the East Asian developmental states - economic growth is the basis of state power. 
China's transition strategy safeguards the power and privileges of the political elite, 
and implements wide-ranging economic reforms that both reduce the scope of state 
managerial controls over production and distribution and expand the role of the 
market as a mechanism to motivate and guide economic growth at the same time.471 
The central government follows the East Asian industrial policy approach of guiding 
the market and active state intervention through industrial policy in order to enhance 
economic development. 
Before analyzing more recent industrial policy implementation and focusing on the 
criteria of the East Asian Developmental State Model such as promotion of selected 
sectors, usage of foreign investment and trade policy, specific Chinese institutional 
innovations have to be highlighted. Fiscal federalism and collective ownership at the 
local level have particularly shaped industrial policy-making and have influenced the 
country's economic transformation since the early reform years. 
3.3.2 Institutional reforms - drivers of and obstacles to economic growth 
As the previous analysis indicates, in the 1980s, the relative scope of market 
institutions in coordinating the economy expanded, and the property rights structure 
changed. An incremental shift from a redistributive to a regulatory state happened 
gradually. These changes are key factors explaining the rapid growth of hybrid 
governance structures and private enterprises. These structural changes in 
combination with local bureaucrats' fiscal incentives resulted in economic 
performance improvements and subsequently economic growth.472 
3.3.2.1 Fiscal federalism 
Qian and Roland (1998) contend that two mechanisms may particularly constrain 
predatory political interference in the economy.473 First, under the assumption of 
factor mobility, fiscal decentralization can prompt more efficient provisions of local 
public goods if individuals can freely move across localities.474 Competition between 
localities thus increases opportunity costs of bailouts and any activities leading to 
inferior enterprise performance. Second, in a federal system, local governments 
471 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 95. 
472 For further information refer to Nee (1989) and Nee and Su (1990). 
473 For further information refer to Qian and Roland (1998). 
474 Tiebout argues that in a system with fiscal decentralization and interjurisdictional competition, 
citizens can "vote with their feet" by moving to the locality that provides their optimal bundle of 
public goods and taxes. For further information refer to Tiebout (1956) and Bardhan (2002). 
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compete in building a business environment favorable to private capital. Only local 
governments that manage to provide a hospitable business environment will attract 
the resources needed to enhance economic growth. This may harden budget 
constraints of jurisdictions and provide incentives for efficiency-oriented local 
activities. In a federalist system, interjurisdictional competition may consequently 
constrain discretionary authority, predatory behavior, and rent-seeking.475 
Fiscal decentralization may, however, also cause allocative inefficiency. According to 
Riker (1964), the central design problem of federalism is how to create institutions 
that grant the central government enough authority to provide central ioods and 
police subunits, but not so much that it usurps all public authority.47 The two 
dilemmas are difficult to solve because institutional mechanisms designed to mitigate 
one might exacerbate the other. To control subnational governments, the federal 
government must have the power to punish them. This power, however, allows a 
non-benevolent federal government to abuse states. Sustaining federalism therefore 
requires a careful balance between the two dilemmas. The central government must 
have sufficient power to prevent states from free-riding; yet not be so powerful as to 
be able to overawe them.477 
In China, the most important of the fiscal reforms was the tax responsibility system. 
By the mid-1980s, provinces, municipalities, prefectures, counties and townships 
were subject to a bottom-up revenue-sharing system. The central state and each of 
its provinces signed fiscal contracts to formalize revenue sharing. In the same 
manner, each province and its prefectures, each prefecture and its counties, and 
each county and its townships signed respective fiscal contracts.478 Only certain 
taxes such as taxes on state and collective industries were subject to share 
contracts, and collected by localities, as they constituted the core of the locality's 
"within-budget revenues". The other major items that made up the within-budget 
revenues included agricultural tax and profits from state-run enterprises within the 
locality. Most of the other revenues that a locality collected were considered as 
"extrabudgetary revenues" which were not subject to revenue sharing.479 As Figure 9 
shows, the extrabudgetary revenue of local governments increased from RMB 3.1 
billion in 1978 to RMB 14.0 billion in 1994. 
475 Refer to Weingast (1995) and Nee and Opper (2007), p. 100-101. 
476 For an elaboration on his general theory of federalism refer to Riker (1964). 
477 De Figueiredo and Weingast argue that the center and the states must have incentives to fulfill 
their obligations within the limits of federal bargains. For further elaboration on self-enforcing 
federalism refer to de Figueiredo and Weingast (2005). 
476 Not all areas have instituted the tax responsibility system to the township. Some places used an 
overall ratio, such as 70:30, where the locality kept 70 percent and 30 percent was sent to the 
next higher level. In other cases the locality payed a set quota to the next higher level, but once 
that quota was met, the locality retained all or at least the bulk of the remaining tax revenues. 
479 In addition, there were some taxes designated as "central taxes". These were not subject to 
revenue sharing. Central taxes were the sole property of the central state. Localities collected but 
received nothing from central taxes. Refer to Oi (1992), p. 104. 
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Figure 9: Extrabudgetary revenue of local governments, 1978-1994. 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2006). 
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Due to the tax responsibility system, localities became independent fiscal entities that 
had both responsibility for local expenditures and the unprecedented right to use the 
revenue they retained.480 As tax revenue is positively correlated with firm 
performance, local bureaucrats started to support the growth and profitability of their 
locality's enterprises.481 Fiscal decentralization gave local governments the incentive 
to choose the policy that appeared to be the most successful according to local 
characteristics.482 In order to attract private investors and entrepreneurs, localities 
offered indirect incentives that did not interfere with the market mechanism. They 
provided enterprises within their locality well developed infrastructure and services, 
and the reduction of county-level tax and local fees.483 Additionally, local 
governments attempted to have efficient and timely bureaucratic procedures in order 
to achieve and enhance local competitiveness. In this way, local authorities attracted 
inward investment from abroad and promoted the sale of their localities' goods in 
international markets.484 
480 Ibidem, p. 103. 
481 Previously, the central government took away all the locally generated revenue. In consequence, 
the local government did not have any ince ntive to support productive local businesses because 
it could not benefit from their efforts. Conversely, if local governments' expenditures are closely 
linked to the revenue they generate, the local governments will more likely support productive 
local businesses as they benefit directly from their efforts. Refer to Qian (2003), pp. 27-30 and 
Nee and Opper (2007), p. 101. For a useful summary of the evolution of fiscal policies and 
variations in the formal system, refer to Oksenberg and Tong (1991), Tong (1989) and Wong 
(1991, 1992). 
482 Refer to Thun (2006), pp. 16-17. 
483 Refer to Nee et al. (2005), p. 31 and Edin (2000), pp. 105-106. 
484 Refer to Nolan (1995b), p. 178. 
119 Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
A new model of economic development 
On January 1, 1994, the central government introduced major tax and fiscal 
reforms.485 The reform included a clear distinction between national and local taxes, 
and established a national tax bureau and local tax bureaus, each responsible for its 
own tax collection.486 The reform also set up fixed rules between the national 
government and local governments. It included the introduction of an indirect value-
added tax which has to be shared by the national and local government at a fixed 
ratio of 75:25 in order to assure adequate revenues for the central government.487 
With the adoption of the new reform, local governments can hardly extract tax 
revenues at the expense of the central government (refer to Figure 10). 
Figure 10 shows that while in 1993, local government revenue was 78 percent of 
total government revenue, it decreased to 43 percent in 1994 and remained stable 
since then. Also the extrabudgetary revenue of local governments decreased to RMB 
11.6 billion in 1997 (compared with RMB 14 billion in 1994). Due to decreasing 
extrabudgetary revenues and increasing financial responsibilities, local governments 
have had incentives to promote economic growth and local revenue by facilitating 
market-oriented economic activities.488 
Figure 10: Revenue ratio of central and local governments, 1978-2006. 














11 Local governrrents • central governrrent 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
Year 
485 With the tax and fiscal reforms, the central government aimed to establish a system that was 
more aligned to international best practices. Refer to Qian (2003), p. 40. 
486 Previously, China did not have a national tax bureau, and there was no such a need because all 
taxes were collected by local governments and shared with the central government. Refer to Qian 
(2003), pp. 40-41. 
487 The 1980s model had starved the central government of revenues, which fell as a fraction of GDP 
from 30 percent in 1970, to 23 percent in 1985, to 12.6 percent in 1993, to 10 percent in 1995. 
Refer to Qian (2003), p. 41 and Keefer (2007), p. 233. 
488 Refer to Ahrens and Mengeringhaus (2006), p. 95, Nee and Opper (2007), p. 101 and Lin (2001 ), 
p. 4. 
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Altogether, fiscal federalism has constituted a key institutional innovation. Fiscal 
federalism has affected the pervasiveness of soft budget constraints. While Walder 
(1995) assumes that fiscal federalism has hardened local governments' budget 
constraints, Nee et al. (2007) contend that fiscal federalism creates incentives for 
interjurisdictional competition that will eventually bring about a hardening of budget 
constraints at the firm level.489 Most of all, revenue-sharing arrangements stimulated 
enthusiasm on the part of local governments to support and pursue market-oriented 
economic development. Local governments' financial independence has stimulated 
revenue-generating reforms.490 It is moreover important not to obscure the enduring 
influence of the central government over local policy. Provincial autonomy is at the 
bequest of the central government rather than a legal right as in a federal 
structure.491 
3.3.2.2 Collective ownership 
According to the asserters of New Institutional Economics, the main condition for an 
efficient market economy is not only "gettinf prices right", but also ''getting property 
rights right" and ''getting institutions right".4 2 As North (1997) pointed out, political 
institutions can play an important role in reducing transaction costs by improving the 
security of property rights and the enforcement of contracts.493 The transition 
economy is featured by weak market structures, poorly specified property rights,494 
and institutional uncertainty. In a partially reformed system, hybrid government forms 
savor a transaction cost advantage for collective firms, because (local) governments 
may assist collective enterprises to secure reliable access to factor resources they 
need, serve as intermediaries in critical negotiations with banks for access to credit, 
fix local prices on key commodities, and approve and coordinate the investment of 
extrabudgetary funds. A continuing shift from redistribution to markets and secure 
property rights, however, induces change in the comparative costs of governance.495 
Market institutions become more dominant in the transition economy, and the 
institutional foundation of a market economy is incrementally constructed. This 
results in a relative increase in the cost of hybrid governance structures, and a 
decrease of transaction cost advantages for collective firms. Private companies are 
the beneficiaries of transition to market structures.496 
489 According to Nee et al., governments themselves have by definition soft budget constraints as 
there is always a bailout guarantee through higher level governments, extra-budgetary fees, tax 
increases and public debt. For further information refer to Nee et al. (2007), p. 41ft. 
490 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 101 and Nee (1992), p. 5. 
491 Refer to Thun (2006), p. 35. 
492 For further information refer to Coase (1992), North (1997) and Williamson (1994). 
493 Refer to North (1997), p. 150 and Coase (1992). 
494 For further information refer to Demsetz (1967). 
495 Reier to Nee (1992), p. 4. 
496 Refer to North (1990) and Williamson (1991) 
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In the early reform period, the central government encouraged the foundation of rural 
township and village enterprises (TVEs), which are the successors of collectively-
owned industrial enterprises in people's communes. TVEs are best characterized as 
community enterprises with a governance structure in which the community 
government has control. The central government envisioned that these collective 
enterprises would facilitate structural employment changes and absorb the rapidly 
increasing supply of workers. 
TVEs rapidly developed into an efficient and indispensable part of the Chinese 
economy due to the following reasons.497 First, the central government issued 
regulations that were less hostile to TVEs than to private enterprises. Already in 
1978, the central government declared that commune brigade enterprises were to 
strive for greater development, and encouraged provincial, city and county 
governments to grant these particular enterprises tax breaks.498 In comparison, the 
central government did not allow private enterprises to operate until 1981, and limited 
their hiring of employees to no more than eight per enterprise.499 
Second, TVEs' success can be traced to the incentive structure they faced. The 
social-economic development of rural townships and villages depended heavily on 
the economic success of local industrial enterprises, as up to 95 percent of local 
revenues stemmed from TVEs. Increasing revenues accrued to the local 
governments directly. Bureaucrats' interest was no longer solely in pleasing a 
bureaucratic superior, but in enhancing the prosperous growth of TVEs. Local cadres 
hence had a strong motivation to follow economic principals.500 The rise of TVEs was 
related closely to the underdevelopment of input markets. Local governments 
contributed critical inputs to the growth of TVEs such as land and credit where factor 
markets were underdeveloped and prices of inputs were tightly controlled.501 
Furthermore, as TVEs had less or no access to soft credits in comparison to SOEs, 
they worked relatively autonomously within a basically competitive environment and 
under hard budget constraints.502 Through the introduction of payment schemes and 
management responsibility contracts, TVE managers were also presented with 
personal incentives to promote the growth of TVEs. 
The incentive structures constituted coalitions between local bureaucrats and 
entrepreneurs which Oi (1992) calls "local corporatism".503 While bureaucrats 
contributed bureaucratic connections, enterprise managers provided business ideas 
and managerial skills. Thus, both parties had become indispensable for the success 
497 Refer to Opper (2001 ), p. 207. 
498 Refer to Che and Qian (1998), pp.10-11. 
499 This restriction was removed in 1984. Refer to Che and Qian (1998), p. 11. 
500 Refer to Opper (2001 ), p. 207. 
501 Refer to Che (2002), pp. 800-803, Li (1998), p. 395 and Li et al. (2006), pp. 10-11. 
502 For further information on why TVEs face harder budget constraints refer to Che and Qian (1998), 
p. 17 ff. 
503 For further information refer to Oi (1992). 
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of new businesses in the half-reformed Chinese economy.504 They were de facto 
shareholders rather than short-term bribe-takers. Bureaucrats became pro-reform in 
principle, having incentives to lobby higher-level agencies for reduced regulations on 
behalf of local entrepreneurs.505 
The development of China's TVEs was yet not uniform across regions. Jin and Qian 
(1998) find empirical evidence that the development of TVEs is negatively correlated 
with the locality's market development.506 In the early reform years, TVEs were 
hence successful in localities with weak market structures, poorly specified property 
rights and institutional uncertainty. Local corporatism may reduce transaction costs 
when the institutional arrangements underpinning markets are weak and 
redistributive institutions still subordinate to market forces. As marketization has 
proceeded in the reform period, localities with high growth rates have been the ones 
that have economized on transaction costs by reducing bureaucratic interference in 
economic decisions of the enterprise. In the absence of contractual law hardened by 
routine compliance and enforcement, marketized enterprises need political allies who 
provide the backing and resources needed by entrepreneurs to compete 
effectively.507 
TVEs were being privatized throughout the 1990s, as recessionary conditions in the 
domestic economy drove many collective enterprises to orient production even more 
to the world economy.508 In addition, in the late 1990s, private ownership of 
enterprises gained legitimacy. The Constitutional Amendment of 1999 regarded the 
private sector as "an important component" of the economy.509 Consequently, the 
benefit of TVEs in terms of more secure property rights decreased, and local 
governments transformed more and more TVEs into individual shareholdings.510 As 
504 Although most studies have focused on those new businesses established by local governments, 
in fact, many central-government agencies have also established their own business ventures. 
Reier to Li (1998), p. 395. 
505 One negative effect of having bureaucrats sponsor businesses is that it increases their appetite 
for bureaucratic power. In the Chinese context, the economic and bureaucratic competition 
among regions seems to have kept this tendency in check. Refer to Li (1998), p. 395. 
506 For further information refer to Jin and Qian (1998). 
507 Reier to Nee (1992), p. 4 and p. 23. 
508 Reier to Qian (2003), p. 40 and Nee (1992), p. 15. 
509 However, the term privatization is avoided by the Chinese leadership, and SOEs are still a major 
pillar of the Chinese economy. In 2005, the Ministry of Commerce promulgated that the Chinese 
economic reform is carried out "from exclusively public ownership to the pattern with the public 
sector remaining dominant and diverse sectors of the economy developing side by side". Reier to 
National People's Congress, ·constitution of the People's Republic of China", Amendment Three, 
Approved on 15.03.1999 by the NPC at its 2nd Session and Ministry of Commerce (2005), 
"Chinese Government's Administrative Mode Transformation", Internet Edition, reviewed 
23.03.2006. For further information refer to Chinese Government (2005), "Economic System", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 28.03.2006. 
510 Refer to Qian (2003), p. 40 and Ahrens and Mengeringhaus (2006), pp. 90-91. 
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the economy became increasingly marketized and both product and labor market 
competition intensified in the 1990s, the profitability of manr, TVEs deteriorated, while 
private enterprises started to boom in the same location.5 1 In this regard, while the 
share of collective firms in national industrial output had increased from 22 to 39 
percent between 1978 and 1996, it decreased from 38 percent to 3 percent between 
1997 and 2006. While other enterprises such as private enterprises, FFEs and JVs 
were non-existent at the beginning of reform, they accounted for almost 87 percent of 
gross industrial output value in 2006 (refer to Figure 11 ). However, particularly in 
inland regions, local governments still frequently oppose market reform, harass 
private businesses and practice protectionist measures which result in economic 
autarky.512 
To sum up, while the East Asian developmental states were committed to private 
property, growth at the local level in China was driven by collectively owned TVEs in 
the early reform period. State officials at the township level became entrepreneurs 
promoting the growth of their localities' TVEs, and securing a sound business 
environment within their jurisdictions. 
Figure 11: Share of gross industrial output value by type of firm ownership, 19 78-
2006. 513 
Share of total gross 
industrial output value(%) 
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Source: China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004 and China Statistical Yearbook (2006, 2007). 
511 The potential social gains from privatization do not automatically lead to privatization unless the 
local governments have the incentives to do so. The significant benefits of TVE ownership to local 
governments are the tax revenues they extract from TVEs. After privatization, the township and 
village governments were able to keep all the privatization revenue. They were also able to 
continue to levy fees on local private firms, usually 1.5 percent of total sales. This "local tax" did 
not have to be shared with the higher level government. Township and village governments 
usually payed a fixed amount instead. Therefore, local governments supported, rather than 
opposed, privatization out of their own interests. Refer to Qian (2003), p. 40. 
512 Refer to Nee (1992), p. 16. 
513 The category "Others" includes Cooperative Enterprises, Joint Ownership Enterprises, Limited 
Liability Corporations, Share Holding Enterprises, Enterprises with Foreign Funds From Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and FFEs. 
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3.3.2.3 Corruption 
Klitgaard (1988) stated that three structural dimensions of a government institution 
are most critical in creating opportunities for corruption: the monopoly power of 
officials; the degree of discretion that officials are permitted to exercise; and the lack 
of accountability and the transparency in an institution.514 China's decentralization 
process has triggered an increase in all three aspects. While the degree of discretion 
of local officials has increased to the extent of forming monopolized powers, 
accountability and transparency of exercising these powers have not been 
established. 
Decentralization transferred power from the central government to the localities. 
Under economic and political pressures, officials at subnational levels no longer 
behave simply as state agents within the official budgetary boundaries, but assume 
the role of local economic principals. Local authorities enjoy extensive administrative 
and economic discretion in carrying out government policies. They control business 
licensing, resource distribution, administrative budgeting and local taxation, as well 
as trade and investment in their jurisdiction. In consequence, local officials have 
more opportunities to use and abuse their power. The surge of local bureaucrats' 
self-interests has transformed local officials from mere state agents into local 
economic principals with entrepreneurial and sometimes predatory behavior. Such a 
structure of governance provides enough room for local officials to render favorable 
treatment to special interests in exchange for personal gain.515 
Based on statistics supplied by the CCP's Central Discipline and Inspection 
Commission, on average 130,000 - 190,000 party members have been punished and 
disciplined each year for various types of misdeeds and crimes since the early 
1980s. The Central Discipline and Inspection Commission's data show that 16 
percent of the CCP members disciplined and punished in 2006 engaged in 
economically corrupt activities. From October 1997 to September 2002, 28,996 
cadres at the county and division levels as well as 2,422 officials at the department 
and bureau levels were prosecuted for corruption.516 Land-related corruption is 
particularly widespread.517 One case of a high-ranking official was Tian Fengshan, 
China's former minister of land and resources, who was sentenced on charges of 
job-related crimes to life imprisonment in late December 2005. His sentence makes it 
the mainland's highest level corruption conviction between 2001 and 2005. Tian was 
charged with accepting more than RMB 4.4 million in bribes between 1995 and 2003, 
when he served first as the governor of Heilongjiang province and then as a cabinet 
514 For further information refer to Klitgaard ( 1988). 
515 Refer to Gong (2006), p. 89. 
516 Refer to Pei (2007), p. 1. 
517 For a detailed elaboration on land-related corruption refer to Gong (2006), p. 89. 
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minister.518 Altogether, Pei (2007) estimates that illicit activities such as bribery, 
kickbacks, theft, and misspending of public funds cost at least 3 percent of GDP.519 
Overall, state capacity and autonomy which can be translated into coherent policy 
implementation has often been disrupted by the widespread corruption of civil 
servants at all levels. Corruption arises from the indistinct separation of rights and 
powers between the state, regulatory institutions and economic agents. By exploiting 
their political power of controlling licenses, franchises and cheap materials which had 
state-controlled prices, government officials favored their own companies, or took 
bribes from other entrepreneurs who were then granted privileges such as cheap 
resources. 520 
Even after almost 30 years of reform, the CCP remains severely imbued with 
corruption that critically impedes its efforts to implement a consistent and effective 
industrial policy. As long as the close connection between the state, regulatory 
institutions and economic agents benefits its members, regulators' incentives to 
detect corruption are scant and state-led anti-corruption campaigns will be a short-
term priority of a rational government.521 
3.3.2.4 Local protectionism 
Not only were local officials' salaries affected by local growth, but also their individual 
career paths. As local officials' performance is assessed less by their compliance 
with the central government and more by local economic output, revenue growth and 
improvement in living standards, local ~overnments have become eager to improve 
their jurisdiction's financial well-being.52 Consequently, many localities have adopted 
protectionist measures such as trade barriers against one another. This resulted in 
the so-called "dukedom economies" phenomenon. Provinces, autonomous regions 
and municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai) were ''big dukedoms·: prefectures 
and cities were "middle dukedoms" and counties were "small dukedoms". 523 China's 
economy had become a "ducal economy" which intensified regional disparity.524 
Although Article 7 of the 1993 "Countering Unfair Competition Law of the People's 
Republic of China" prohibits local governments from utilizing administrative means to 
518 Refer to People's Daily (2004), "Former land minister expelled from CPC Central Committee", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 02.01.2007. 
519 Refer to Pei (2007), p. 2. 
520 Refer to Xia (2000), p. 95. 
521 Refer to Opper (2005a), p. 201 and p. 213. 
522 Refer to Gong (2006), p. 93. 
523 Refer to Montionola et al. (1995), p. 65 and Zheng (1995), p. 30. 
524 Furthermore, Zheng describes the consequences of decentralization as "a centralized empire 
breaking up into many small kingdoms". Refer to Zheng (1997), p. 30 and p. 129. 
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erect trade barriers,525 local governments use various measures to protect and 
support companies within their jurisdiction. Under the name of assistance to the local 
economy, local governments seek to cover trade barriers. Some regions set up 
barriers to limit the entry of similar commodities from outside through administrative 
economic and even legislative means, and thus protect local industry and stimulate 
market demand. These include approved import bans, discriminatory product and 
health certification standards, tariffs and dumping charges, the confiscations of profits 
earned from marketing foreign-provincial goods, as well as subsidies to local 
commercial units for buying locally produced products aimed at curtailing competition 
with home-province products and sustaining employment and the survival of 
uncompetitive local enterprises. Other regions fight "price wars" with other localities 
over similar products, and encourage local residents to buy local products only.526 
Protectionism has occurred most often in the markets of high profit-margin 
manufacturing goods (such as autos, tobacco products, and alcohol) and raw 
materials in short supply (such as cotton, silkworm cocoons527, tobacco and 
aluminum).528 In 2001, the World Bank reported that a bottle of Beijing's Yanjing beer 
that costs the equivalent of 18 cents in the capital, costs USO 1 in Sichuan province 
because of provincial fees and taxes.529 
The imperfect policing of the common market allows local governments to insulate 
themselves from competition by erecting trade barriers. This has resulted in small 
production units with inefficient scales of production. Similar conclusions can be 
drawn regarding sectoral and geographic specialization and rationalization in the 
industrial sector. The consequence is that regions do not specialize according to their 
comparative advantages, but push strongly into similar industries and product 
groups. This results in a convergence of industrial production across different 
regions. A "repetitive and duplicative" economic structure has emerged. The local 
authorities' attempts to first capture and then protect these rents has led to the 
creation of further distortions.530 
China thus appears as a collection of separate regional economies protected by 
barriers rather than a single market. Domestic trade protection pursues a dual 
objective of socio-economic stability preservation and fiscal revenue maximization. If 
economic reforms favor the reduction of internal barriers through the reduction of the 
public sector and the search for productivity gains, their disrupting effects put in 
movement destabilizing forces that impede domestic trade integration.53 The 
525 Refer to OECD (2003), "Objectives of the Competition Law of PRC and the Optimal Design of 
Competition Authorities", Internet Edition, reviewed 02.10.2006. 
526 Refer to Steinfeld (2002), p. 18, Gong (2006), p. 93, Ponce! (2005), p. 411 and Editorial Board of 
the Progress of China Industry Modernization (1999), p. 99. 
527 For detailed information on the "silkworm cocoon war" refer to Young (2000), pp. 1092-1093. 
528 Refer to Montinola et al. (1995), p. 65. 
529 Refer to World Bank (2001), "China's Local Trade Barriers: A Hard Nut to Crack", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 25.10.2007. 
530 Refer to Steinfeld (2002), p. 19 and Huang (2003), p. 261. 
531 The disrupting effects may be layoffs, losses of inefficient SOEs 1 declining profits etc. 
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Chinese central government faces challenges to comply with WTO rules and 
promote domestic market integration. It has to strike a balance between economic 
reforms and inherent adjustment costs and to limit local governments' economic 
interventionism. 532 
In conclusion, while the incentive structure transformed local bureaucrats from mere 
state agents into local economic principals promoting market-driven growth, 
predatory behavior in the form of corruption and protectionism also increased.533 
Bureaucrats' rent-seeking activities bear internal tensions and weaknesses, and 
diminish the central government's overall coherence. Thus, the emergence of a 
strong, bureaucratic state could not be established. In this respect, the Chinese 
bureaucracy lacks the intense commitment to national development which its 
neighbors in East Asia had.534 Containing rent-seeking is a key issue for the success 
of state and economic transformation in China.535 To control rent-seeking behavior, a 
government needs to reduce its regulatory interventions to the minimum necessary to 
achieve important national goals. Where regulatory and tax interventions are 
necessary, discretionary authority on the part of government officials must be kept to 
a minimum. An activist industrial policy (including a variety of licenses, government 
control over critical imports, and government-directed loans at subsidized rates to 
enforce government industrial policy initiatives) is the antithesis of an effort to reduce 
rent-seeking behavior.536 Altogether, although localism leads often to protectionism 
and "solos" of localities, local governments have actively enhanced the economic 
growth and transformation of their jurisdictions and thus of China. 
3.3.3 Promotion of selected sectors, companies and projects 
In the East Asian developmental states, only selected "upstream" industries and 
enterprises were targeted for preferential treatment such as protection, allocation of 
scarce production inputs and bureaucratic support. Similar to the East Asian 
developmental states, China has relied on different types of industrial policy tools to 
promote selected industries and enterprises during its reform: central government 
planning, empowering key industries with direct financing, preferential interest and 
tax rates, direct subsidies and a favorable supply of energy, raw materials, 
transportation facilities and funds for target industries, infant industry (trade) 
protection as well as pricing policies (state price controls over power and water 
supply) and administrative means (issuing direct orders to close down or merge 
532 Refer to Poncet (2005), p. 426. 
533 Refer to Gong (2006), p. 98. 
534 Refer to Fewsmith (2001 c), p. 107 ff and Nolan (2001 ), p. 93. 
535 Refer to Zhu (2003), p. 158. 
536 Refer to Perkins (2001 ), p. 8. 
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SOEs).537 The relative importance of these instruments changed over the years as 
the whole economy moved towards a more open and market-oriented system. Some 
of the policy instruments had to be abandoned gradually. According to the terms of 
the GATT and WTO agreements, China decided to dismantle various :Jrotectionist 
mechanisms favoring domestic industries and products over foreign.5 Even after 
China's WTO accession, however, central and local governments have applied most 
of the industrial policy tools the East Asian developmental states used to support 
domestic companies and enhance the country's economic transformation.539 
According to WTO law, member countries can continue to support R&D projects. 
Direct financial subsidies for R&D expenditure on specified science and technology 
(S&T) projects have thus become an essential instrument of industrial policy. 
3.3.3.1 Industrial policy targeting S& T 
As promulgated in the five-year plans, the central government attempts to establish 
and promote companies and technology-intensive products that are internationally 
competitive. The central government has directed its focus towards S&T since the 
1980s, when it recognized the mutual interdependency of economic, scientific and 
technological development. Since then, it has reiterated that S& T is the centerpiece 
of China's economic modernization strategy.540 The central government's "Report on 
the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development (2001-2005)" focused on the expansion of technology and high-tech 
industries and the manufacturing of information technology products. Thus, China 
was to "catch up with its ne~hbors" and accelerate its development "under the 
guidance of industrial policies". 1 
China's national technology policy comprises a set of mutually complementary S&T 
programs with the strategic aim of improving China's competitiveness in S&T.542 
Since 1987, S&T programs have received direct central government finance for R&D 
in priority sectors (such as space, laser and computing). They focus on applied 
537 Refer to "Decision on Further Improving the Economic Environment, Straightening Out the 
Economic Order, and Deepening the Reforms (Excerpts) (Adopted at the Fifth Plenary Session of 
the 13th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 09.11.1989), p. VIII. For further 
information refer to Zhang and Long (1997), p. 266 and Lu (2000a), p. 345. 
538 Refer to WTO Secretariat (2001 ), "Accession of the People's Republic of China - Decision of 1 O 
November 2001 "', Internet Edition, reviewed 23.11.2006. 
539 Refer to Weiss (2003), p. 245. 
540 Refer to Miller (1996), p. 184. 
541 Refer to NDRC (2006), 11Strengthen the Integration of Science, Technology and Economy 
Enhance Independent Innovation Capability", Internet Edition, reviewed 18.12.2006. 
542 Refer to Li (1989), "Resolutely Carry Out the Principles of Improvement, Rectification and 
Deepened Reform", p. XII. For a full overview of S&T programs refer to Ministry of Science and 
Technology of the People's Republic of China (2006), "National programs for science and 
technology", Internet Edition, reviewed 28.03.2006. 
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research and medium-term results. In the early reform period, central leaders 
realized that China's severe limits in R&D funding made it necessary to concentrate 
them on selected areas. Based on arguments of market failure and economies of 
scale, strengthened by a high level of uncertainty and the length of R&D cycles, 
central leaders assumed that this goal could be achieved better via planning than 
through market-means. They reaffirmed the necessity for state support of key 
programs which had to be provided at the central level, as local and provincial 
governments pushed too strongly for short-term profits.543 
The individual programs follow a set of distinct core objectives and support close 
science-business interface to secure innovation activities with good prospects for 
productivity growth. Thus, the central government intends to maximize the 
commercialization of R&D output. The planning institutions gradually adjust national 
priorities and targeted research goals in response to the changing overall state 
development goals. The State Science and Technology Commission is the major 
institution in charge of formulating national S&T plans. In this regard, China's 
technology policy essentially relies on central planning and resource allocation, which 
is in line with its socialist planning tradition.544 
The "Key Technologies Research and Development Program", the "863 (National 
High-tech Research and Development) Program" and the "973 Program" as well as 
the "Spark" and the "Torch" programs form the main body of state programs for S&T. 
First started in 1982, the "Key Technologies R&D Program" is a critical component of 
the five-year plans for the national economic and social development. Its strategic 
objectives are to promote the modernization of traditional industries and the 
optimization of industrial structures of national priority sectors. Its major aims are to 
carry out study and research on key S&T issues based on the principle of S&T 
pioneering.545 In this regard, priority is on the research-business interface and the 
support of joint projects between universities, research institutes and enterprises. 
The core principle of the program is to concentrate efforts and the nation's resources 
in personnel, as well as establish the firm as the major venue of innovative activities. 
Therefore, in line with the program, the central government provides advanced 
applicable new technologies, materials, techniques and e9;u:pment in order to speed 
up the national modernization process in priority industries. 4 
Approved by the State Council in 1986, the "Spark Program" is the nation's first 
guided development program designed to develop the rural economy through S&T, 
and thus spur the development of TVEs.547 One of its long-term development 
objectives is to move the rural economy in the direction of relying on scientific and 
543 Refer to Gabriele (2002), p. 346 and Gabriele (2001 ), p. 20, Internet Edition, reviewed 
01.05.2007. 
544 Refer to Opper (2005b), p. 43 and Nee and Opper (2007), p. 104. 
545 Refer to Chinese Government (2006), "National programs for science and technology", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 28.03.2006. 
546 Refer to Opper (2005b), p. 44. 
547 Refer to Chinese Government (2006), "National programs for science and technology", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 28.03.2006. 
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technological progress and on the improved labor performance of TVEs. Its priority is 
to develop regional pillar industries in rural areas. Projects listed in the program are 
entitled to favorable bank loans and preferential taxation policies. 
The "863 Program" was created in 1987.548 Its focus is on seven key R&D-intensive 
fields - automation, biotechnology, energy, information technology, lasers, new 
materials and space technology - and intends to accelerate development and 
maximize the results obtained from pooling together all national resources. The 863 
Plan is a large and complex project which brings together specialists in many fields 
on cross-disciplinary projects such as computer integrated manufacturing systems in 
order to reduce the technology gap between China and foreign countries. The 
financial support required for the program comes mainly from special government 
appropriations. Although the program has been politically relevant, scientists have 
maintained most of the decision-making process governed by technical criteria and 
also make most financial decisions. Politicians granted them a large share of 
effective autonomy, "insulation" and real power, in a manner similar to that of 
planners in the developmental states of East Asia.549 
The "Torch Program" grew out of a 1988 State Council Decision to accelerate the 
development of high tech manufacturing technology.550 The Torch program directs 
the development of high and new technology industries, focusing mainly on the 
electronics sector.551 The program promotes commercialization through venture 
investment by universities, the transfer of research results from universities and the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the dual employment of professors and 
researchers. This has led to many ventures launched from universities.552 The Torch 
program aims to create a beneficial innovation environment and promote the 
industrialization and commercialization of high and new technology products. The 
creation of High and Emerging Technology Industry Development Zones - with the 
aim of applying R&D to production and commercialization - also represents a major 
thrust of the Torch Program. New product projects listed in the program are entitled 
to priority in receiving bank loans and preferential taxation policies over a specified 
period of time. With the support of the Torch program, some of the former small firms 
have grown into large industrial groups, such as Lenovo Computers. 553 Since 1996, 
Lenovo has become the largest Chinese IT company and occupied first place in 
China's PC sales market. With its 2005 acquisition of IBM's PC business, Lenovo 
has become the world's third largest PC firm in terms of sales. 
548 Ibidem. 
549 Refer to Gabriele (2001), p. 21, Internet Edition, reviewed 01.05.2007. 
550 Refer to Chinese Government (2006), "National programs for science and technology", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 28.03.2006. 
551 Refer to Gabriele (2001 ), p. 20, Internet Edition, reviewed 01.05.2007. 
552 Refer to Asian Development Bank Institute (2006)i "The Internal Environment and Input 
Conditions", Internet Edition, reviewed 27.04.2007. 
553 Before 2003, Lenovo was named Legend Computers. For further information refer to Yu (1999), 
p. 188 and Gabriele (2001), pp. 20-21, Internet Edition, reviewed 01.05.2007. 
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The Chinese central leaders were well aware of the risk of misallocation of state-
guided R&D acquisitions due to the risk of selection and collusion.554 In order to 
reduce misallocation, the central government promulgated the "Decision on the 
Reform of the Science and Technology Management System" in 1985.555 The 
decision called for decentralization and a reduction of government competencies in 
the choice and selection of research proprieties. It encouraged breaking the close 
links between government and R&D facilities and emphasized the necessity of 
intensive competition in the field of R&D policy. The procedure of planned allocation 
of S&T funds was replaced by public competitions. Furthermore, the potential for the 
commercialization of S&T output emerged as a major criterion for funding 
decisions.556 Overall, market mechanisms were to be substituted for administrative 
ones in the S& T system. 
The 1995 "Decision on Accelerating S& T Development" accepted that the 
development of applied technologies should be left to the market; however, at the 
same time, called for the strengthening of government leadership in basic technology 
research. According to the decision, China has to rely on S&T to solve problems 
such as inefficient industrial structure, technological backwardness, and low labor 
productivity.557 With the decision, the central government granted scientific research 
institutes full autonomy in choosing R&D projects, and encouraged them to form JVs 
with domestic and foreign partners. Moreover, the decision pointed out that the 
government would encourage non-state companies as it acknowledged their 
importance in the high-tech field.558 The state's leadership role was undisputed 
throughout the reform period and reconfirmed in the 2006 "Report on the Work of the 
Government" which promulgated that the state ''will improve the mechanisms for 
encouraging independent innovation and adopt fiscal, tax, banking and government 
procurement policies that support enterprise innovation".559 
Altogether, during the reform period, the central government has emphasized 
increasingly the role of technology in promoting economic development, and shifted 
its goals and priorities in a more ambitious direction. The national S&T development 
programs are intended to guide the S& T sector by providing incentives for innovation 
and entrepreneurship.560 The central leaders have focused on the establishment of 
the foundations of a national S& T system capable of realizing scientific and 
554 The risk of resource misallocation may be even more pronounced in non-democratic regimes that 
are characterized to a larger extent by objectives of prestige with a strong signaling effect to the 
international community. 
555 Refer to Opper (2005b), p. 44. 
556 Ibidem. 
557 Refer to US Embassy Beijing (1996), PRC State Council "Decision on Accelerating S&T 
Development", Internet Edition, reviewed 07.09.2006. 
558 Refer to Naughton and Segal (2001 ), p. 11. 
559 Refer to Wen (2006), "Report on the work of the government", Internet Edition, reviewed 
09.05.2006. 
560 Refer to Gabriele (2001 ), p. 22, Internet Edition, reviewed 01.05.2007 and Walsh (2003), p. 973. 
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technological breakthroughs in frontier, high-technology fields. The new strategy is 
founded on a more mature understanding of the S&T apparatus as a means to 
improve the overall national system of innovation. The central government 
emphasized the professionalization of research activities and the enhancement of the 
economic and social role of innovators. Resources are to be concentrated on a 
limited set of targets under the highest policy direction, and horizontal international 
research cooperation with public and private foreign partners is actively promoted.561 
3.3.3.2 State effort to increase China's R&D capabilities 
Along with S& T programs, the state has extended its expenditure on R&D and 
promoted science parks and R&D projects. These measures have increasingly 
become an instrument of industrial policy. 
In the fields of top-level technology and research, China's S&T policy accords priority 
to centrally coordinated, state-sponsored, targeted R&D programs.562 The 1995 
"Decision on Accelerating S&T Development" set a quantitative target: gross 
expenditure on R&D was set to reach 1.5 percent of GDP by the year 2000.563 This 
policy line was confirmed at the 15th Party Congress in 1997 and at the National 
People's Congress meetings in 1999. Although this goal could not be reached, 
between 1999 and 2006, annual R&D expenditures increased from 0.8 percent of 
GDP to 1.4 percent of GDP. Expenditure for Innovation Funds, as well as Science 
and Technology Promotion Funds more than doubled between 1999 (RMB 76.6 
billion) and 2006 (RMB 174.5 billion) (refer to Table 5).564 The majority of funding for 
S&T activities accrues in the business sector (as of 2006, funds raised by 
enterprises: 66 percent; government funds: 22 percent; loans from finance 
institutions: 12 percent).565 In an international context, China ranked six after the 
USA, Japan, Germany, the UK and France with regard to total expenditure on R&D 
561 Refer to Suttmeier and Cao (1999), "China faces the new industrial revolution", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 05.01.2007. 
562 Despite the increase of enterprise-financed R&D along China's move towards a market economy 
(1999: 51 percent, 2006: 66 percent), in 2006, 22 percent of the funding for S&T activities was 
from the state. Calculation based on data from China Statistical Yearbook (2004, 2007). 
563 Refer to US Embassy Beijing (1996), PRC State Council "Decision on Accelerating S&T 
Development", Internet Edition, reviewed 07.09.2006. 
564 In 2006, government expenditure on Science and Technology Promotion Funds was though less 
than for supporting rural production (Science and Technology Promotion Funds: RMB 174.5 
billion, expenditure for supporting rural production: RMB 216.1 billion). Refer to China Statistical 
Yearbook (2007). 
565 Refer to China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
133 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
A new model of economic development 
in 2005.566 The proportion of scientist and engineers in national S&T population also 
increased between 1999 and 2006 from 55 percent to 68 percent (refer to Table 5). 
Table 5: National S& T financing, personnel and output indicators, 1999-2006. 
11199 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Gross domestic expenditure on 
67.9 89.6 104.3 128.8 154.0 196.6 245.0 300.3 R&D (RMB billion) 
Gross domestic expenditure on 
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 R&D as percentage of GOP 
Innovation funds and sctence 
and technology promotion 76.6 86.5 99.2 96.8 109.3 124.4 149.5 174.5 
funds (RMB billion) 
Personnel engaged in S&T 
2.9 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.1 activities (million persons) 
ScienOsts and engineers 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.8 (mHlion persons) 
Number of patent appticaUons 134,239 170,682 203,573 252,631 308,487 353,807 476,264 573,178 
Number of patent applications 100,156 105,345 114.251 132,399 182,226 190,238 214,003 268,002 cenitiec:I 
Source: Data refer to the Ministry of Science and Technology (2007). "Output Indicators", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 09.11.2007; China Compendium of Statistics 1949 - 2004 and various years of 
China Statistical Yearbook. 
In 2006, the NDRC stated to "further strengthen guidance through programs and 
policy" in order to support the independent innovation capability of domestic 
companies and enforce the S&T progress.567 The central government grants 
incentives such as the provision of tax reductions in order to stimulate R&D activities 
of enterprises.568 Already in 2004, the State Administration of Taxation promulgated 
that enterprises with foreign investment are granted tax reliefs for technology-
intensive or knowledge-intensive projects that include products defined in the 
"Catalogue of High and New Technological Products" (promulgated in 2000). A 
condition of the tax relief is that the products must exceed 50 percent of the total 
income from yearly sales.569 
National S&T output indicators show that between 1999 and 2006, the number of 
patent applications tripled and those actually certified doubled (in 1999, 100,156 
566 Refer to IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (2007), "Total Expenditure on R&D", Table 4.3.01, 
p.429, 
567 Refer to NDRC (2006), "Strengthen the Integration of Science, Technology and Economy 
Enhance Independent Innovation Capability", Internet Edition, reviewed 18.12.2006. 
568 Refer to Jefferson (2004), p. 2. 
589 Refer to State Administration of Taxation (2004), "Circular of the State Administration of Taxation 
concerning the Tax Preferential Policy Applicable to Enterprises with Foreign Investment with 
Regard to Technology-Intensive and Knowledge-Intensive Projects", Internet Edition, reviewed 
23.03.2006. 
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patent applications were certified; the number increased to 268,002 certified patent 
applications until 2006) (refer to Table 5). Direct causal links between technology 
policies and innovation performance are hard to establish, however. It is not possible 
to infer from the numbers whether the increase of patent applications is the result of 
increased inputs or improved performance. 
As Chinese planners have recognized the limits of targeted industrial policies, S&T 
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s aimed to introduce markets and promote 
entrepreneurialism.570 With the aim of modernizing S&T, China combined science 
parks and national R&D projects to nurture the rise of high-tech firms. The Beijing 
municipal government established "China's Silicon Valley", the Haidian Science Park 
in 1988. The science park developed into a leading-edge R&D testing zone. It boasts 
more than 6,000 new high-tech enterprises with a combined staff of over 100,000. 70 
enterprises whose sales exceed RMB 100 million and eight whose sales exceed 
RMB 1 billion are located in the Haidian Science Park. The number of R&D projects 
undertaken between 1992 and 1996 totaled 11,152.571 
In the science parks, the government allocated resources to strategic sectors by 
adopting certain institutional devices. Targeted industries were granted low-cost 
loans from state banks with below-market interest rates and tax breaks. In order to 
promote national R&D projects, the State Planning Commission announced a policy 
to build approximately 100 national key laboratories and "S& T enterprises" in 
selected fields of basic science. These enterprises were spun off by national, 
provincial or city governments to commercialize the knowledge of public labs. 
Although S&T enterprises are nominally independent, the government obliged them 
to meet certain requirements in exchange for granting them a special legal status. 
These requirements were similar to reciprocal control mechanisms: they included a 
percentage of technology personnel, a percentage of sales contributed by new 
products, a percentage of products exported, the allocation of retained earnings, 
etc.572 Thus, even in the high-tech phase of industrial development, the state retained 
its condition-based form of subsidy allocation, as in the East Asian developmental 
states. 
Overall, the selective promotion of targeted industries has become a general feature 
of developmental states and one criterion of their success.573 The central government 
has also supported selected industrial sectors, enterprises and projects. China's 
centralized, planned S& T strategy, carried out through administrative, albeit flexible 
instruments such as long-term programs and priority projects, resembles that of other 
Asian developmental states. Preferential policies have become an integral part of 
570 Refer to Feigenbaum (1999), p. 123. 
571 Refer to Haidian Science Park (n.d.), "Zhongguancun (Haidian) Science Park", Internet Edition, 
and Haidian Science Park (n.d.), "History", Internet Edition, both reviewed 02.10.2006. 
572 Refer to Amsden and Hikino (2000), pp. 111-112. 
573 Refer to Evans (1995), p. 58. 
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state intervention, and are designed to influence firms' business decisions. Selectivity 
of industrial policy focused on "upstream industries" (such as S&T projects) and on 
special geographical areas (special zones). The central government introduced 
particular S& T programs that indicate China's ambitions to catch-up with 
technologically and economically more advanced states. Central authorities granted 
high-tech projects special support such as tax incentives.574 Hence, selective state 
intervention in China resembles the policies of the developmental states. 
As the above measures and indicators demonstrate, China has made impressive 
gains in some key scientific and technological areas. Overall, the trend line is 
positive. Nevertheless, when compared to world standards, China's achievements 
and high-tech capabilities do not yet match those of industrialized nations, and it is 
likely to be some time before they do.575 
3.3.4 Foreign participation 
According to Dunning (1993), multinational firms generally have firm-specific 
advantages that might be related to their large endowments of intangible assets, 
such as superior technologies, patents, trade secrets, brand names, management 
techniques, and marketing strategies.576 Once a multinational enterprise has set up a 
subsidiary, some of these advantages may not be totally internalized but spill over to 
domestic firms. FDI can therefore advance economic growth in the host economy 
through global technology transfers (including product, process, and distribution 
technology, as well as management and marketing skills). The means through which 
technology is transferred between MNCs and the host countries include explicit 
transfers, such as contracts, and implicit transfers, including "learning by doing" and 
the transmission of skills from foreign skilled labor to domestic employees working in 
the same factory.577 FDI in the form of JVs functions particularly as a vehicle by which 
"tacit knowledge" is transferred from the foreign to the domestic partner.578 FDI is 
hence thought to allow developing countries to "catch up" in the growth process by 
574 Refer to Opper (2005b), p. 43 and Gabriele (2001 ), p. 13, Internet Edition, reviewed 01.05.2007 
and Gabriele (2002), p. 344 ff and Nolan (1995b), p. 190. 
575 Refer to Walsh (2003), p. 69. 
576 For further information refer to Dunning (1993). 
577 Saggi notes in the World Bank Research Observer that there are three potential channels of 
spillovers: demonstration effects (where firms adopt technologies through imitation or reverse 
engineering), labor migration (workers move to other firms and carry their knowledge with them), 
and vertical linkages (otherwise known as backward and forward linkages). The idea of vertical 
linkages rests on the concept that a foreign investment in one industry can indirectly produce 
benefits in other related industries. For example, suppliers of auto parts and components may 
benefit from having a new source of demand for their product if there is FDI into a manufacturer. 
This would be an example of a '"backward" linkage. For further information refer to Saggi (2002), 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), p. 1 and Crespo and Fontoura (2007), p. 410. Also refer to 
Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Nelson and Winter (1982) and Knell and Radosevic (2000). 
578 For further information refer to Polanyi (1967). 
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closing the technology gap through imitation and the adoption of established 
technologies. Along with the technology transfer, proponents expect that FOi will 
cause integration into the world economy, backward and forward linkages to related 
industries (spillovers), human capital-formation, and surges in domestic innovation. 
Furthermore, FOi is considered by many to be a strong contributor to economic 
growth and industrial development because it provides financing for worthy 
projects.579 A World Bank study, however, notes that foreign investment does not 
necessarily stimulate new economic development. The absorption of outside 
technology is dependent upon the development of domestic technological capabilities 
and the government's "macroorganizational strategy".580 
3.3.4.1 Substantial reliance on FOi 
FOi is an important component of China's development strategy. The jovernment 
hopes that FOi boosts economic growth and raises domestic investment. 1 From the 
beginning of the reform process, the central leaders, above all Deng Xiaoping, 
expressed the need to accelerate the pace of technology import as a key instrument 
of reform.582 Deng was of the opinion that China's socialist economic base was big 
enough to absorb billions of foreign funds without "shakirl3," the "socialist economic 
base".583 In contrast to Maoist hostility to foreign capital, 4 the reform government 
assured foreign investors the good investment environment.585 The main purpose of 
the central government in attracting foreign investment was not to supplement 
domestic savings, since the savings rate was high throughout the reform period.586 
The central government envisioned that FOi would accelerate productivity growth 
and the competitiveness of domestic industries through indirect spillover effects and 
579 For further information refer to OECD (2002). 
580 For further information refer to Saggi (2002), Gabriele (2001 ), Internet Edition, reviewed 
01.05.2007 and Young and Lan (1997). 
581 Also refer to Borensztein et. al. (1998) and Bosworth and Collins (1999). 
582 Refer to Deng (1978), "Speech at the opening ceremony of the national conference on science•, 
Internet Edition, reviewed 27.05.2006 and Deng (1979), "Some Comments on Economic Work", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 19.03.2006. 
583 Refer to Deng (1984) "Building a Socialism with a Specifically Chinese Character", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 19.03.2006. 
584 No foreign investment was permitted from 1949 to the late 1970s. Refer to Nolan ( 1995b), p. 184. 
585 Refer to Deng (1979), "Some Comments on Economic Work", Internet Edition, reviewed 
19.03.2006. 
586 China's national savings increased from 30 percent of Gross National Product in 1980 to around 
35 percent in 1991. China's savings ratio increased even further as it is expected to rise to 50.5 
percent in 2005. 
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knowledge transfers.587 It was furthermore an "important content of China's 
fundamental principle of opening up to the outside world". 588 
FDI in China has grown rapidly since 1978, especially in the 1990s. FDI inflow to 
China increased from USD 0.1 billion in 1980 to USD 69.5 billion in 2006.589 In 2003, 
China overtook the USA as the biggest recipient of FDI. Moreover, China hosts the 
largest number of foreign affiliates, accounting for one third of all foreign affiliates of 
transnational corporations worldwide. In 2004, around 24 million workers (3 percent 
of total employment in Chinal were employed in foreign affiliates in China compared 
to less than 5 million in 1991 . 90 
A useful measure to analyze China's dependency on foreign investment is FDI in 
relation to the economic size of the host country. The role FDI plays in the Chinese 
economy can be illustrated by benchmarking China against other economies. China's 
inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP has exceeded that of Taiwan, Korea and 
Japan since the mid-1990s. In 2000, FDI accounted for 18 percent of GDP in China, 
7 percent of GDP in Korea, 5 percent of GDP in Taiwan and 1 percent of GDP in 
Japan. The difference between China and Taiwan in particular has yet been 
shrinking since 2000. In 2006, the inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP 
decelerated to 11 percent in China (compared with 14 percent in Taiwan) (refer to 
Figure 12).591 Credit tightening measures initiated by the central government, slower 
profit growth (due to the central government's macro-regulation measures to cool 
down the economy) and modest growth in machinery and equipment imports have 
slowed FDI to a more sustainable pace.592 
587 In particular, the transfer of management skills and technology were promulgated by Deng in 
1992 during his Southern Tour. Refer to Deng (1992), "Excerpts From Talks Given in Wuchang, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai", Internet Edition, reviewed 19.03.2006. 
588 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (n.d.), "China's Absorption of Foreign Investment", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 17.04.2006. Deng stressed the benefit of foreign investments to China: "The 
government [will] levy taxes on [FFEs], workers get wages from them, and we learn technology 
and managerial skills. In addition, we can get information from them that will help us open more 
markets."Reler to Deng (1992), "Excerpts From Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and 
Shanghai", Internet Edition, reviewed 19.03.2006. 
589 Refer to UNCTAD (2007), p. 267. 
590 In Japan, though, only 430,900 workers (0.8 percent of total employment in Japan) were 
employed in foreign affiliates in 2004. Ibidem, pp. 10-12. 
591 However, the inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP was "only" 8.0 percent in Korea and 2.5 
percent in Japan in the same year. 
592 Refer to World Bank (World Bank Office Beijing) (2005), "China Quarterly Update", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 17.07.2007 and People's Daily (2004), "Industrial profit growth starts to slow", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 15.08.2007. 
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Figure 12: Inward FOi stock as a percentage of GDP, by host region and economy, 
1980-2006. 
Inward FOi stock as a 
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Source: UNCTAD (2006, 2007). 
Further opposing the development approach of the East Asian developmental states, 
China's attraction of foreign investments included not only technical progress in the 
narrow sense of importing modern equipment for manufacturing plants. Instead, the 
Chinese central government envisioned raising the R&D capacity of domestic firms 
through technology transfer from FFEs to domestic enterprises. Among the FFEs are 
mainly three types of entry mode: 
• Equity Joint Ventures: The "Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures" was promulgated in July 1979.593 An Equity JV 
is a limited liability firm incorporated and registered in China. Capital is 
contributed from both the foreign and local partners, who hold shared equities. 
It is treated as a distinct legal business entity subject in all aspects to Chinese 
laws and administrative procedures. Both partners are responsible for costs 
and divide profits in negotiated proportions. 
• Contractual Joint Ventures: Contractual JVs are arrangements whereby 
Chinese and foreign partners cooperate in certain joint project activities 
according to the terms and conditions stipulated in a venture contract. 
Contractual JVs are used mostly for lower-value-added export-processing 
operations. The "Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign 
Contractual Joint Ventures" was promulgated in April 1988.594 According to the 
593 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (1979, revised 1990), "Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures", Internet Edition, reviewed 17.04.2006. The laws that 
were promulgated after 1979 specified the framework in which FFEs operate (such as taxes and 
foreign investors' rights). For further information refer to China Daily (2006), "Regulations of 
Qinghai Provincial People's Government on Encouragement of Foreign Investment", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 10.07.2007. For further information refer to Crespo and Fontoura (2007), p. 41 O. 
594 Refer to China.erg (1988, revised 2000), "Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-
Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures", Internet Edition, reviewed 17.7.2007. 
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Contractual JV law, the Chinese and the foreign parties have to specify all 
issues covered in the cooperative enterprise contracts (the cooperation 
conditions, the distribution of the profits or products, the share of risks and 
losses, the method of management, the ownership of the properties of the 
enterprises when the cooperation ceases etc.).595 
• Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises: In the early reform years, the Wholly 
Foreign-Owned Enterprise (WFOE) mode was not permitted except for policy 
experiments within the Special Economic Zones. Expansion of this mode to 
other areas occurred only in the late 1980s, when the "Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises" was promulgated in 
April 1986.596 The WFOE law stipulated that China would allow foreign 
investors to establish foreign capital enterprises in the country. The law 
specifically prohibits the state from nationalizing or expropriating WFOEs. The 
law considers a WFOE as a limited liability company established in China with 
capital contributed exclusively by foreign investors. WFOEs paid higher taxes 
than JVs until the Unified Tax Law was passed in 1991, which treated all 
forms of FOi equally for tax purposes.597 
The central government considers Equity JVs to be the preferred mode of FOi. The 
central government hopes that foreign management skills are transferred from the 
foreign to the Chinese partner. Almost all foreign investment enterprises are linked to 
a wide network of domestic suppliers, upon whom new standards of product quality, 
production methods and business concepts are imposed.598 The Equity JV mode 
also has certain advantages from the investor's point of view, as foreign investors 
entering a country with different cultural, political, and economic systems from their 
own are likely to seek cooperative arrangements with local firms.599 In transition 
economies, where requirements for adaptation and information are greater due to 
market imperfections, the appropriateness of Equity JVs is further reinforced.600 The 
most commonly cited motives for selecting the Equity JV mode include the 
opportunity to gain rapid market entry, exploit economies of scale, obtain local know-
how and vital raw materials, spread business risks, and meet host government 
demands. 
595 For further information on the different forms of investment in China refer to Wang (1997). 
596 Refer to Shanghai Foreign Investment Development Board (1986, revised 2000), "Law of 
People's Republic of China on Wholly-Foreign Owned Enterprises", Internet Edition, reviewed 
17.07.2007. 
597 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (1991), "Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises", Internet Edition, reviewed 
17.07.2007. 
598 For further information on JVs in China refer to Pearson (1991). 
599 For further information on international operations of MNCs refer to Dunning (1993). 
60° For further information on Equity JVs refer to Beamish and Banks (1987). 
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As economic transition proceeds, China has increasingly become integrated into the 
global economy, and institutional uncertainties have receded gradually. MNCs have 
also gained business experience in the Chinese economy. Foreign entry modes 
therefore have evolved from an initial focus on risk-averse JVs to WFOEs, since 
those enjoy greater flexibility and independence in their business operations. 
Moreover, the foreign investors can more easily protect proprietary company 
information in a WFOE if the intellectual property rights system is not well 
established.601 In 1994, 74 percent of FDls were from JVs (49 percent of FDls were 
from Equity JVs; 25 percent of FDls were from Contractual JVs) and only 27 percent 
of FDls were from WFOEs. By 2006, the proportion had reversed, as 78 percent of 
FDls were from WFOEs and 21 percent of FDls from JVs (17 percent of FDls were 
from Equity JVs; 4 percent of FDls were from Contractual JVs) (refer to Figure 13). 
Figure 13: Share of contractual amount of FD/ by type of firm ownership, 1994-2006. 
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Source: China External Economic Statistical Yearbook (2005) and various years of China Statistical 
Yearbook. Note: The category "Other" includes foreign investments such as Cooperative Develop-
ment. 
The business activities of WFOEs are restricted and controlled by the state. WFOE 
investors need direct approval from the central government to make investments in 
public utilities, transportation, real estate, trusts, and leasing. As WFOEs are still 
prohibited from operating in such sectors as (life) insurance, media and 
telecommunications, foreign investors have no choice but to operate in JVs.602 
601 For further information on FDls during the refonn era and the process of JV partner-selection in 
China refer to Fu (2000) and Luo (1998). 
802 Refer to World Bank (2004), "China: A summary of Implementing GATS Commitments in Main 
Service Sectors", Internet Edition, reviewed 12.07.2007. 
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Altogether, China's FOi policy in the reform period contrasted with that pursued by 
the East Asian developmental states during comparable phases in their economic 
growth. The East Asian states severely limited FDls during their reform years, while 
Chinese central and local level bureaucrats have actively attracted them.603 
Moreover, foreign investors have mainly operated in JVs as envisioned by central 
government policies on foreign investment. 
3.3.4.2 State guidance of FOi 
The central government's guidance of FOi has been twofold. It has issued different 
policies to inform state agents on the national FOi approach, and controlled inflowing 
investments through approval processes. 
From the mid 1990s, government policies began to focus on linking FOi promotion to 
domestic industrial objectives. 604 At the beginning of 1993, China planned a series of 
measures to attract foreign investment in the areas of finance, communications, 
information technology, farm products processing, urban infrastructure and housing 
renovation.605 After the central government had promulgated specific pillar industries 
in 1994, its policy toward FOi has become more specific. In 1995, the State 
Development and Planning Commission, the State Economics and Trade 
Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation jointly 
promulgated the "Interim Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign 
Investment" and the attached "Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment 
lndustries".606 The two documents aimed to increase the clarity and precision of FOi 
policy. The Foreign Investment Catalogue generally lists specific industries and 
economic activities in which foreign investment is "encouraged", "restricted" or 
"prohibited". Projects not included in the Foreign Investment Catalogue are 
considered "permitted". Among the encouraged investments are new and high 
technology products and projects that strengthen the competing capability of 
products in international markets. Among the restricted foreign investments are 
projects that adopt "out-of-date technologies".607 With this regulation, "sunrise 
industries" are promoted while "sunset industries" are restricted like in the East Asian 
developmental states. The central government ensured that foreign investment was 
compatible with government industrial policies, and that the Chinese state would 
803 Refer to Nolan (1995b), p. 188. 
604 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2002), "Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign 
Investment", Internet Edition, reviewed 18.04.2006. 
605 Refer to Lu (2000b), "Prospects of industrial policy regime after the WTO", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 17.11.2006. 
606 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2002), "Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign 
Investment", Internet Edition, reviewed 18.04.2006. 
607 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2003), "Policies and Preferences·, Internet Edition, reviewed 
10.07.2006. 
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retain control in the pillar industries. In the "restricted" categories, for instance, the 
equity stake of the foreign partner was limited and in the "prohibited" categories it 
was even barred completely.608 Since then, the guidelines have been embodied in a 
large number of laws and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation (since 2003 by the Ministry of Commerce) and other 
government agencies. They are updated regular!~ reflecting the latest economic 
developments, policy re-orientations and priorities.60 
In 1997, the Foreign Investment Catalogue was revised in accordance with the 
national industrial policy which aimed to adjust China's industrial structure and attract 
advanced technology. Accordingly, the scope of the encouraged projects broadened. 
The revised catalogue highlighted the policy to encourage FOi in the central and 
western regions and particularly aimed to promote export-oriented FOi projects.610 
The central government assumed that foreign investors would channel capital into 
industries that had the potential to compete internationally. The global linkages of 
MNCs would then facilitate their access to foreign markets and teach domestic 
companies about channels of distribution.611 Projects that fell into the category of 
"permitted investments", but export all their products directly, were "deemed as 
encouraged projects''. 612 
In 2002, the newly promulgated "Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign 
Investment" replaced the previous "Interim Provisions", and a new catalogue of 
industrial guidance for FOi was issued. While the number of "encouraged" categories 
increased from 186 to 262, the number of "restricted" categories decreased from 112 
to 75. The central government permitted foreign entry to utility industries. This 
revision reflected the promises China had made for its WTO accession: the further 
opening up of service industries which includes financial services, tourism, 
telecommunications, transportation, accountancy, law services etc.613 
608 Refer to Thun (2006), p. 59. 
609 Since 2005, the central government has categorized industries no longer into four, but three types 
(encouraged, restricted and those to be eliminated) and thus reduced the complexity of FDI 
regulation. For further information refer to the "Decision of the State Council on Implementing the 
Interim Regulation on Promoting the Adjustment of Industrial Structure• and NDRC's "Guiding 
Catalogue for the Adjustment of Industrial Structure". Reier to NDRC (2005), "Major Measures to 
Promote the Adjustment of Industrial Structure", Internet Edition, reviewed 18.12.2006. 
610 Reier to Liang (2004), p. 190. 
611 Refer to Zhang and Song (2000), pp. 394-395. 
612 Reier to Ministry of Commerce (2003), "Policies and Preferences", Internet Edition, reviewed 
10.07.2006. 
613 Refer to State Council (2002), "Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment", 
Internet Edition, and State Development Planning Commission, the State Economy and Trade 
Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation {2002), "Catalogue for the 
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries", Internet Edition, both reviewed 18.04.2006. The 
guiding catalogue was updated again in 2004. Refer to NDRC and Ministry of Commerce (2004), 
"Catalogue of Priority lnudstries for Foreign Investment in the Central-Western Region", Internet 
Edition, and National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Commerce (2005), 
"Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment", Internet Edition, reviewed 22.04.2006. 
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The Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Commerce jointly 
promulgated the "Catalogue of Encouraged Hi-tech Products for Foreign Investment" 
in 2003.614 Thus, they emphasized the central government's focus on developing the 
nation's high-tech capacities. The catalogue listed 917 high-technology products 
within 11 categories in accordance with technological domain, including information 
technology, software, aerospace, optical electronics, biological medicine and medical 
instruments, new materials, new energy, environment protection, geological 
instruments, nuclear and modern agriculture. The catalogue stipulated 721 items that 
should be developed imperatively in terms of technology and equipment, and 
identified 196 items which showed a big gap between China and abroad, as well as 
requirements of national security and environmental protection.615 The central 
government hoped to attract advanced applicable technologies from abroad and 
strengthen the abilities of internal assimilation and independent innovation. The 
catalogue aimed to advise provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions and 
departments to encourage foreign investment in high-tech industry, to accelerate the 
pace in introducing advanced technologies from abroad, to strengthen the abilities of 
internal assimilation and independent innovation, and further improve the quality and 
level of foreign investment in the promulgated categories. 
Overall, state guidance of foreign investments to preferred sectors reveals the 
strategic approach of using investment as a means of economic development. The 
analysis of the various policy documents regulating foreign investment shows that 
restrictions have been reduced gradually in line with proceeding economic reform, 
and government attention has been focused increasingly on high-tech FDls. 
In addition to the policies guiding inflowing investment, the central government has 
exerted strong influence on the landscape of foreign investment through its approval 
function of large-scale investment projects. In its 2004 "Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Examining and Approving Foreign Investment Projects", the NORG 
promulgated the approval system of foreign investments in China. Depending on the 
investment sum, either the NDRC, the State Council or regional development and 
reform departments are responsible for the examination and approval of foreign 
investments (refer to Table 6): 
• Regional and county authorities are authorized to approve "encouraged" 
projects with investment under USD 30 million and "permitted" projects under 
USO 10 million. They may authorize "encouraged" and "permitted" projects 
614 Refer to Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of Commerce, "Catalogue of 
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within municipal level development zones valued at USD 30 million or less.616 
The localities' autonomy has simplified the approval procedures.617 
• Provincial and municipal governments can approve "encouraged" and 
"permitted" projects with investments under USD 100 million, and "restricted" 
projects with investments under 50 million. 
• The NORG has to approve "encouraged" and "permitted" investment projects 
exceeding an investment volume of USD 100 million. 
• Approval from both the NORG and the State Council is necessary for 
"encouraged" and "permitted" investment projects exceeding an investment 
volume of USD 500 million. The NORG and the State Council have to approve 
FDI projects with an investment volume higher than USD 50 million for 
"restricted" projects. 
Table 6: Approval of foreign investment projects, 2004. 
Industry type Size of project (lncludlng prolH) (USO) Type of approval required 
Encouraged up to 30 million Regional and county level authorities 
Permitted up to 10 million Regional and county level authorities 
Encouraged/ 
up to 100 million 
Provincial level development and reform 
Permitted commission 
over 100 million NDRC 
over 500 million NDRC and State Council 
Restricted up to 50 million Provincial level development and reform 
commission 
over 50 million NDRC and State Council 
Source: Own illustration according to NDRC (2004), "Interim Measures for the Administration of 
Examining and Approving Foreign Investment Projects•, Article 3 and 4, Internet Edition, reviewed 
24.04.2006 and Shanghai Government (2005), "Examination and Approval Jurisdiction·, 22.10.2005, 
Internet Edition, reviewed 10.12.2006. 
In conclusion, since opening up in 1978, China has extensively absorbed foreign 
investment. The experience of other East Asian states influenced Chinese decision-
makers. The East Asian developmental states strictly controlled the amount of 
inflowing capital in order to keep a "healthy balance" and not become subservient to 
it.618 Similar to its East Asian counterparts, the government in China has been 
controlling all inflowing capital. The central government's guidance of FDI can be 
616 Refer to Shanghai Government (2005), "Examination and Approval Jurisdiction·, Internet Edition, 
reviewed 10.12.2006. 
617 Refer to Panagariya (2003), p. 5. 
618 Refer to Johnson ( 1987), p. 163. 
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seen as one important industrial policy instrument that the developmental states also 
utilized. FDl-guidance was in line with the central leadership's economic and social 
development planning. 
Unlike the East Asian developmental states that have not only controlled, but also 
systematically excluded FDI, China has attempted to attract FDI in order to quickly 
catch up technologically. So that foreign companies cannot dominate the domestic 
market, the Chinese foreign investment scheme forces foreign companies eager to 
set up businesses in certain sectors to form JVs with domestic companies. With the 
JV regulations, the central government aims to develop domestic companies through 
spillovers from foreign to domestic partners, and thus advance the nation's 
technological catch-up. 
3.3.5 Export-oriented industrialization 
China's development strategy at the central level has not focused exclusively on FDl-
led growth, but also on export-led growth. Throughout the reform period, Chinese 
products have been exported, and companies such as Lenovo, TCL and Huawei 
have proved to be internationally competitive. 
Krueger (1980) contends that growth performance has been more satisfactory under 
export promotion strategies (intended as a general bias toward exports, and not as a 
package of specific measures to encourage selective exports of particular items, 
themselves induced bYi a bias toward import substitution) than under import-
substitution strategies.6 9 Import substitution raises returns on the protected sector 
relative to the unprotected sectors, and thus creates rent in the economy and invites 
rent-seeking activities.620 High import restrictions make the domestic production of 
importable products artificially more profitable relative to other products, typically 
those in the traditional sectors. Socialized credit risks and budgetary subsidies make 
financial resources cheaper to firms than otherwise would be the case. These rents 
attract new entrants to the industry.621 The actual number of new entrants depends 
both on the size of the rents and the average size of the initial firms and their size of 
distribution. All else being equal, if an industry is populated with small firms, and if no 
firm enjoys a significant first-mover's advantage over others, the entries will be 
numerous.622 
619 Refer to Krueger (1980), p. 288. 
620 For further information refer to Krueger (1974). 
621 Refer to Huang (2002a), p. 549. 
622 In Thailand, the degree of import substitution policies was directly correlated with the number of 
auto plants. Between 1960 and 1978, the tariff rate on auto imports increased from 60 percent to 
150 percent and the number of auto plants rose from 8 to 22 during the same period. Similar 
correlations can be found in Latin America. Refer to Kesavatana (1989) and Shapiro (1993). 
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3.3.5.1 Export promotion and import substitution 
China was not a major trading nation before economic reform started in 1978. It 
mostly traded primary products with other developing nations.623 In the years after 
1978, China gradually started its re-integration into the global economy. The process 
of international economic integration marked a fundamental ideological shift. Similar 
to the export strategy of China's East Asian neighbors, in 1979, Deng called for 
exports even if they had to be subsidized at the beginning.624 
China followed East Asia's example as a manufacturing export champion, moving the 
country towards a high level of participation in the world economy. Along China's 
reform path, virtuall! the entire eastern coast of China has exhibited an export-
oriented economy.62 While in 1980, the sum of total trade was USO 38.1 billion, in 
2006, Chinese exports amounted to USO 969 billion and imports to USO 792 billion. 
In 2006, China's export proportion in GDP was 37 percent (compared with 6 percent 
in 1980) (refer to Figure 14). 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
While the Chinese government encouraged exports, it simultaneously maintained 
import controls which included state allocation of foreign exchange and a wide array 
of quantitative restrictions.626 The central government gave priority to those products 
which it assumed would most rapidly raise China's labor productivity.627 For central 
623 Refer to Breslin (1999), p. 1179. 
624 Refer to Deng (1979), "Some Comments on Economic Work", Internet Edition, reviewed 
19.03.2006. 
625 Refer to Wang (1993), p. 199. 
626 Refer to Vogel (1989). 
627 For further information refer to Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (1985), p. 
511-512, in: Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (1991). 
147 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
A new model of economic development 
level bureaucrats, it was apparent that a command economy which was economically 
and especially technically backward could not compete in open competition on world 
markets.628 China's almost entire industrial sector was in the stage of an "infant 
industry", or specialized in the manufacturing of sunset products. It needed economic 
restructuring in order to become internationally competitive. Access to the Chinese 
market remained restricted throughout the reform period. Restrictions (such as import 
tariffs and quotas) were imposed on sectors where inefficient national producers in 
the state sector were vulnerable to international competition (e.g. the auto sector).629 
3.3.5.2 Sectoral targeting of exports 
The most important instruments of export targeting were production networks for 
exports (PNEs) and higher exchange retention rights to targeted sectors. The 
Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90) provided for the creation of PNEs. In the PNEs, 
the leading factories within the targeted sector were granted tax relieves, subsidies 
for technological upgrading, guaranteed supplies of raw materials and power, 
preferential access to transportation, and attractive purchase prices for their goods. 
The first industry group to benefit from this scheme was machinery and electronic 
goods. PNEs have also been created in light industrial products and textiles, as well 
as farm and sideline products.63° Furthermore, the foreign exchange retention system 
(practiced since 1979/ allowed selected exporting enterprises to retain a large share 
of foreign earnings.63 Foreign exchange was needed to "introduce technology from 
outside, import essential facilities and raw materials and repay the principal and 
interest of foreign loans". 632 The capacity to earn foreign exchange mirrored the 
degree to which China had opened to the outside world. This in turn affected the 
scale and pace of domestic economic development.633 
Particularly tax relief is a common practice adopted in international trade. The central 
government repaid a certain proportion of the consumption taxes and value-added 
tax to the enterprises, and thus reimbursed them for the taxes they had to pay on 
628 At that time, China had not established a structure of modern firms, nor completed domestic price 
reform, nor entirely dismantled its material balance planning system, nor reformed its social 
security system. Refer to Nolan (1995b), p. 190. 
629 Refer to Breslin (1999), p. 1188. 
630 Refer to Panagariya (2003), p. 3. 
631 By 1987, producers of electrical machinery and instruments were allowed to retain 100 percent of 
export earnings. Refer to Nolan (1995b), p. 189. For further information refer to Zhao (1987), p. 
657, in: Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (1991). 
632 Refer to Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council (1985): "Summary of the forum on 
the Changjian Delta, Zhujiang Delta and Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle in Southern 
Fujian (Excerpts)", p. 444, in: Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (1991). 
633 Refer to Zhao (1987), "Advance along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics", p. 657, 
in: Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (1991 ). 
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exported goods.634 Firms that were exporting were, moreover, granted a rebate on 
industrial and commercial taxes and preferential access to imported technology, and 
received credit at low interest rates for technical upgrading.635 
In 1994, direct subsidies for exports were largely abolished due to escalating 
international pressure and China's ambitions to enter the WTO.636 Under the 
transition review mechanism provided in China's Protocol of Accession, the 
European Community, Japan and the USA urged the country to cut its subsidies as 
required by the Subsidies Agreement.637 The 2001 WTO Protocol finally required 
China to eliminate all export subsidies within the scope of the "Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures" (SCM Agreement) upon accession.638 
Under the SCM Agreement, developing country members have at least eight years, 
and transition economy members seven years, after WTO accession to phase out 
export subsidies. China's commitment to eliminate all export subsidies upon 
accession wiped out any transitional ~eriods that were available to other accession 
countries under the SCM Agreement. 39 However, the central government still grants 
export subsidies for various product exports such as complete sets of equipment, 
high-tech products and mechanical and electronic products. Indirect subsidies for 
exports are low cost energy and inputs, preferential bank loans, and tax incentives:640 
• The Export-Import Bank of China offers an "Export Seller's Credit". All the 
bank's capital comes from the government's fiscal allocation and is provided 
for the purpose of lending government support by observing the state 
industrial, foreign trade, financial and fiscal policies.641 The loans that the bank 
provides to the exporter have usually a long maturity and preferential interest 
rates.642 
53• Refer to People's Daily (2003), "Economist calls for abolishment of export tax rebate", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 07.08.2006. 
635 Refer to State Council (1994), '"Outline of State Industrial Policies for the 1990s", Chapter V, 
Internet Edition, reviewed 31.03.2006. 
636 Refer to WTO (1994), "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994", Internet Edition, reviewed 
27.11.2006. Moreover, the average tariff rate was reduced from 43 percent to about 17 percent 
and further reductions were promised. Refer to Zhu (2003), p. 155. 
637 Refer to WTO (2004), "Transition period extended for export subsidies of developing countries·•, 
Internet Edition, reviewed 07.08.2006. 
638 Refer to WTO (1994), "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures'", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 17.12.2006 and WTO (2001 ), "Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 10.09.2006, p. 33. 
639 China became member of the WTO on 11.12.2001. Under the SCM Agreement, the 8-year 
transitional period for developing country members ended on 31.12.2002, and the 7-year 
transitional period for transition economies ended on 31.12.2001. 
640 Refer to Wade (2003b), p. xxi and Zhu (2003), p. 155. 
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• In pursuit of a central government goal to increase semiconductor output from 
USD 2 billion in 2000 to USD 24 billion by 2010, China applied discriminatory 
rates for value-added taxes on circuit chips. While China subjected all 
semiconductors to a value-added tax, domestic producers - whether wholly 
Chinese-owned or foreign-invested - received a value-added tax rebate for 
circuit chips designed and fabricated in the country, which made the effective 
value-added tax rate only 3 percent. The full 17 percent rate was only imposed 
on imported semiconductors.643 
Altogether, even after WTO accession, central and local governments use industrial 
policy measures to promote exports or hinder imports in order to favor domestic over 
foreign industries. For these, Wade (2003) uses the expression "below-the-radar" 
industrial policy measures.644 
3.3.5.3 The central government's devaluation policy to promote exports 
The Chinese actively emulated Taiwan's and Korea's devaluation policy to 
encourage the growth of exports in the interests of development.645 Like the East 
Asian developmental states, the Chinese government devalued the RMB during 
1981-1994 as an attempt to cut imports and stimulate exports. After a prolonged 
phase of gradual nominal depreciations starting in 1980,646 the RMB was devalued in 
January 1994 from 5.81 to 8.70 to the USD (refer to Figure 15). This improved price 
competition of domestically produced products. In the same year, the export growth 
rate was 31 percent.647 Relative to the cost of exports from other states in Southeast 
Asia following export-led growth strategies, this move increased the relative 
competitiveness of Chinese exports. China adopted current account convertibility in 
1996, and the RMB traded in a narrow band of RMB 8.19 to the USD until late 
2005.648 Being fixed against the USD for a decade in July 2005, central authorities 
dropped the peg to the USD in favor of a managed float against an unspecified 
basket of currencies.649 The RMB's base exchange rate against the USD rose from 
643 Refer to US Government Information (2005), "China's Industrial Policies Conflict with WTO 
Rules", Internet Edition, reviewed 11.07.2007. 
644 Refer to Wade (2003b), p. xxi and Zhu (2003), p. 155. 
645 Refer to Wang (1993), p. 90. 
646 Major devaluations were: 14 percent in 1986, 21 percent in 1989 and 9.6 percent in 1990. 
647 In comparison, the export growth rate was 8 percent in 1993. Calcuation based on data from the 
China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
648 Refer to Breslin (1999), p. 1183 and Holweg et al. (2005), p. 55. 
649 The main components of the reference currency basket consisted of the currencies of China's 
major trading partners, including the US dollar, the euro, the yen and the Korean won. The 
Singapore dollar, the British pound, the Malaysian ringgit, the Russian rouble, the Australian 
dollar, the Thai baht and the Canadian dollar are also in the basket. However, the government 
has not announced the weights of the currency basket index. 
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RMB 8.28 to RMB 8.11 , an appreciation of 2.1 percent. The authorities kept the 
existing trading bands of 0.3 percent on either side of a central rate against the USD 
(with the closing rate of the previous day becoming the central rate of the next day). 
The RMB is still assumed to be undervalued by more than 20 percent. American 
critics accuse Beijing of keeping the value of the RMB at an artificially low level.650 In 
order to prevent the economy from overheating, in March 2007, China's central bank 
raised the prime rate to its highest level for eight years. The export boom is hence 
expected to slow down.651 











Source: China External Economic Statistical Yearbook (2005) and China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
Altogether, China's instrumental attitude towards international trade, and the pace of 
growth of Chinese exports, have a lot in common with that of the East Asian 
developmental states. The government introduced several export incentive programs 
for selected industrial sectors with the aim of enhancing competition and receiving 
foreign exchange earnings as well as management and technology know-how. 
Simultaneously, imports were tightly controlled by a wide variety of quantitative 
controls. Import substitution has protected specific infant industrial sectors from 
international competition. This makes an emulation of the developmental states' 
policy approach obvious. Due to the complexity of the economic system during the 
transition, and the characteristics of international integration, China had to choose 
different policy tools from those previously adopted by Japan, Korea and Taiwan.652 
Overall, the pattern of exports and imports is determined more by administrative 
decisions than by incentives at the level of the individual enterprise. 
650 Refer to Economist Intelligence Unit (2007), "China Economy: Critical issues - The Renminbi", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 10.07.2007. 
651 Refer to China Daily (2007), "Central bank raises interest rates, reserve requirements11 , Internet 
Edition, reviewed 23.10.2007. Also refer to Belke and Spies (2007), pp. 463-464. 
652 Refer to Zhang and Long (1997), p. 266. 
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3.3.5.4 Export-FOi nexus in Special Economic Zones 
Already in 1979, the Central Committee established four Special Economic Zones as 
a particular type of export-processing zones. The first Special Economic Zones were 
opened in Guangdong and Fujian (Shenzhen, Xiamen, Zhuhai and Shantou) in 1979 
and 1980.653 The establishment of Special Economic Zones was designed to attract 
FOi into specifically designated export-oriented areas. These areas gained more 
authority over economic development.654 In this way, they could experiment with the 
norms of a market economy. According to the gradual development strategy, most of 
China's economic reform measures were not applied simultaneously throughout the 
entire country. Experiments with a variety of innovations were conducted within 
selected, limited geographic areas and left a great deal of leeway to localities.655 Not 
before the experiment proved to be successful, the reform was introduced to the rest 
of the nation. Gradualism in China was not so much the result of a [>articular theory 
of reform as of political deadlock and compromises within the CCP.65 
As a means to attract FDls and upgrade the international competitiveness of 
domestic firms, the central government offered foreign companies preferential tax 
rates according to the 1986 "Provisions of the State Council on the Encouragement 
of Foreign lnvestment".657 Tax reductions available to FFEs are higher in the 
economic zones than those available under the national tax legislation. Table 7 
shows that in the Special Economic Zones and National Development Zones, 
productive foreign enterprises are granted a reduced income tax rate of 15 percent 
instead of the normal 30 percent. Technology-intensive projects of non-productive 
enterprises, as well as energy and transportation projects, are rewarded with an 
income tax rate of 15 percent in all Special Economic Zones and National 
Development Zones.658 Especially export enterprises have to pay a reduced income 
tax rate of 10 percent within Special Economic Zones and National Development 
Zones (compared with 15 percent outside these zones). Tax holidays of up to five 
years are available for companies in the special zones, depending on the amount of 
investment, the nature of the technology, and the duration of the project. Imported 
inputs used in exports or sold within the Special Economic Zones are free of indirect 
taxes such as import duty. Further measures to stimulate FOi are advantages in 
653 Refer to Editorial Board of the Progress of China Industry Modernization (1999), p. 42. 
654 The Ninth Five-Year Plan contends: ''All special economic zones and open coastal cities and 
areas should actively engage in international economic cooperation and serve as an example and 
a driving force for economic development in surrounding areas and the rest of the country". Li 
{1996), "Report on the Outline of the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development and the Long-Range Objectives to the Year 201 O", p. X. For further information refer 
to Yueh (2006), p. 5 and Montinola et al. (1995), pp. 62-63. 
655 Refer to Deng (1985), "Special Economic Zones should shift their economy from a domestic 
orientation to an external orientation", Internet Edition, reviewed 19.03.2006. 
656 Refer to Woo (1999), p. 123. 
657 Refer to State Council (1986), "Provisions of the State Council on the Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.04.2006. 
658 The tax rate for energy and transportation projects is 15 percent outside the development zones. 
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manufacturing location, such as reduced land-use fees, priority in obtaining utilities, 
transport and communication facilities.659 Accordingly, the main reasons for 
companies to locate in the special zones are particular policies and preferential 
treatment as well as flexible measures in carrying out foreign economic activities. 
Table 7: Income tax rates concerning foreign enterprises in development zones, 
2006. 
Enterprises Income tax rate State Ragulatlons Spacial Economic National 
Zones Develooment Zonas 
1. Productive enterprises 30% 15% 15% 
2. Non-productive enterprises 30% 15% 30% 
Knowledge-intensive and technology-intensive 
projects and technology development centers: 
30% 15% 15% projects with a long investment rewarding 
oeriod 
Projects concerning energy, transportation, 
port or projections engorged by the 15% 15% 15% 
governments 
Export-oriented enterprises if the export value 
ol the year equals or exceeds 70 percent of 
15% 10% 10% the output value of the same year after the 
exemption-reduction period is over 
Source: Ministry of Commerce (2006), "Tax Policies Concerning Foreign Enterprises in China's 
Development Zones", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.03.2006. Note: Among the National Development 
Zones are Economic and Technological Development Zones, Free Trade Zones, High-Technology 
Industrial Development Zones, Border and Economic Cooperation Zones, and Export Processing 
Zones. Special regulations for Border Economic Cooperative Areas are not considered here.660 
Meanwhile, each province has established Special Economic Zones and National 
Development Zones in which enterprises can profit from low tax rates, particularly for 
high-tech and export-oriented enterprises. With the central and local governments' 
policy approach of attracting foreign investment to special zones, China has attracted 
about .400 of the World Top 500 transnational corporations to Economic and 
Technological Development Zones.661 Investment from foreign companies resulted in 
659 Refer to State Council (1986), "Provisions of the State Council on the Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment", Article 5, Internet Edition, reviewed 23.04.2006. 
660 For further information on types of zones and tax policies within the zones refer to United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2005), "Free Trade Zone and Port 
Hinterland Development", p. 50 ff, Ministry of Commerce (2006), "Tax Policies Concerning 
Foreign Enterprises in China's Development Zones", Internet Edition, and China Development 
Zones (2003), "The Tax Policies Concerning Foreign-Funded Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises 
in China's Development Zones", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.03.2006. 
661 Refer to China Development Zones (2002) 1 "World Top 500 in ETDZs", Internet Edition, reviewed 
25.10.2006 and People's Daily (2005), "China: Share Wealth With the World", Internet Edition and 
People's Daily (2005), "Full text of Hu Jintao's speech at 2005 Fortune Global Forum", Internet 
Edition, both reviewed 10.07.2007. 
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a heated competition between provinces and localities. Localities have often ignored 
instructions from the central government, and strived to offer incentives to gain new 
investments or lure existing investments away from other parts of China.662 
Various tax incentives for foreign enterprises have been widely criticized for lack of 
harmony as well as the resulting discrimination against domestic enterprises. In 
consequence, China has started to transform its tax system. The two parallel income 
tax laws for domestic and foreign enterprises663 (irrespective of whether the company 
is located in a development zone or not) are abolished. Under the tax law, the actual 
income tax rate for a foreign invested company can be as low as 15 percent (as 
opposed to 33 percent for domestic enterprises).664 In January 2007, the Chinese 
State Administration of Taxation announced to adopt uniform corporate income tax 
rates (25 percent) for both domestic and foreign companies effective as of January 
2008. The new law creates a level playing field for domestic and foreign 
enterprises.665 Apart from increased income tax, foreign companies will no longer 
enjoy some other tax incentives, including pre-tax reduction and tax rebate for re-
investment. With the new tax law, Beijing replies to WTO demands of equal tax 
treatment and confirms its aim to particularly attract high-tech investments. From 
2008 onwards, a preferential tax rate of 15 percent will only be granted to companies 
operating in specific industry sectors, such as high-tech, as well as energy efficiency, 
and environmental protection. Some MNCs have already adapted their business 
plans to the policy change. General Electric China has announced it will invest USO 
50 million in its Shanghai-based technology center for products serving 
environmental protection, including more efficient airplane engines and wind power 
generators, seawater desalination technology, and energy-saving bulbs.666 
662 Refer to The Economist (2005), "The insidious charms of foreign investment", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 12.12.2006. 
663 The Interim Regulations on Enterprise Income Tax, effective 01.01.1994 which is applicable to 
domestic enterprises, and the Income Tax Law for Foreign Invested Enterprises and Foreign 
Enterprises, effective 01.07.1991, which is applicable to foreign invested enterprises and foreign 
enterprises. 
664 Moreover, a foreign investor may be entitled to a tax reduction or exemption for dividend 
distributions. Another distinct advantage for foreign invested companies is that a foreign invested 
company can make a full deduction of salary and benefit expenses, while a domestic company 
may only deduct a specific portion of salary payments. 
665 The new tax rate is lower than the average tax rates of neighboring countries in an effort to 
increase the competitiveness of enterprises and to boost China's attraction for foreign investors. 
The average enterprise income tax rate is 28.6 percent in 159 countries and regions around the 
world in which an enterprise income tax is applied, while that in China's 18 neighboring countries 
and regions is 26. 7 percent. Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2007), "China's taxation authorities 
promise to well advance corporate income tax reform", Internet Edition, reviewed 21.02.2007, 
Xinhuanet (2007), "NPC to speed up legislation on social issues in 2007", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 21.10.2007 and People's Daily Online (2007), "China's parliament adopts enterprise 
income tax law", Internet Edition, reviewed 21.10.2007. 
666 Refer to People's Daily Online (2007), "China's parliament adopts enterprise income tax law", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 21.10.2007. 
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Nevertheless, from the close link between FDI and export promotion since the 1980s, 
the question arises as to whether Chinese exports are driven by domestic or foreign 
companies? The breakdown of China's exports according to type of producing firm 
puts China's economic rise in perspective. Statistics indicate that from 1990 until 
2006, exports from FFEs in China rose more quickly than did national gross exports 
(refer to Figure 16). The central government's incentives as well as China's 
competitive advantage of cheap labor have stimulated FFEs' export activities. While 
FFEs accounted for only 20 percent of Taiwan's manufactured exports in the mid-
1970s, and only 25 percent of Korea's manufactured exports between 1974 and 
1978, FFEs accounted for 58 percent of China's exports in 2006.667 Exports from 
these businesses boost China's overall exports.668 
Figure 16: Exports of FFEs, 1980-2006. 
Total exports and exports 







Exports of FFEs as a 










=Total lelue of exports l'liZIB Exports of FFEs -Exports of FFEs as a percentage of total exports 
Source: China External Economic Statistical Yearbook (2005) and China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
FFEs have furthermore catalyzed the boom in exports of particularly (high) tech-
oriented goods.669 Establishing export bases for new and high-tech products in 
selected high-tech industrial development zones is an important part of the 
government's plan for developing trade through S&T. The Pearl River Delta, Yangtze 
River Delta and the Beijing-Tianjin region have the greatest concentration of such 
export bases. Consequently, export volumes of new and high-tech products from 
667 Refer to Gilboy (Foreign Affairs) (2004), "The Myth Behind China's Miracle", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 16.10.2006. 
668 Refer to People's Daily (2003), "FDI fueling China's economic boom", Internet Edition, reviewed 
18.10.2006. 
669 Refer to Abele (bfai) (2006), p. 12. 
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these areas account for over 80 percent of the national total.670 The share of national 
exports of high-tech products increased from 4.0 percent in 1991 to 28.6 percent in 
2005. The CAGR of high-tech product exports was 15.1 percent between 1991 and 
2005.671 Also, the share of high-tech products in manufactured imports was 30.0 
percent in 2005. In the same year, the share of high-tech exports in industrial 
manufacturered exports was 30.6 percent (the share of high-tech imports in industrial 
manufactured imports was 38.5 percent) (refer to Table 8). 81 percent of high-tech 
exports were information technology and telecommunication products and 11 percent 
of high-tech exports were electronic products in that year.672 
Table 8: National imports and exports of high-tech products, 1991-2005. 
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
Exports of high-tech products 
2.9 4.7 10.1 9.7 24.7 46.5 110.3 218.3 (USO billion) 
Share in total expons 
4.0 5.1 6.8 5.3 12.7 17.5 25.2 28.6 (%) 
Share in industrial manufactured 
5.2 6.2 7.9 6.1 14.1 19.4 27.3 30.6 exports(%) 
Imports of high-tech products 
9.4 15.9 21.8 19.8 37.6 64.1 119.3 197.7 (USO billion) 
Share in total imports 
14.8 15.3 16.5 13.9 22.7 26.3 28.9 30.0 11%) 
Share in industrial manufactured 17.4 17.7 20.3 17.4 27.1 32.4 35.1 38.5 imports(%) 
Source: Refer to Ministry of Science and Technology, various years of S&T Statistics Data Books, 
Internet Edition, reviewed 10.11.2007. 
The main reason for the rapid increase of high-tech exports is that the final 
production stage has been transferred to China from industrialized economies, while 
the actual Chinese value added is still estimated to be relatively low. As a result, the 
subsidiaries of MNCs still account for the bulk - nearly 90 percent - of total Chinese 
high-tech exports.673 The European Central Bank expects, however, that over the 
medium term, China will climb the technology ladder rather quickly, aided partly by 
the dissemination of technology and management skills due to FOi. The enhanced 
technological capability of Chinese products can be seen from the angle of the 
product composition of the euro area's imports from China. More sophisticated goods 
from China, such as office machinery and telecommunications equipment, have 
experienced a large increase in euro area's imports over the past five years, even 
670 Refer to Chinese Government (2005), "New and high-tech development zones", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 17.11.2006. 
671 Calculation based on data from the Ministry of Science and Technology, various years of S& T 
Statistics Data Books, Internet Edition, reviewed 10.11.2007 and from China Monthly Exports and 
Imports data reprinted in Abele (2006), p. 12. 
672 Calculation based on China Monthly Exports and Imports data reprinted in Abele (2006), p. 12. 
673 Refer to European Central Bank (2005), "The next dimension for EU-China relations", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 26.02.2007. 
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though traditional and more labor-intensive goods - such as handbags, clothing and 
footwear products - remain the main import items.674 
Overall, China has encouraged multinational affiliates to enter China through FOi. 
Tax incentives have encouraged foreign investors to export a large share of sales. 
The analysis showed that about 60 percent of China's manufactured exports are 
generated by foreign-owned firms. Tax reductions of FFEs have, however, put 
domestic enterprises at a disadvantage. The new income tax law indicates China's 
ambitions to slow the pace of foreign investment inflow, and establish a level playing-
field for foreign and domestic companies in China. At the same time, the new income 
tax law stipulates that central bureaucrats increasingly focus on the country's high-
tech development. While the central government's focus was the inflow of a broad 
spectrum of FOi in the early reform period, FOi attraction has become more selective 
and targeted to high-tech investments since the 1990s. This parallels the nation's 
industrial policy approach via its five year plans. 
3.4 Financial system 
In the East Asian developmental states, the financial system was a key instrument of 
industrial policy-making. The advocates of a bank- and credit-based financial system 
bring forward three arguments. First, in a bank-based system, enterprises depend 
heavily on banks for finance, and less on a broad public of shareholders. Hence, the 
long-term growth preferences of government officials and bank executives have more 
weight, and investment decisions are more insulated from the public's preferences. 
The economy's investment decisions, therefore, should be guided by long-term 
growth expectations. In a capital market-based system, alternatively, the public 
usually allocates potential savings to more short-term productive investment, 
financial speculation or consumption.675 Second, a bank-based financial system 
gives the government a powerful mechanism for encouraging firms to enter specific 
sectors.676 The state has many tools at its disposal, in order to direct investment 
decisions. In the developmental states, governments often provided guarantees for 
loans and consequently influenced the availability and cost of bank loans and the 
relaxation of antitrust bans.677 The state was hence in a position to "maximize 
induced decision-making''.676 Third, the state's control over the financial system, and 
thus over the allocation of credit to highly leveraged firms, can be used to make 
674 Ibidem. 
675 Refer to Wade (1990), pp. 364-365. 
676 Ibidem, p. 365 and Okimoto (1989), p. 142 ff. 
677 The Korean government is paramount in this respect as it acted as a guarantor for foreign credit 
which has financed its long-term investments. Reier to Amsden (1989), p. 945. 
678 Refer to Johnson (1982), p. 236. 
157 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
A new model of economic development 
business leaders sur port the government's objectives and the implementation of the 
industrial strategy. 67 
In the East Asian developmental states, under the direction of an industrial 
bureaucracy that was to a certain extent isolated from societal pressures, the 
government-controlled financial system channeled investment capital to alleged 
strategic sectors. Individuals, with no choice but to make their deposits in the closed 
financial system, ended up subsidizing large firms that received preferential credit.680 
China also made use of the financial system as an industrial policy instrument. Deng 
stated in 1979: "Some {. .. ]projects can bring us quick profits, therefore, the finance 
departments and banks should support them".681 The pursuit of a socialist market 
economy has increased the need for reliance on the banking sector as the central 
government's major tool for macroeconomic control, following the decline of the state 
sector.682 
3.4.1 Government influence over the financial system 
The financial sector consists of two regulatory institutions (the People's Bank of 
China, which is the central bank, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission) as 
well as banking and non-bank financial institutions (refer to Figure 17). Although the 
role of other segments of the financial system like stock and bond markets has been 
growing in importance since the 1990s, the domestic banking system is still the main 
channel of financial intermediation. In comparison with other countries, China still 
depends on bank financing. In 2004, bank credit (of deposit-taking commercial 
banks) to the private sector accounted for 141 percent of GDP in China, compared 
with 46 percent of GDP in the USA. In the same year, stock market capitalization in 
China accounted for 27 percent of GDP compared with 138 percent of GDP in the 
USA.sa3 
679 Obviously, this practice might easily be abused, if it becomes common to allocate credit for 
"loyalty" rather than for economic performance. Only sparing but well-publicized use may obtain 
the political gains without the legitimacy costs. Refer to Wade (1990), pp. 365-366. 
660 Refer to Thun (2006), p. 56. 
661 Refer to Deng (1979), "Some Comments on Economic Work", Internet Edition, reviewed 
19.03.2006. 
662 Enterprization of state commercial banks was therefore viewed as a constrained policy move and 
an entrenched version of the shareholding reform of SOEs. Refer to Leung and Mok (2000), p. 52. 
663 Refer to Belaisch and Zanello (2006), p. 19. 
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Bank or China 
Major banking Institutions 
Agricultural Bank or China 
Bank of China - China Construction Bank 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
Agriculture Development Bank o1 China 
f-- Export-Import Bank of China 
China Development Bank 
Joint-stock commercial banks (12) 
City commercial banks (113) 
f-- Rural commercial banks (13) 
Foreign banks (74' with local branches; 186 with 
representalive offices) 
f--
Rural credit cooperatives (19,348) 
Urban credit cooperattves (78) 
China Orient Asset Management Corporation 
f--
China Cinda Asset Management CorporaUon 
China Huarong Asset Management Corporatk>n 




I Non-bank financial Institutions 
Trusl companies (54) 
Corporate finance companies (70) 
Leasing companies (6) 
Money brokerage companies (1) 
Automobile finance companies (7) 
Source: Own illustration based on China Banking Regulatory Commission (2007), "Annual Report 
2006", p. 30 and p. 130 ff, Internet Edition, reviewed 09.11.2007. Note: Figure only illustrates major 
finance institutions. Number of institutions in brackets. 
Commercial banks, comprising four state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock 
commercial banks, city and rural commercial banks and foreign banks, dominate the 
financial sector. The top three types of banking institutions in terms of assets share 
were large state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and rural 
cooperative financial institutions. These institutions, respectively had assets 
accounting for 55 percent, 12 percent and 1 0 percent of the total assets of the 
banking sector in 2006. The assets share of the state-owned commercial banks has 
been declining over the years, with a decrease of 2.9 percentage points from 2003 
and 0.9 percentage points from 2005. Meanwhile, assets share for the joint-stock 
commercial banks has been rising, with an increase of 1.7 and 0.5 percentage points 
from 2003 and 2005, respectively.684 Institutional investors, notably insurance 
684 Refer to China Banking Regulatory Commission (2007), "Annual Report 2006", p. 30, Internet 
Edition, reviewed 09.11.2007. 
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companies, securities investment funds and, particularly, pension funds, are in an 
early stage of development although they are growing rapidly. Financial instruments 
tor long-term savings and tor man~ing liquidity and risk are quite limited compared 
with more advanced economies.68 China is hence heavily reliant on its banking 
system tor financial intermediation, like its counterparts in East Asia. 
The bank-dominated financial system has been under tight government control 
during the reform period. The People's Bank of China, in particular, has served the 
central government's policy interests. In 1983, the State Council announced the 
transformation of the People's Bank of China into a central bank, in order to complete 
the two-tier banking system by removing commercial lending activities from the 
People's Bank of China, and transferring them to the tour state-owned commercial 
banks.686 To achieve the government's annual money supply target, the People's 
Bank of China carried out national credit plannin~, and imposed an overall credit 
ceiling on all banks and financial institutions.68 The People's Bank of China, 
however, is no independent central bank as known in industrialized countries. As it is 
ultimately overseen by the State Council, it operates under direct state supervision, 
and incorporates the state's policy goals in its monetary policy. This was manifested 
in December 2003, when the Standing Committee of the People's Congress adopted 
the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China". Article 2 
promulgates that the People's Bank of China has to perform functions assigned by 
the State Council. 688 Moreover, the State Council appoints or removes the bank's 
governor and deputy governors. The governor and the deputy governors of the 
People's Bank of China are nominated by the Premier of the State Council. The 
National People's Congress decides on their nomination.689 Accordingly, the 
institutional design of the People's Bank of China, either its position under the State 
Council in the organization chart or the selection of its governors, is clearly linked to 
685 Refer to OECD (2006b), p. 68. 
686 The introduction of a two-tier banking system in 1979 was the first milestone in the modernization 
of the Chinese financial system. The government removed the monopolistic position of the 
People's Bank of China by establishing the Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China and the 
China Construction Bank. The Agricultural Bank of China's objective was to foster rural banking 
business. It also took the supervisory authority of a network of rural credit cooperatives that 
provided small-scale rural banking. The Bank of China was responsible for foreign currency 
transactions, while the China Construction Bank focused on the construction sector. Refer to 
Garcia-Herrero and Santabarbara (2004), pp. 12-13, Internet Edition, reviewed 13.05.2006. 
687 The national credit plan matched annual fund usage (loans) with fund sources (deposits) and 
decided the volume of new currency issued to balance the gap between loans and deposits. The 
central allocation of credit quotas was supplemented by the People's Bank of China's mandatory 
control of the deposit and lending interest rates to ensure the fulfillment of credit plan goals. Reier 
to Lu (2006), p. 6. 
688 "The People's Bank of China shall, under the leadership of the State Council, formulate and 
implement monetary policy, prevent and mitigate financial risks, and maintain financial stability." 
The People's Bank of China (2003), "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank 
of China", Article 2, Internet Edition, reviewed 01.06.2006. 
889 lbidm, Article 10. 
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the state and its industrial policy goals. In order to achieve a clear distinction between 
monetary policy and bank supervision objectives, in late 2003, China amended the 
"Law of the People's Republic of China on Banking Regulation and Supervision" to 
establish the China Banking Regulatory Commission to supervise the banking 
industry.690 The China Banking Regulatory Commission should take over the 
supervisory and regulatory responsibilities for banks from the People's Bank of 
China. This would allow the People's Bank of China to focus on monetary policy, 
including an increased reliance on market-oriented instruments. The China Banking 
Regulatory Commission is also, however, no independent institution. It is overseen 
by the State Council as is the People's Bank of China. 
In the first two decades of the reform era, the big four Chinese state-owned 
commercial banks (Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction 
Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) were also state-owned and largely 
insulated from market forces. They were used as a vehicle for macroeconomic 
control, and hence subject to strict interest rate control and credit quotas.691 The four 
state-owned banks were required to support government objectives ranging from the 
expansion of priority sectors to underwritini loss-making SOEs rather than lending 
according to cor,r,nercial bank decisions.69 These administratively allocated funds 
are referred to as "policy loans", and can be regarded as directed credit programs. 
Policy loans accounted for about 35 percent of total loans made by state banks in the 
first half of the 1990s. Policy loans are well known for their poor returns and high 
risks, compared with commercial loans.693 
With the introduction of a socialist market economic system in 1992, reforms 
accelerated in the banking and financial sector. The Chinese authorities created 
three so-called policy banks (Agricultural Development Bank of China, China 
Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China) in 1994.694 The policy banks 
are "banks whose sole function is to make low-interest loans for state projects".695 
The policy banks took over the state-owned banks' state-directed lending role and 
690 Refer to People's Bank of China (2003), "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's 
Bank of China", Internet Edition, and People's Bank of China (2003), "Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Banking Regulation and Supervision", Internet Edition, both reviewed 
03.10.2006. 
691 Refer to Leung and Mok (2000), p. 45. 
692 Refer to Lardy (1998), p. 83. 
693 Refer to Lu (2006), p. 8. 
694 The overhaul of the banking system had at least three major aims: first, commercialize the four 
state-owned banks by separating commercial from policy lending; second, nourish a more diverse 
and competitive banking sector by allowing more commercial banks to enter the market; third, 
develop the People's Bank of China into an independent modern central bank with tasks such as 
regulating the national financial market and maintaining macroeconomic stability. Refer to Kwong 
and Lee (2005), p. 11 and Chinese Government (2006), "Reform of Financial System", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 28.03.2006. 
695 Refer to Li (1993) 1 "Report on the Work of the Government'\ p. X. 
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freed the big four from policy lending. They were to grant policy loans in accordance 
with state industrial policy and national plans. The capital sources of the policy banks 
were mainly government budgetary funds, social insurance, and postal and 
investment funds from a shrinking public sector. 696 
The Commercial Bank Law, promulgated in 1995, reconfirmed that the state-owned 
commercial banks should function as independent commercial banks, and that their 
credit policy should be independent of state involvement.697 At the same time, 
however, the Commercial Bank Law stated that ·~ commercial bank should issue 
loans [ ... ] under the guidance of the industrial policies of the state".698 In addition, 
according to the 1995 Law, the supervisory boards of the state-owned commercial 
banks should consist of refilresentatives of the People's Bank of China and relevant 
government departments.6 9 These regulations contravened the official claim of the 
independent lending authority of state-owned commercial banks. 
Altogether, Chinese banks have played a crucial role in the country's economic 
growth. Throughout the reform period, the state's influence over the banking system 
has been extensive. The institutional design of the financial system, as well as 
administrative and legal regulations, emphasize the financial sector's role as an 
industrial policy instrument. As in the East Asian developmental states, the 
organization of the financial system has enabled government-directed bank lending. 
3.4.2 Sectoral and firm-level allocation of credit 
After 1998, in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis, the People's Bank of China 
abolished loan quota control over the four state-owned commercial banks, and 
increased flexibility in the use of interest rates as a tool to allocate bank credit.700 
However, the state's control over the financial sector was not loosened, as the 
commercial banks are still not independent in their loan decisions.701 Despite legal 
696 Refer to Asia Times Online (2002), "China: Banking on bank reform", Internet Edition, reviewed 
10.09.2006. 
697 Refer to Nee et al. (2007), p. 39. 
698 Refer to Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (1995), "Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Commerical Banks", Chapter IV, Article 34 A, Internet Edition, reviewed 
18.10.2005. 
699 Ibidem, Chapter 11, Article 18. Since the establishment of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, the supervisory board of the state-owned commercial banks has been under the 
direction of the China Banking Regulatory Commission which is furthermore under the State 
Council. 
700 Banks were allowed to offer loans according to risk premiums at rates of up to 20 percent above, 
or not less than 1 O percent below, the official lending rates. Refer to Leung and Mok (2000), p. 51. 
701 Evidence is provided by Leung and Mok (2000) that analyzed the commercialization of banks in 
China and Zhu ( 1999) that contends that "China's financial sector has always been under the 
strong grip of the state". Refer to Zhu (1999), p. 537. 
162 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
A new model of economic development 
reform of the banking sector to promote banks' formal autonomy in lending decisions, 
political intervention is prevalent.702 
The empirical analysis of Nee and Opper (2007) highlights the sectoral distribution of 
government assistance in loan applications. Their results show that political ties are 
used as instruments to allocate scarce capital into preferred industrial sectors. 
Government assistance in loan applications is particularly common in high-tech 
sectors such as biotechnology and electronics which are in focus of the current 
industrial policy and technology programs (refer to Figure 18).703 










~::i ~ n n n o • • • 
Source: Nee and Opper (2007), p. 26. Note: Nee and Opper's results are based on an empirical 
analysis of data from the 2003 World Bank Investment Climate Survey. 
Unlike the East Asian developmental states, state-owned commercial banks provided 
SOEs with lending priority over non-state enterprises even after 1998, when 
mandatory policy lending was abolished.704 In 2006, private firms and individuals only 
received 3.1 percent of the short-term loans of China's state commercial banks. 
National banks allocated 7 .1 percent of total short-term loans to state-owned 
township enterprises. Banks only allocated 2.1 percent of total short term loans to 
enterprises with foreign funds (refer to Table 9). 
702 Reier to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 110 ff. 
703 Ibidem, p. 26. 
704 While the four state-owned commercial banks are particularly heavily concentrated in lending to 
SOEs, joint stock and city commercial banks are more oriented toward non-state enterprises. The 
capital markets are even more the preserve of SOEs: nearly all of the currently listed companies 
were state controlled at the time of their initial public offering; and non-state enterprises are also 
virtually absent from the corporate bond market. Reier to OECD (2006b), p. 68. 
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The empirical tests of Park and Sehrt (2001) indicate that there is an inverse 
relationship between the rate of financial intermediation and the level of economic 
development among Chinese provinces. In less developed regions, political factors 
rather than economic fundamentals play an important role in lending decisions. 
Accordingly, provinces with higher intermediation rates have tended to be those with 
greater SOE output relative to GDP, and with less profitable SOEs. Fast growing, rich 
coastal provinces such as Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, and Shandong, had the lowest 
state bank intermediation rates from 1991 to 1997.705 
Table 9: Credit funds balance sheet of financial institutions (funds usage), 2006. 706 
Item 2006 Percentage of total 
short-term loans 
Funds Usaae (RMB bllllonl 36523 
Total Loans 22 535 
Short-term Loans 9 853 
Loans to Industrial Sector 2865 32.8 
Loans to Commercial Sector 1,667 19.1 
Loans to Construction Sector 361 4.1 
Loans to Aoricultural Sector 1 321 15.1 
Loans to Townshio Enterorises 622 7.1 
Loans to Private Enterorises and Individuals 267 3.1 
Loans to Enterorises with Foreion Funds 183 2.1 
Other Short-term Loans 2 566 29.3 
Medium-term & Lona-term Loans 10,655 
Credit Loans 252 
Other Loans 1,774 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
3.4.3 Fragility of the Chinese financial system 
During the reform period, SOEs have operated in a soft budget system in which they 
were entitled to receive credits from state-owned banks.707 State-owned banks 
mainly allocated credits to SOEs according to the state's targets, irrespective of their 
ability to repay them. The government has continuously poured subsidies into 
unprofitable SOEs in order to prevent them from bankruptcy and secure employment 
and overall political stability. In 2006, RMB 18 billion of subsidies were allocated to 
loss-making enterprises.708 Hard budget constraints like commercial credit discipline 
705 Refer to Park and Sehrt (2001 ), p. 626. 
706 Due to rounding errors, percentage numbers add up to 113 percent. 
707 For further information on soft budget constraints in state- or collectively-owned companies refer 
to Kornai (1992a,b). 
708 The amount of subsidies to loss-making industrial enterprises declined during the 1990s. While 
subsidies to loss-making enterprises amounted to more than RMB 50 billion in 1985, banks 
allocated "only" RMB 29 billion to unprofitable enterprises in 1999. Refer to China Statistical 
Yearbook (2007). 
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from the financial sector or the implementation of bankruptcy proceedings on SOEs 
have progressed, but are not systematically applied to all SOEs.709 
Subsidies in the form of state-directed lending to SOEs (rather than to profitable 
quasi-private or local private enterprises) either due to upper-level instructed policy 
loans or due to ~ersonal connections, have led to an accumulation of non-performing 
loans (NPLs).71 Banks did not sufficiently verify enterprises' profitability, and the 
pricing of risk remained undifferentiated when making lending decisions. Therefore, 
except for some of the bigger banks, the financial quality of most Chinese banks 
remained poor, with low earnings, inadequate capital, and high levels of NPLs.711 
In 1999, the central government created four asset management companies - Xinda, 
Huarong, Great Wall, and Orient - to buy and manage bad loans from the big four 
banks and China Development Bank. Each of the four asset mana~ement companies 
paired up with one of the big four state-owned commercial banks. 12 NPL purchases 
by the asset management companies were intended to help recapitalize the state 
banks and accelerate SOE reform. By the end of 2000, the four companies finished 
isolating and acquiring bad debts of state-owned commercial banks successively with 
a total amount of RMB 1,394 billion. Also, state capital injections into the capital base 
of state-owned commercial banks together with sales of NPLs to asset management 
companies (financed in part by the central bank) should restore the financial solvency 
of these banks. 
Even after the transfer of NPLs to the asset management companies, the big four 
banks have bad loans on their books, as progress made by the asset management 
companies has been slow.713 At the end of 2006, the share of outstanding loans in 
total loans (NPL ratio) was 7.1 percent compared with 17.8 percent in 2003 (refer to 
709 The "Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy" was adopted in 1986. In 
2003, the "Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy" was reviewed. Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2003), 
"Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy", Internet Edition, reviewed 17.07.2006. In June 2007, a new 
bankruptcy law tor all sorts of enterprises became effective. The law has taken a great leap 
forward in bringing the bankruptcy regime in China in line with international practice. It introduces 
the concept of an independent administrator, e.g. a professional organization (such as an 
accounting firm) or individual charged with managing the subject enterprise's affairs and 
overseeing the administration. This is very different from current practice in China where the 
bankruptcy process is under the control of a liquidation committee comprising mainly government 
officials and related parties. Refer to China.erg (2006), "Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Enterprise Bankruptcy", Internet Edition, reviewed 25.10.2007. 
71° For a detailed, yet older analysis on China's NPLs, refer to Lardy (1998), pp. 115-124. 
711 Refer to OECD (2006b), p. 67. 
712 Refer to China Daily (2001), "Tenth Five Year Plan of Banking Industry and its Development" 
(Yearbook of China Financial Market), Internet Edition, reviewed 28.03.2006. 
713 From 1994 to 2002, RMB 199.54 billion were allocated to write-off NPLs of more than 3,000 
bankrupt SOEs. In 1998, the government issued a special treasury bond of RMB 280 billion to 
boost the capital adequacy ratio of the four state banks. In fact, capital injection has been used in 
Japan and Korea, paid in cash or with bonds and stocks. Refer to Li (2003), "Continuously 
adjusting the layout and structure of China's state economy, propelling Chinese SOEs to 
participate in international competition and cooperation", Internet Edition, reviewed 10.09.2006. 
Also refer to Qin (2004), p. 879 and Chen (2003), p. 323. 
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Figure 19).714 In fact, the substantial decrease of the NPL ratio after 2004 can almost 
entirely be explained by the transfers of NPLs to asset management companies as 
part of their restructuring and the infusion of USD 45 billion by the People's Bank of 
China.715 
Figure 19: Total NPLs and NPL ratio of major state-owned and joint-stock 
commercial banks, 2003-2006. 













2003 2004 2005 2006 
=NPLs -+-NPL ratio 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission (2003-2005), "Loan conditions of major banking 
institutions", Internet Edition, reviewed 05.04.2006 and China Banking Regulatory Commission (2007), 
"Annual Report 2006", p. 30 and p. 130 ff, Internet Edition, reviewed 09.11.2007. 
In conclusion, the Chinese financial system is bank- and credit based like that of the 
East Asian developmental states. Most financing is regulated by banks' credits. Like 
the East Asian developmental states, the central government has actively directed 
and controlled the allocation of credit, and used the financial system as an industrial 
policy instrument to support selected key industries. In this sense, it has successfully 
supported loan applications for biotechnology projects. 
At the same time, however, China failed to instruct hard budget constraints on SOEs, 
and the banking system allocates credit to value-destroying SOEs, not to the private 
sector, as was the case in the East Asian developmental states. While in the 
industrial sector non-state enterprises have been the driving force of growth, the 
financial sector has always been under the close supervision of the state (State 
Council, Ministry of Finance). The privatization trend observed in most of the real 
economy has been virtually absent in the financial sector.716 The management of the 
banks has remained subject to close state control. Thus, state-owned commercial 
banks cannot make lending decisions in full autonomy from government interest. 
714 In 2006, the pilot banks had only few NPLs left on their balance sheets (Bank of China: 4.0 
percent, China Construction Bank: 3.3 percent and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China: 3.8 
percent). However, the Agricultural Bank of China had still 23 percent of NPLs. Refer to 
respective banks 2006 annual reports, Internet Edition, reviewed 22.08.2007. 
715 Refer to Yusuf and Nabeshima (2006b), p. 18. 
716 Refer to OECD (2006b), pp. 67-68. 
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They are often forced to bail out loss-making SOEs because credits not only fulfil 
industrial, but also social policy goals (credits hinder state companies from 
insolvency and thus safeguard employment). State banks lack the power to force 
payment in the case of default or delinquency. In return, profitability cannot be used 
as a performance indicator, as in the East Asian developmental states. 
The rethinking of the East Asian financial crisis, and the recognition of the cumulating 
problems in its own financial system, led China to pursue economic and financial 
reforms. Key areas of progress are improvements in the supervisory regime, 
including the establishment of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the 
ongoing opening of the market to foreign financial institutions, expanded flexibility in 
setting lending interest rates, and the measures aimed at strengthening and 
modernizing state-owned commercial banks.717 
3.5 Government-business relations 
The East Asian developmental states relied on an institutionalized state-business 
partnership. Extensive cooperation and information-sharing between government and 
business enabled the developmental states to pick priority sectors in anticipation of 
future profit. In China, information is shared formally, as well as informally, between 
the state and the business sector. The frameworks typically used to describe the 
interaction between government and society (pluralism, societal corporatism, state 
corporatism, clientelism and monism) fail to fully grasp important aspects of 
government-business relations in China.718 
Organizational policy has aimed to determine the shape of the party-state's 
institutions, and define their relationships with the business sector. Since 1989, 
chambers of commerce and trade associations have been built in every part of the 
country and in every sector of the economy.719 The move to a market regulatory 
regime has led firms to have an interest in policy influence (and give government a 
reason to listen). Business associations then try to influence the formulation of public 
policy in terms of their member firms.720 
Usually, before the central government adopts new policies, government and 
business (business associations or individual companies) exchange information on a 
regular base. Kennedy (2005) contends from interviews with officials in the people's 
congresses, the State Council, industrial ministries and local governments, that it is 
common practice to obtain the opinions of industry as part of their attempts to 
717 Refer to Barnett (2004), p. 50. 
718 In his analysis on business lobbying in China, Kennedy (2005) elaborates on these different 
frameworks. 
719 Associations' functions have gained importance after China's accession to the WTO as Chinese 
companies need to better coordinate their activities to respond to more intense global competition. 
720 Refer to Kennedy (2005), p. 28. 
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regulate the economy. Such exchanges of opinions are initiated by both sides. They 
occur during the consideration of specific laws and regulations, and as part of the 
process of regulatory oversight, which then might prompt a new policy initiative. One 
way for information exchange between the government and the business sector is 
the organization of formal hearings, where ministries at the national and regional 
levels obtain industry's opinions.721 Consultations regarding commercial work, 
legislative regulations and other political questions of regularization, are held 
frequently. Participants are not only the leading CCP members, but also invited 
representatives from affected state organs, economic and social sectors and officially 
registered associations. In March 2006, the Ministry of Commerce held a symposium 
with 18 industry associations. The Ministry of Commerce especially heard 
suggestions of the associations in the process of applying trade remedy measures, 
maintaining security of domestic industries, responding to trade frictions and 
launching multi-lateral negotiations.722 
Besides formalized information exchange at hearings and through business 
associations, there are indirect routes of contact between the Chinese state and 
businesses operating in China. The most prominent alternative to associations is 
direct interaction between the government officials and firms. 
Nee (1989) and Bian and Logan (1996) contend that the importance of (political) 
connections for business success is neJatively correlated with the degree of 
economic liberalization and marketization. 3 Although during the 1990s, guidance 
plans were replaced by indicative plans and the importance of planning dropped, the 
Mao era had left a legacy that stressed direct interaction between government and 
business. The legitimacy of direct interaction between SOEs and government has 
extended to domestic and foreign private firms. Entrepreneurs often articulate their 
interests privately, and thus informally, to policy-makers with whom they have 
guanxi.724 The government-business relationship in China, however, goes far beyond 
informal information sharing. Due to strong state intervention in business activities, 
government and businesses are closely intertwined. This nexus is founded on 
bilateral alliances between local governments on the provincial, city or county level, 
and local business. In heavily state-regulated industrial sectors and regions, local 
government organizations are still in a position to control the access of local firms to 
important inputs and licenses, as long as strong macro-economic institutions that 
protect a market system based on fair competition are absent.725 Entrepreneurs thus 
cultivate personal connections with powerful government bureaucrats to gain access 
721 Ibidem, pp. 48-49. 
722 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2006), "MOFCOM Holding a Symposium with Industry 
Associations", Internet Edition, 15.03.2006, reviewed 30.03.2006. 
723 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 107. For further information refer to Nee (1989) and Bian and 
Logan (1996). 
724 Refer to Heilmann (2004), p. 61. 
725 Refer to Taube (2005), p. 5. 
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to resources and protect their firms from predatory interventions.726 As cadres are 
evaluated by central government and party organizations according to their ability to 
promote economic development, create new jobs, etc. in their localities, they also 
rely on strong business partners. As a consequence, there exists a strong 
interdependency between local government and businesses.727 Moreover, as market-
oriented reforms represent a challenge to bureaucrats' ability to directly determine 
economic outcomes, government officials have run government-created associations 
so that associations will not usurp the bureaucracy's original powers. In this way, 
bureaucrats aim to continue the planning-era practice of direct interaction with 
businesses.728 Especially if entrepreneurs depend on government contracts for their 
business, strong political ties with government officials is often the decisive factor in 
business success. The firm's economic performance then becomes dependent on its 
relations with state representatives, and the extent and quality of government 
involvement within the firm. 729 
Taube (2005) conceives that politics and the business sector in several cases even 
form an "integrated organization".730 Local governments have developed 
organizational characteristics in many ways like those of industrial firms.731 Many 
provinces and municipalities experienced government-led economic growth based on 
"local state corporatism", where officials acted as the equivalent of a board of 
directors, or sometimes more directly as chief executive officers, in a corporation.732 
Also the central government and its agencies frequently function like "China lnc.".733 
Even without detailed plan directives, the central government is involved in the pro-
active design of industry structure and the opening of development paths for its 
"national champions". The case of CNOOC's bid for the American oil corporation 
Unocal, which was aborted due to strong political resistance in the USA in August 
2005, provides an example of the merger between political interests and individual 
business strategies. Political interests may even dominate the latter. CNOOC would 
never have been able to raise the USO 18.5 billion it was bidding for the US 
company. As the deal would have fitted in the government's policy to improve the 
nation's access to natural resources, it offered to ~rovide CNOOC the necessary 
financing by means of loans guaranteed by the state. 34 
726 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), pp. 107-10B. For further information refer to Wank (1996), Xin 
and Pearce (1996) and Peng and Luo (2000). 
727 Refer to Taube (2005), p. 5. 
728 Refer to Kennedy {2005), p. 47. 
729 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), pp. 106 -108. For further information refer to Findlay (1999). 
730 Refer to Taube (2005), p. 4. 
731 For further information refer to Walder (1995). 
732 For further information refer to Oi (1992). 
733 Refer to Taube (2005), pp. 4-5. 
734 Refer to China Daily (2005), "US lawmakers meddle in CNOOC's Unocal bid", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 17.11.2006. For further information on how China uses its economic potential in order to 
reach strategic targets refer to Belke (2007), "Wirtschaftliche Macht als Instrument der 
AuBenpolitik am Beispiel Chinas", Internet Edition, reviewed 10.11.2007. 
169 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
A new model of economic development 
State and business, mostly at the local level, and sometimes even at the central 
level, are closely entangled, and a clear separation between bureaucracy and firms 
can often not be found. The local party cadre is at the same time responsible for the 
provision of investment for a risky business plan, and the management of the 
established enterprise, in one jurisdiction. Institutionalized information-sharing in 
business associations is thus not necessary. 
Altogether, relations between the government and private businesses are different 
from the East Asian developmental states. Regardless of China's great advances in 
its technical capabilities and successful industrial policy, the Chinese bureaucracy 
never succeeded in truly separating from the operations of the leading enterprises. 
Accordingly, active information sharing of (private) businesses with the state was 
only in particular cases institutionalized, as in the developmental states. Resulting 
from the legitimacy of direct interaction between SOEs and government bureaucrats, 
informal lobbying through guanxi networks between government officials and 
businessmen (of SOEs, private and foreign companies) have been prevalent 
throughout the reform period. Whether the government has thus only received 
information on "sunrise" industries and business needs as in the developmental 
states, or has also been captured by business interests due to its close involvement 
in business activities, remains debatable. 
3.6 Conclusion 
During the reform, China gradually abandoned central planning and import 
substitution and moved from state dominance toward a Chinese model of state-
guidance (refer to Figure 20). China has chosen a modified path of the 
developmental state approach. It has not only adopted and emulated previous 
strategies of the East Asian developmental states, but also adapted its path to its 
special characteristics. 735 
Unlike the East Asian developmental states, China's industrial policy focused not 
only on exports, but also on FOi (export-FOi nexus). Furthermore, the rethinking of 
the East Asian financial crisis and thus the recognition of the cumulating problems in 
its own financial system led China to pursue further economic and financial reforms 
to build up market-supporting institutions largely based upon market-centered 
capitalism. In addition, particularly the local states in China resemble the East Asian 
developmental states. They are responsible for local prosperity, because they are 
empowered to carry out development, realigning revenue distribution between the 
central authorities and localities. These aspects demonstrate a revision of the 
previously most influential Japanese and Korean model. 
735 In this context, adoption implies emulation of the criteria of the East Asian developmental state; 
adaptation means variation of the criteria of the East Asian developmental states, and adjustment 
to China's special characteristics. An adjustment of the East Asian Model has been assumed 
previously when analyzing the special characteristics of China. 
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4 The auto industry in the light of the Chinese development approach 
Chapter 3 analyzed China's economic development approach by concentrating on 
each criterion of the East Asian Developmental State Model. The analysis showed 
that - as in the East Asian developmental states - institutional reform and industrial 
policy have guided China's development process since 1978 and have had direct 
impact on changes in the real economy. At the same time, the analysis provides 
evidence that decisive differences between the development strategies of China and 
its East Asian neighbors exist. 
In order to gain further insight into the Chinese model of economic development, 
Chapter 4 uses an empirical analysis of the auto industry. The global auto industry 
has entered a new phase. A combination of massive production overcapacity, 
together with structural-geographical shifts in market demand, continuing 
technological transformation, tightening environmental regulation, and changing 
relationships between auto assemblers and their component suppliers, have 
produced a crisis for most of the major auto manufacturers. At the same time, 
however, many developing countries have set up domestic auto production. They still 
see the auto industry as an important driver of industrial development and 
technological capability - not only because of its impact on the balance of trade, but 
also because of its potential for upgrading the various industries which feed into it. 
The auto sector is hence the object of continuing government intervention -
particularly in China.736 This sector's analysis consequently provides useful 
information on the outcome of state-led growth in China. 
After elaboration of the research design, the chapter explores whether the criteria of 
the East Asian Developmental State Model can be found in China's approach to 
modernizing its domestic auto industry. The analysis centers on the following 
determinants of state-guidance in the auto sector: 
• Bureaucratic framework of the auto industry (organization and quality of state 
agents involved in the sector's development). 
• National industrial policy for the auto sector (foreign investment, trade, 
localism). 
• Financial system as an industrial policy instrument to regulate the sector's 
growth. 
• Government-business cooperation and information-sharing in the auto 
industry. 
• Outcome of two decades of distinctive government support for the sector. 
736 Humphrey rightly poses the question as to how worthwhile an auto-centered development 
strategy might be under these circumstances. However, only few states reject building up a strong 
auto industry. In consequence of all these factors, interstate (and intrastate) competition has 
intensified. For further information on the impact of globalization and national development on the 
auto industry refer to Humphrey (2000) and Liu and Dicken (2006). 
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Overall, the chapter analyzes the industrial policy for the auto sector, and the 
measures implemented to transform domestic auto manufacturers into global 
players. The analysis concentrates on the unique measures of the Chinese 
development strategy, and explores whether state-guidance in the auto sector has 
succeeded in building up internationally competitive auto companies and overall 
rapid economic development. The findings allow inferences on the effectiveness of 
the Chinese model of state-led development. 
4.1 Design of research 
Traditional economic approaches largely overlook the dynamic process of industrial 
development as well as the role of changing government policies and institutional 
settings. In order to overcome these problems, the empirical analysis of the Chinese 
auto industry uses a mixed methods research approach. The accuracy of judgments 
can be improved by collecting different kinds of data bearing on the same 
phenomenon.737 The research incorporates secondary statistics as well as qualitative 
and quantitative information in order to underpin theoretical arguments by empirical 
evidence. Triangulation is the superior method for identifying causal mechanisms and 
for process tracing.738 It combines investigative depth with the coverage of various 
facets of the chosen research object and enables the researcher to incorporate 
exploration and explanation in the study. 739 As the secondary analysis approach and 
its sources have been discussed in Chapter 1 .3, the following sections only highlight 
the qualitative and quantitative analysis used in Chapter 4. 
The primary focus of research is one industry in a single country. The research 
methodology, however, also incorporates aspects of comparative analysis in order to 
examine whether any differences in the implementation of the national auto policies 
exist at the local level. Thus, variation at the sub-national level can be highlighted 
while the macroeconomic environment and the policy framework are set. The two 
municipalities that rank highest in auto production - Beijing, which is a "newly" 
industrializing area and Shanghai, which has been a traditional center of 
industrialization - are in the focus of analysis.740 In 2006, output of motor vehicles 
was 683,700 units in Beijing followed by Shanghai with 682,200 units (refer to Figure 
21 ). 
737 Refer to Jick (1979), p. 602. 
738 Refer to Bennett (1999), Yin and Moore (1987), Yin (1993; 1994) and Hamel et al. (1993). 
739 Refer to Creswell (2003), p. 208. 
740 Beijing is the capital, and thus the political center, of China where the CCP's Central Committee, 
the State Council, ministries and commissions are located. Shanghai, unlike Beijing, has thrived 
as a city of commerce and a window to the outside world. Due to its geographic position, situated 
on the banks of the Yangtze River Delta in East China, and its large harbor, the city was an ideal 
location for trade. It evolved into China's economic center with a strong industrial base. The 
analysis of Beijing and Shanghai does not claim to be representative of all localities in China. 
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Figure 21: Output of motor vehicles in provinces and municipalities, 2006. 741 
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The analysis draws upon Thun's (2004a, 2004b, 2006) findings of Beijing as a 
"Laissez-faire Local State" and Shanghai as a "Local Developmental State''.742 
Accordingly, qualitative and quantitative research in this study focus not only on 
central state-guidance in the auto sector, but also on different approaches to local 
development in Beijing and Shanghai. It can thus be explored whether the municipal 
governments have been able to create internationally competitive domestic auto 
companies within the policy framework set by the central state. 
4.1.1 Qualitative analysis 
Qualitative research means "any kind of research that produces findin?,.s not arrived 
at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification". 43 It is largely 
an investigative process where the researcher gradually makes sense of a social 
phenomenon b~ contrasting, comparing, replicating, cataloguing and classifying the 
object of study. 44 Qualitative research focuses on the process that is occurring, as 
well as the product or outcome.745 This may be changing policy approaches as well 
as the shifting of leader's decision-making or state-business relations. Qualitative 
analysis creates an understanding of relationships or complex interactions, 
participants' perceptions and experiences.746 In this line, qualitative research 
741 Only the 15 provinces and municipalities with the highest output volume of motor vehicles are 
listed. 
742 Refer to Thun (2004a,b) for further information on his analysis of the auto and supplier industry at 
the local state and, in particular, Thun (2006) for an illustration of "Alternative Patterns of 
Development" in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou as well as Changchun and Wuhan. Refer to 
Thun (2006), p. 29 ff. 
743 Refer to Strauss and Corbin (1990), p. 17. 
744 For further information refer to Miles and Huberman (1994). 
745 Creswell (2003), pp. 198-199. 
746 Refer to Ellram (1996), p. 97, Yin (1994), pp. 3-4 and Creswell (2003), pp. 198-199. 
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approaches are used when the research objective is to identify mechanisms behind 
phenomena which cannot be tested quantitatively.747 Qualitative research thus 
complements statistical analysis.748 
4.1.1.1 Expert interviews as a method of qualitative research 
The interview is an important source of information, and a frequently-used and 
highly-developed instrument of qualitative, empirical data collection.749 Thus, it was 
chosen as an instrument for research in this study. 
An interview is about communication between different persons in which different 
stimuli intend to cause reaction. It is a conversation that has a structure and a 
purpose. It uses a careful questioning and listening approach with the purpose of 
obtaining thoroughly-tested knowledge.750 No objective, universal results can be 
conducted, however, because each reaction is a result of the subject's personal 
experiences. The instrument is most suitable, if experiences, and the opinions and 
assessments based on them, are to be covered, and when depth rather than breadth 
of understanding is necessary. 
A specific form of applying interviews is the expert interview.751 The interviewee is an 
expert when he or she has a complex knowledge regarding a specific topic or 
aspect.752 The interviewer is responsible for initiating and directing the interview with 
regard to the question of research. The interviewer accordingly acts passively, while 
the interviewee has an active role, and is left with much leeway for the direction and 
the content of the interview. In this regard, the interviewee is of less interest than his 
or her capacity of being an expert in a certain field of activity. He or she is integrated 
into the study, not as an individual, but as representing a group (of specific experts). 
The interpretation of expert interviews mainly aims at analyzing and comparing the 
content of the expert knowledge.753 
As the aim of this study is to collect information on the effectiveness of the Chinese 
development path, opinions and experiences of experts in China are appropriate to 
gain information on processes in the auto sector, as well as interactions between the 
state and private entrepreneurs. The expert interview in this respect is the best 
method of primary research. 
747 Refer to Edin (2000), pp. 8-9. 
748 Refer to Yin (1993) and de Vaus (2001 ), pp. 221 ff and Bitsch (2000), p. 229. 
749 Refer to Yin (1994), p. 84. 
750 Refer to Atteslander (2000), p. 114 and Kvale (1996), p. 6. 
751 Refer to Meuser and Nagel (1991), pp. 441-468 and Flick (2002), p. 89. 
752 Refer to Flick (1995), p. 100. For further information also refer to Flick et al. (1991 ). 
753 Refer to Schnell et al. (1989), p. 295 and Flick (2002), pp. 89-90. 
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4.1.1.2 Interview partners and questionnaires 
Information on the effectiveness of the Chinese auto industrial policy and its 
implementation was derived from interviews with experts in Beijing and Shanghai 
who are familiar with the development of the auto industry in China. The individuals 
for the proposed study were selected purposefully. Interviewees were identified who 
would best help the researcher to answer the question of research. 
Eleven of the nineteen interviewed experts are managers of leading MNCs 
headquartered in Germany. Thus, cultural differences among companies can be 
excluded. The phenomenon of technology transfer is only likely to appear in MNCs 
where important parts of the value chain are present in China. All MNCs included in 
the qualitative analysis have at least one manufacturing site in China. Amo~ the 
MNCs are the two original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) DaimlerChrysler7 and 
Volkswagen (VW) as well as the two parts suppliers Bosch and ZF Friedrichshafen. 
DaimlerChrysler and VW both established production sites in Beijing and Shanghai, 
respectively, in the early 1980s, and have since then continuously expanded their 
China activities. Bosch and ZF Friedrichshafen also entered the market decades ago, 
and both now run more than 20 production sites in China. Their experience provides 
important information, as MNCs generally incorporate the Chinese government's 
trade, investment and industrial policies into their location and production 
decisions. 755 
Eight experts come from different institutional organizations located in Beijing or 
Shanghai. Among those are three experts from the Delegations of German Industry 
and Commerce (GIG) in Beijing, and one expert from the GIG in Shanghai, one 
expert from the Association des Constructeurs Europeens d'Automobiles (ACEA) in 
Beijing, one expert from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) 
in Beijing, and two experts from the State Information Center in Beijing. All 
institutions conduct research on the Chinese auto market, and provide strategic 
consulting to their clients who may be businessmen or governments. For a complete 
list of interviewees' names and affiliation, refer to Appendix I and Appendix II. 
Those who agreed to participate in the interview were sent a letter including an 
overview of the research to prepare them for the session, and also a subject index, 
so they knew what topics to expect (refer to Appendix 111).756 The interviews involved 
on-site visits, and were conducted in face-to-face settings in the location of the 
754 In August 2007, DaimlerChrysler completed the closing for the transfer of a majority interest in the 
Chrysler Group and for the related financial services business in NAFT A to a subsidiary of 
Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. The German automaker, which was renamed Daimler AG in 
October 2007, retained a 19.9 percent interest in Chrysler. The company·s reorganization, 
however, does not have any impact on the insights gained from the interviews conducted in 
Beijing. 
755 Refer to Wang (2001 ), p. 1. 
756 Refer to Ellram (1996), p. 105. 
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interviewee's workplace in China. 757 Face-to-face interviews with top executives 
ensure that the source of information is indeed the intended addressee. The problem 
with mail survey is that employees not directly in touch with the studied issue might 
reply instead. All interviewees agreed that the session was digitally recorded. The 
duration of the interviews ranged from 45 - 90 minutes. Interviews with the State 
Information Center and the CAAM were attended by a Chinese-English translator. 
Different questionnaires were prepared: one for the experts from foreign auto 
companies, one for the Chinese, and one for the foreign institutes, according to their 
different backgrounds (refer to Appendix IV).758 With five pages, the questionnaires 
were complex. However, all questions were needed to fulfill the tasks of the research. 
The questionnaires used were semi-structured. The interview design allowed for 
movement in the formulation of questions, follow-up strategies and sequencin~, and 
for posing subsequent questions that were not foreseen in the interview script.7 9 
The questionnaires consisted of two types of questions: first, open-ended questions, 
which allow the respondents to answer in their own frames of reference, entirely 
uninfluenced by any specific alternatives suggested by the interviewer, and second, 
semi-structured questions which provide the interviewee with different choices for an 
answer.760 These types of questions help to gather information, establish rapport and 
increase understanding. With regard to the open-ended nature of interviews, the 
respondent may assist as an "informant" rather than a respondent. Such persons not 
only provide the investigator with insights into a matter, but can also suggest sources 
of corroboratory evidence - and initiate the access to such sources.761 The 
researcher, however, has to bear in mind that the statements of the interviewees 
mirror only their personal opinions and might be influenced by an emotional context 
rather than a solely rational one.762 Moreover, the statements of the expatriates might 
differ from those of the Chinese experts working for governmental institutions, who 
do not want to or cannot speak as openly. Altogether, a potential poor fit between the 
research questions, the operationalized concepts and a respondent's understanding 
could be avoided by conducting expert interviews with open-ended questions at on-
site visits. 763 
757 One expert working for a German auto supplier company located in Shanghai was interviewed in 
Feuerbach, Germany. 
758 The interviewees could choose between English or German questionnaires. Appendix IV contains 
only the English questionnaire for company representatives. The questionnaires were not handed 
over to the interviewees, but functioned as a guideline to the interviewer. 
759 Pennings et al. (1999), p. 79. 
760 Refer to Sheatsley (1983), p. 204, Schnell et al. (1989), p. 302 ff and Atteslander (2000), p. 150 ff. 
761 Refer to Yin (1994), p. 84. 
762 Refer to Hewstone and Fincham (1996), pp. 177-218. 
763 This approach ensures construct validity. 
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4.1.1.3 Research design quality 
It is generally hard to objectively evaluate qualitative information. Ensuring the 
suitability of qualitative research is central for the le~timacy of implications.764 Three 
criteria are used to judge the soundness of research: 65 
• External validity: Qualitative research is concerned with testing the analytical 
soundness of a proposed conceptual framework and generalizing the results 
to a broader theory. External validity establishes the domain to which a study's 
findings can be generalized, and thus ensures the integrity of this process. It 
reflects how accurately the results represent the phenomenon studied, 
establishing generalizability of results. It can be achieved by including multiple 
interview partners with different backgrounds in the research design, as done 
in this study. This enables the researcher to apply replication logic. 
• Reliability: Reliability is concerned with the repeatability of results. Will 
replication achieve the same results and conclusions? The objective of 
reliability is to minimize errors and biases in a study. Documentation of the 
procedures, methods and documents in each interview report is instrumental 
to reach that objective.766 
• Construct Validity: Construct validity ensures the adequacy of the operational 
measures for the concepts researched. In order to increase construct validity, 
the researcher combines multiple sources of evidence (expert interviews as 
well as documents from the interviewee's workplace that was not restricted to 
internal use). During data collection, the researcher focuses on analytical 
insights, however, rather than on ensuring construct validity. 
The expert interviews were conducted according to the framework of Yin (1994) 
(refer to Figure 22). Although reports were written after each interview, conclusions 
are drawn across individual interview results. The virtue of analysis across sin~le 
interviews is that it permits the aggregation of data and information respectively. 67 
The qualitative research design of this study guarantees external validity, reliability 
and construct validity. 
764 Internal validity is no further commented upon. It is necessary for experimental and quasi-
experimental research (explanatory or causal research to establish causal relationships) and not 
for exploratory (descriptive) studies. Refer to Yin (1994), pp. 33-35. 
765 Refer to Yin (1994), p. 33 ff, Ellram (1996), p. 104 ff and Bonoma (1985), p. 201 ff. 
766 Furthermore, triangulation or multiple methods of data collection and analysis strengthens 
reliability as well as internal validity. Triangulation is less a strategy for validating results and 
procedures than an alternative to validation which increases scope, depth and consistency in 
methodological proceedings. Refer to Creswell (2003), p. 204 and Flick (2002), p. 227. 
767 Refer to Yin (1994), pp. 144-152. 
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Figure 22: Qualitative research design. 
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Source: Own illustration according to Yin (1994), p. 49. Note: Number of interviewees in brackets. 
4.1.2 Quantitative analysis 
In addition to analyzing data from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook, 
the China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2006) and other sources of statistical data, 
the World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001) is evaluated statistically. 
4.1.2.1 The data sample 
The World Bank conducted the survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm 
Linkages in Manufacturing Sectors" in 2001.768 The survey comprises 1,500 firms, 
300 firms each from five large cities: Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai and 
Tianjin. Firms in the sample belong to five manufacturing sectors (apparel and 
leather goods, consumer goods, electronic components, electronic equipment, and 
vehicles and vehicle parts) and five service sectors (accounting and related services, 
advertising and marketing, business logistics, communication services, and 
information-technology services). The sample covers 216 companies (14.4 percent of 
768 Most accounting data cover the period 1998-2000, while interview data are only tor the year 2000. 
180 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
The auto industry in the light of the Chinese development approach 
total firms covered) in the auto ("vehicles and vehicle parts") sector. The statistical 
analysis of the survey data concentrates on three groups. 
"Group auto sector - residual sectors": 
Does the development of the auto industry differ significantly from that of the residual 
sectors covered in the sample?769 Did the government actively and effectively 
promote the auto industry in comparison with the residual sectors? To answer these 
questions, the first group built is "Group auto sector - residual sectors". 14.4 percent 
of the interviewees (n=216) are active in the auto sector; 85.6 percent of the 
interviewees are in the residual sector (n=1284). 
"Group auto sector - electronics sector": 
As China declared the auto and the electronics industry as pillar industries in 1994, 
the analysis explores whether there are any significant differences between the two 
sectors. The second group is hence "Group auto sector - electronics sector". While 
the World Bank sample covers the electronic components sector and the electronic 
equipment sector separately, in the following analysis, both are merged in the 
category electronics sector. 395 respondents of the World Bank survey come from 
the electronics sector (26.3 percent). 
"Group auto sector Beijing - auto sector Shanghai": 
What similarities and differences can be observed between the auto industry in 
Beijing and that in Shanghai? If there are significant differences, this might be traced 
to the local municipalities' engagement in promoting the local auto industry. The third 
group is thus "Group auto sector Beijing and auto sector Shanghai". The World Bank 
sample includes 44 (2.9 percent) interviewed managers of the auto sector in Beijing 
and 40 (2.7 percent) respondents of the auto sector in Shanghai. 
4.1.2.2 Methodology of the statistical evaluation 
The World Bank data is analyzed by using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) (Version 12.0.1 ). Some string (alphanumeric) variables such as city and 
sector are converted into numeric variables. This guarantees the operationalization of 
the variables. 
769 The auto sector includes vehicles and vehicle parts manufacturing. The residual sector comprises 
the following sub-sectors: apparel and leather goods, consumer goods, electronic components, 
electronic equipment, accounting and related services, advertising and marketing, business 
logistics, communication services, and information technology services. 
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The traditional classification of levels of measurement into different scales was 
developed by Stevens (1946).770 This remains the basic typology and is the one used 
throughout this analysis. The variables of the World Bank sample can be categorized 
in three types of scales: nominal scale, ordinal scale and metric (ratio) scale. 
For each variable, dependent on the scale, measures of central tendency, the mode, 
median or arithmetic mean, are calculated.771 The mode, median and mean are used 
to describe the location of a distribution.772 Furthermore, the standard deviation is 
calculated.773 
Crosstabulation tables (contingency tables) display the relationship between two or 
more categorical (nominal or ordinal) variables. The size of the table is determined by 
the number of distinct values for each variable, with each cell in the table 
representing a unique combination of values. 
In order to measure statistic differences between central tendencies of two groups, 
different tests are used. Tests for statistical significance are made against a null 
hypothesis that asserts that there is no systematic relationship between the 
variables.774 When performing a significance test, the null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis are compared. In this analysis, p (probability) describes the level of 
significance. All p values of less than 0.05 are considered to be significant. 
A quite general test for the comrarison of two nominal variables is the Pearson Chi-
Square Test for cross tables.77 It is useful to see whether there is a statistica.J!ls 
significant relationship between two samples from a nominal population distribution. 6 
When the cross table is reduced to a 2x2 table, the test may also be used to check 
whether there is an association between two dichotomous variables, and whether two 
proportions are different from each other.777 The Chi-Square Test assumes that the 
expected value for each cell is five or higher. The Fisher's Exact Test or the 
Likelihood Ratio Test is used if one or more of the cells have an expected frequency 
of five or less.778 Additionally, the Fisher's Exact Test can be only performed on a 2x2 
77° For further information refer to Stevens (1946), pp. 677-680. 
771 The central tendency of a variable is the value on that variable that "attracts" most of the cases. 
Refer to Benninghaus (2005), p. 22 ff and p. 36 ff and Heiler and Michels (1994), p. 86 ff. 
772 The mode is the most frequently occurring value (or values). It indicates the central tendency of 
nominal variables. The median is the value above and below which one half of the observations 
fall. For ordinal data the median is usually a good measure of central tendency since it uses the 
ranking information. The mean, also called the arithmetic average, is the sum of the values of all 
observations divided by the number of observations. Refer to Norusis/SPSS Inc. (1988), p. 39, 
Pennings et al. (1999), p. 117 and Benninghaus (2002), pp. 38-50. 
773 It is the result of summing the squared deviations of the ratios about the mean, dividing the result 
by the total number of ratios minus one, and taking the positive square root. 
774 Refer to Bortz (2005), p. 108 ff. 
775 The Pearson Chi-Square Test is calculated by summing over all cells the squared residuals 
divided by the expected frequencies. Refer to Norusis/SPSS Inc. (1988), p. 54. 
776 Refer to Pennings et al. (1999), p. 159. 
777 Refer to Benninghaus (2002), pp. 77 ff and Pennings et al. (1999), p. 159. 
778 Refer to Norusis/SPSS Inc. (1988), p. 55 and Bortz (2005), p. 491 ff. 
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cross table. The Pearson Chi-Square Test and Fisher's Exact Test are only 
appropriate when the data in the table are independent. A one-sided and two-sided 
version of Fisher's Exact Test can be calculated. In this analysis, the two-sided 
version is generally used, as there is no prior alternative to independence.779 
The Mann-Whitney U Test is the most popular of the two-independent-samples 
tests.780 An ordinal scale is sufficient.781 The Mann-Whitney Test, also known as the 
Wilcoxon Test, does not require assumptions about the shape of the underlying 
distributions. It tests the hypothesis that two independent samples come from 
populations having the same distribution.782 If the number of cases is smaller than 30, 
SPSS calculates the exact significance p value.783 
An Independent-Samples T-Test is used when comparing the means of a normally 
distributed interval dependent variable for two independent groups.784 The two-
sample T-Test is fairly resistant to departures from normality. In this respect, even 
when samples are taken from a nonnormal population, the distribution of the sample 
means is approximately normal for sufficiently large samples. As the size of the 
sample increases, the sampling distribution of the mean approaches normality.785 
This assumes a number of cases larger than 30. By default, a 95 percent confidence 
interval for the difference in means is displayed. The column labeled Sig. (2-tailed) 
gives the smallest probability (largest confidence level) for which the null hypothesis 
can be rejected. One of the assumptions underlying the use of T-Test is the equality 
of variance. In SPSS homogeneity of variances is tested by "Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances", with F value and corresponding significance. These are part of 
SPSS output for Two Independent Sample T-Tests. It tests the hypothesis that the 
variances of the two groups are equal. Provided the F value is not significant 
(p>0.05), the variances can be assumed to be homogeneous and the Equal Variance 
line values for the T-Test be used. If p<0.05, then the equality of variance assumption 
has been violated and the T-Test based on the separate variance estimates (unequal 
variances) should be used. The T-Test for unequal variances is an alternative way of 
computing the T-Test that accounts for heterogeneous variances and provides an 
779 When both table variables are quantitative, Chi-Square yields the Linear-by-linear Association 
Test (Mantel-Haenszel-Test). Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square, unlike ordinary and Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square, is an ordinal measure of significance. As the Mantel-Haenzel Chi-Square is not 
appropriate for nominal variables, it is left aside in this analysis. Refer to SPSS, Version 12. 
780 It is equivalent to the Wilcoxon rank sum test and the Kruskal-Wallis test for two groups. 
781 The Mann-Whitney Test checks whether two sampled populations are equivalent in location. The 
observations from both groups are combined and ranked, with the average rank assigned in the 
case of ties. The number of ties should be small relative to the total number of observations. If the 
populations are identical in location, the ranks should be randomly mixed between the two 
samples. The number of times a score from group 1 precedes a score from group 2 and the 
number of times a score from group 2 precedes a score from group 1 are calculated. The Mann-
Whitney U statistic is the smaller of these two numbers. 
782 Refer to Norusis/SPSS Inc. (1988), p. 137. 
783 Refer to Buhl and Z6fel (2000), p. 259 ff. 
784 Refer to Bortz (2005), p. 475 ff. 
785 Refer to Norusis/SPSS Inc. (1988), pp. 79-80. 
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accurate result even when the homogeneity assumption has been violated (as 
indicated by the Levene Test).786 The output for both formats shows the degrees of 
freedom (df) and probability (2-tailed significance).787 If the number of cases is less 
than 30, before conducting a T-Test, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test has to be applied 
to test for a normal distribution. 
The normal distribution of a variable is given if p>0.05.788 In the analysis, the 
procedure remains virtually the same for tests of most hypotheses: 
1. A hypothesis of no difference (called null hypothesis) and its alternative are 
formulated. 
2. A test statistic is chosen to evaluate the null hypothesis. 
3. For the sample, the test statistic is calculated. 
4. The probability, if the null hypothesis is true, of obtaining a test value at least 
as extreme as the one observed is determined. 
5. If the observed significance level is judged small enough, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. 789 
4.1.3 Shortcomings of the research approach 
When conducting the empirical analysis of state-guidance in the auto sector, the 
following aspects have to be considered: 
• Generalization of the results to a wider context should be undertaken with 
caution, as the analysis covers one industry setting in one emerging market. 
China's auto industry has experienced a remarkable development in the last 
two decades, and its institutional environment is very different from a 
developed economy. Nevertheless, the research findings are generalizable to 
theoretical propositions rather than populations or universe. In this sense, the 
empirical analysis of the auto industry does not represent a "sample", and the 
investigator's goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical ~eneralization).790 
Therefore, in the trade-off between validity and generality 91 , validity is of 
higher priority at the expense of generality. Triangulation is a rigorous 
786 Ibidem, p. 80. 
787 As in all statistical tests, the basic criterion for statistical significance is a "2-tailed significance" 
less than 0.05. 
788 Refer to Buhl and Ztifel (2000), p. 259 ff and p. 295. 
789 Refer to Norusis/SPSS Inc. (1988), p. 85. 
790 Refer to Yin (1994), pp. 9-13. 
791 Refer to Collier and Mahoney (1996), p. 69. 
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approach which, based on a carefully chosen sector, the auto industry, yields a 
generally applicable explanation.792 
• The conducted expert interviews, as well as the World Bank survey, rely on 
voluntary information, and are thus subject to many sources of error: people 
deliberately distort the truth, inadvertently fail to recall events correctly, or 
refuse to participate. Refusals influence survey results by failing to provide 
information about a particular type of person - one who refuses to answer 
surveys at all, or avoids certain types of questions.793 
• Although the World Bank sample is the most recent one of the auto industry at 
the local level, the data covers only the period 1998 - 2000. Due to China's 
rapid development, data from this time might be already outdated. Moreover, 
the sample's variables are analyzed with respect to specific groups, and not all 
of the interviewees in one group responded to all interview questions. In 
consequence, despite the large population (1,200 companies) of the sample, 
the counted answers may be small. If conclusions have to be drawn from small 
counts they may not be representative for the whole group. The sample is, 
however, valuable as it allows a statistical evaluation, and thus a quantitative 
basis of the research analysis. 
These shortcomings are taken into account when analyzing the development of the 
auto industry. As insights are gained from secondary statistics, the statistical 
evaluation of the World Bank sample and up-to-date expert interviews, informed 
conclusions can be drawn, incorporating and abstracting the results from the various 
sources. 
4.2 Bureaucratic framework of the auto industry 
Although the central government's power over the auto industry diminished gradually 
in the reform era, a legacy of central planning has remained. Various central-level 
government agencies maintain strict control over the sector. In order to gain 
information on the effectiveness of policy-making and implementation in the auto 
sector, different indicators of bureaucratic competence are evaluated and 
international and regional comparisons drawn. 
792 Refer to Hamel (1993), p. 51. 
793 The totality of all cases about which conclusions are desired is called the population, while the 
observations actually included in the study are the sample. Refer to Norusis/SPSS Inc. (1988), p. 
35 and p. 78. 
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4.2.1 Bureaucratic institutions shaping the auto sector's development 
The State Council, and the NDRC in particular, shape the development of the auto 
sector. The State Council sets the general goal of China's industrial development by 
issuing five-year plans and approves (auto) JV or WFOE projects above USD 500 
million investment volume.794 The NDRC controls the establishment of vehicle 
factories and is responsible for the examination and approval of auto projects 
exceeding an investment volume of USD 100 million.795 Sino-foreign auto projects 
usually exceed the threshold for State Council and NDRC approval; in consequence, 
both agencies have to approve each new auto project in China. The State Council 
and the NDRC subsequently wield extensive control over the sector. Foreign 
investors negotiate with the NDRC concerning their business plan, approval 
conditions, project timeline etc. The NDRC furthermore coordinates and implements 
national economic and social development plans, including auto industrial policies 
which guide the development of the sector. It issues public announcements with 
regard to legal regulations and standards for the auto sector.796 
Other agencies participate in auto policy-making through their respective functions 
such as the Ministry of Commerce, which issues regulations on FFEs and is 
responsible for auto distribution; the Ministry of Science and Technology, which 
makes strategic planning for auto technologies; the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, which has control over auto financing companies; the Ministry of Public 
Security, which is responsible for vehicle registration and traffic regulation; the State 
Environmental Protection Administration, which issues model-specific fuel 
consumption standards and regulates emission compliance; and the State 
Administration of Taxation, which exercises taxes on auto manufacturers and 
consumers (auto consumption tax). In addition, the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine is in charge of homologation, standards and 
certification in the auto sector.797 The General Administration of Customs regulates 
tariffs on imported components and completely knocked down (CKD)798 kits; and the 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce is accountable for auto 
manufacturer and dealer registration. Altogether, at least eleven agencies have 
power over the auto sector. 
794 In the early years of reform, the State Council was also responsible for certifying import quotas for 
motor vehicles and disassembled vehicle kits. This duty was assigned to the Machinery and 
Electronics Import Inspection Office in 1990. Refer to Harwit (1995), p. 46. 
795 Refer to NDRC (2004), "Interim Measures for the Administration of Examining and Approving 
Foreign Investment Projects", Article 3 and 4, Internet Edition, reviewed 24.04.2006. 
796 Refer to NDRC (2007), "Main Functions of the NDRC", Internet Edition, reviewed 16.01.2007. 
797 Information based on official documents of respective agencies. 
798 CKDs are sets of auto parts that are packaged in one country, then exported to another for 
assembly. It is a common practice among automakers to sell knocked down kits to their foreign 
affiliates in order to avoid high import taxes and/or receive tax preferences for providing local 
employment. An incomplete kit is known as semi knocked down (SKD). 
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In the organizational chart that shows the key bureaucratic institutions responsible for 
auto policy-making, the State Council is at the top (it has the highest bureaucratic 
rank), followed by the commissions, the ministries and the administrative 
organizations that are directly under the State Council. Commissions have a higher 
bureaucratic rank than the ministries, and unlike the heads of the commissions and 
the ministries, the leaders of the administrations do not belong to the State Council 
( refer to Figure 23). 799 
Beside these agencies, the Certification and Accreditation Administration of China 
(authorized by the State Defoartment and responsible for issuing the China 
Compulsory Certificate, CCC) 00 and the Standardization Administration of the 
People's Republic of China (under the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine) also establish the policy process for the auto sector.801 
The Standardization Administration carries out centralized administration for 
compulsory standardization in China. The China Auto Technology and Research 
Center also exerts influence on the sector. It was established in 1985 upon the 
approval of the China National Science and Technology Commission, and since 
2003, it has been affiliated to SASAC of the State Council. It is accountable for 
standardization and technical regulations, product certification and testing research, 
quality system certification, information service and soft-science research, 
engineering management and design, enterprise management science research, 
auto high-tech development and application.80 
799 The State Council is composed of a premier, vice-premiers, state councillors, ministers in charge 
of ministries and commissions, the auditor-general and the secretary-general. Refer to Lieberthal 
(1997), p. 3 and China.org (2007), "Political system and state structure", Internet Edition, reviewed 
09.09.2007. 
800 The CCC system was implemented in China on 01.05.2002 and became fully effective on 
01.08.2003 as mandatory certification and marking. The aim of the certification system is to 
establish a uniform standard in China tor selected products (19 product groups, 132 product 
categories). CCC has replaced the former "China Commission tor Conformity of Electric 
Equipment" symbol tor domestic products and the "China Commodity Inspection Bureau" symbol 
for imported products. This change ensures that domestic and international companies and their 
goods are treated equally in accordance with WTO rules. Both Chinese and foreign 
manufacturers are affected, therefore. The Chinese customs have been using CCC as the valid 
guidelines for the import into China of goods subject to certification. Refer to NDRC (2004), 
"Automobile Industry Development Policy No. 8 decree of the State Development and Reform 
Commission", Chapter 5, Article 20, Internet Edition, reviewed 11.04.2006. 
eo, Both rank lower than the agencies at ministry-level. Interview conducted with an expert of a 
Chinese auto government institution in Beijing on 16.06.2006. 
802 Information based on official documents of respective agencies. 
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Figure 23: Key institutions engaged in auto industry regulation and oversight. 
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Slate Environmental Slate AdmlnlelraUon of General Admlnl11trat1on of State Admlnlatratlon for General Administration of 
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•Emissions compliance •New auto con1L.1T1ption CKDktts manufacturers and dealers •Homologalion. 111andards taxation and certification 
Source: Own illustration according to interviews with managers of OEMs and suppliers in Beijing and 
Shanghai, interviews with experts of a European and a Chinese auto association in Beijing between 
08.06.2006 and 13.07.2006 as well as official documents of respective agencies. 
SASAC has become the main body responsible for structural reform of the economy 
and for industrial policy. With the creation of SASAC, SOEs under the State Council 
(196 in 2003, when the commission was founded) became assets to be run by 
managers under market conditions rather than ministries.803 SASAC sees its mission 
not only in improving governance, transparency and ultimately performance of SOEs, 
but also in increasing the value of public assets. As the government agency charged 
with exercising the authority of ownership, but without a privatization mandate, 
SASAC understandably interprets "reform" in a way that is consistent with its own 
bureaucratic interests, which include maintaining a large state sector.804 As in 2003, 
21.4 percent of SOEs were active in the auto industry; SASAC had subsequently 
obtained wide influence over the sector.805 
In addition to central level state agents, different local actors have influenced the 
development of the auto sector throughout the reform period. A local planning 
commission formulates long-term development schemes, and an economic 
803 Refer to Noble et al. (2005), pp. 11-12. 
804 Refer to Naughton (2006), p. 2. Libecap contends that self-interested bureaucrats are likely to be 
influenced by the size of the budget made available to their bureaucracy. Cost or waste 
maximization is the assumption that self-interested bureaucrats maximize their budgets, which 
leads to quite different results in the polity compared with the results in private-market institutions. 
For further information refer to Libecap (1989). 
805 Refer to Lee (2006), p. 26. 
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comm1ss1on carries out these plans by regulating energy allocation, overseeing 
industrial laws etc. Foreign Economic Relation and Trade Commissions (such as the 
Shanghai Foreign Economic Relation and Trade Commission)Bos are responsible for 
JVs and other foreign investment projects at the local level. However, they play a 
minor role in implementing projects.807 
In most cities, local leaders are actively involved in identifying and supporting JVs. 
Within the municipalities, the mayor generally has the most power to direct the 
development of the capital-intensive auto industry. Usually, one or two vice mayors 
also are instructed to work on the development of the sector. In 1990, "Auto Leading 
Small Groups" existed in municipalities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. 
The small groups were composed of at least one vice mayor and representatives 
from the cities' economic, planning and international trade committees as well as 
representatives from the leading auto industrial corporations. The small groups 
offered a platform for information exchange between bureaucrats and businessmen. 
In the auto small groups, representatives of the state and the business sector acted 
officially as two separate groups, but were often merged. In Guangzhou, the board 
chairman of Guangzhou Peugeot, Xie Gancheng, was at the same time the vice 
chairman of the Machinery and Electronics Department under the Economic 
Committee_BoB In Shanghai, the auto leading small group complemented the role of 
the municipal government. Municipal leaders increasingly used their expertise and 
knowledge of the bureaucratic bodies governing Chinese industry to serve as 
advocates for their local industry. A prime example is the protection of the capital 
collected by means of the Shanghai component localization tax from 1988 to 1994. In 
1990, the State Planning Commission demanded from Shanghai to turn half of the 
proceeds from the component tax over to Beijing in the interest of "balanced growth". 
Mayor Zhu Rongji played the pivotal role in protecting the localization fund. He told 
the State Planning Commission officials that the primary problem of the auto industry 
was that investment was too dispersed, and if the localization fund did not remain in 
Shanghai, the municipality would fail to develop a strong supply base. In the end, 
Shanghai sent a nominal portion of the localization fund to the central government, 
but the vast majority remained in Shanghai. Overall, the auto leading small groups 
charted a general course for the local industry, and provided a forum for coordination 
among the disparate government bodies. The strength of the small groups in 
promoting the local industry was dependent on its officials chosen as leaders.B09 
806 Refer to Shanghai Foreign Economic Relation and Trade Commission (2006), Internet Edition, 
reviewed 17.01.2006. 
807 Refer to Harwit (1995), pp. 55-56 and p. 163. 
808 Ibidem. 
809 Refer to Thun (2006), pp. 110-133. 
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4.2.2 Policy-making and implementation 
Policy-makers and academics agree that good governance matters in economic 
development. Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments 
are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.810 
Scholars have discovered that high-quality institutions have the power, over the long 
run, to raise per capita incomes and promote growth in all parts of the world.811 An 
economy is expected to work much better when bureaucrats follow precise 
responsibilities and are more interested in enforcing efficient rules rather than in 
maximizing bureaucratic budgets.812 
In China, multiple state agencies conduct policy-making for the auto industry, either 
on the central or the local government level. The following analysis explores whether 
the institutional organization has been conducive to effective governance in China 
and to efficient state-guidance in the auto sector. Information on governance and the 
effectiveness of policy-making and implementation is gathered from the expert 
interviews conducted in Beijing and Shanghai. Moreover, the IMO World 
Competitiveness Yearbook and the latest governance indicators from the 2006 World 
Bank report "China Governance, Investment Climate, and Harmonious Society" are 
used to analyze government effectiveness in China.813 From the various sources, 
certain indicators provide valuable information on the effectiveness of government 
policy-making (coordination across institutions, adaptability of government policy to 
changes in the economy, policy transparency) and governance (regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption). 
The IMO ranking and the World Bank governance indicators are not sector specific, 
however. As overall government competence differs across regions,814 not sectors, 
the rankings and indicators can nevertheless be applied to gain information on 
bureaucratic efficiency in the auto sector. Overall, the combination of auto-specific 
information from expert interviews together with information from the IMO ranking 
and the World Bank indicators on national and regional government efficiency 
provide satisfactory insight into governance in China. From the general bureaucratic 
810 Refer to World Bank (2007), "Governance Matters 2007", Internet Edition, reviewed 20.10.2007. 
811 Refer to International Bank of Reconstruction/The World Bank (2006), "A Decade of Measuring 
the Quality of Governance", Internet Edition, reviewed 10.10.2007. 
812 For further information on the "grabbing hand" and the "helping hand" of the state refer to Shleifer 
and Vishny ( 1999). 
813 The governance indicators are based on a longstanding research program of the World Bank 
Institute and the Research Department of the World Bank, initiated in the late 1990s. 
814 Different indicators of government efficiency (taxes and fees, informal payments and bureaucratic 
interaction) are analyzed on a regional basis. 
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efficiency one can judge the bureaucratic competence as well as policy-making and 
implementation effectiveness in the auto sector. 
As the previous analysis indicated, the Chinese government's ability to enforce 
industrial policy is weakened by China's bureaucratic organization.815 Various 
ministries claim planning and management roles and aim to direct the sector's 
development. If more than two contracting parties can affect the income flow from a 
set of property rights, delineating each party's respective property rights becomes 
difficult. Vested interests and imperfect information on existing political, social, and 
economic positions of contracting parties lead to high transaction costs and markets 
operating below the (Pareto) efficient levels.816 In addition, overlapping 
responsibilities result in inter-ministerial rivalries, and complicate industrial policy 
implementation. 
Interviewees gave two examples of central-level coordination failure and revealed 
that "the division of work between the various agencies involved in auto policy-
making is complicated''. 617 First, the NDRC and the Ministry of Commerce both have 
to approve JVs.818 Although the two agencies cooperate closely, and their policy 
approaches seem to be consistent, there are internal quarrels, as both pursue 
different policy goals. While the Ministry of Commerce embarks on the strategy of 
liberalization and is pro WTO, the NDRC is the planning agency which issues strict 
regulations that sometimes do not conform to WTO law (e.g. local content 
regulations). Accordingly, as explored by the interviewees, foreign investors might 
obtain different information from NDRC and Ministry of Commerce bureaucrats on 
the requirements they have to fulfil in order to receive approval of planned auto 
projects.819 Second, three government bodies oversee certification and accreditation 
in China: the Certification and Accreditation Administration of China, the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and the China 
National Certification and Accreditation Commission. Foreign interviewees reported 
that the three agencies have overlapping responsibilities. They complained that in 
order to receive the CCC, foreign companies have to make certain tests for the 
central government twice. One test for the Public Announcement Administration 
under the NDRC in order to get project approval, and another test for the Certification 
815 Refer to Huang (2002a), p. 558 and Wang (2001), pp. 17-18. 
816 Refer to Poulson (1994), p. 81. Fur further information refer to Libecap (1989) and Alston et al. 
(1999). 
817 Interview conducted with an expert of a Chinese auto government institution in Beijing on 16.06. 
2006. 
818 After approval from NDAC and State Council, contract and regulations compliance documentation 
must be submitted to the Ministry of Commerce for approval, after which the Ministry of 
Commerce will issue an authorization certificate. The auto manufacturer then receives the 
certificate of approval from the Ministry of Commerce. 
819 Interviews conducted with managers of a German OEM in Beijing between 08.06.2006 and 16.06. 
2006. 
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and Accreditation Administration of China, which monitors auto imports and domestic 
production with respect to Chinese standards.820 
As each ministry tries to increase its influence and follows its own interests, 
coordination between the different agencies is complicated and time-consuming.821 
Given the manner in which many governmental structures in China are fragmented 
vertically along functional lines, bureaucratic authorities of equal rank bargain 
continually and intensely - any resource that is scarce will be subject to 
bargaining.822 According to a study of AT Kearney (2005), ten agencies are 
accountable for the content of industrial policies for the auto industry; five different 
agencies are responsible for fuel consumption standards and auto dealership 
franchising, and four different agencies are in charge of vehicle recycling 
requirements, emissions compliance, used car appraisal processes, tariff regulations 
for imported parts and auto side collision safety regulations (refer to Table 10).823 
Overall, unlike the far-reaching competence of a single pilot agency in the 
developmental states, state agencies' coordination effort negatively affects 
government efficiency in the auto sector. 
At the same time, though, certain aspects of government policy-making and thus 
state competence are more pronounced in China than in the East Asian 
developmental states. The IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (2007) indicates 
that China ranks ahead of Japan, Taiwan and Korea with regards to adaptability of 
government policy to changes in the economy and policy transparency. In detail, out 
of 55 countries, China ranks four with regard to the adaptability of government policy 
to changes in the economy, before Japan (rank 30), Taiwan (rank 33) and Korea 
( rank 34). Moreover, China ranks 19 regarding satisfaction of policy transparency 
compared with Japan (rank 32), Taiwan (rank 39) and Korea (rank 34) (refer to Table 
11 ). 
820 One foreign expert elaborated that the overlap of responsibility between different central level 
agencies is not limited to the auto sector. When it comes to decisions on the railway system, the 
Ministry of Construction is responsible for the metro railway system within one city. The Ministry of 
Railways is yet responsible for the metro railway system inbetween two cities. Interviews 
conducted with managers of a German supplier company in Shanghai on 19.06.2006. 
821 Interview conducted with an expert of a European auto association in Beijing on 16.06.2006. 
822 Refer to Thun (2006), p. 110. 
823 A German manager of a supplier company in Shanghai referred to the study of AT Kearny during 
the interview on 13.07.2006. 
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Table 10: Coordination and agreement across policy-making organizations. 
NDRC Minislr., cl :;111. Minillry cl Ulina UllbmS :s4111e MiliMry cl Slatl State 8l.lfUU ol Mirittry ol PWic 
Ccmm1,c1 Aclmlniltrah,n ol Commura:ation El'IWOMlerul Sc:itfQ am Aclmnltration DI Ouaily and SeQ,my 
Common ptOCNt lor 
luaedearappraisal 
lUlliOO PIOIKiion Tec::hf'illlolw IIQ.lltry ard Tedv'ical 
Adm...-.on Comm1ic1 5'4)1rvili0r'I and -
Source: AT Kearney (together with the European Union Chamber of Commerce and the Auto 
Components Working Group) (2005). 
Table 11: Government policy-making, 2007.824 
"Out of 55 countries, China/Japan/Taiwan/ China Japan Taiwan Korea Korea rank ... " 
"Adaptability ol government policy to changes in the 
4 30 33 34 
economy is high" 
"Transparency of government policy is satisfactory" 19 32 39 34 
Source: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (2007), p. 328 ff. 
In China, a counteractive set of laws is often necessary, as the auto industry has 
developed rapidly since 1978.825 While in 2000, the passenger car pare in China was 
less than 5,000 units, it reached 17 million units in 2006.826 Due to rapidly increasing 
passenger car sales, the central government regularly implements a raft of new 
legislative measures such as frontal and side crash tests to increase safety as well 
as emission standards (Euro norms) to combat rising pollution.827 China adopted 
824 The smaller the rank, the better government policy•making with regards to each indicator. 
825 Interviews conducted with experts from a German public corporation in Beijing on 08.06.2006 and 
with experts from a Chinese state organization in Beijing on 13.06.2006. 
826 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, September 2007, p. 4. 
827 Interview conducted with an expert of a Chinese auto government institution in Beijing on 
16.06.2006. 
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Euro II emission standards for all new cars in 2003.828 Euro Ill standards were 
adopted nationwide in July 2007. Euro IV emission standards are scheduled for 
nationwide adoption by 2010.829 The example shows that the standards and 
regulations domestic and foreign investors have to fulfil are transparent. Moreover, 
central level bureaucrats clearly target national regulations for the sector. They enact 
corrective regulations to adapt the development of the industry to changing 
macroeconomic, environmental or social conditions.830 
While policy-making demonstrates to be adaptable to macro-economic changes, and 
government policy is transparent to economic subjects, governance lacks quality. 
The World Bank's governance indicators confirm that the regulatory burden 
(measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies) is larger in China 
("Regulatory Quality": 46.3 percentile rank) than in Japan (87.3 percentile rank).831 
Further governance indicators such as "Rule of Law" (measuring the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence) and "Control of Corruption" (measuring the exercise of public power for 
private gain, including both petty and large-scale corruption and state capture) 
demonstrate that governance is far less pronounced in China ("Rule of Law": 45.2 
percentile rank; "Control of Corruption": 37.9 percentile rank) than in Japan ("Rule of 
Law": 90.0 percentile rank; "Control of Corruption": 90.3 percentile rank) (refer to 
Table 12). The scale of corruption resulting from local governments' extensive 
economic regulatory rights832 is larger than that of the East Asian developmental 
states.833 
828 Euro I emission standards were adopted nationwide in China in 2000. 
829 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 45. 
830 Interview conducted with an expert of a European auto association in Beijing on 16.06.2006 and 
with managers of a German OEM in Beijing between 08.06.2006 and 16.06.2006. 
831 The indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of 
governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations. The 
authors assign these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions 
of governance, and use an unobserved components model to construct six aggregate governance 
indicators in each period. The authors present the point estimates of the dimensions of 
governance as well as the margins of errors for each country and period. 
832 Refer to Perkins (2001 ), p. 8. 
833 With regard to bribery and corruption, the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook also ranks China 
44 among 55 countries and regions worldwide compared with Japan (rank 22), Taiwan (rank 27) 
and Korea (rank 29). Refer to IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (2007), Survey question 
2.3.15 ( "Does bribing and corruption exist/do not exist in your economy?'), p. 348. 
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Table 12: Governance indicators, 2006.834 
Govemance Indicator Country Percantlle Rank Governance Score Standard Error (0-100) (-2.5 to + 2.5) 
Regulatory Quality China 46.3 -0.19 0.18 
Japan 87.3 +1.27 0.20 
Rule of Law China 45.2 -0.40 0.13 
Japan 90.0 +1.40 0.14 
Control of Corruption China 37.9 -0.53 0.14 
Japan 90.3 +1.31 0.14 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2007), "Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 01.10.2007. 
Government efficiency varies widely across China. The World Bank (2006) report 
"China Governance, Investment Climate, and Harmonious Society" reveals that 
government efficiency (measured by informal payments in the form of travel and 
entertainment expenditures as a percentage of sales, days of bureaucratic interaction 
by managers and taxes and tees as a percentage of sales) is foremost in China's 
Southeast cities (Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong); followed by 
the Bohai cities (Shandong, Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei); with Northeast 
(Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) and Central cities (Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and 
Jiangxi) typically somewhere in the middle; and with Southwest (Yunnan, Guizhou, 
Guangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, and Hainan) and Northwest cities (Shanxi, Shaanxi, 
Neimenggu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu, and Xinjiang) lagging (refer to Table 13).835 
Taxes and tees as a proportion of sales revenue appear to be lowest in the 
Southeast (4.1 percent) and Bohai (4.5 percent) cities and highest in the Northwest 
(5.8 percent) and Southwest (6.3 percent) cities.836 Travel and entertainment relative 
to sales is highest in Northeast (1.4 percent) and lowest in Bohai (0.9 percent) cities. 
While laws and regulations tend to be consistent nationwide, enforcement is not. The 
amount of time enterprise staff must spend interacting with government 
bureaucracies (tax administration, public security, environmental protection, and 
labor and social security) varies widely. On a regional basis, firm interactions with 
major bureaucracies are highest in Northwest cities, followed by Bohai, Southwest 
and Northeast cities. Days of bureaucratic interaction are lowest in Central cities 
83" The governance indicators aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large 
number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing 
countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators do not 
reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. 
Countries' relative positions on these indicators are subject to indicated margins of error that 
should be taken into consideration when making comparisons across countries and over time. 
835 Numbers are based on a survey of 120 cities (and 12,400 firms). Refer to World Bank (2006), 
"China Governance, Investment Climate, and Harmonious Society: Competitiveness 
Enhancements for 120 Cities in China", Internet Edition, reviewed 07.09.2007. 
836 Ibidem. 
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(51. 7 days) and Southeast cities (51.6 days) (refer to Table 13). The low "time tax" 
for Southeast cities is in line with their pro-business reputation. The similarly low 
figure for the less developed Central cities is somewhat surprising. It is also 
noteworthy that the average for Northeast cities falls below that for Bohai cities, 
despite the Northeast's legacy of greater government intervention in the economy. 
This may reflect Bohai cities' greater interaction with tax administration which 
administers various tax preferences. 
Table 13: Taxes and fees, informal payments and bureaucratic interaction, 2006. 
Taxes and lees/sales (%) Travel and Days of bureaucratic 
entertainment/sales(%) Interactions 
Southeast (Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang. 4.1 1.0 51.6 
Fujian, and Guangdong) 
Bohal (Shandong, Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei) 4.5 0.9 71.9 
Northeast (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) 5.4 1.4 63.1 
Central (Anhui, Hanan. Hubei, Hunan, and 5.0 1.2 51.7 
Jiangxi) 
Southwest (Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi. 6.3 1.2 65.9 
Sichuan, Chongqing. and Hainan) 
Northwest (Shanxi. Shaanxi, Neimenggu, 5.8 1.3 78.3 
Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu, and Xinjiang) 
Source: World Bank (2006), "China Governance, Investment Climate, and Harmonious Society: Com-
petitiveness Enhancements for 120 Cities in China", Internet Edition, reviewed 07.09.2007. 
The data indicate that entertainment and travel expenditures (measured as a ratio of 
sales), which can be a vehicle for corruption, tend to be higher where local 
governments provide poorer service or where the tax burden is higher. This also 
confirms a study of Cai et al. (2005) which finds that higher entertainment/travel 
expenditures tend to be associated with poorer firm performance, and that the 
"quality" of entertainment/travel expenditures is correlated with corporate 
governance. According to their study, firms make large payments to government 
officials to offset bureaucratic burdens and the threat of opportunistic behavior by 
governments.837 The results of Nee and Opper (2007) also show evidence that the 
power of government bureaucrats and party authorities over firm decisions is 
associated negatively with firm return on assets and· equity. They analyzed a survey 
of 72 firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, asking about involvement either 
by government agencies or officials of the CCP in 63 different firm decisions, ranging 
from finance and investment to personnel and external relationships. On average, 
firms reported some involvement in all of these decisions.838 The foreign interviewees 
likewise showed concerns about bureaucrats with their political rather than business 
837 For further information refer to Cai et al. (2005). 
838 For further information refer to Nee et al. (2007). 
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background deciding on the feasibility of auto business projects.839 Political 
intervention is hence a concern for firm managers, and it affects business decisions. 
Overall, unlike in the East Asian developmental states, various central level agencies 
are responsible for auto policy-making in China. This involves an extensive 
coordination effort between them, and increases transaction costs. The state 
agencies' policy goals and long-term direction of industrial policy are transparent and 
regulations are constantly adapted to the changed economic environment of China's 
fast economic development. In consequence, China ranks in an international 
comparison before its East Asian counterparts with regard to the adaptability of 
government policy to changes in the economy, and policy transparency. The central 
government's industrial policy is directed towards clear-cut, long-term development 
goals. At the same time, however, Chinese bureaucrats lack enforcement 
competence. The World Bank indicators show evidence of the hindrance of business 
activity by state bureaucrats, although varying across regions, and thus confirm the 
expert interviews' assessments. The incidence of market-unfriendly policies, 
disregard for the rule of law, and corruption, are factors that reinforce the conclusion 
that growth has proceeded despite a merely average governance environment.840 
4.3 National auto industrial policy 
Since the 1980s, China has attempted to re-structure its auto industry through an 
industrial policy approach closely modelled on that of Japan and Korea. Korea's 
success in restructuring its auto industry, in the 1970s and 1980s can be attributed to 
strong government support granted to the industry and the government's ability to 
distribute rent, selectively and strategically, to a few key firms. This enabled the 
selected manufacturers to acquire economies of scale more quickly than firms 
outside the government's focus.841 The developmental states used variants of entry-
restrictive policies, including industrial consortia, joint R&D programs, arranged 
mergers as well as licensing and granted direct and indirect support to business 
conglomerates. 
Chinese state agents have actively regulated and directed the development of the 
auto sector throughout the reform period. Since the change to reform and openness 
839 The conducted expert interviews in Beijing and Shanghai moreover indicate that senior managers 
have to spend more time for contingency plans than in other countries in case planned projects do 
not receive NDRC and State Council approval. One interviewee estimated that the management 
team of his company furthermore has to spend about 30-40 percent of its time for contingency 
plans (Hong Kong and Singapore: 2 percent and Malaysia 10 percent). Interview conducted with a 
manager of a German OEM in Beijing on 14.06.2006 and an expert of a Chinese auto 
government institution in Beijing on 16.06.2006. 
840 Refer to Keefer (2007), p. 213. 
841 For a descriptive account refer to Rodrik (1996). 
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at the end of the 1970s, the sector has been of strategic importance to China's 
development process for the following reasons: 
• Prestige: Not only for China, but also for many other developing countries, the 
auto industry is a visual symbol of a modern economy. "It represents China's 
fast industrialization and the country's economic and political strength. " 842 
• Spillover effects to other sectors: As extensive linkages create the potential for 
substantial positive spillover effects, state promotion of the auto sector aims to 
develop basic manufacturing capabilities in a wide variety of industries. The 
auto industry is related to many other industries such as metallurgy, 
petroleum, chemical, coal, light industry, electronics, and textiles. Auto 
production would consequently have positive spillover effects on other sectors. 
Moreover, as it is connected to different industries, it creates indirect jobs in 
services, aftersales etc. Thus, development of the auto sector is decisive for 
national economic growth. 
• Specialization and coordination among different companies and sectors: The 
central leaders hoped that the development of the auto industry would 
encourage domestic manufacturers in many sectors to specialize and better 
co-ordinate their efforts. A complex network of relationships between firms, 
markets and governments would be set-up that would increase the country's 
overall economic competitiveness.843 
Due to the auto sector's far-reaching economic influence on the country's overall 
development, state-guidance in the auto sector has been framed by industrial policy 
directives. Three policy documents have mainly shaped the sector's restructuring 
since the mid-1980s: 
• In 1986, the central government officially promulgated the auto industry to be 
a strategic sector of development in its Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). 
The first auto industrial policy was introduced before similar efforts in other 
industries.844 The Chinese government was determined to strengthen the 
presence of state-owned enterprises in the industry after the surge in auto 
demand and the establishment of initial JVs. 
• In 1994, inspired by soaring motor vehicle sales by Japan and Korea (Japan 
sold more than 6.5 million vehicles worldwide in that year)845, and in 
anticipation of eventual entry into the WTO, the State Council promulgated the 
"Industrial Policy for the Automobile lndustry".846 It was the first stand-alone 
842 Interview conducted with an expert of a European auto association in Beijing on 16.06.2006. 
843 Refer to Holweg et al. (2005), pp. 13-14 and Thun (2004b), pp. 233-234. 
844 Refer to lwagaki (1986), p. 11, Takayama (1991 ), p. 17, Zhang and Taylor (2001 ), p. 267, Noble 
et al. (2005), p. 6, Ravenhill (2005), p. 17 and Thun (2006), p. 55. 
845 Data refer to Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, "Japan's Motor Vehicle Statistics", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 22.06.2007. 
846 Refer to State Council (1994), "Industrial Policy of China's Automobile Industry", Preamble. 
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policy document that was sector-specific and not integrated in the national 
five-year plan.847 The main effect of the policy was a competitive rush by 
foreign auto assemblers and parts firms to enter the Chinese market, and to 
establish a favorable position before China entered the WTO. 
• In May 2004, the NDRC released the "Automobile Industry Development 
Policy" which replaced existing guidelines implemented in 1994.848 The 2004 
auto policy confirmed the central government's goal of "making the auto 
industry a pillar industry in the national economy by the year 201 O" and 
updated its guidance from a decade before according to the rules of the 
WTO.849 At the same time, it raised barriers to entry to the market for auto 
assembly. 
China has gradually shifted from overall central planning to market mechanisms in 
the auto industry during the reform period. The 2004 industrial policy confirms the 
government's intent to reinforce its management of industrial development until 2010 
and supposedly also beyond.850 The industrial policies for the auto sector 
concentrate on the transformation of state-owned auto manufacturers into exporting 
national champions with the help of foreign investors. The following analysis thus 
concentrates on the national policy approach towards FDI and trade in order to 
develop the domestic auto sector. 
4.3.1 FDls in the auto sector 
The most important source of leverage for the state in the auto sector is its ability to 
regulate and control foreign investment. China has imported technology and 
established JVs between its key state-owned auto enterprises and well-established 
foreign partners since the early 1980s. The central government has attempted to use 
its regulatory control over FDI to promote the development of centrally sanctioned 
domestic firms. It was one of the few means by which state bureaucrats could give a 
tangible positive benefit to a particular firm. The three domestic auto groups that are 
at the core of the state's focus have each at least two major foreign assembly 
partners: Dongfeng has Citroen and Nissan, First Auto Works (FAW) has VW and 
Toyota, and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) has VW and General 
Motors (GM). Reliance on foreign investment to buildup the domestic auto industry is 
in many respects the defining feature of China's development approach for the 
sector. 
847 Refer to Noble et al. (2005), p. 7. 
848 NDRC (2004), "Automobile Industry Development Policy No. 8 decree of the State Development 
and Reform Commission", Internet Edition, reviewed 11.04. 2006. 
849 Ibidem, Preamble. 
850 This is reflected in the content of the 2004 industrial policy for the auto industry. The policy 
stipulates that by 2010 the auto industry will have been nurtured as a national pillar industry. 
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4.3.1.1 Designation of nine auto groups 
In 1981, Premier Zhao Ziyang announced that in order to achieve production at world 
standards, "large-scale development"was necessary. The sector should 
''switch from self-reliance and the all-under-one-roof mentality of small-scale 
development, to a cooperative industrial complex system, centered around 
large-scale factories based on modern technology, which allows for 
specialization in order to mass produce high-quality autos".851 
The desire for large business groups was a response to genuine weaknesses in the 
Chinese economy - fragmented production (in 1978, China had 56 auto assembly 
plants), uncoordinated technology transfer and thus redundant investment, low R&D 
capability, weak brands, and poor overall quality.852 Large firms were thought to be a 
key element in the economic "miracles" of neighboring Korea and Japan. In Japan, 
industrial keiretsu were at the center of the development process, particularly in the 
sectors that were capital and/or technology intensive (primary products, construction, 
machinery, transportation, and electronics). Auto companies such as Toyota, Nissan, 
and Mitsubishi are Japanese keiretsu-groups.853 Central leaders envisioned domestic 
business groups becoming internationally competitive and representing the country in 
the global economy.854 Harwit (1995) and Thun (2006) report that in a series of 
meetings sponsored by the Ministry of Machinery Industry in 1986, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan were cited as examples in which governments had successfully promoted 
industrial development through the establishment of large-scale indigenous firms that 
could compete on global markets, and thus should be imitated.855 
The 1986 policy confirmed the state's effort to build large auto business groups and 
consolidate the existing production facilities under more centralized managerial 
structures.856 In the mid-1980s, the central government had thus created six auto 
enterprise groups that aimed at forging backward and forward integration with the 
help of foreign JV partners. The government's preference, especially in passenger 
cars, has been to encourage SOEs to tie-up with foreign investors in JVs as a way to 
acquire technology, quality control, and managerial experience.857 
851 Refer to Zhao Ziyang in lwagaki ( 1986), p. 11. 
852 Refer to Thun (2004a), p. 454 ff. 
853 Also in Korea, massive chaebols such as Hyundai were the agents of economic expansion. 
854 Refer to Thun (2006), p. 7. 
855 Additionally, the policy bureau of the central State Science and Technology Commission carried 
out a major study of the passenger car industry in 1987. Refer to Harwit (1995), p. 36 and Thun 
(2006), p. 55 and Thun (2004a), p. 457. 
856 Refer to Huang (2002a), pp. 542-546. 
857 Refer to Noble (2006), "Overcapacity, Contract Design and the Emergence of Independent Auto 
Firms in China", Internet Edition, reviewed 01.08.2007. 
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In May 1983, Beijing Jeep Corporation, a JV between Beijing Auto Industry 
Corporation (BAIG) and American Motor Corporation (AMC)858 , was established as 
the first JV for manufacturing utility vehicles.859 For the Beijing Jeep JV, Jeep 
Cherokee CKD kits were packaged in the USA by AMC, sold to Beijing Jeep, and 
then exported to China for assembly by the Beijing Jeep Corporation Chinese 
workers. One year later, Shanghai-Volkswagen (SVW) - a JV between SAIC and VW 
- was founded in Shanghai, followed by FAW-VW, Second Auto Works (SAW, later 
renamed Dongfeng)-Citroen, Guangzhou Peugeot860 and Tianjin Daihatsu.861 The 
designated domestic auto companies were to participate in global passenger car 
production networks through their JV partners. Central leaders hoped that technology 
in product development and production would be transferred from foreign to domestic 
state-owned producers.862 This was necessary, as Chinese automakers were of low 
proficiency, and were not able to meet the international technology standards of 
passenger cars. The sanctioned six major car assemblers became known as the "Big 
Three plus Small Three", the former referring to the three Sino-foreign JVs of SVW, 
FAW-VW and SAW-Citroen, while the latter were the two JVs of Beijing Jeep 
Corporation and Guangzhou Peugeot plus Tianjin Daihatsu. 
In 1987, the government designated FAW, SAW and SAIC as China's passenger car 
production bases. FAW and SAIC were to handle mid-size autos, with smaller cars 
coming from SAW, which had previously mainly produced trucks.863 The three 
players were to become powerful business groups through mergers and alliances 
with existing small and medium-sized auto factories. Through the formation of 
business groups, the central government furthermore aimed to convert large single-
vehicle firms into multi-vehicle conglomerates that explore economies of scope and 
amortize the price for R&D between their products.864 One reason why concentration 
ratios in Korea and Japan were much higher than in China is the multi-product nature 
of their large auto firms. 865 
The policy approach did not result in the envisioned development of the Chinese auto 
industry, however. Local governments protected and bailed-out unprofitable auto 
SOEs within their jurisdiction in order to prevent them from bankruptcy or "hostile" 
858 Chrysler bought AMC in 1987 and merged with Daimler-Benz to become DaimlerChrysler in 1998. 
859 Beijing Jeep Corporation was the first major manufacturing JV of any kind that was established 
between a Chinese company and a foreign firm after the Cultural Revolution. For a detailed 
analysis of the establishment of Beijing Jeep Corporation refer to Mann (1989). 
880 Guangzhou Peugeot was closed in 1997 and Honda took over Peugeot's position in Guangzhou. 
861 Refer to Chinese Academy of Engineering and National Research Council (2003), p. 38. 
862 Refer to Liang (2004), p. 228 and Lee (2003), p. 290. 
863 Refer to Ravenhill (2005), p. 17. 
864 For further information on the economic theory of the multiproduct firm refer to Teece (1982). 
865 The big Korean and Japanese auto makers are large producers of passenger cars as well as 
trucks and buses. Toyota accounted for 26 percent of Japan's truck production and 34 percent of 
buses in 1975. Hyundai accounted for 34 percent of Korean truck production in 1987 and 31 
percent of bus output. Refer to Sit and Liu (2000), pp. 661-662. 
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takeovers.ass In addition, the state did not maintain its promulgated restriction to six 
large groups. After the 1987 designation, the government revised its policy, and in 
the early 1990s, issued permission to establish two new firms of the defense-industry 
for minicar production (Chang'an Manufacturing Company and Guizhou Aircraft Auto 
Company) due to pressure from the Central Military Commission. The two companies 
were enterprises under the central Military Commission and their profit was subject to 
the military. Their parent companies were the China Ordnance Industry Corporation 
and the Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation which both had strong bargaining 
power and close relationships with top government leaders, as the former Vice 
Premier Zou Jiahua had been a minister responsible for the defense industry. The 
central government thus extended its policy approach to ''Three Large, Three Small 
and Two Mini".8s7 
As the reform and opening policy propelled grow1h, more and more localities and 
military-related units established JVs with foreign assembly and parts firms. In 
consequence, although China intended to stimulate consolidation of the industry and 
passenger car sales grow1h through the domestic production of state of the art 
models with foreign partners, it had 125 auto factories, more than 600 auto refitting 
factories and about 2,300 auto parts factories in the early 1990s.8s8 All of these 
combined produced annually less than one month's production of any one of the 
American "Big Three" (Ford, GM, Chrysler) auto companies.8s9 Although the six auto 
firms (plus Chang'an Manufacturing Company and Guizhou Aircraft Auto Company) 
accounted for 66 percent of vehicle production in 1995, their individual scale was 
small by international comparison: their average output volume was only 27,466 
vehicles.870 This is far below a company's efficient level of production, which is 
estimated to be between 250,000 and 300,000 vehicles, irrespective of location or 
segment.871 
4.3.1.2 Attraction of foreign investors 
In 1994, the State Council promulgated the new "Industrial Policy for the Auto 
lndustry".872 The policy revised the approach of restriction to nine major auto projects 
and arranged to lift the ban on new JVs as well as new cars and light commercial 
866 Refer to Ravenhill (2005), p. 17. 
867 The classification of "big", "small" and "mini" mainly indicates the scale of production. All the 
passenger cars in these two categories equipped with engine over 1.3 liters. The "mini" 
represents the car of less than one liter engine. Refer to Sit and Liu (2000), pp. 661-662, Lo 
(1997), p. 182, Huang (2002a), p. 546 and Tsuji (2004), p. 6. 
868 Refer to Tsuji (2004), p. 6 and Lo (1997), p. 182. 
869 Refer to Xia (2000), p. 90. 
870 Refer to Tsuji (2004), p. 6. 
871 Refer to Bain (1968), pp. 284-287. 
872 Refer to State Council (1994), "Industrial Policy of China's Automobile Industry". 
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vehicle projects by 1996. Central leaders aimed to construct a market structure that 
was characterized by competition among a small number of big firms.873 Through the 
JVs, selected local partners were to gain access to technology, managerial skills, and 
capital.B74 
Construction plans of large scale and new investments from domestic sources 
needed the approval of the State Council which consulted with the State 
Development Planning Commission, the State Economics and Trade Commission 
and the Ministry of Machinery lndustry.B75 In addition, operational practices of FDI 
approval involved a set of requirements to promote domestic auto companies, but 
prevent foreign automakers from dominating the Chinese market:B76 
• Foreign equity could not exceed 50 percent in assembly and engine JVs. 
Moreover, each foreign firm could only establish two international JVs for one 
product category.B77 These regulations prevent foreign auto firms from 
operating without a domestic partner in China, and restrict their business 
activities in defined fields (limitation of JVs within one product category). The 
equity JV regulation guarantees that the Chinese partner has access to all 
crucial operations of the JV. In addition, foreign companies could not directly 
provide financing for vehicle purchase, offer after-sales services or distribute 
cars.B7B The regulations hinder international OEMs from acquiring full control 
of their China operations. 
• The JVs were required to produce products according to international 
technical standards, have product patents and trademarks, product 
development and manufacturing technology and establish an internal R&D 
department. In this way, the state encouraged foreign OEMs to produce their 
latest models in China. 
• The JVs were obliged to have independent international sales organizations 
and were to export products.879 Thus, the domestic partner would gain access 
to international markets and obtain foreign exchange. China's leaders hoped 
to build up a remunerative export-oriented industry and emulate their more 
prosperous neighbors Japan and Korea.BBo 
• The minimum scales of production were 150,000 for passenger cars of engine 
capacity below 1,600 cc; 100,000 for light trucks; 50,000 for vans; 10,000 for 
873 Refer to Lo (1997), p. 185. 
874 Refer to Thun (2004a), pp. 455-456. 
875 Refer to State Council (1994), "Industrial Policy of China's Automobile Industry", Articles 12.56 
and 12.57. 
876 Refer to Wang (2001 ), p. 1 and p. 3. 
en Refer to State Council (1994), "Industrial Policy of China's Automobile Industry", Article 6.29. 
878 Refer to Harwit (2001 ), p. 659. 
879 Refer to State Council (1994), "Industrial Policy of China's Automobile Industry", Article 6.31. 
880 The state also actively manages the imports of motor vehicles, motorcycles and key components, 
as China's auto industry was still not internationally competitive. Refer to Harwit (1995), p. 3. 
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hea~-duty trucks and 200,000 for motorcycles of engine capacity below 150 
cc.88 Thus, the central leaders aimed to avoid diseconomies of scale and 
consolidate the fragmented auto market. 
Despite China's ambitions to become a WTO member, the auto policy introduced 
local content requirements the foreign partner had to fulfill.882 The local content 
regulation was to raise the contribution of local parts and processes in assembled 
vehicles.883 Article 9.44 of the policy contends that fsreferential import tariff rates vary 
according to the localization rate of auto products. 84 Passenger car ventures had to 
satisfy government-imposed local content requirements to qualify for preferential tariff 
rates on imported components.885 Import tariff rates were set according to the 
company's local content rate. The tariff on CKD kits (originally between 100-150 
percent) was reduced if the local content rate was increased. Three levels of local 
content for passenger cars (40 percent, 60 percent and 80 percent) and three levels 
for commercial vehicles and motorcycles (50 percent, 70 percent and 90 percent) 
existed. For passenger cars with a local content rate of 60-80 percent, the tariff rate 
on imported parts was 32 percent. For a local content of 40-60 fsercent and below 40 
percent, the tariff was 48 percent and 50 percent, respectively.8 6 
With the local content regulation, the central government aimed to create 
technological linkages between Sino-foreign manufacturers and domestic suppliers, 
and to ensure the indigenous capabilities of the entire car sector instead of turning it 
into an industry that only assembles auto parts for the international market. The state 
hoped to thus safeguard the national auto industry. At the same time, it could actively 
allow the globalization of its production by encouraging FDI inflow and advance its 
international competitiveness.887 
Indeed, the 1994 policy effectively forced manufacturers to use the expected 
percentage of Chinese-made parts and components. While in 1994 only 24 percent 
of the VW Jetta parts were made by Chinese companies, by 2000, 84 percent of its 
881 Refer to State Council (1994), "Industrial Policy of China's Automobile Industry", Article 3.10. 
882 The local content regulation is prohibited according to WTO regulations. The local content clause 
stipulates that a certain percentage of the final product has to be from domestic production. Refer 
to WTO (2001), "Accession Protocol", (D) Judical Review, Article 7-3, Internet Edition, reviewed 
09.10.2006 and Krugman and Obstfeld (2004), p. 273. 
883 The local content is also one of the prerequisites for permitting a firm to produce a second vehicle 
model. Refer to Wang (2001 ), p. 12 and Lo (1997), p. 189. 
884 Refer to State Council (1994), "Industrial Policy of China's Automobile Industry", Article 9.44. 
885 Refer to China Business Review (1998), "Shifting Gears", Internet Edition, reviewed 16.10.2006. 
886 Refer to State Council (1994), "Industrial Policy of China's Automobile Industry", Article 9.44. 
887 Refer to Wang (2001), p. 12 and Sit and Liu (2000), p. 664. 
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parts were produced domestically.888 Thus, the strategy of developing the domestic 
market had positive results. 
4.3.1.3 Revised policy approach after WTO accession 
One major policy development for the domestic auto industry was China's entry into 
the WTO in 2001. WTO regulations forced China to revise its 1994 industrial policy -
the 2004 auto policy was the answer. 
Following WTO accession, China eliminated some of the performance requirements 
imposed on foreign investors in 1994. In conformity with the WTO agreements on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs),889 China agreed to abandon the local content regulation by 
2004. In addition, the regulation that stipulated that foreign equity in auto engine 
ventures could not exceed 50 percent was dropped. Foreign investors could even 
avoid cooperation with domestic companies, and build wholly foreign-owned auto 
engine companies after 2004. Moreover, foreign investors were allowed to establish 
non-banking financing (captive auto financing) and engage in sales and distribution 
(sales and distribution had to be Chinese-owned pre-WTO) after 2004 (refer to Table 
14). Furthermore, China's Accession Protocol provides that "a// measures applicable 
to motor vehicle producers restricting the categories, types or models of vehicle 
permitted for production, would gradually be lifted" and completely removed two 
years after accession. After that phase, motor vehicle fsroducers would be free to 
choose the categories, types and models they produced. 90 
WTO accession stimulated investment in the auto sector. Foreign and domestic 
investment in the auto industry was RMB 19.4 billion on a yearly average during the 
Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000).891 The accumulated investment in the auto 
industry during the Tenth Five-Year Plan (CAGR 2001-2005: 39.4 percent) was RMB 
235.1 billion - 2.4 times more than during the years of the Ninth Five-Year Plan 
before WTO accession (refer to Figure 24). 
888 For further information refer to Shanghai Government (2005), "Volkswagen Leading New Way In 
China-Tribute to the 20th Anniversary of Shanghai Volkswagen", Internet Edition, reviewed 
21.07.2007. 
889 Refer to WTO (2001 ), "Accession Protocol", (D) Judical Review, Article 7-3, Internet Edition, 
reviewed 09.10.2006. 
890 Ibidem, Article 8-(b). 
891 Total investment in the auto industry increased from RMB 2 billion during the Fifth Five-Year Plan 
(1976-1980) to RMB 4 billion during the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985), RMB 17 billion during 
the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) and RMB 76 billion during the Eighth Five-Year Plan 
(1991-1995). 
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Table 14: China's WTO entry- implications for the auto industry. 
Category p,...wro (2001) Poat-WTO (2004) Poat-WTO (2006) 
Local content 40% in first year of production, No local content requirements 
increasing to 60% and 80% in 
second and third years 
Forwlgn panlclpatlon In sales and Limited to wholesaling through Limited to wholesaling through Will be allowed to own vehicle wholesale, 
dlatributlon JVs JVs retail organizations; integrated sales 
organizations pennltted by 2006 
Auto engine Foreign companies can invest Up to 100% stake 
up to a 49% stake 
Auto financing Foreign non-bank financial Four foreign financing Gradual roll-out of operations from 
institutions prohibited from institutions are expected to selected cities to nationwide 
providing financing begin operations in 2004 
Source: Ministry of Commerce (2002), "The Commitments to the WTO and the International Practices 
of the Auto Industry", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.03.2006. 
Figure 24: Total investment in the auto industry (including parts and components), 
1976-2005. 
Total investment in the 





1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2006).892 
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 
China's WTO accession made a modification of China's auto industry policy 
necessary. The auto industry faced the challenge of how to keep its independence in 
the aftermath of WTO accession and the liberalization of business activities of foreign 
investors. According to the goal of avoiding foreign investors' domination in the 
market, China increased investment barriers with the promulgation of the 2004 auto 
policy.893 Although administrative screening had been simplified over the years, a 
series of criteria for investment projects of auto vehicle production were kept or newly 
introduced: 
892 All data from the China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2006) were translated by DaimlerChrysler. 
893 Refer to NORG (2004), "Automobile Industry Development Policy No. 8 decree of the State 
Development and Reform Commission", Chapter 1, Articles 1-4. 
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• Foreign investors are still granted 50 percent equity participation in JVs at 
maximum. 
• The threshold investment level of new auto projects was raised to RMB 2 
billion, and a R&D center with investment of over RMB 500 million has to be 
built.894 These conditions impose restriction on projects below the expected 
investment level. The central government also hopes that this regulation will 
encourage the industry's consolidation and act as a disincentive for smaller 
private firms to enter the market. The R&D requirement forces foreign 
investors to transfer technology know-how to China. 
• The new industrial policy forbids the transfer of production licenses, and thus 
blocks the entry of mostly private firms through mergers of small incumbents. 
• The policy stipulates the encouragement of auto enterprises' R&D and 
technical innovation capability. It supports enterprises that develop products 
with China's own intellectual property right (IPR), and promotes Chinese 
proprietary (newly created and established) brands.895 ''The threshold for 
future auto projects will thus be whether foreign investors are willing to 
produce cars in China and sell them with their own brand. " 896 
The key of the auto industry policy was to rationalize the industry in order to maintain 
its independence after the phasing out of protectionist tariffs related to its WTO 
accession, and support major state-owned corporations.897 The revised approach, 
however, left the state with many policy tools. As stipulated by the 2004 auto policy, 
investors have to fulfil requirements on scale, local R&D and restrictions on kit 
imports and JV formation. Among the policy measures are also controls on tax 
breaks, preferential financing, as well as discretionary authority over a range of 
regulatory issues from distribution to pollution control, and compulsory labelling of 
domestic parts.898 Particularly, JVs approval of, and thus discretion over, domestic-
foreign project formation is an important policy tool. The World Bank sample 
"Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in Manufacturing Sectors" (2001) 
confirms that the government is not only involved in project approval, but also 
participates in the setting-up of Sino-foreign auto projects by assisting auto 
companies in identifying foreign investors. A significant difference exists between the 
auto sector and the residual sectors (Pearson Chi-Square Test: p=0.036, 2-sided) in 
view of government assistance in identifying foreign investors in the year 2000. While 
11.2 percent (n=24) of the managers in the auto sector answered that they received 
this form of official assistance, only 8.1 percent (n=104) of the interviewees in the 
residual sectors confirmed that they were granted state assistance in identifying 
89' Ibidem, Chapter 10, Article 47-5. 
895 Ibidem, Chapter 1, Article 3. 
896 Interview conducted with experts from a Chinese government institution in Beijing on 13.06.2006. 
897 Refer to Taylor Wessing China Desk (2004), "New Automobile Policy", p. 1. 
898 Refer to Noble et al. (2005), p. 10-14. 
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foreign investors (refer to Table 15, Table 16). The government, moreover, assisted 
the auto sector significantly more (Pearson Chi-Square Test: p=0.006, 2-sided) than 
the residual sectors, in locating foreign technology to license (refer to Appendix V, 
Table A49, Table A50) and identifying potential foreign clients (Pearson Chi-Square 
Test: p=0.029, 2-sided) (refer to Appendix V, Table A51, Table A52). 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics: Government agency's or official's assistance in 
identifying foreign investors in the auto sector and in the residual sectors, 
2000. 
Government agency's or offic:iars 
assistance in identifying foreign 
investors 
Yes No N.A. Total 
uroup_autosec_ressec Auto sec Count 24 162 29 215 
% within Group_ 
11.2% 75,3% 13,5% 100,0"!. aulosec_ressec 
Aesi:Jualsec Count 104 921 259 1284 
'%, within Group_ 8,1% 71,7% 20,2% 100,0"/o autosec_ressec 
Total Count 128 1083 288 1499 
% within Group_ 
8,5% n,2"!. 19,2% 100,09/o autosec_ressec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Table 16: Chi-Square Test: Government agency's or official's assistance in 
identifying foreign investors in the auto sector and in the residual sectors, 
Value 
Pearson Chi-Square 6,6398 
Likelihood Ratio 6,906 
Linear-by-Linear 
6,569 Association 
N of Valid Cases 1499 
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The 







Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Even after China's WTO accession, state bureaucrats use industrial policy 
instruments to guide economic development. China's WTO entry did thus not destroy 
industrial policy for the auto industry, but constrained and disciplined it. With its 
assistance in identifying foreign investors and locating foreign technology to license, 
the government helped domestic auto companies to cooperate with foreign firms. 
The World Bank sample "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001) provides indication that licensing technology from 
foreign firms differs significantly between the auto sector and the residual sectors 
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(Pearson Chi-Square Test: p=0.000, 2-sided) (refer to Table 17, Table 18) and 
between the auto sector and the electronics sector in particular (Pearson Chi-Square 
Test: p=0.046, 2-sided) (refer to Appendix V, Table A53, Table A54). While in the 
auto sector 30.1 percent (n=40) of the managers confirmed that their company 
licensed technology from a foreign company, in the residual sector only 15.6 percent 
(n=91) of the managers stated the same (refer to Table 17, Table 18). Companies in 
the auto sector, moreover, licensed processes from a foreign firm significantly more 
often than companies in the residual sectors (Pearson Chi-Square Test: p=0.001, 2-
sided), and in the electronics sector in particular (Pearson Chi-Square Test: p=0.035, 
2-sided) (refer to Appendix V, Table A55, Table A56, Table A57, Table A58). 
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics: Introduction of new products into the plant by 
licensing technology from a foreign firm in the auto sector and in the 
residual sectors since 1998. 
Licensed technology 
from foreian firm 
Yes No Total 
Group_autosec_ressec Auto sec Count 40 93 133 
% within Group_ 30,1% 69,9% 100.0% autosec ressec 
Residual sec Count 91 492 583 
% within Group_ 15,6% 84,4% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Total Count 131 585 716 
% within Group_ 18,3% 81.7% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Table 18: Chi-Square Test: Introduction of new products into the plant by licensing 
technology from a foreign firm in the auto sector and in the residual 
sectors since 1998. 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value di /2-sidedl 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.161" 1 
Continuity Correction . 14,208 1 
Likelihood Ratio 13,737 1 
Fisher's Exact Test 
linear-by-Linear 
15,140 1 Association 
N of Valid Cases 716 
a. Computed only tor a 2x2 table 






Exact Sig. Exact Sig. 
12-sidedl 11-sidedl 
,000 .ooo 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
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Overall, the FDI strategy has been coherently oriented towards the long-term goal of 
establishing internationally competitive Chinese auto companies. The regulatory 
framework for the auto industry focuses on technology transfer from foreign investors 
to domestic auto companies. Therefore, the state encourages domestic auto 
companies to license foreign technology and establish JVs with foreign OEMs for 
technology transfer. The interviewees confirmed that China has been raising the 
threshold for approval of investment projects step by step, and only selectively 
approves FDI projects in order to "avoid China becoming a mere production base for 
MNCs".899 The design of the industrial policies for the auto industry demands that 
foreign auto investors fulfil strict requirements for project approval. Since 1994, 
central and local governments selected MNCs for cooraeration according to their 
alleged willingness to engage in technology transfer.9 0 The difficulty for policy-
makers is drawing the distinction between legitimate competition and the crowding 
out of domestic carmakers by foreign competitors. 
4.3.2 Trade policy for the auto sector 
The East Asian developmental states have been successful examples of a dualistic 
trade policy. Korea has used entry quotas to protect its infant auto industry. The main 
constraint on allocating rent among domestic firms through administrative means is 
that their enforcement costs are high.901 If governments fail to coordinate their 
activities and restrict entry, financial resources and market opportunities might 
become dispersed among many firms leading to scale diseconomies, at least in the 
short run.902 
In addition to import substitution, export promotion was a central component in the 
development of Korea's auto industry. In the late 1980s, almost 50 percent of its total 
domestic auto production was destined for export markets. This success had been 
achieved by Korean companies exporting for the most part under their own brand 
names. The Hyundai Excel became the best-selling import model in the US market in 
1987 .903 The Korean government had followed the Japanese example of promoting 
899 Quotation comes from an interview conducted with an expert of a European auto association in 
Beijing on 16.06.2006. Moreover, interviews conducted with experts from a Chinese government 
institution in Beijing on 13.06.2006, with an expert of a Chinese auto government institution in 
Beijing on 16.06.2006 and with managers of a German OEM in Beijing between 08.06.2006 and 
16.06.2006 confirm the central government's policy approach. 
900 Refer to Lo (1997), p. 189. 
901 Refer to Huang (2002a), pp. 549-550. 
902 Excessive entry is costly in two ways in industries characterized by increasing returns. One is a 
static effect: excessive entry causes many plants to operate under minimum efficient scale and 
higher unit costs than otherwise, because financing or markets are dispersed among numerous 
producers. The other is a dynamic effect. When adjustment to competition is not instantaneous, 
protection delays the maturity of the infant firms, and increases the protected industry's 
dependency on market-distorting policies, making temporary protection a long-lasting proposition. 
903 Refer to Ravenhill (2001 ), p. 2. 
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auto exports in order to position its firms better in the international market.904 Export 
promotion was necessary to accelerate economies of scale. The size of the Korean 
domestic market for autos was small in the 1970s and 1980s, despite its rapid 
economic growth. Focusing solely on the domestic market would have limited auto 
firms' growth potentials and resulted in sub-optimal scales.905 Exporting forced 
Korean firms to compete overseas and prompted them to improve their products' 
quality by meeting international safety, fuel efficiency and emission standards. Auto 
firms export performance thus served as an objective criterion to assess firms' 
performance, and ensured economic rather than political allocation criteria.906 
4.3.2.1 Import substitution 
With his theory of "national economics", List (1841) argued that a country entering 
the early stages of industrialization was at a disadvantage in relation to those nations 
that were already industrialized. The new, industrializing firms could not successfully 
compete against the established foreign industrial enterprises which had already 
incurred all the required start-up costs and which could sell their products at prices 
that reflected all the cost-efficiencies of mass production and an already existing 
highly-skilled labor force. The government of an industrializing nation had to erect 
protectionist barriers to keep the prices of foreign manufactured goods as high as the 
costs of production of the new industrializing domestic enterprises. Only in this way 
would those domestic firms have a chance to survive in the market and establish 
themselves firmly enough to finally face the older foreign industrial enterprises on an 
open field of free trade at some point in the future. 907 
904 In 1953, Japan revised its Anti-Monopoly Law to pave the way for the formation of more cartels 
and the protection of its export sector. For further information refer to Yamamura (1967). In 1980, 
56 percent of the cars produced in Japan were exported. Data refer to Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers Association, "Japan's Motor Vehicle Statistics (Production and Exports)", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 07.09.2007. 
905 The need to export in order to achieve economies of scale in Korea is illustrated by comparing 
Korea and Japan. In part because of a smaller domestic market, Korea pushed for export 
promotion harder than Japan. It took Korea only about five years after beginning auto production 
to export 15 percent of the output, whereas it took Japan more than ten years. For further 
information refer to Amsden and Kim (1989). 
906 Refer to Huang (2002a), p. 557. 
907 Refer to List (1841). For further elaboration on import substitution policies refer to Alexander 
(1987), Little et al. (1970) and Pazos (1987). For information on trade policy as an input to 
development refer to Krueger (1980). 
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4.3.2.1.1 Infant-industry protection of the auto sector through tariff barriers 
until 2001 
With the 1986 auto policy, China chose an import substitution policy approach to 
promote the domestic auto industry.908 Entry barriers placed on foreign counterparts 
were to prevent nascent ("infant") domestic auto firms from being crowded out by 
MNCs and becoming foreign-part assembly plants. The 1986 policy expected to 
substitute for foreign cars by implementing trade barriers and thus protect domestic 
automakers.909 The central government set the tariff rate on autos at 200-220 percent 
in 1986, and introduced quotas that restricted the import of foreign vehicles to 30,000 
units per year.910 Moreover, foreign auto companies were not allowed to act as 
vehicle importers or conduct marketing in the domestic market.911 
Tariffs remained above 200 percent until the early 1990s. Only in anticipation of 
eventual entry into the WTO, were tariffs on cars gradually lowered after the 
promulgation of the 1994 auto policy. Sectoral comparison, however, shows that tariff 
reductions for the auto sector were low - China maintained protection for the auto 
sector. While the average weighted tariff across all industries was 21 percent in 
1995,912 in 1997, tariffs on autos were only lowered to 80 percent for vehicles with an 
engine size smaller than 3,000 cubic capacilj, and 100 percent for vehicles with an 
engine size bigger than 3,000 cubic capacity. 13 In addition to high tariff rates, central 
leaders kept restrictive import licensing to a number of product categories including 
motor vehicles, key parts for vehicles, crane lorries, vehicle tyres, motorcycles, and 
key parts for motorcycles.914 Altogether, 89 items of auto products were subject to 
quotas, which represented 60 percent of Chinese machinery and electronic products. 
Besides, only Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai and Huangpu ports were permitted to import 
complete vehicles. They were centrally controlled in order to keep imports within the 
state's planned quota, and functioned as an administrative barrier to foreign imports. 
Imports of used vehicles were prohibited.915 
Although the 1994 industrial policy emr,hasized the importance of passenger car 
production for industrial development, 16 it neglected the demand side of the 
908 Refer to lwagaki (1986), p.11, Takayama (1991), p. 17, Zhang and Taylor (2001), p. 267, Noble 
et al. (2005), p. 6, Ravenhill (2005), p. 17 and Thun (2006), p. 55. 
909 Refer to Wang (2001), pp. 2-3 and Huang (2002a), pp. 542-546. 
910 Refer to He and Yang (1999), p. 14. 
911 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2002), "The Commitments to the WTO and the International 
Practices of the Auto Industry", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.03.2006. 
912 Refer to Chinese Academy of Engineering and National Research Council (2003), p. 27. 
913 Refer to He and Yang (1999), p. 15. 
914 Refer to Wang (2001 ), p. 7. 
915 Refer to He and Yang ( 1999), p. 15. 
916 Refer to State Council (1994), "Industrial Policy of China's Automobile Industry". 
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market.917 Given tariff protection and administrative barriers, the auto sector 
produced higher profits than other manufacturing industries.918 Rents created by the 
protection measures ballooned car prices as enterprises of both domestic and foreign 
investors reaped short-term profits through high prices. In the case of SVW, the 
domestic sales price in 1993 was around RMB 200,000 per car (and the production 
cost around RMB 85,000), which at the official exchange rate was double the world 
price.919 
As a result of high prices and profit expectations, 22 out of 30 provinces had declared 
their auto industry as the pillar sector of their economies for the 1996-2010 period as 
of January 1997. The 122 final assembly ~lants had a combined output volume of 
11,888 units of motor vehicles in 1997.92 Small-scale projects (mostly assembly 
plants that relied heavily on CKD kits) became lucrative, and thus economies of scale 
were no more a necessary condition for profitability. In consequence, the 
protectionist regime caused the proliferation of inferior car producers in China.921 
Besides, due to high prices resulting from the protected market, demand for 
passenger cars was low. China's production capacity for passenger cars (1.37 million 
units) was much higher than domestic demand (600,000 units) in 1997.922 
Overcapacity was a consequence of redundant investment in the auto sector, and 
the high profit anticipation caused by persistent excess profits.923 
4.3.2.1.2 Reduction of tariff barriers and introduction of non-tariff barriers since 
2001 
The accession terms China had to agree upon to join the WTO were amon~ the 
stiffest ever required and constituted massive challenges to existing practices.92 The 
accession commitments relevant to motor vehicles banned many of the most 
important industrial policy tools China had used to protect its domestic market (refer 
to Table 19): 
• Tariff cuts on vehicles: At accession, tariffs on passenger cars were 70 
percent (80 percent for cars with engines over 3.0 liters); by 2005 they fell to 
917 Not before 19841 the state had officially permitted private ownership of autos to help create a 
market for auto companies in China. Refer to Gallagher (2006), p. 38. 
918 Reier to Nee (2002), p. 5. 
919 Refer to Lo (1997), p. 190, He and Yang (1999), p. 16 and Wang (2001), p. 8. 
920 Refer to Huang (2002a), pp. 558-559. 
921 Refer to Wang (2001 ), p. 8. 
922 Refer to Global Insight (2002), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report - China, March 2002, 
p. 140 and FOURIN (2005b), p. 1. 
923 Refer to Huang (2002a), pp. 558-559. 
924 For the accession documents and related materials, refer to WTO (2001 ), "Accession 
documents··, Internet Edition, for a concise summary of commitments regarding the motor vehicle 
sector, refer to US Department of Commerce - International Trade Administration (2001 ), "Autos 
and Auto Parts", Internet Edition, both reviewed 09.10.2006. 
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38-43 percent (depending on the engine size). Since July 2006, tariffs on 
passenger cars have been 25 percent. 
• Tariff cuts on auto components: Auto parts tariffs, which averaged 17.4 
percent on accession, dropped to 1 O percent in July 2006.925 
• Gradual elimination of quotas and licenses: Aggregate import quotas covering 
motor vehicles and parts were gradually loosened (20 percent per year after 
2004).926 All import licenses and quotas were phased out in January 2006.927 
Table 19: Impact of WTO entry on the Chinese auto industry. 
Category Pre-WTO (2001) Poot-WTO (2004) Poll-WTO (2008) 
Import tariffs on vehicles 70-80% 38% -43%, depending on size of 25% tor all vehicles 
engine 
Import tariffs on auto components 15-50% 10-40•/o 10-/o 
Import llcensea and quotas Annual quota of 30,000 vehicles per Quota decreased by roughly 20% per Quota to be phased out 
year from foreign OEMs year 
Source: Ministry of Commerce (2002), "The Commitments to the WTO and the International Practices 
of the Auto Industry", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.03.2006. 
Low passenger car imports as a share of domestic demand have been possible even 
after WTO accession and involved tariff reductions, because China still pursues a 
development approach to the auto industry that is dominated by import substitution. 
In line with the reduction of tariff rates, the price of an imported Mercedes Benz S600 
fell by RMB 1.1 million in 2002. Other luxury cars were about 15-20 percent cheaper 
in 2003 than those sold before WTO accession.928 Indeed, auto imports increased 
after WTO accession: China imported 58,000 vehicles in 2000, and 166,000 vehicles 
in 2006. From the total numbers, however, one cannot infer that auto imports gained 
importance to meet increasing demand. While total passenger car imports accounted 
for 7.8 percent of demand in 2002; total passenger car imports as a percentage of 
demand have been decreasing since then. In 2006, only 3.4 percent of passenger 
car demand came from imports, because of high import tariff rates (refer to Figure 
25). Even in 2007, import tariffs on cars are still substantially higher in China than in 
many other countries. Import tariffs on passenger cars are 25 percent in China, 
925 Refer to WTO (2001), "Accession Protocol", (D) Judical Review, Article 7-3, Internet Edition, 
reviewed 09.10.2006. 
926 Refer to MOFCOM (2004), "Announcement of the Ministry of Commerce on the Issues of 
Replacing and Issuing Automatic Import Permit of Automobile Import Quota", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 09.10.2006. 
927 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2002), "The Commitments to the WTO and the International 
Practices of the Auto Industry", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.03.2006. 
928 Refer to Xinhuanet (2006), "A Review of China's Car Industry in Past 5 Years", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 26.07.2007. 
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compared with 10 percent in the European Union (EU}, 8 percent in Korea and 2.5 
percent in the USA.929 
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= 111'!)orts --111'!)orts as apercertageof demrd ('/l 
Source: Own illustration based on data from Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry 
Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 4. 
In addition to the 25 percent tariff rate on imported passenger cars, the central 
government has stipulated regulations that aim to diminish imports and favor 
domestic production since its WTO accession. The government has established 
nontariff barriers such as certification, licensing, and testing requirements on 
products and production materials in a number of areas which force foreign 
manufacturers to produce locally, rather than import vehicles. 
In most cases, the requirements on imports involve government approval of all 
products and materials covered before they are allowed to enter the market. Due to 
the lack of capacity to administer the requirements, they often function as barriers to 
those products' and materials' access to the Chinese market. Particularly, mandatory 
certification (CCC} as well as local content regulations function as nontariff barriers in 
the auto sector: 
1. China Compulsory Certification: Standard certification and testing are in effect 
barriers to imports. In spite of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
additional tests in Chinese laboratories are required for vehicles and parts, although 
929 Refer to European Commission, Market Access Database, Internet Edition, reviewed 11.07.2007. 
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test results supported by foreign certificates are made available. China does not 
recognize any international certification standards, and importers must have their 
products retested in China. The European Commission (2007) contends that 
"additional testing and certification requirements are disproportionate as they would 
not seem to provide additional safety, health, or environment benefits".930 The 
certification process in China can be prohibitively expensive as CCC is typically 
subject to a number of (unpredictable) tests which usually have to be repeated every 
year. There is no way of predicting or influencing whether and when a commission 
will hand out the certificates. If a manufacturer has several manufacturing facilities, 
these must all be certified.931 The main difference between the certification system in 
China and those in other countries is that no foreign test agencies have the re~uired 
accreditation. Type approval has to be carried out in Chinese laboratories only.9 2 
The system tends to be "overbuilt", requiring that all products or materials covered, 
regardless of the presence of any indicators of non-compliance with Chinese law, 
undergo lengthy reviews. This procedure aims to encourage foreign companies to 
move production to China and avoid imports, as it is "time-intensive, costly and an 
administrative burden".933 In addition, China's designated testing bodies are not 
independent of the government. In many cases, testing facilities are closely 
connected with research institutes that engage in R&D activities related to foreign 
products. This raises IPR concerns among foreign companies.934 
2. Local content regulation: The localization regulation is another measure that aims 
at import substitution. Through the localization regulation, the national government 
discourages kit assembly using imported parts and subsystems. In this way, it tries to 
foster the development of the industry, as foreign companies have to invest 
domestically in core technology and vehicle subsystems. Officially, as part of its 
commitment to the WTO, China abandoned the 40 percent localization rate. The 
central government, however, issued new regulations for importing vehicles, auto 
systems and components. In this regard, the Customs General Administration, the 
NDRC, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued the 
"Measures for the Administration of Import of Automobile Components and Parts 
930 This applies to Standards, Sanitary and Other Technical Requirements. Refer to European 
Commission, Market Access Database, Internet Edition, reviewed 11.07.2007. 
931 At the time the interviews were taken, the certification process took between three and seven 
months. Interview conducted with an expert of a Chinese auto association in Beijing on 
16.06.2006. 
932 China, however, also has to implement the regulatory framework necessary to allow foreign-
invested testing and certification organizations to conduct conformity assessment services for the 
domestic market. Majority-owned ventures were to be allowed in this area by no later than 
11.12.2003. Refer to China Business Review (2003), "Navigating China's Standards Regime", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 20.07.2007 and China Business Review (2004), "WTO: China enters 
year three", Internet Edition, reviewed 03.10.2006. 
933 Interview conducted with an expert of a European auto association in Beijing on 16.06.2006. 
934 Refer to Businessweek (2003), "Navigating China's Standards Regime", Internet Edition, reviewed 
19.07.2007. 
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Featuring Complete Vehicles" in 2005.935 Under the legislation, eight key parts 
(engine, vehicle body, transmission, driving axle, non-driving axle, frame, braking 
system, steerin~ system) as well as CKD and SKD kits were taxed as completely 
built up (CBU)93 imports from April 1, 2005: 
• If both vehicle body and engine are imported, the vehicle will be regarded as a 
CBU import. 
• If either vehicle body or engine is imported, plus any three or more of a 
combination of transmission, driving and driven axles, chassis, steering and 
braking, the vehicle will be regarded as a CBU import. 
• Alternatively, if any five or more of a combination of transmission, driving and 
driven axles, chassis, steering and braking are imported, the vehicle will be 
regarded as a CBU import. 
• As of July 1 si, 2008, if the total cost of imported components accounts for 60 
percent or more of a complete vehicle retail price, the vehicle will be regarded 
as a CBU import.937 
China's leaders claimed that the above policy aimed at curbing tariff evasion by 
importers who tried to avoid paying the 25 percent tariff. However, according to the 
foreign respondents, the Administrative Measures regulation was de facto a 
substitute for the pre-WTO local content regulation.938 The resulting additional charge 
penalizes imported components, and forces auto companies to source components 
locally rather than to import them. The stipulation of the regulation was to reach 40 
percent local content after one year, and 60 percent local content after three years.939 
Overall, the new law demanded production of the whole car in China, because 
imports of key components would have become too expensive to be profitable in 
China. The policy-makers' key intention was to further improve the quality of FDI in 
the auto sector. They aimed to transform the sector into a "global auto manufacturing 
935 Refer to the General Administration of Customs, NDRC, Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of 
Finance (2005), "Measures for the Administration of Import of Automobile Components and Parts 
Featuring Complete Vehicles", Internet Edition, reviewed 09.10.2006. 
936 Vehicles are CBU if they are almost completely assembled in the country of origin, but partly 
disassembled before export. To gain some extra tax preferences, the manufacturer needs to 
further localize the car, i.e. increase the share of parts produced by local manufacturers, such as 
tires, wheels, seats, headlights, windscreens and glass, batteries, interior plastics, etc. down to 
the engine and transmission. 
937 Refer to the General Administration of Customs, NDRC, Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of 
Finance (2005), "Measures for the Administration of Import of Automobile Components and Parts 
Featuring Complete Vehicles", Internet Edition, reviewed 09.10.2006. 
938 Interviews conducted with managers of a German OEM in Beijing on 14.06.2006. 
939 Refer to Global Insight (2006), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, August 2006, China, 
p. 50. 
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base rather than assembly center" and propel the development and reorganization of 
the local auto parts industry.940 
Trade lobby groups from different countries presented their objections to the WTO, 
as WTO law promulgates that members have to offer the same trade policies to all 
WTO members (most-favored-nation status).941 The European Commission 
considers that China has failed to comply with its obligations under the GA TT 1994, 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, the Agreement of Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures and the Protocol on the Accession of the Peoples 
Republic of China. The issue was referred to a WTO Panel by the Dispute Settlement 
Body in October 2006 at the request of the European Commission, Canada and the 
USA.942 
In July 2006 (one month after the interviews were conducted in China), following the 
complaints of the trade lobby groups, the Chinese government announced a 
postponement of the implementation of the Administrative Measures until July 1 "1, 
2008. The import duty on CBU imports is therefore 25 percent, while the import tariff 
on parts and components is 10 percent. After the postponement, it is still not entirely 
clear whether CKD and SKD kits will be subject to duty of 25 percent or 10 percent 
but the back-tracking implies that these will be subject to the lower rate. Large and 
luxury models typically have lower levels of local content. Consequently, production 
is particularly vulnerable to this regulation.943 While the Administrative Measures 
have been postponed, China has still not abandoned its 40 percent local content 
regulation for the auto sector. In November 2006, the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission stated in its report to the Congress, that "Chinese 
regulations still require automakers to exceed a 40 percent domestic content 
requirement or face higher tariffs on the imported auto parts''.944 These discriminatory 
tariffs pressure continuously China-based auto assembly companies to use parts 
manufactured in China. 
Data of the World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001) also indicate that the auto sector faces constraints on 
imports. There is a significant difference (Levene's Test: p=0.000, T-Test: p=0.034 
equal variances not assumed) between the auto sector and the residual sectors with 
respect to how many days consignments of a major imported raw material took on 
average to clear local customs. While it took 11.8 days in the auto sector (n=77), it 
took 7.0 days in the residual sectors (n=357) (refer to Table 20, Table 21) and 6.7 
940 Interviews conducted with managers of a German OEM in Beijing on 14.06.2006. 
941 Refer to WTO Secretariat (1999), "Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements·. 
942 Refer to European Commission, Market Access Database, Internet Edition, reviewed 11.07.2007. 
For further information refer to European Commission, 'WT/DS339 - Measures affecting imports 
of automobile parts", Internet Edition, reviewed 25.07.2007. 
943 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 62. 
944 Refer to US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2006), "2006 Report to 
Congress," Internet Edition, reviewed 29.07.2007, p. 12 and p. 167 ff. 
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days in the electronics sector (n=194). The difference between the auto sector and 
the electronics sector is also significant (Levene's Test: p=0.000, T-Test: p=0.025 
equal variances not assumed) (refer to Appendix V, Table A59, Table A60). 
The challenge for the Chinese government is consequently to come up with a 
strategy to encourage localization while keeping within the spirit of its WTO 
agreement. The interviewed experts explained that China's cost structure and 
expanding scale are already encouraging greater localization (and thus competition) 
and the outsourcing of global operations.945 However, interviewees from auto 
companies added that their companies' profitability considerations should decide 
about the products and the amount of localization in China. The Chinese government 
should therefore not rely on protection by a local content policy but on market 
forces.946 
Table 20: Descriptive Statistics: Days for consignments of a major input experienced 
before clearing local customs in the auto sector and the residual sectors, 
2000. 
Group_autosec_ Sid. Error 
ressec N Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Days for consignments of Auto sec n 11,8312 19,08871 2,17536 a major imported raw 
matenaJ to clear local Residual sec 
customs 357 7,0420 8,36297 ,44262 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Table 21: Independent Samples T-Test: Days for consignments of a major input 
experienced before clearing local customs in the auto sector and the 
residual sectors, 2000. 
Lev•un THI lor 
.,_ ........ -,varj--- ·.1Mt I r Enu ... ltv ol u ·•-
95% Conllderce 
n111rv11011u, -· S1:1.Error n1•---F .... ' ., Sin 2•11l!IMI 011-nce Olt•en.ea ,_, ' uap ... r c ... ,..grmen• cqu•v•11•n:e• 
30,5i7 ,000 3.454 "' ,001 4,78915 1.38637 2,06428 7,51403 of a major lmpoHd 111w aaum,d ma1er11110 c•ar IOcal Equllll varlan:as 
CUltlffll nolUll.lmed 2,157 82,393 .034 4,78915 2,21993 ,37331 
1,20,199 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Moreover, due to the continuous protection of the auto market, profits of auto 
manufacturers remain high. Profit expectations as well as the incentives for high-
volume production have resulted in overcapacity in the auto market. While the actual 
945 Interviews conducted with experts from a German public corporation in Shanghai on 19.06.2006. 
946 Interview conducted with an expert of a European auto association in Beijing on 16.06.2006 and 
with a manager of an OEM in Beijing on 09.06.2006. 
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sales volume was 3.3 million passenger vehicles in 2005, capacity was more than 6 
million (refer to Figure 26).947 The growth of auto production has been slowing since 
2004 (growth of auto assembly was 72 percent in 2004 and 14 percent in 2005)948 , 
and thus the operation rate has also been decreasing. In order to combat rising 
overcapacity in the auto industry, the NDRC issued another circulation on the 
restructuring of the auto industry in 2006. The focus of the document is on newly 
founded car projects. The circulation stipulates that if an existing auto maker applies 
to establish a new plant at any other place, its vehicle sales in the previous year 
should be 80 percent over its approved or filed production capacity.949 With this 
regulation, the state further increased the threshold for foreign projects. Altogether, 
the protective regime of the auto industry (imposing high tariffs on finished-vehicle 
imports together with licenses and quotas) persists despite extensive trade and 
economic liberalization in most other sectors in the late 1990s. 



















1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
= Production Capacity -+-Operation Rate 
Source: FOURIN (2005b), p. 1. 
4.3.2.2 Export promotion 
2004 2005 Year 
At the beginning of China's reform path, central bureaucrats only needed to look at 
their prosperous neighbors Japan and Korea to see the stimulatin~ effect a vibrant 
export-oriented auto sector could have on a nation's economy.95 The 1994 auto 
industrial policy intended to encourage auto companies' export activities. According 
to Article 3.12, exporting auto enterprises would enjoy preferential treatment, such as 
947 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 4. 
948 Ibidem. 
949 Refer to China Auto (2007), p. 8. 
950 Refer to Harwit (1992), p.141. 
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tax exemptions, from the regulatory tax for fixed asset investments and special 
permissions in utilizing foreign capital starting from 1996.951 The policy also clarified 
that the state would provide preferential loans for exporting companies in order to 
establish internationally competitive domestic auto manufacturers.952 Article 8.39 
promulgated that 
"The state encourages auto industry enterprises to make efforts to expand and 
take part in international competition, which should be regarded as the 
development objective of auto enterprises".953 
Despite preferential treatment for exporting enterprises, export volumes remained 
low in the mid-1990s. In 1995, only 1 .4 percent of passenger cars produced in China 
were exported. In comparison, Korea exported almost 50 percent of its domestic 
passenger car production in the same year.954 Until 2003, exports of passenger cars 
as a percentage of domestic car production had not increased (1.3 percent of 
domestic car production).955 High car prices due to import tariffs on parts, as well as 
low quality, hindered domestic manufacturers from exporting. 
Since the 2004 Auto Industrial Policy, the state has been aiming to increase exports 
of cars and auto components 20 times by 2010, to USO 100 billion (2003: USO 4.7 
billion).956 This policy encourages investment in export-oriented JVs, and uses the 
following measures to increase auto companies' export activities.957 The government 
issues special export loans via the Export-Import Bank of China, which is a fully 
government-owned policy bank under the State Council.958 In 2005, the Export-
Import Bank of China loaned RMB 5 billion to domestic auto maker Chery for its 
overseas business expansion. The loan was to aid Chery in its foreign investment 
and overseas contracts for its cars, and other mechanical, electrical and high-tech 
951 Refer to State Council (1994), "Industrial Policy of China's Automobile Industry", Article 3.12. 
952 Ibidem, Article 8.39. 
953 Ibidem, Article 8.40. 
954 Chinese companies' products were not yet internationally competitive. Besides, with their 
investments in China, foreign companies aimed to produce locally for the Chinese market instead 
of using China as an export hub as most MNCs had production facilities in other markets from 
where they exported worldwide. Refer to Global Insight (2002), Asian Automotive Industry 
Forecast Report - China, March 2002, p. 140 and Global Insight (2002), Asian Automotive 
Industry Forecast Report - South Korea, March 2002, p. 104. 
955 Refer to Global Insight (2006), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, December 2006, p. 4. 
956 Refer to World Markets Analysis (2004). 
957 Refer to NDRC (2004), "Automobile Industry Development Policy No. 8 decree of the State 
Development and Reform Commission", Chapter 1, Article 2, Internet Edition, reviewed 11.04. 
2006. 
958 Refer to China Export-Import Bank (n.d.), "The Export-Import Bank of China", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 27.08.2007. 
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products.959 In addition, central and local governments encourage exports by tax 
refund. FFEs established in Beijing can enjoy preferential policies formulated by the 
central government and Beijing Municipality. As provided in Articles 80 and 81 of the 
"Enforcement Regulations for the Law of the People's Republic of China on Income 
Tax of Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises", a foreign 
investor receives full refund of the charged income tax if he reinvests "directly earned 
profits in enterprises with advanced technology and export orientation within a period 
of not less than 5 years".960 Moreover, as provided in the Preferential Policies 
Provided by Beijing Economic and Technological Development Zone for Investors, 
export-oriented foreign enterprises enjoy a reduced corporate income tax rate of 1 0 
percent even after the expiry of the corporate income tax exemption and reduction 
period "if the output value of export products in the current year has reached above 
70 percent of the product output value of the enterprise in the same year". 961 These 
regulations function as incentives for foreign auto companies to use China as an 
export hub, and at the same time discipline companies through strict requirements on 
the amount and period of exports. 
MNCs are still limited to 50 percent ownership of domestic JVs, but, they can hold 
majority stakes in auto and motorcycle JVs if their operations are geared solely 
towards exports.962 The new guidelines followed the precedent when the NDRC 
allowed Honda to take a majority stake in its export-oriented JV with Guangzhou 
Auto in 2003.963 The regulation aims to encourage foreign manufacturers to expand 
their export activities and set up export-oriented plants. 
To sum up, the analysis of China's national auto industrial policies showed that, 
unlike from policies in the East Asian developmental states, industrial policy for the 
auto sector and its signals aimed at foreign investors have been inconsistent in China 
during the reform period:964 
• After the opening to the world in the 1970s, industrial policy encouraged state-
owned auto manufacturers to update the old 1960s Soviet technology by 
acquiring more advanced technology from MNCs. The government-owned 
959 Refer to People's Daily (2005), "China aids domestic auto maker for overseas expansion", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 19.07.2007. 
960 Refer to Beijing Municipal Bureau of Industrial Development (n.d.), "Auto Manufacturing Industry -
Development Advantages", Internet Edition, reviewed 21.07.2007. 
961 Ibidem. 
962 Refer to NDRC (2004), "Automobile Industry Development Policy No. 8 decree of the State 
Development and Reform Commission•, Chapter 10, Article 48 and 49, Internet Edition, reviewed 
11.04. 2006. 
963 Honda, in its export JV, has a 65 percent stake, while Dongfeng Motor and Guangzhou Auto hold 
25 and 10 percent, respectively. Refer to People's Daily (2003), "China's Automobiles to Tap for 
Overseas Markets", Internet Edition, reviewed 21.07.2007. Chapter 4.3.3.1 discusses on how the 
Guangzhou Development District lobbied for the Honda export JV. 
964 For further information refer to Amsden (2001 ), p. 151 ff. 
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auto firms both licensed technology from the Japanese and negotiated JVs 
with US and European auto companies during that time. 
• After several major Sino-foreign JVs had been established, the government 
reconsidered this strategy in its 1994 auto policy. Chinese auto firms had 
become mere assemblers of foreign CKD kits of their foreign JV partners. The 
central government wanted to cultivate indigenous technological capabilities 
so that domestic companies could become internationally competitive. With 
the auto policy of 1994, China erected even higher trade barriers for its infant 
industry and introduced strict demands on foreign investors with respect to 
technology transfer. In this regard, the 1994 auto policy was a landmark policy 
that imposed far-reaching technology-transfer requirements on foreign 
investors. 
• After China's WTO entry in 2001, the state had to abandon most of the 
requirements placed on foreign investors, and dismantle trade protections 
introduced in 1994. This indicates another turnaround in Chinese policy for the 
auto industry. 
4.3.3 Localism in the auto Industry 
Local governments are increasingly the agents of industrial development at the level 
of the firm. The developmental role attributed to local governments is a direct result 
of economic decentralization, the dominant characteristic of China's transition from 
central planning to a market economy. Local governments in China actively promote 
their localities' growth and thus contribute to the nation's industrial development. 
Local states are not nation-states, however. The central government sets the 
framework of rules within which local governments operate (such as taxation policy, 
environmental policy, corporate law etc.) and the form of interaction with the global 
economy (tariff policy, participation in international organizations etc.). During the 
reform period, local governments have experimented with new policy approaches 
within their jurisdiction, which have not always complied with national policy 
directives.965 The auto sector provides examples of both the positive and negative 
results of local developmentalism. 
4.3.3.1 Incentives to boost the development of the auto sector 
Local bureaucrats are responsible for the economic management of the auto sector. 
Except for the China National Heavy-Duty Truck Corporation, Dongfeng and FAW, 
which are under the direct authority of the central government, Chinese car 
manufacturers are under the direct control of a ministry or a provincial or municipal 
government. BAIC, SAIC, and Tianjin Auto Industry Group Corporation (TAIC) are 
under the jurisdictions of the respective municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai and 
965 Refer to Thun (2004a), pp. 460-461 and Thun (2006), p. 80. 
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Tianjin. The Guangzhou city government oversees Guangzhou-Peugeot. Chang'an 
and Guizhou are, respectively, under the control of the ministerial-level entities China 
North Industries Corporation and China National Aviation Industry Corporation.966 
Provincial and municipal governments take a deep interest in the promotion of auto 
firms to enhance local industrialization. In competition with other provinces for foreign 
auto companies, local bureaucrats strive to attract foreign auto companies into their 
jurisdiction that should form JVs with local auto companies.967 In the mid-1980s, 
there were 17 Chinese parties negotiating simultaneously with Honda, and 22 others 
with Ford, to attract the respective firms to their local development zones.968 "Local 
level governments even have their staffs that are travellini around the world to attract 
foreign investors to local development zones." 96 Managers of industrial 
development zones give speeches at conferences and fairs, and praise the 
investment climate of their locality.970 
Local administrative authorities use several policy instruments to support local 
firms. 971 They provide preferential help for domestic and international investors in 
their jurisdictions, including favorable leasing fees for land, low rents for production 
halls, and administrative support in the form of fast approvals. Speedy approval of 
investments in facilities, marketing and financial products provide competitive 
advantages for cooperative companies. The approval process of Chang'an Ford 
Mazda Engine Company to build a plant near Nanjing took about one month. In 
contrast, Toyota had to wait several years for approval to assemble cars in Tianjin 
and in Guangzhou. Furthermore, local governments provide financing, infrastructure 
and free trade zones.972 The most important incentive is preferential tax treatment in 
the local development zones. Tax reliefs, however, are not solely directed towards 
the encouragement of auto companies, but are applicable to all encouraged 
investments. The China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park grants technologically 
advanced manufacturing enterprises a local income tax reduction (in addition to the 
966 Refer to China Business Review (1998), "Shifting Gears", Internet Edition, reviewed 14.10.2006. 
967 Refer to People's Daily (2003), "China sets to put breaks on auto industry", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 16.10.2006 and interview conducted with an expert of a Chinese auto government 
institution in Beijing on 16.06.2006. 
968 Refer to Lo (1997), p. 177. 
969 Interview conducted with a German manager of a supplier company in Shanghai on 13.07.2006. 
970 At the 2006 Global Business Forum in Hannover, representatives of the Suzhou High-Tech-Park, 
the Kunshan Development Zone and the Zhang Jiagang Development Zone explored the 
advantages of their parks and development zones for foreign investors (they held speeches and 
had standings at the fair). Refer to Global Business Forum (2006), "Sourcing Asia", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 06.06.2007. 
971 Refer to Hebei Provincial Department of Commerce (2002), "The Provisions of Hebei Province 
Concerning Further Optimizing of the Investment Environment and the Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment", Chapter 11, Article 4 (Examination, Approval and Registration), Chapter Ill 
(Investment Environment and Service) and Chapter IV, Article 22 (Key Sectors to Attract Foreign 
Investment and Preferential Policies), Internet Edition, reviewed 27.08.2007. 
972 Refer to Noble et al. (2005), pp. 14-15. 
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already reduced tax rates in development zones) of 3 percent for two years and a 
reduced tax rate of 7.5 percent (instead of 15 percent) for the following three years. 
Thereafter, enterprises pay a rate of 10 percent for the next 3 years.973 
The World Bank sample "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors, 1998 - 2000" (2001) also indicates that the primary reason 
for the location974 of a plant is "fewer regulatory requirements and taxes based on 
government's assignments" (refer to Table 22). There is no significant difference 
between the three grour,s in this respect (refer to Appendix V, Table A45, Table A46, 
Table A47, Table A48). 75 
Table 22: Descriptive Statistics: Reasons for location of plant for companies in the 
auto sector, 2000. 
Reasons the plant was located here when plant was Advantages for locating plant here now 
established 
Local Proximity to Low rents Fewer regulatory Local Proximity to Low rents Fewer regulatory 
market other firms in or cost of requirements and market other firms in the or cost of requirements and 
size the same line buying taxes based on size same line of buying taxes based on 
of business property government's business property government's 
assignments assignments 
N Valid 57 53 84 87 63 52 69 50 
Missing 159 163 132 129 153 164 147 166 
Median 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
The foreign auto managers interviewed explained that local governments support 
foreign auto companies in order to benefit domestic manufacturers, create jobs, and 
promote the overall economic environment of the locality.976 Foreign auto managers 
agreed that the subsidies and preferential conditions that local governments offer 
foreign companies, are a matter of negotiation between foreign investors and local 
bureaucrats. Incentives vary not only between localities but also between foreign 
companies in the same locality. Due to the aim of foreign companies to enter the 
growing Chinese auto market, local governments are in a good position to negotiate 
with foreign investors. Accordingly, the negotiations with domestic partners and the 
local governments of different provinces can make the negotiation process lengthy 
973 For a detailed listing of tax incentives refer to China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
Development Co., Ltd (2007), "Preferential Policies", Internet Edition, reviewed 17.01.2007. 
974 The question was twofold, asking for "reasons the plant was located here when it was 
established" and for "advantages for locating plant here now". 
975 The only significant difference (Mann-Whitney U-Test: p =0.027) is between the auto sector and 
the electronics sector with regard to the proximity to other firms in the same line of business as an 
advantage for locating a plant in the same region now. While managers in the auto sector ranked 
this advantage two, managers of the electronics sector ranked it three. This difference is, 
however, obvious, as especially the vehicle parts manufacturers are heavily dependent on their 
customers, the vehicle manufacturers and locate their plants close to them. Refer to Appendix V, 
Table A45, Table A46, Table A47, Table A48. 
976 Interviews conducted with experts from a German public corporation in Beijing on 08.06.2006. 
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for foreign investors.977 Moreover, regional inconsistencies in regulation and 
enforcement, coupled with sometimes weak communication between government 
ministries, complicate investment and the business planning decisions of foreign 
investors. With regard to the auto industry, regional inconsistencies exist in 
connection with emission standards. While Euro Ill standards were adopted 
nationwide in July 2007; Beijing and Shanghai had already adopted Euro Ill 
standards at the beginning of 2006. Euro IV emissions standards are scheduled for 
adoption in Beijing by 2008, in Shanghai by 2009.978 Whilst other emerging markets 
also show regional inconsistencies in regulations and enforcement, the sheer size of 
China and its economic growth, exacerbates the situation and presents major 
obstacles to foreign auto companies active in China.979 
As the economic performance of large auto groups is linked to the locality's growth -
SVW contributed 8 percent of Shanghai's GDP in 2002980 - local bureaucrats try to 
adjust central-government regulations to their companies' needs. Until 2004, the 
legislation regulating investment in the auto industry permitted a foreign manufacturer 
to have no more than 50 percent of ownership in a JV with a Chinese partner. In 
2003, central bureaucrats approved the JV of Honda with Guangzhou Auto, in which 
the foreign partner would have a majority with 65 percent ownership, only because 
the local authorities of Guangzhou Development District appealed to central level 
agencies on the auto maker's behalf.98 The export plant was designed to 
manufacture 50,000 "JAZZ" cars annually, which would be exported particularly to 
European markets. The export JV would not only increase the locality's tax revenue 
and provide new jobs, but would also enable its domestic producer Guangzhou Auto 
to gain experience with international market structures, regulations and sales 
networks. The application approval took only six months. Moreover, the municipal 
government granted the ex~ort JV preference and support on land price, electric and 
administrative charges etc. 82 The reason the central authorities made an exception 
was that the Honda production facility in Guangzhou Development District was 
established to produce exports. Export performance is the most persuasive evidence 
of technical upgrading; it is a standard "control" mechanism for governments that 
seek to assess the relative performance of domestic firms.983 In the 2004 auto 
977 Interviews conducted with German managers of two different supplier companies in Shanghai on 
13.07.2006 and 19.07.2006. 
978 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 45. 
979 Refer to the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) (2007), "BIAC 
Priorities for Regulatory Reform in China", Internet Edition, reviewed 28.07.2007. 
980 Refer to People's Daily (2003), "China sets to put breaks on auto industry", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 16.10.2006. 
981 Refer to Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of Guangzhou Municipality (2005), 
"Guangzhou Honda Automobile Export Base project", Internet Edition, reviewed 07.09.2007. 
982 Refer to Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of Guangzhou Municipality (2005), 
"Guangzhou - An Automotive Industry Base with the Strongest Competitiveness in the World", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 07.09.2007. 
983 Refer to Amsden (2001 ), p. 8. 
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industrial policy, the new legislation came into force permitting foreign companies in 
the auto industry to have up to 70 percent of shares if their production was solely 
destined for export.984 
This example shows that local governments actively lobbied for their local auto 
manufacturers if this benefited their jurisdiction. The case also demonstrates that 
national directives are not perceived as direct orders at the local level. The 
authorities in Special Economic Zones make adjustments, negotiate with the central 
government on behalf of their investors, and generally approach the directives with 
pragmatic flexibility.985 
4.3.3.2 Protectionist measures to safeguard local auto companies 
For industries that enjoy increasing returns to scale, there is a natural tendency to 
have production clustered in a few places. The scale-economies theory of 
international trade calls attention to the theory of regional specialization. In an 
industry where there is a significant fixed cost of production or a decreasing average 
variable cost of production, a firm would enjoy a low average cost of production by 
producing a large volume of goods and services, which in turn enhances the firm's 
competitiveness and increases the demand for its products. The positive feedback 
eventually leads to a high (geographic) concentration of production.986 The empirical 
findings of Bai et al. (2004) show that regional specialization in China is low for 
industries that yield high profit and tax, and for industries with large shares of state 
ownership - both arguments apply to the auto industry in China.987 
The long-term goal of transforming domestic auto companies into global players is 
impaired by conflicts between the central government and local governments. While 
central bureaucrats pursue balanced growth of the national auto industry, local state 
agents promote fast economic industrialization irrespective of national 
inconsistencies.988 Due to the high degree of financial autonomy and local leaders' 
peculiar incentive systems under the policy of fiscal federalism, local governments 
(especially those with small tax bases) safeguard and expand their licensing 
authority. Even after the central government's attempt to rein in local investment after 
the tax reforms in 1994, creative local officials use different sources of capital for 
favored projects: foreign investment, extra-budgetary funds, control over local banks, 
even local curb markets.989 The incentives local governments grant foreign auto 
984 NDRC (2004), "Automobile Industry Development Policy No. 8 decree of the State Development 
and Reform Commission", Internet Edition, reviewed 11.04.2006. 
985 Refer to Asia Times (2006), "China's extra-special zones", Internet Edition, reviewed 17.01.2007. 
986 For further information refer to Marshall (1920) and Krugman (1991). 
987 Refer to Bai et al. (2004), p. 399 ff. 
988 Interview conducted with experts from a Chinese government institution in Beijing on 13.06.2006. 
989 For further information on the consequences of fiscal federalism refer to Tsai (2004). 
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companies thus do not always correspond to national regulations. Accordingly, there 
is no industrial policy in the sense of the selective and coordinated allocation of 
resources. Central agencies have no policy instrument for the control of resource 
allocation by provincial governments. It has been very difficult for the central 
government to identify one or several specific locations or provinces to promote 
specific industries. In this respect, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan criticizes local 
governments for attracting foreign investment, contrary to industrial policy 
regulations.990 Although NDRC approves the setting-up of new auto companies, local 
governments find ways to circumvent central approval procedures: 
• Chery originated from the auto project of the local government of Wuhu City in 
Anhui province. As it did not get any central license approval to start a new 
auto company, the local government of Wuhu set up an auto parts company, 
Anhui Auto Part Industrial, in March 1997.991 Wuhu's mayor, Zhan Xialai, 
became the company's president. Although they had no license to produce 
cars, they never stopped the car production plan initialized in 1995. In 1998, 
the factory for entire car production began construction and in December 
1999, the first "Qi Rui (Chery)" sedan rolled of its assembly line. The local 
government offered incentives in the form of tax reliefs to the cab companies 
in Wuhu city to purchase the first batch of Chery cars as taxis.992 
• In order to circumvent national directives, local companies buy licenses from 
other local players who are no longer active in the auto business, but have 
kept their license. Another option to get round from central establishment 
approval is, as the interviewed experts confirmed, to split the investment 
volume into different phases so that the promulgated investment volume is 
lower than the one which is necessary for NORG approval.993 Between 1981 
and 1995, more than BO percent of the FOi projects that came from the USA, 
Japan or Hong Kong were approved at the provincial level with investment 
capitalization of less than USO 30 million.994 This contrasts with the national 
auto policy approach, which emphasized economies of scale. The threshold of 
990 Refer to People's Daily Online (2006), "China's new policy stresses quality of foreign investment", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 15.11.2006. 
991 Chery did not receive central government approval to manufacture cars before 2001. 
992 Refer to Luo (2005), "The Growth of Independent Chinese Automotive Companies", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 02.08.2007. Similarly, when FAW Group Corporation posted a net loss of RMB 
570 million for the first quarter of 2005, the local government of Jilin province guaranteed FAW 
supply of energy and special treatment on land use and encouraged the purchase of FAW cars 
within the province by tax incentives. Refer to China Business lnfocenter (2005), "FAW posts big 
loss, government tries to help", Internet Edition, reviewed 27.08.2007. 
993 Interviews conducted with managers of a German OEM in Beijing between 08.06.2006 and 
16.06.2006. 
994 Refer to Wang (2001 ), p. 9. For further information on the threshold of USD 30 million refer to 
Shanghai Government (2005), "Examination and Approval Jurisdiction", 22.10.2005, Internet 
Edition, reviewed 10.12.2006. 
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USD 30 million has hence reinforced the miniaturization of FDI projects (not 
solely auto projects) and provincial officials' rent-seeking behavior.995 
In order to reach high economic growth, local governments introduce protectionist 
measures to safeguard local auto companies from interregional competition and 
defend their tax base. Local governments "patronize local companies and protect 
their pet projects".996 Intraregional trade barriers have caused the fragmentation of 
markets and diseconomies of scale. A local government could protect the local 
market for autos simply by directing enterprises under its control to purchase from a 
particular manufacturer, or by attaching higher registration and licensing fees to cars 
manufactured in other localities (as the Wuhu city government did to promote Chery). 
Central agencies could prevent local manufacturers from expanding beyond their 
home jurisdiction - it used the security bureau to deny licenses to cars that were not 
manufactured by an approved plant - if a firm was content to stay within the home 
locality, however, the local government could provide it with all necessary 
approvals.997 Thus, local governments could raise the barriers of market entry for 
outside entrepreneurs, or impose a ban on the import of certain types of products to 
protect local business interests. In Hubei province, in late 1999, the Wuhan 
bureaucracy offered special tax relief to the purchasers of Citroen-Fukang cars which 
were produced within the province. Those who "imported" non-Fukang cars to the 
province had to pay a special fee of up to RMB 70,000.998 Similarly, a bus company 
in a city of Anhui province had already received approval from the city government 
before it purchased new buses. As soon as the city government discovered that the 
new buses were not manufactured in Anhui province, it banned the buses from being 
used within its jurisdiction.999 
Local trade barriers, indeed, affect the domestic market strongly: interprovincial trade 
fell from 37 percent of national retail trade in 1985 to about 25 percent in 2000.1000 As 
the central agencies have not been powerful enough to enforce central-government 
policies that prohibit interregional trade barriers, some local governments have used 
their political freedom to maintain substantial trade barriers to protect local auto 
manufacturers from other provinces' competitive products. 1001 Particularly when the 
auto industry faced weak demand in the 1990s, some cities introduced local policies 
to restrict imports of compact cars from other provinces.1002 Cross-provincial 
995 Refer to Wang (2001 ), pp. 9-10. 
996 Interview conducted with an expert of a European auto association in Beijing on 16.06.2006. Also 
refer to Bai et al. (2004), p. 398. 
997 Refer to Thun (2004a), p. 462. 
998 Refer to Harwit (2001 ), pp. 668-669. 
999 Refer to Chou (2006), p. 10. 
1000 Refer to Tenev et al. (2002), p. 21. 
1001 Refer to Montinola et al. (1995), p. 14. 
1002 Refer to People"s Daily (2001 ), "Auto Industry Faces Challenges", Internet Edition, and China 
Business Review (1998), "Shifting Gears", Internet Edition, both reviewed 14.10.2006. 
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protectionism was appreciated by the MNCs and local governments alike, as both 
possessed controls over the share of auto JVs.1003 
Although the central government favored big assemblers, and discriminated against 
small operations in an attempt to achieve economies of scale, the auto market 
continues to be fragmented. The rivalry among provinces for generating high rates of 
growth has encouraged bureaucrats of many provinces and cities to establish the 
industrial policy for the auto industry according to their jurisdiction's conditions. Local 
states' ambitions to participate in the sector's growth spurred the establishment of 
auto assembly plants in almost every province.1004 The protected local markets 
resulted in the survival of spatially dispersed small and inefficient indigenous 
assemblers.1005 The state had insufficient capacity to regulate these defections from 
a unified common market.1006 Local governments' independent FDI screening 
process (below the threshold of USD 30 million), and the increased inter-jurisdictional 
competition for FDI, have contributed to the fragmented auto market. In addition, as 
confirmed by the experts interviewed, local governments have often financially 
pepped up small-scale, unprofitable companies in their jurisdiction, because the 
bankruptcy of local companies would endanger social stability, local economic growth 
and the bureaucrats' political career. 1007 
Due to local protectionism and national local content regulations, joint-venture auto 
producers had to use locally-made parts in their vehicles and began to cultivate their 
own auto parts suppliers. Despite having the same foreign partner, SVW and FAW-
VW established their own independent network of suppliers, promoting domestic 
suppliers within their locality. Foreign investors in JVs would also bring their own auto 
parts suppliers to China and establish JVs producing auto parts. As a result, China's 
auto parts industry became fragmented, like the industry of auto manufacturers. Most 
manufacturers were small or medium-sized, and economies of scale were almost 
impossible to achieve.1008 
1003 Refer to Wang (2002), p. 9. 
100• Refer to Zhu (2004), pp. 427-428. 
1005 Chapter 4.3.2.1.1 elaborated that protection resulted in high prices and thus profitability of small-
scale auto manufacturers. 
1006 Refer to Thun (2004a), pp. 461-462. 
1007 Interviews conducted with an expert of a European auto association in Beijing on 16.06.2006 with 
experts from a German public corporation in Beijing on 08.06.2006. According to an interviewed 
Chinese expert, even the central government (NDRC) has been reluctant to issue proofs of 
insolvency, because stakeholders and employees would ask NDRC for aid, social payments, 
reimbursement and compensation. NDRC is seen to be responsible as it gave project approval. 
Interview conducted with an expert of a Chinese auto government institution in Beijing on 
06.06.2006. 
1008 Refer to People's Daily (2004), "Problems linger in auto parts sector•, Internet Edition, 
07.07.2004, reviewed 06.10.2006. 
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Overall, the development of the Chinese auto indust~ in the reform era has largely 
been influenced by local authorities and enterprises.10 9 Decentralization may lead to 
positive economic outcomes when local governments are forced by the central 
government to adhere to hard budget constraints. However, if central state agents do 
not have the ability to impose such budget constraints, local governments have little 
incentive to constrain spending (they continue to support and/or subsidize inefficient 
and unproductive enterprises), and economic results are likely to be worse.1010 In 
China during the early to mid-1990s, this latter situation was more the norm. 
Decentralization was, in many respects, a result of central government weakness, 
and this made it difficult to impose discipline on local governments. Although the 
interests of local governments did overlap with national objectives to a certain extent, 
they were not identical. "Chinese-style federalism" and local governments' opposition 
and malfeasance undermined the central state's capacity to implement market 
reform. Fiscal arrangements create incentives for local governments to promote auto 
companies within their jurisdiction. As a result, they put local interests above national 
ones. Japanese firms were protected from international competition during their high-
growth stage, but at least in some industries, glaring inefficiencies were kept in check 
by fierce competition within the domestic marketplace. Local governments in China 
attempt to benefit from the artificially high profits that result from a domestic auto 
market protected from international competition. This has in turn spurred distorted 
incentives and suboptimal outcomes in the auto industry.1011 Local protectionism has 
impeded regional specialization and the progress of mass auto assembly. Domestic 
competition has been hampered by a weak central authority, which could not enforce 
market integration regulations effectively.1012 The key problem of the central 
government's ability to direct auto sector development was hence its inability to 
properly constrain local governments. 
4.3.3.3 Different development approaches for the auto sector - Beijing and 
Shanghai 
There have been differences between local development approaches, as the 
structures of the auto sector in Beijing and Shanghai show. While Shanghai, together 
with Jiangsu, has successfully established the development of the auto industry with 
a broad supplier network, Beijing has been struggling. The development of the auto 
industry in Beijing and Shanghai has to be seen in the light of the state-directed 
development of the auto industry. Not only the national policy approach to guide the 
growth of the auto industry, however, but also local governments' ambitions to 
accelerate auto production within their jurisdiction, influenced the sector's 
development. 
1009 Refer to Lo (1997), p. 179. 
101° For further information on decentralization and the challenge of hard budget constraints refer to 
Rodden (2001). 
1011 Refer to Thun (2004b), p. 242, Thun (2006), p. 258 ff and Wang (2002), p. 17. 
1012 Refer to Bai et al. (2004), p. 398 and Huang (2002a), p. 540 and p. 551. 
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After 1978, central bureaucrats decided on auto production in different 
municipalities/provinces, and determined that JVs would be established. The earliest 
JV to assemble motor vehicles was Beijing Jeep Corporation (BAIG together with 
AMC) in 1983. In fact, it was the very first Chinese manufacturing JV si~ned with any 
foreign company after China reopened to the West in the late 1970s.101 BAIG is 100 
percent owned by the municipal government of Beijing. The central government 
envisioned Beijing Jeep Corporation manufacturing light commercial vehicles and 
"Beijing developing a cluster for this segment". 1014 There was a strong motivation for 
the JV in the late 1970s. While the Americans wished to establish a base in Asia that 
would enable them to manufacture cars at low cost, and compete in the growing 
region, the Chinese hoped for technology. After the JV started in 1984, the two sides 
disagreed over the product to be produced. The Americans wanted the new product 
to be similar to AMC's existing line of Jeeps, but Chinese bureaucrats wanted a 
newly-developed military Jeep for the army. Neither the government nor AMC, 
however, had the money to develop a new vehicle. The conflicting goals of the two 
partners restricted the development of the auto industry in Beijing. In addition, after 
the JV deal was signed, the Americans learned that the "real" negotiations had just 
begun. Chinese business people were much more accustomed to doing business 
based on personal relationships and the charisma of business leaders and tended to 
view concluded contracts as a base for negotiation. The Americans, on the other 
hand, viewed contracts as binding, and put much less emphasis on the aspects of 
personality in business.1015 After long-winded discussions between the two partners 
and few sales, Beijing Jeep Corporation went bankrupt, and had to shut down its 
plant in early 1986. 
Only after intervention by Premier Zhao Ziyang, did the central government provide 
large loans to cover the fact that the high-profile Beijing Jeep project was unable to 
expand or develop new models.1016 Beijing Jeep was also given preferential import 
tariffs, and special permission to convert AMC's share of dividends (RMB 6.9 million) 
into US dollars at the official government exchange rate. 1017 Moreover, the Public 
Security Bureau purchased the JV's Jeeps to renew its fleet. 1018 
In 1987, AMC was acquired by Chrysler. Although Chrysler showed willingness to 
invest more in China, it did not obtain official permission to produce passenger cars 
in addition to utility vehicles. Besides, its main products failed to develop a mass 
market appeal, and sales peaked at only 26,000 vehicles in 1996. Gallagher (2006) 
1013 Refer to Gallagher (2006), p. 47. 
1014 Interviews conducted with managers of a German OEM in Beijing between 08.06.2006 and 
16.06.2006. 
1015 For further information on Beijing Jeep and Western business activities in China refer to Mann 
(1989). 
1016 The State Bureau of Supplies delivered RMB 16.8 million. Refer to Harwit (1995), p. 75 and Noble 
(2006), "Overcapacity, Contract Design and the Emergence of Independent Auto Firms in China", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 01.08.2007. 
1017 Refer to Young and Tan (2001), p. 5 and Harwit (1995), p. 74. 
1018 Refer to Harwit (1995), p. 76. 
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contends that the JV was "strangled by its conservative state ownership'; but "kept 
alive by Beijing's reluctance to let it fai/".1019 During the years after the merger of 
Chrysler with Daimler-Benz in 1998, DaimlerChrysler was beset with merger 
challenges and did not focus much attention on Beijing Jeep Corporation, which 
played a small role in its corporate structure. Indeed, in 1998, Beijing Jeep's total 
revenues were approximately equivalent to USO 399 million, of which 
DaimlerChrysler's share was about USO 169 million. This represented 0.1 percent of 
DaimlerChrysler's total sales (USO 131.8 billion) in that year. 1020 
In 1984, the central government planned the establishment of China's second auto 
JV, SVW, in Shanghai. With the VW - SAIC venture, the state intended to build an 
"auto cluster for passenger cars in Shanghai". 1021 SAIC's primary purpose in 
establishing a JV was to increase its capabilities by catching up with the advanced 
world's level. "The interests of SAIC and the Shanghai municipal government were 
identical", because SAIC was 100 percent owned by the municipal government.1022 
SVW, like BAIG, started its operations, manufacturing CKD kits. Soon after SVW's 
foundation, it became market leader in China with a rise in sales volume from 7,000 
vehicles in 1985 to over 200,000 cars since 2000. Due to an increase of passenger 
car demand during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and national import tariff barriers, 
the JV was able to dominate the Chinese auto market until the mid-1990s. In the 
early 1990s, SVW captured 70 percent of the Chinese market for passenger cars.1023 
The Shanghai municipal government had spurred growth of SVW by buying much of 
the company's output of its Santana model for taxis and municipal vehicles. 1024 Due 
to sustained tariff levels, prices remained high, and the JV was able to realize 
anticipated profit margins. In 1996, the Shanghai municipal government banned from 
municipal streets cars that had an engine capacity of below 1.6 liters in order to 
exclude cars from rival auto manufacturers in Tianjin. 1025 
The growth of SVW, and the financial support of the municipal government suppliers 
(in the mid-1990s, about RMB 5 billion extrabudgetary funds were in the localization 
fund) cultivated a strong supply base in Shanghai. As SAIC owns the vast majority of 
supply firms in Shanghai, it has had strong bargaining power with foreign suppliers 
that aimed to follow VW. "VW's foreign suppliers had to venture with SA/C's 
1019 Gallagher (2006), p. 49. 
1020 Refer to Young and Tan (2001 ), p. 4 ff. 
1021 Interviews conducted with managers of a German OEM in Beijing between 08.06.2006 and 
16.06.2006. 
1022 Interviews conducted with managers of a German OEM in Beijing on 14.06.2006. 
1023 Refer to Ministry of Commerce/International Property Protection (2006), "Chinese auto joint 
ventures go their own way", Internet Edition, reviewed 29.08.2007. 
1024 Still in 2004, the Santana 2000 cars dominated the cab fleet with market share of around 54 
percent. Refer to Shanghai Government (2005): "City seeks better, more spacious cabs", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 28.07.2007. 
1025 Refer to Thun (2004a), p. 461 ff and Thun (2006), p. 259. 
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suppliers, otherwise SAIC would have delegated the order to a competitor". 1026 "SAIC 
even nep,otiated the percentage of products that have to be exported by the supplier 
JVs." 10 SAIC, furthermore, controls the finances and personnel of supply firms 
within its group. Besides, once one firm of SAIC's conglomerate introduces a new 
technology, the group ensures that the technology will also be introduced in the other 
companies of the SAIC conglomerate. 1028 
As a result of the municipal bureaucrats' approach to developing its auto and supply 
industry, Shanghai is the only municipality that has been able to rely heavily on the 
local supplier sector. Within the domestic market, which continues to be the primary 
focus of most Chinese auto firms, the overall strength of the Shanghai supply sector 
has proven to be durable, as competition has increased. Not only was the value of 
Shanghai's auto parts output three times greater than any other locality in 2003, but it 
has also helped to transform the neighboring provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu into 
major bases of component production. Compared with Shanghai, Beijing had about 
ten times less output of auto parts in 2003 (refer to Figure 27). The superiority of 
Shanghai (and its neighboring provinces) over Beijing with regard to auto parts 
production, is also indicated by the number of suppliers located in the two 
municipalities. In 2004, 64 auto suppliers were located in Shanghai and only 23 in 
Beijing. In consequence, 90 percent of the components for the SVW Santana, and 
well over 60 percent of the components for the Shanghai-GM Buick, are 
manufactured within the municipal borders of Shanghai. No other municipality has 
reached even 25 percent. In 2002, Beijing Jeep sourced 50 percent of its 
components (by value) from Shanghai.1029 
Figure 27: Output of auto parts by region, 2003. 












Shanghai Zhejiang JIiin Jiangsu Shandong Hubei Chongqing liaonlng Guangdong Hunan Beijing 
Source: FOURIN (2005a), p. 11. 
102• Interviews conducted with managers of a German supplier company in Shanghai on 19.06.2006. 
1021 Interview conducted with a German manager of a supplier company in Shanghai on 13.07.2006. 
1028 Refer to Segal and Thun (2001 ), p. 570 ff and Thun (2004a), p. 470 ff. 
1029 Refer to Thun (2006), pp. 71-72. 
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The statistical analysis of the World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and 
Firm Linkages in Manufacturing Sectors" (2001) also provides indication that the 
municipal government in Shanghai has more actively assisted its local auto 
manufacturers to develop. The government's assistance in identifying potential 
foreign suppliers is 4.5 percent (n=2) in the auto industry in Beijing and 7.5 percent 
(n=3) in Shanghai. The difference between the auto sector in Beijing and the one in 
Shanghai is significant (Likelihood Ratio Test: p=0.016, 2-sided) (refer to Table 23, 
Table 24). 
Table 23: Descriptive Statistics: Government agency's or official's assistance in 
identifying potential foreign suppliers in the auto sector in Beijing and 
Shanghai, 2000. 
Government agency's or omcial's 
assistance in identifying potential 
foreim SUIDliers 
Yes No N.A. Taal 
uroup_autosec_ Auto sec l.,;OLlll 2 41 1 
Beijing_Shang"lai Beijing % within Group_ 
44 
autosec_Beijing_ 4,5% 93,2% 2,3% 100,0% 
Shanghai 
Auto sec Coi..11 3 29 8 40 
Shanghai o/o within Group_ 
autosec_Beijing_ 7,5% 72,5% 20,0% 100,0% 
Shanghai 
Taal COi.i'ii 5 70 9 84 
% within Group_ 
autosec_Beijng_ 6,0o/. 83,3% 10,7% 100,0% 
Shanghai 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Table 24: Chi-Square Test: Government agency's or official's assistance in 
identifying potential foreign suppliers in the auto sector in Beijing and 
Shanghai, 2000. 
Vaue 
I' e,non (.;h>Square 7,5:!fl• 
Lkelhocxl Ratio 8,276 
Linear-by-Linear 
2,748 Assodction 
N of Valil Cases 84 
a. 4 cells (66,7%) have e,q>eeled ca.int lmsthan 5. The 






Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001). 
Both municipalities are characterized by extensive foreign participation through FDls; 
however, Shanghai has been more open towards foreign investment than Beijing. In 
2005, Shanghai used USO 6.2 billion foreign investments, while Beijing only used 
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USO 3.5 billion. In addition, while in Shanghai 23.1 percent of foreign capital were JV 
enterprises in 2005, only 19. 7 percent of foreign capital were JVs in Beijing. With 
more than 70 percent, WFOEs absorbed the largest share of foreign capital in both 
municipalities (refer to Table 25). Markedly different between the two municipalities, 
however, is the share of gross output value of the auto industry. In Shanghai, the 
largest share of gross output value of industry (63 percent, USO 146.2 billion in 
2006)1030 was generated by FFEs, which play a key role in industrial development. In 
Beijing, the largest share of gross output value of industry (56 percent, RMB 47.1 
billion in 2005) came from domestic enterprises.1031 
Table 25: Amount of foreign capital actually used grouped by investment manner in 
Beijing and Shanghai, 2005. 
Beijing Shanghai 
Total amount of foreign capltal actually used (In USO mllllon) 3,525 6,174 
Joint Ventures (as a percentage of total foreign capital used) 19.7 23.1 
Cooperative Ventures (as a percentage of total foreign capital used) 6.7 2.6 
Wholly foreign owned enterprises (as a percentage of total foreign capital used) 73.6 74.3 
Source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook (2006) and Shanghai Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
The Shanghai municipal government especially used its position to attract foreign 
investors. Municipal bureaucrats even made the investing MNCs compete with each 
other in providing capital and technology. The key contest took place in 1997, when 
GM obtained the license to establish a second JV (after VW) with SAIC, which Ford 
and Toyota had also envisioned. GM had already proven its commitment to China's 
auto market by establishing parts plants in China, many of them oriented to exports. 
GM agreed to make a USO 1.6 billion investment in a high-tech facility to produce 
modern models (Buick Regal and Century), and to help SAIC build an R&O center. In 
return, the Shanghai municipal government helped GM to complete construction in 
less than two years (by issuing construction approvals fast, and providing land), and 
gave GM much greater freedom to choose suppliers and handle labor than VW had 
enjoyed. Stimulated by GM's entry, SVW also invested in the development of new 
models, and hoped for similar treatment from the municipal government.1032 
The World Bank sample also shows that the municipal government of Shanghai has 
more actively assisted local auto companies in attracting foreign technology into their 
jurisdiction than the Beijing municipal government. 10.0 percent (n=4) of the 
managers in the auto sector in Shanghai stated that they received government 
assistance in locating foreign technology to license, while only 6.8 percent (n=3) of 
1030 The number includes enterprises from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
1031 Refer to Beijing Statistical Yearbook (2006) and Shanghai Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
1032 Refer to Lee (2003), p. 285 and p. 291. 
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the managers of the auto sector in Beijing answered the same. The difference is 
significant (refer to Table 26, Table 27).1033 
Table 26: Descriptive Statistics: Government agency's or official's assistance in 
locating foreign technology to license in the auto sector in Beijing and 
Shanghai, 2000. 
Government agency's or official's 
assistarx:e in locating foreign 
technoArvou lo hcense 
Yes No N.A. Total 
Group_auto_Beijing_ Auto sec Count 3 40 1 44 
Shanghai Beijing % within Gtoup_auto_ 
6,13% 90,9% 2,3% 100,0% Beijing Shanghai 
Auto sec Count 4 27 9 40 
Shanghai % within Group_auto_ 
67,5% 22,5% 100,0% Beijing__Shanghai 10,0% 
Total Count 7 67 10 134 
% within Gtoup_auto_ 8,3% 79,8% 11,9% 100,0% Beijing_Shanghai 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Table 27: Chi-Square Test: Government agency's or official's assistance in locating 
foreign technology to license in the auto sector in Beijing and Shanghai, 
2000. 
Valu, 
l'earsa, vn-:,(!Jare 13,1115• 
Lkalhood Raio 9,853 
Line1J-by-Line1J 
2,991 Associafon 
N cJ Valid Cases 134 







Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
In order to improve local auto companies' innovation capabilities, the Shanghai 
municipal government encouraged the cooperation of domestic and foreign 
companies with local universities. In June 2000, VW donated RMB 5 million to jointly 
set up an auto research center with Tongji University.1034 Four years later, VW und 
Tongji University signed a memorandum of their joint R&D efforts on fuel cell 
1033 Footnote a of the Chi-Square Test indicates that three cells have expected count less than live, 
therefore, the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square Test is used (instead of the Pearson Chi-Square Test). 
The differences are significant (Likelihood Ratio Test: p=0.007, 2-sided). 
103' Reier to People's Daily (2001 ), "Volkswagenwerk AG President Lectures in Shanghai", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 26.08.2007. 
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technology. 1035 Among the leaders of fuel cell-related research is the Pan Asia 
Technical Automotive Center in Shanghai, a JV with GM and SAIC.1036 
The 2001 World Bank survey also indicates the close cooperation between auto 
companies and universities located in Shanghai. According to the World Bank data, 
13.6 percent (n=6) of the managers of the auto industry in Beijing confirmed that the 
local university performed R&D for their plants in the year 2000. In the auto industry 
in Shanghai, in 2000, 37.5 percent (n=15) of the companies instructed the local 
university to perform R&D for them. The difference between the auto industry in 
Beijing and Shanghai is significant (Pearson Chi-Square Test: p=0.012, 2-sided) 
(refer to Table 28, Table 29). 
Although the municipality of Beijing, similar to that of Shanghai, has promoted the 
development of the local auto industry, its development approach seems to be less 
targeted towards auto manufacturers and suppliers, as the statistics of the World 
Bank sample show. In addition, Beijing's disadvantage was the central leaders' 
decision to establish a production hub for light duty trucks in Beijing. The Beijing Jeep 
venture never found a mass market for its utility vehicles, and the company struggled 
to produce more than 15,000 - 20,000 vehicles in the 1990s. After 1995, light 
commercial vehicle production in Beijing decreased, while passenger car production 
in Shanghai increased. Light duty trucks did not correspond to customers' demands 
to the extent passenger cars did. Accordingly, from the mid-1990s until 2004, the 
production of motor vehicles in Shanghai grew faster than the production of motor 
vehicles in Beijing (refer to Figure 28). 
Table 28: Descriptive Statistics: Contractual or long-standing relationship with the 
local university to perform R&D for the plant in the auto sector in Beijing 
and Shanghai, 2000. 
Local universitv 
Yes No Total 
Grol.ll_autosec_ Auto sec (;0'-'11 6 38 44 
Beljing_Shang,ai Beijing % within Group_ 
autosec_Beijing_ 13,6% 86,4% 100,0% 
Shang,ai 
Auto sec Co'-'11 15 25 40 
Shang,ai % within Group_ 
autosec_Beljlng_ 37,5% 62,5% 100,0% 
Shanghai 
Total Count 21 63 84 
% within Group_ 
autosec_Beljlng_ 25.0% 75,0% 100,0% 
Shanghai 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
' 035 Refer to Volkswagen (2004), "Volkswagen and Tongji sign a Memorandum Joining Hands to 
Develop Fuel Cell Vehicles for the Future", Internet Edition, reviewed 26.08.2007. 
1036 Refer to US Department of Energy (2006), "Major Government-Supported Fuel Cell Vehicle 
Projects", Internet Edition, reviewed 26.08.2007. 
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Table 29: Chi-Square Test: Contractual or long-standing relationship with the local 
university to perform R&D for the plant in the auto sector in Beijing and 
Shanghai, 2000. 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value di /2-sided\ 
Pearson Chi-Square 6,364° 1 ,012 
Continuity Correction a 5,155 1 ,023 
Likelihood Ratio 6,496 1 ,011 
Fisher's Exaa Test 
Linear-by-Linear 
6,288 1 ,012 Association 
N of Valid Cases 84 
a. Computed only !or a 2 x2 table 
b. O cells (,0%) haveexpeded count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
10,00. 
Exaa Sig. Exaa Sig. 
/2-sided\ /1-sidedl 
,022 ,011 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
As a consequence of passenger car growth in China, the municipality in Beijing also 
"aimed to develop a passenger car cluster in its jurisdiction and supported local 
passenger car manufacturers". 1037 The municipal government in Beijing has granted 
BAIG, formerly Beijing Jeep Corporation, and its JV company Beijing Benz-
DaimlerChrysler Automotive Ltd. (BBDCA), special support in spurring development 
and passenger car production. However, the NDRC did not approve the production of 
Mercedes-Benz C- and E-class passenger cars by the JV partners DaimlerChrysler 
and BAIG before May 2004.1038 According to a foreign interviewee, among the local 
subsidies the JV receives, is the provision of property at preferential rental fees in the 
Beijing Development Area.1039 BBDCA is, however, only slowly advancing, and its 
production volume is still low (BBDCA has a production capacity of 100,000 vehicles 
and sold 30,000 units in 2006).1040 It seems as if the central government imposed 
requirements on the foreign partner DaimlerChrysler in order to improve BBDCA's 
business performance before the NDCR would approve further projects of 
DaimlerChrysler's in China. Indeed, the NDRC did not issue approval of 
DaimlerChrysler cooperation with the Beijing-based Chinese commercial vehicle 
manufacturer Beiqi Foton before DaimlerChrysler sold the 50 percent stake of its 
Yaxing Benz bus JV in Yangzhou.1041 
1037 Interview conducted with an expert of a Chinese auto government institution in Beijing on 
16.06.2006. 
1038 Refer to DaimlerChrysler (2004), "Fertigung von Mercedes-Limousinen in China durch Staatsrat 
genehmigt", Internet Edition, reviewed 22.05.2006. 
1039 Interview conducted with a manager of a German OEM in Beijing on 08.06.2006. 
1040 Refer to China Daily (2007), "Beijing Benz May Break Even in 2007", Internet Edition, reviewed 
13.09.2007. 
1041 For further information refer to Financial Times Deutschland (2007), "Daimler krempelt China-
Strategie um", 22.05.2007, p. 7. 
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While the municipal government in Shanghai has concentrated its support on SAIC in 
particular, Beijing has not only ambitions to develop BBDCA, but also aggressively 
promotes Beijing Hyundai Motor Corporation, a JV between Korea's Hyundai Motor 
Company and municipal Beijing Automotive Industry Holding. Beijing Hyundai was 
established in 2002.1042 "The municipal government provides the JV cheap land for 
its production base and promotes the JV's Sonata as Beijing's official taxi model." 1043 
Due to the municipality's effort to promote passenger car production in its jurisdiction, 
motor vehicle production in Beijing has increased since its slump in 1998, and has 
caught-up with Shanghai. Passenger car sales growth in Beijing was in line with the 
increase in passenger car (rather than light commercial vehicle) demand after WTO 
accession in 2001 (CAGR 2001-2006 of passenger cars: 38.3 percent, CAGR 2001-
2006 of light commercial vehicles: 13.7). In 2005, auto production in Beijing 
amounted to 586,000 vehicles - representing 10.3 percent of China's total auto 
production (5.7 million vehicles). Shanghai's output of motor vehicles was 484,500 
units in 2005. However, it increased to 652,800 units in 2006 (refer to Figure 28).1044 
Overall, due to the competition for foreign MNCs, municipal governments invest in 
the construction of industrial parks, and offer bureaucratic services and fast 
approvals as well as a well-established infrastructure. With the settlement of foreign 
MNCs within their jurisdiction, and the setting-up of Sino-foreign JVs, local 
governments aim to promote local auto companies. Since the establishment of its 
first auto JV in the 1980s, the Shanghai government has more actively assisted the 
development of domestic auto companies than has the Beijing municipal 
government. Shanghai has been successful in establishing an auto cluster in its 
jurisdiction. Its JV SVW is manufacturing on a large scale. With pressure and support 
from the Shanghai municipal government, SVW fostered the development of a iroup 
of local suppliers that grew into the heartland of the Chinese auto industry.104 The 
Shanghai municipal government actively followed an integrated development path 
towards establishing an auto industrial base in its location, and building a tight 
network between OEMs and suppliers. As a result, the Shanghai, and Jiangsu area 
has developed into an auto cluster, integrating OEMs and suppliers. Almost half of 
the parts manufacturers in China are located in Shanghai and in nearby provinces 
such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Hardly any auto suppliers are located in the Beijing 
area yet. The municipal government in Shanghai has been able to use its power and 
resources to advance the auto sector within its jurisdiction. Beijing did not succeed in 
1°'2 Interview conducted with a manager of a German OEM in Beijing on 08.06.2006 and with an 
expert of a Chinese auto government institution in Beijing on 16.06.2006. 
1043 Interviews conducted with experts from a Chinese government institution in Beijing on 
13.06.2006, with managers of a German OEM in Beijing on 14.06.2006 and with an expert of a 
Chinese auto government institution in Beijing on 16.06.2006. 
1044 Refer to Shanghai Statistical Yearbook (2006), Internet Edition, reviewed 05.01.2007 and Global 
Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 4. 
' 045 Refer to Noble {2006), "Overcapacity, Contract Design and the Emergence of Independent Auto 
Firms in China", Internet Edition, reviewed 01.08.2007. 
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its objective of promoting the auto sector as a core industry. The gross output value 
of the auto industry was RMB 68.8 billion in Beijing (in 2005) compared with RMB 
146.2 billion in Shanghai (in 2006).1046 The findings are in accordance with those of 
Segal and Thun (2001 ), which contend that Shanghai rather than Beijing was 
essentially a local developmental state.1047 Most of all, however, Shanghai benefited 
from the national plan of establishing an auto cluster for passenger cars in Shanghai, 
and one for light duty trucks in Beijing, as passenger cars rather than light duty trucks 
experienced high growth rates during the reform period. Beijing has only "recently" 
focused on passenger car production within its municipality. However, neither the 
municipal bureaucrats in Beijing nor those in Shanghai have been able to create 
internationally competitive domestic passenger car producers. In this segment, both 
municipalities are dominated by Sino-foreign JVs (SVW in Shanghai, BBDCA and 
Beijing Hyundai in Beijing). 
Figure 28: Production of motor vehicles in Beijing and Shanghai and national new 
light vehicle registrations, 1995-2006. 
Production of motor 
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= Production of motor whicles in Beijing 
-.-Total new passenger car registrations 
111/Z,111 Production of Motor Vehicles in Shanghai 
---Total new light commercial whicle registrations 
Source: China Compendium of Statistics 1949 - 2004, p. 112 and 384, Beijing Statistical Yearbook 
(2006), Shanghai Statistical Yearbook (2007) and Global Insight (2002), Asian Automotive Industry 
Forecast Report, March 2002, p.140 and Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast 
Report, April 2007, p. 4. Note: Data on production volume of motor vehicles in Beijing are not 
published for 2006 yet. 
1046 Refer to China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2006) and Shanghai Statistical Yearbook (2006). 
1047 Refer to Segal and Thun (2001 ), p. 562. 
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4.4 Financial system as an instrument to regulate the auto sector's growth 
The Chinese state wields power over the financial system by specifying credit quotas 
for each sector. The experts interviewed confirmed that credit is allocated to key 
sectors in the government's focus for development.1048 The larger the company's 
share of capital from bank loans, the more influence the state can exert on its 
business activities by regulating the credit volume. Among the companies in the 
World Bank sample "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ), 27.1 percent (n=215) of the auto companies' capital 
share was from bank loans. This was significantly higher than in the residual sectors 
where bank loans only amounted to 17.5 percent (n=1271) of the companies' capital 
(Levene's Test: p=0.000, T-Test: p=0.000 equal variances not assumed) (refer to 
Table 30, Table 31).1049 The same trend applies to the electronics sector that 
received significantly fewer bank loans than the auto sector (Levene's Test: p=0.003, 
T-Test: p=0.032 equal variances not assumed) (refer to Appendix V, Table A61, 
Table A62). 
Table 30: Descriptive Statistics: Approximate shares of capital from different sources 
in the auto sector and the residual sectors (in percent), 2000. 
Group_autosec_ Std. Error 
ressec N Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Retained Auto sec 215 43,0372 37,48718 2,55660 
earnings/internal funds Residual sec 1271 52,8961 40,06173 1,12372 
Bank loans Auto sec 215 27,0884 31,95816 2,17953 
Residual sec 1271 17,5445 26,96722 ,75642 
Loan from a parent or Auto sec 215 5,2651 18,73149 1,27748 
partner company Residual sec 1271 8,9119 25,46271 ,71422 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
1048 Interviews conducted with experts from a German public corporation in Beijing on 08.06.2006 and 
with managers of a German OEM in Beijing between 08.06.2006 and 16.06.2006. 
10• 9 In all sectors, retained earnings and/or internal funds were the biggest share of companies' 
capital, this share was significantly higher in the residual sectors (52.9 percent, n=1271) than in 
the auto sector (43.0 percent, n=215) (Levene's Test: p=0.013, T-Test: p=0.000 equal variances 
not assumed). Loans from a parent or partner company were significantly higher in the residual 
sector (8.9 percent, n=1271, Levene's Test: p=0.000, T-Test: p=0.013 equal variances not 
assumed) than in the auto sector (5.3 percent, n=1271) (refer to Table 30, 
Table 31). 
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Table 31: Independent Samples T-Test: Approximate shares of capital from different 
sources in the auto sector and the residual sectors (in percent), 2000. 
Lavena's Test lor 
Enualilv ol Variances !-lest !or Enualilv nf Means 
95o/o Confid&nce 
Interval ol lhe 
Mean Std. Error Oillerence 
F s• 1 dl Si:J. l2•tail•U Oilfer9r1Ce Difference LOWB< ""-Retained Equal variances 
6,144 ,013 ·3.368 1484 .001 -9.85894 2,92763 -15,150167 -4,11620 earnings/1111ema1 assumed 
lunds EQual variances 
no1 assumed -3,530 302,769 ,000 -9,85894 2,79266 •15,35442 -4.36345 
Bank loans Equal variances 18,528 ,000 4,665 1484 ,000 9,54392 2,04579 5,53097 13.55687 assumed 
Equal variances 
4,137 268,002 ,000 9,54392 2,30706 5,00166 14,06618 nota•umed 
Loan from a parer,! Equal variances 15,056 ,000 -2,010 1484 ,0,5 -3,64676 1,81450 -7,20602 -,08751 or partner company assumed 
Equal variances 
-2.492 362,720 ,013 -3,64676 1,46358 •6,52493 -,76860 not assumed 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Since the late 1990s, banks have accepted indirect finance for car purchase and auto 
investments, because auto markets were developing quickly. Indirect finance means 
that businesses and individuals make use of normal bank lending to purchase 
vehicles, and use business assets or property as collateral. During the boom years of 
2002 and 2003, the credit volume increased and much credit was risky, because the 
fluctuation and instability of personal incomes in some sectors and regions was 
severe. Due to the absence of a reliable credit screening system and personal credit 
history, banks often allocated credit to small-scale unprofitable local companies or 
customers that were not credit-worthy. 1050 
According to a national directive, credits have been reduced, to avoid financial 
institutions' dead debts, and to circumvent overcapacity and traffic collapse in the big 
cities since the beginning of 2004. Cars purchased on credit accounted for only 1 0 
percent of total car purchases in China in 2006, representing a steep fall from 2003, 
when auto-financing arrangements accounted for 30 percent of total sales.1051 
Indeed, the government's credit tightening measures had a negative effect on car 
buying behavior, especially at the top end of the market. This resulted in decelerating 
car sales growth rates in 2004. While the growth in passenger car sales was 57 
percent in 2002 and 77 percent in 2003, it was "only" 17 percent in 2004. Quarterly 
data in particular show the government's influence on the deceleration of passenger 
car sales growth in 2004. The growth in passenger car sales is usually the largest in 
the fourth quarter of each year (90 percent in the fourth quarter of 2002, and 101 
percent in the fourth quarter of 2003). Passenger car sales growth was, however, -4 
1050 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 23. 
1051 In more developed markets, approximately 70 percent of car sales are financed through loans, 
suggesting that there is potential for a big increase in car sales if the government allows a further 
increase in lending to consumers. Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry 
Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 23. 
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percent in the fourth quarter of 2004 (refer to Figure 29).1052 The state's credit policy 
has successfully spurred auto growth when the financial system set credit below 
market prices; it triggered a deceleration of growth when economic slowdown was 
targeted. The state uses the financial system as an industrial policy instrument to 
regulate the auto market, by either extending or restricting credit for auto companies 
and purchasers. In addition to specifying credit quotas, bureaucrats exert strong 
influence on the development of the auto market by restricting and controlling 
companies' vehicle financing activities. 





























































Source: Own illustration based on data from the German Association of Automobile Manufacturers 
(VOA) (2005). 
According to a WTO regulation, China is "forced" to open the non-bank auto 
financing sector.1053 The central government aims to gradually expand market 
mechanisms for the financial sector. Since 2004, the state has allowed foreign auto 
manufacturers to establish finance companies and provide car-financing deals. In 
August 2004, GM was the first foreign auto comrcany to obtain government approval 
for establishing a JV car-financing company. 054 Other foreign car companies, 
1052 Quarterly growth rates refer to changes to the same quarter of the previous year. 
1053 Refer to wro (2001), "Accession Protocol", (D) Judical Review, Article 7-3, Internet Edition, 
reviewed 09.10.2006. 
1054 Refer to People's Bank of China (2004), "Administrative Rules for Automotive Loans", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 27.08.2007 and People's Daily (2004), "GM obtains approval for auto finance", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 21.07.2007. 
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including VW, Ford, Toyota and DaimlerChrysler have followed suit since. Altogether, 
seven auto finance companies operate in China.1055 
Membership of the WTO resulted in lower tariffs on imports, and consequently lower 
prices on many locally-made models. Finally, economic gains in China have 
produced a large and growing middle class that can afford a new car. While 
consumer finance has had a limited role in auto sales in recent years, 1056 the 
approval of captive auto finance operations in the country has opened the market to 
an even greater number of buyers. The surge in auto sales has positively contributed 
to national economic growth during the last decade; in the meantime, however, 
overcapacity and the fear of an overheating economy, as well as environmental and 
social costs (pollution, roadway-accident deaths) are forcing central and local leaders 
to shift their economic growth targets, and address the costs of expansion. In 
response to the growing Chinese urban middle class eager to purchase private 
vehicles, the Shanghai municipal government now "sells" license plates at auctions 
every month for about RMB 40,000 each {which is more than the RMB 39,800 price 
tag for Chery Automobile's 1 .1 liter-engine QQ subcompact car) in order to regulate 
the growth rate of auto sales within the municipality. 1057 
Overall, the Chinese government uses the financial system as an industrial policy 
instrument and steers the growth of the auto sector by regulating the volume of auto 
loans. It fears the domination of foreign captive financing {and thus a loss in state 
power) as well as unbalanced growth in the sector. Hence, state agents have only 
gradually reduced the restrictions on foreign auto financing companies since WTO 
accession. 
4.5 Government-business cooperation and information sharing in the auto 
sector 
Information between government and business representatives of the auto sector is 
shared in a formalized way. First, NDRC holds hearings or seminars to inform auto 
companies on special topics, or to ask foreign OEMs for their assessment of the 
development of the Chinese auto market. NDRC also sends "red head letter" papers 
to companies. 1058 These letters provide formal notice on major national guidelines. 
1055 Refer to China Banking Regulatory Commission (2007), "Annual Report 2006", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 09.11.2007. 
1056 Between January and October 2006, 223,688 passenger cars were registered in Beijing, 
however, only 3.8 percent of these were financed by loans. Refer to China Auto (2007), p. 9. 
1057 Refer to Shanghai Government (2006), "Shanghai: car license plate prices set record", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 14.07.2007 and Reuters (2007), "Shanghai license plate pricier than small car", 
Internet Edition, reviewed 06.09.2007. 
1058 Interview conducted with an expert of a Chinese auto government institution in Beijing on 
16.06.2006. 
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Moreover, NDRC organizes forums and expert panels, where information on relevant 
auto topics is announced, and drafts of laws and regulations are discussed with 
experts.1059 
The state does not announce all information relevant to auto companies to the same 
extent, however.1060 Thus, being a member of a business association is important for 
gaining market information. The World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology 
and Firm Linkages in Manufacturing Sectors" (2001) shows that membership in 
business associations differs significantly (Pearson Chi-Square Test: p=0.016, 2-
sided) between companies in the auto sector and companies in the residual sectors. 
While 62.0 percent (n=134) of the auto managers interviewed confirmed that their 
company is a member of a business association, in the residual sectors only 53.2 
percent (n=683) of the respondents confirmed this (refer to Table 32, Table 33). 
Table 32: Descriptive Statistics: Firm's membership in a business association in the 
auto sector and in the residual sectors, 2000. 
Member of a business 
association 
Yes No Total 
Group_aulosec_ressec AUIO sec <,;cunt 134 82 216 
% within Group_ 
62.0% 38,0% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Residual sec Count 683 601 1284 
% within Group_ 
53,2% 46,8% 100,0% autosec_ressec 
Total Count 817 683 1500 
% within Group_ 
54,5% 45,5% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
1059 Interviews conducted with managers of a German OEM in Beijing on 08.06.2006. 
1060 Ibidem. 
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Table 33: Chi-Square Test: Firm's membership in a business association in the auto 
sector and in the residual sectors, 2000. 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value di 12-sidedl 
Pearson Chi-:;quare 5,831" 1 ,016 
Continuity Correction a 5.480 1 ,019 
Likelihood Ratio 5,896 1 ,015 
Fishe(s Exact Test 
Linear-by-Linear 
5,827 1 ,016 Association 
N a Valid Cases 1500 
a. Ccmputed only for a 2"2 table 
b. 0 cells (,0%) have e,ipected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
98,35. 
Exad Sig. Exad Sig. 
12-sidedl 11-sidedl 
,018 ,009 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors• (2001 ). 
Indeed, the World Bank sample shows that the most important reason to be a 
member of a business association is to gain market information. 90.3 percent 
(n=121) of the members whose business is in the auto sector confirm this. 
Significantly fewer members active in the residual sectors (79.4 percent, n=542} gave 
the same answer (Pearson Chi-Square Test: p=0.003, 2-sided) (refer to Table 34, 
Table 35). The World Bank sample furthermore shows that being a member of a 
business association is one way to gain information on the development of the auto 
market, and future laws and regulations. 
Table 34: Descriptive Statistics: Helping members to get market information is one 
function the most important business associations perform on a regular 
basis for companies in the auto sector and in the residual sectors, 2000. 
Helps members get 
market information 
Yes No Total 
liroup_autosec_ressec Auto sec Count 121 13 134 
% within Group_ 
90,3% 9,7% 100,0% autosec_ressec 
Residual sec Count 542 141 683 
% within Group_ 
79,4% 20,6% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Total Count 663 154 817 
% within Group_ 
81,2% ~8.8% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ), 
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Table 35: Chi-Square Test: Helping members to get market information is one 
function the most important business associations perform on a regular 
basis for companies in the auto sector and in the residual sectors, 2000. 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson vni.::square B,769" 1 ,003 
Continuity Correction . 8,068 1 ,005 
Likelihood Ratio 9,985 1 ,002 
Fisher's Exact Test 
Linear-by-Linear 
8,759 1 ,003 Association 
N of Valid Cases 817 
a. Computed only for a 2x2table 
b. O cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
25,26. 
Exact Sig. Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) (1-sided) 
,002 ,001 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Foreign auto companies can give feedback to the relevant central level agencies not 
only via business associations, but also via auto working groups, as one interviewee 
indicated. The Auto Working Group under the European Chamber of Commerce in 
China (of which the Chief Representative of ACEA in China is the Vice Chairman) 
compiles yearly position papers on the development of the Chinese auto business 
environment. The paper is in Chinese and English and is officially given to the 
Chinese government and the European Commission. Its content is a review of 
market development and prospects, and contains suggestions on regulatory reform. 
Its impact on China's policy decisions is, however, questionable.1061 
An interviewee of a European auto association in Beijing stated that auto companies 
usually obtain timely information from central agencies on upcoming technical 
standards/norms. However, some laws "fall from the sky'; and are an "unpleasant 
surprise" for foreign investors. While the time-horizon for emission standard 
requirements is provided until 2010, the "Measures for the Administration of Import of 
Automobile Components and Parts Featuring Complete Vehicles" were implemented 
as a reaction to the official phase-out of local content regulations, with only short 
notice for foreign investors. The regulation was discussed only with Chinese 
companies in advance, to the disadvantage of foreign investors.1062 Therefore, 
managers of auto companies rely on informal lobbying activities to acquire 
information on the state's latest regulations, or try to informally discuss specific 
regulations and their interpretation with government officials. There are no 
institutionalized regular meetings between government representatives and foreign 
business associations; they rather meet irregularly and ad hoc.1063 
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An interviewee from a Chinese government institution explained that, as the auto 
sector is still dominated by SOEs, central-level auto companies such as FAW and 
Dongfeng report their production data to SASAC; and local companies such as BAIG 
and SAIC give reports to their municipal governments.1064 The central government 
also negotiates all subject terms of contracts FAW and Dongfeng sign. Some general 
managers of the large auto companies even sit on the CCP Central Committee.1065 
At the local level, the municipal governments of Beijing and Shanghai are involved in 
the businesses of BAIG and SAIC, respectively. A foreign interviewee explained that 
the chairman of the Supervisory Board of BAIG, which is owned by the municipal 
government, Lu Hao, is also the vice mayor of Beijing. Furthermore, Chairman An 
Qinghen~ who is the CEO of BAIG and of BBDCA, is at the same time a civil 
servant.1 66 Even private companies such as Chery are backed by high-ranking 
officials. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China reports that Chery 
Automobile received millions of US dollars in subsidies from the Ministry of Science 
and Technology in 2004.1067 Accordingly, there is no purely private sector in the 
Chinese auto industry. In addition, high-ranking managers of Chinese state-owned 
auto companies are often at the same time local-level bureaucrats. As a result of this 
close interaction between the state and domestic auto companies, information flows 
directly from the (state-owned) auto companies to the responsible bureaucrats. In 
China, an institutionalized form of information exchange between the state and the 
business sector - as set up in the East Asian developmental states - is less important 
than informal information flow. 
The central government does not envision insulation of the elite bureaucracy from 
business activities. Politics, bureaucracy and private businesses build a symbiosis. 
Most domestic auto companies have the support of central or local bureaucrats (in 
2005, 33 percent of the assets of the total auto sector were state-owned) and are 
thus powerful in negotiations with foreign companies. 1068 This may have advantages 
or disadvantages for foreign investors, depending on the respective interests of the 
partners. The interviewees in the supplier sector agreed that, once the local 
bureaucracy no longer required operation in JVs, they chose to establish WFOEs. 1069 
The interviewees of the OEMs asserted that their domestic partner was dominant 
1064 Interview conducted with experts from a Chinese government institution in Beijing on 13.06.2006. 
1065 Refer to Liu and Dicken (2006), p. 1235. 
1066 However, An Qingheng had no government post at the time the interview was conducted. 
Interview conducted with a manager of a German OEM in Beijing on 08.06.2006. 
1067 Refer to Congressional-Executive Commission on China (2005), "Annual Report, V. Development 
of Rule of Law and the Institutions of Democratic Governance", Internet Edition, reviewed 
27.08.2007. 
1068 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2005), "The Status Quo of Foreign Investment in the Automotive 
Industry", Internet Edition, reviewed 23.03.2006. 
1069 Only auto suppliers are allowed to build WFOE, OEMs have to establish joint-venture companies 
with a Chinese partner. Interviews conducted with supplier companies in Shanghai on 19.06.2006 
and 20.06.2006. 
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because of advocates in the municipal government and the resulting selective state 
assistance. In this respect, one challenge to their investment in China is the 
cooperation with state-owned companies and the responsible state officials when 
doing business with a Chinese state-owned company. 
For foreign auto companies, the most effective way to lobby for their interests is still 
to stay in close contact with the Ministry of Commerce and the NDRC. Both agencies 
grant especially big MNCs personal meetings and early information on upcoming 
regulations and laws, as large-scale auto OEMs are decisive for domestic growth. 
For smaller companies, it is very difficult to get an appointment. Central agencies' 
subsidiaries on the local level have not enough power although they are part of the 
central level agency. Therefore, all companies have representative offices or 
holdings in Beijing. A Chinese interviewee of a German auto company revealed that 
"only direct contact to the central level government agencies enables companies to 
lobby for details of enacted laws". 1070 The World Bank survey "Competitiveness, 
Technology and Firm Linkages in Manufacturing Sectors" (2001) also confirms that 
managers in the auto sector do not expect business associations to (formally) 
represent their members' concerns to the government. 39.8 percent (n=53) of the 
auto managers who are members of business associations specified that they are 
members of a business association because it represents its members' views and 
concerns to the government. In the residual sectors, 47.4 percent (n=324) of the 
members of business associations confirmed this and in the electronics sector, 48.7 
percent (n=109) of the members of business associations confirmed this (refer to 
Table 36 and Appendix V, Table A63). There is no significant difference between any 
of the three groups. 
Table 36: Descriptive Statistics: Representation of members' views to the 
government as one function the most important business association 
performs on a regular basis for companies in the auto sector and the 
residual sectors, 2000. 
Representation of members' view 
and concerns to the novemmenl 
Yes No Total 
liroup_autosec_ressec Auto sec co..,t 53 BO 133 
% within Group_ 39,8% 60,2"/o 100,0% autosec: ressec 
Residual sec eo ... 1 324 359 683 
% within Group_ 
47,4•/o 52,6% 100,0% autosec raesec 
Total Count 377 439 816 
% within Group_ 
46,2% 53,8% 100,0"/o autosec ressec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
1010 Interview conducted with a Chinese manager of a German OEM in Beijing on 14.06.2006. The 
same was stated by experts from a German public corporation in Beijing on 08.06.2006. 
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The data confirm that, although formalized consultations and briefings on auto issues 
take place between state organs and private businesses, information exchange 
between foreign auto companies, and between foreign auto companies and state 
officials, take place rather informally. Personal contacts between company 
employees and bureaucrats in charge are most effective with regard to information 
exchange and company lobbying. In foreign auto enterprises, the position of 
company representative thus needs to be filled by Chinese managers who have a 
broad network with central-level agencies. This network often dates back to 
university (Qinghua University, Beijing University). Lobbying then functions via direct 
calls and meetings, instead of business associations or official seminars etc. "Official 
seminars are rather used to network and keep contact to important persons•: as one 
Chinese employee in a foreign auto company confirmed. "Seminar breaks are more 
important than speeches and presentations." 1071 In general, good government 
relations are a central determinant of doing business, and entrepreneurs make 
significant financial investments in maintaining political connections. Auto companies' 
performance is subsequently not solely dependent on their ability to respond to 
market signals, but also on the quality of relations with state representatives. 
Overall, bureaucrats' far-reaching involvement in the business activities of (state-run) 
domestic auto firms has enabled them to gain detailed information on the sector's 
development and companies' needs. The institutionalization of information exchange, 
as in the East Asian developmental states, has been less important, however, than 
informal and ad-hoc consultations between foreign investors and state 
representatives. China's institutional design has, in consequence, facilitated 
favoritism (and thus opportunities for corruption) in auto enterprises with widespread 
guanxi networks, and informational asymmetry between domestic and foreign 
companies, putting foreign OEMs and suppliers at a disadvantage. 
4.6 Two decades of state-promotion In the auto sector 
The industrial policies for the auto sector indicate that there is a long tradition of 
government intervention in the Chinese auto industry. State guidance has had mixed 
results. In fact, when the objectives of the industrial policies for the auto sector -
employment growth, concentration of production in key manufacturers, high local 
content and high production volumes of passenger cars - are compared with the 
current state of the industry, it can be seen that the central government has achieved 
its objectives in some respects. The ultimate goal of the policies for the auto industry 
has been to establish internationally competitive Chinese "proprietor" brands with the 
help of foreign JV partners. Proprietor brands include brand name, R&D facility, 
supplier base and production facility owned by Chinese OEMs. Policy success can 
1071 Interviews conducted with managers of two German OEMs in Beijing on 08.06.2006 and 
14.06.2006. 
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be measured by the structure of the auto market, as well as technology know-how, 
market share and the export activities of domestic auto companies. 
4.6.1 Achievements 
During the 20 years of state-guidance in the auto sector, China has successfully 
climbed up the global ranking of the largest passenger car markets.1072 While China 
ranked seven in 2001 (sales: 0.8 million units), it was the third largest market for 
passenger cars in 2006 (sales: 4.3 million units) - ranking before Germany where 3.5 
million passenger cars were sold in the same year.1073 At the same time, China has 
not relied on imports to meet its growing demand for passenger cars. Passenger car 
production rose from 0.4 million units in 1996 to 4.3 million units in 2006.1074 In 2006, 
passenger car production accounted for 64 percent of total vehicle production in 
China (compared with 26 percent in 1996) and for 9.3 percent of passenger car 
production worldwide. 1075 Domestic auto production has created jobs for Chinese 
workers in the auto and supplier industry. Already in 2001, 1.5 million people were 
employed in the auto industry in China. The number increased to almost 1.7 million 
people by 2005.1076 
In line with increased auto production volumes (and thus economies of scale) and 
cheaper imports, pre-tax profit in the auto industry has risen since the 1990s, and 
particularly after WTO accession (pre-tax profit in 1990: USD 0.9 billion, in 2003: 
USD 12.5 billion). Between 2000 and 2003, the CAGR of total pre-tax profit was 37.5 
percent (refer to Figure 30). 
In order not to lose control over the industry to foreign investors, bureaucrats have 
regulated inward investment in various ways: screening, foreign e~uity limits and 
local content requirements to narrow the technology gap etc.10 7 Due to the 
maximum-equity regulation, foreign auto manufacturers have been unable to 
dominate the Chinese auto market.1078 While granting foreign firms access to the 
growing domestic auto market, the state has been able to aggregate support in key 
firms (in the form of JV partnerships) and concentrate domestic car production. Since 
1012 The CAGR of passenger car sales was 40 percent between 2001 and 2006. Calculation based on 
data from Global Insight (2007), World Car Sales Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 30. 
1073 Data from Global Insight (2004), Automotive World Car Sales Forecast Report, April 2004, p. 25 
and Global Insight (2007), World Car Sales Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 30. 
101• The gross output value of auto production as a share of total production rose from 2.1 percent in 
1990 to 4.1 percent in 2005. Refer to China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2006). 
1075 Refer to Global Insight (2007), World Car Sales Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 30. 
1076 Refer to China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2006). 
1077 Refer to Wang (2001 ), p. 3. 
1078 Refer to Sit and Liu (2000), p. 671. 
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2004, thirteen auto manufacturers (nine of them foreign-invested JVs) have produced 
over 90 percent of the total output of passenger cars in China.1079 
Moreover, the JV and the localization requirements on foreign investors have forced 
the FDls of auto-producing MNCs to establish passenger car production locations in 
China (mostly in coastal provinces, refer to Figure 31). Due to an almost stagnating 
triad (Japan, USA, and Europe),1080 foreign investors were eager to set up assembly 
plants in the Chinese auto market, and participate in the rapid sales growth of the 
domestic auto market. China's auto industry is thus becoming integrated into the 
global production networks of transnational corporations.1081 In addition, MNCs have 
had to localize manufacturing in China in order to circumvent high tariffs on imports, 
and fulfil local content requirements. This investment has benefited auto parts 
suppliers because demand for local auto parts and components has increased. 
These "backward linkages" from Sino-foreign JVs, and the Chinese auto industry in 
general, are contributing to economic growth in China.1082 
Figure 30: Total pre-tax profit in the auto industry (foreign and domestic invested, 











1990 1995 2000 
Source: Automotive Industry of China - China Auto Supplementary Issue (2004), pp. 34-35. 
Note: Data in RMB were converted into USO using FERI exchange rates for each year. 




1080 Global Insight expects that the CAGR of passenger cars sales in the period 2007 until 2017 will 
be 6.4 percent in China, compared with 0.2 percent in Japan, 0.4 percent in Western Europe and 
1.3 percent in the United States. Refer to Global Insight (2007), World Car Sales Forecast Report, 
April 2007, p. 33. 
10• 1 Refer to Liu and Dicken (2006), p. 1230. 
1082 Refer to Gallagher (2006), p. 23. 
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Figure 31: Production locations of foreign OEMs in China. 
Source: Own illustration. 
Today, as envisioned by the state, most manufacturers in China assemble 
domestically made vehicles rather than CKD kits, and have set up the whole value 
chain of vehicle assembly in China. Accumulated production figures in December 
2006 show that only .4.6 percent of total vehicle production in China was CKD 
production (338,125 units). While the production of domestically made vehicles 
increased by 27 percent (sales of domestic made vehicles: +25.1 percent) in the 
period January-December 2006 compared with the same period in the previous year, 
CKD production decreased by 20.1 percent (CKD sales: -20.4 percent) (refer to 
Table 37). In this regard, the policy approach of combining FDI attraction (and 
guidance) and import substitution (high tariffs, local content requirements) has 
successfully forced foreign manufacturers to produce and source in China, and thus 
support the development of domestic OEMs and suppliers. 
Table 37: Auto production and sales, 2006. 
Production Sales 
Accumulated (January• Change(%)" Accumulated (January - Change(%)" 
December 2006) December 2006) 
Total 7279726 27.3 7 215972 25.1 
Domestic made 6 941 601 . 31.1 6877991 28.8 
CKD 338.125 -20.1 337.981 ·20.4 
Source: FOURIN (2007), p. 21. •Note: Change refers to equivalent period of the previous year. 
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The central government has gradually increased the threshold for foreign auto 
investments in China. State regulations have forced MNCs to introduce and produce 
their most recent car models in China (125 new models came on the market between 
2000 and 2006).1083 The latest regulations on foreign investment in the auto sector 
even force foreign auto manufacturers to develop new brands in China. In this 
regard, Guangzhou Honda and SVW announced in July 2007 that they would set up 
R&D facilities and develop self-branded vehicles in China.1084 Furthermore, 
competition among foreign auto manufacturers and the reduction of import tariffs 
have lowered car prices. The average price for an entry-level compact car in China, 
which ranges from USD 8,000 to USD 16,000, fell by 28 percent between 2000 and 
2005.1085 In general, intense price competition and promotional activity by virtually all 
auto manufacturers, as well as production localization, are drivers of auto technology 
modernization and overall growth of auto sales in China. 
Increasing competition and overcapacity have contributed to overseas expansion by 
Chinese OEMs since China further opened its market. While in 2001, the total export 
volume of passenger cars from China was 3,579 units, it was 123,245 units in 
2006.1086 In 2005, the total export volume of vehicles and parts even exceeded the 
corresponding imports for the first time. 1087 This achievement was not only a 
milestone for the domestic auto industry, but also confirmed China's ambition to 
become a leader in the global auto market. However, China's export volume 
represented only 2.4 percent of its output volume in 2006.1088 While OEMs in Japan 
and Korea focused on exports, due to their small domestic markets, OEMs producing 
in China have concentrated on sales in the domestic market, with its large population 
and the high number of cities with strong purchasing power (especially in the coastal 
areas). 1089 
The FDl-led growth strategy for the auto sector has contributed to the economic 
success of the auto industry in China in a number of ways. The regulatory framework 
in combination with the race for market share in the growing auto market, has 
attracted investment from almost all top global OEMs, who are committed to 
' 083 Refer to Businessweek (2007), "The Quality Drag on China's Car Industry", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 18.07.2007. 
1084 Refer to Hong Kong Trade Development Council (2007), "Honda to create brand for China auto 
market", Internet Edition, and China Economic Net (2007), ·svw to develop new model for 
Chinese and US markets", Internet Edition, both reviewed 11.08.2007. 
1085 Refer to Businessweek (2006), "China's Booming Car Market Defies Pundits", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 18.07.2007. 
1086 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 57. 
1087 Refer to China Auto (2007), p. 4. 
1088 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 4. 
1089 As demand in major cities slows or begins to saturate, the large number of second-tier and third-
tier cities will drive growth. Refer to Global Insight (2007), World Car Sales Forecast Report, April 
2007, p. 14. 
255 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
The auto industry in the light of the Chinese development approach 
introducing their latest models onto the market. Through the JV regulation, Chinese 
auto firms could acquire manufacturing expertise from their foreign partners; and 
tariff protection and subsidized credit have helped domestic producers to increase 
economies of scale. Moreover, fierce competition among OEMs subsequently 
contributed to a sudden modernization of auto technology. Domestic auto companies 
have achieved greater product development capability and China has shifted from 
importing all manufacturing technology to developing some technology. New vehicle 
products have been developed jointly with foreign partners.1090 
4.6.2 Shortcomings 
While rapid industrialization was achieved with the help of foreign investments, the 
auto sector remains fragmented, as small-scale manufacturers are protected by local 
governments. Furthermore, China's original plan of developing its auto industry 
through trading market access for technology, has had limited results. State 
regulations could not provide domestic firms with technology know-how and 
independent design skills. In consequence, international competitiveness is still 
limited. 
4.6.2.1 Fragmentation of the auto market 
The policy framework for the sector aimed to develop the infant Chinese auto 
industry by protecting domestic auto producers through import barriers. 1091 In order 
for infant industry protection to work, it is important for governments to have reliable 
information about how large the protective tariffs should be, and over what period of 
time the tariff should be imposed. If governments set tariffs for too short a period, 
then firms may not learn enough to compete with the rest of the world once the tariffs 
are removed. If tariffs are imposed for too long a period to protect infant industries, 
then firms might not have incentives to improve efficiency. Protection may then 
dampen the competitive edge of domestic firms, either in terms of costs or pricing. It 
may also encourage new entry into the industry by domestic firms that aim to benefit 
from deterred competition and rents arising from high prices for locally produced 
vehicles. 1092 In consequence, the number of entrants expecting high returns on 
investments increases. Either of these developments could mean that the hoped-for 
improvements in competitiveness through learning and economies of scale do not 
materialize. Strong policy capacity and powerful institutions are necessary to 
implement countermeasures. While in a free market economy, effective competition 
encourages mergers and acquisitions, within the protected market, governments 
1090 Refer to Chinese Academy of Engineering and National Research Council (2003), pp. 12-13. 
1091 Refer to Zhang and Taylor (2001 ), p. 270 and Thun (2006), p. 291. 
1092 Berglas and Razin introduced the element of profits into the Stolper and Samuelson (1941) 
analysis of protection. They contend that in the short run, protection is likely to increase profits. 
For further information on protection and real profits refer to Berglas and Razin (1974). 
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have to encourage or directly organize mergers in an effort to concentrate rent in a 
few firms.1093 As experience from other emerging economies such as Korea and 
Thailand shows, policies to protect the domestic market must be combined with strict 
control of new entrants in order to promote the rapid growth of key firms in the 
industry.1094 
While the industrial policies for the auto sector have supported concentration of 
production in a few companies, consolidation of the sector has not proceeded, but 
more companies have entered the lucrative auto market. During the 1980s, local 
states assisted (state-run) firms to enter the auto business. They aimed to participate 
in the high profits of the auto market, resulting from high tariff barriers. While 56 
OEMs existed in 1980, 114 OEMs had entered the auto business by 1985.1095 
Although the state reiterates in its industrial policies for the auto sector the 
importance of a consolidated auto market, the number of auto manufacturers has 
been relatively stable throughout the last two decades (the number of OEMs only 
decreased from its high point of 124 OEMs in 1992/3 to 117 OEMs in 2005) (refer to 
Figure 32). Out of the 117 OEMs in 2005, 104 OEMs produced fewer than 100,000 
vehicles. 60 OEMs produced between 100 and 10,000 units and 22 OEMs even 
produced less than 100 vehicles (refer to Figure 33) which is far below the efficient 
level of production. 
Figure 32: Number of OEMs in the auto industry, 1980-2005. 








O ~-~~~~~~-~~~~~--~~~~~~-~~~-~ Year 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2006). 
1093 Reier to Huang (2002a), pp. 538-540. 
1094 For further information refer to Auty (1996), Wait! (1993) and Chaudhuri (1989). 
1095 In 1985, Japan only had 49 vehicle manufacturers. Reier to VOA (1990), "International Auto 
Statistics", p. 132. 
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Figure 33: Number of OEMs in the auto industry producing x units of vehicles, 2005. 
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China's protective import tariffs have fueled redundant investment in the auto sector. 
Moreover, central level agencies have been too weak to enforce competition within 
the protected domestic market and control of new entrants, due to its decentralized 
and fragmented administrative planning power. 1096 Provincial and local governments 
have tried to protect their indigenous auto sector, often bagiaining successfully for 
special permission that circumvents national regulations. 109 For the same reason, 
the central government has never ceased to reduce excess capacity, and never 
succeeded in eliminating it. 1098 Local protectionism also prevented mergers and 
acquisitions of domestic firms and resulted in the survival of spatially dispersed small 
indigenous assemblers. The numbers suggest that local governments protected even 
uncompetitive auto firms from insolvency and covered their operating losses with 
ongoing access to funds for unprofitable companies. Thus, employment and social 
stability could be ensured within the locality. 
Even after China's WTO accession and the lowering of tariffs, nontariff barriers and 
local protectionism of small scale auto companies have hindered the auto sector's 
consolidation process. In an attempt to cut the number of domestic producers, the 
government raised the minimum investment for a manufacturing plant to RMB 2 
billion in 2004. The threshold for auto investments was to be a disincentive for 
smaller private firms to enter the market. The introduction of new regulations to 
consolidate the market indicates that the state refuses to reduce intervention and 
1096 Producers of vehicle parts are as fragmented as vehicle manufacturers. Many world-class auto 
parts suppliers followed the MNCs to China: Delphi Auto Systems, Bosch, Valeo, Siemens, Dana, 
Allied Signal, Lucas Varity, United Technologies, ITT, TRW, Rockwell, Tenneco, Cooper etc. 
Suppliers invested in upstream and (or) downstream industries in order to supply complementary 
services. Refer to People's Daily (2004), "Problems linger in auto parts sector", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 06.10.2006. 
1097 Refer to Sit and Liu (2000), p. 663. 
1098 Refer to Noble (2006), "Overcapacity, Contract Design and the Emergence of Independent Auto 
Firms in China", Internet Edition, reviewed 01.08.2007. 
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strengthen market mechanisms, because domestic auto companies are still in an 
infant stage of development. If market principles expanded, non-competitive 
domestic companies would be replaced by an increase in imports and the local 
presence of foreign companies. Moreover, being linked to a broad range of industries 
such as parts, machine tools, steel and chemistry, the auto industry has a large 
impact on the national economy. The auto industry not only influences the 
production, but also the technology levels of the entire country. As long as local 
governments are able to eliminate competition within their jurisdiction, and the central 
government does not ease protection of the whole sector (non-tariff barriers, local 
content and equity regulations), consolidation of the market will proceed slowly. 
A fragmented industrial structure is costly. Auto plants are highly capital-intensive, 
and the high fixed costs mean that, for any given output level, a production structure 
with a few ~reducers is more capital-saving than one with numerous, independent 
producers.1 99 This is reflected by the amount of profit made by OEMs and suppliers 
in the auto industry. 1100 Out of 2,637 enterprises in the auto industry (OEMs and 
suppliers), the profit of 985 enterprises was less than RMB 0.1 million in 2005. Only 
80 enterprises were able to make more than RMB 100 million profit in the same year 
(refer to Figure 34). 
Figure 34: Number of OEMs and suppliers in the auto industry making x amount of 
profit, 2005. 
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Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2006). 
Compared with the Japanese auto market, too, the performance of the Chinese auto 
industry (as indicated by total revenue and total revenue per employee ratio) has 
been low. Between 2001 and 2004, the total revenue of the auto industry increased 
1099 Refer to Huang (2002a), p. 545. 
1100 As data for OEMs only is not available, the aggregate of OEMs' and suppliers' profit is taken into 
account. 
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from USO 51.4 billion to USO 110.0 billion. The total revenue of the auto industry in 
Japan, however, was four times that of China in 2004 (USO 442.1 billion). Although 
in China the total revenue of the auto industry per employee also increased in the 
period 2001-2004 (2001: USO 34,100, 2004: USO 64,900), the total revenue of the 
auto industry per employee was "only" USO 64,900 in China in 2004 - compared with 
Japan where it was nine times higher (USO 586,100) in the same year (refer to Table 
38). 
Table 38: Total revenue and total revenue per employee in the Chinese and 
Japanese auto industry, 2001-2004. 
Manufacture of motor vehicles Unit 2001 2002 2003 2004 and motor vehicle parts 
China 
Total revenue USO billion 51.4 71.8 98.4 110.0 
Total revenue per employee USO 1,000 34.1 45.7 61.3 64.9 
Ja1>11n 
Total revenue USO billion 332.7 344.8 388.7 442.1 
Total revenue per employee USO 1,000 462.3 475.0 521.3 586.1 
Source: VDA International Auto Statistics, various issues. Note: Data on China in RMB and on Japan 
in Yen were converted into USD using FERI exchange rates for each year. 
The sector is not competitive at an international level, as the comparison between 
China and Japan indicates. The Chinese auto sector is catching up quickly, however: 
between 2001 and 2004, the CAGR of total revenue per employee was 23.9 percent 
in China, and 8.2 percent in Japan.1101 
Overall, protectionism in China's auto industry has been inspired by Japan's and 
Korea's development pattern. The East Asian developmental states pursued import 
substitution policies, using high tariff rates to protect local auto manufacturers. In 
Korea, institutional centralization was used effectively to force firms to compete 
abroad, thus mitigating the anti-competitive character of certain aspects of import 
substitution policies.110 In this regard, institutional centralization may facilitate entry 
restriction and promote economies of scale in the presence of high rents. Unlike the 
institutional centralization in the East Asian developmental states, in China, 
resources are allocated by divided bureaucratic institutions. Policies and regulations 
1101 Calculation based on data from the VDA International Auto Statistics, various issues. 
1102 Export contests, in which bureaucracy allocates rents based on the export orders firms received, 
ensure that rent is assigned on the basis of objective and monitorable criteria, and of criteria that 
cannot be easily manipulated by policy-makers. However, there is an institutional context to 
administration of the export contests: export contests are more easily set up under a system in 
which the monitoring functions, and where the rent controls and disbursement are all lodged in 
one agency, as in the case of the Korean government in the 1970s and 1980s. Refer to Huang 
(2002a), p. 551. 
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for the auto industry are dispersed among several government agencies at the 
central and local level, making policy implementation harder to enforce.1103 
Fragmentation, miniaturization and low revenue per employee are a consequence of 
protectionism combined with weak central level institutions, and of short-termism -
the focus on short-term profits instead of, and often at the expense of, long-term 
development. 
4.6.2.2 Limited market share and technology know-how 
In China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan, which was published in November 2006, the 
government notes that monopolies of foreign businesses have emerged in certain 
industries because of inflowing foreign investments and that "independent innovation" 
of Chinese companies has to be strengthened. 1104 This is true for the domestic auto 
industry, which is dominated by foreign companies. Between 2000 and 2006, 
Chinese OEMs have only been able to increase their domestic market share by 3 
percentage points, and reached 22 percent market share in 2006. Foreign JVs still 
account for the majority of the auto market (refer to Figure 35). 





Source: Calculations based on data from Global Insight, Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Reports, 
December 2002 and April 2007. 
1103 The Chinese Ministry of Machinery Industry oversees the manufacturing aspects of the auto 
industry, but has no authority over the trade sector. Domestic trade of final auto products is 
regulated by the Ministry of Internal Trade. Foreign trade in auto products is similarly outside the 
power of the Ministry of Machinery Industry, and is subject to regulatory power and administrative 
restrictions imposed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations. Refer to Huang 
(2002a), p. 551. 
1104 Refer to NDRC (2006), "Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic & Social 
Development of the People's Republic of China", Chapter 7 and 9, Internet Edition, reviewed 
14.11.2006. 
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The passenger car market in particular is dominated by Sino-foreign JV companies. 
Of the eleven manufacturers that sold more than 200,000 passenger cars in 2006, 
eight were JVs (Shanghai-GM, SVW, FAW-VW, Beijing Hyundai, Guangzhou Honda, 
FAW-Toyota, Dongfeng-Nissan, Dongfeng Peugeot Citroen; total market share 53.4 
percent) and three were independent manufacturers (FAW, Chery, Geely 
Automotive; total market share: 18.4 percent) (refer to Table 39).1105 
The biggest state-owned automakers (SAIC, FAW and Dongfeng) all have foreign 
auto partners. SAIC together with its JV partners GM and VW, and FAW-VW sold 
more than 1 .1 million passenger cars in 2006, and had 26 percent of total passenger 
car market share in the same year. 1106 SAIC, although successful with its JV 
partners, has not yet been able to introduce self-branded models. The manufacturer 
has invested USD 1 . 7 billion in its attempt to have own-brand cars as it hopes to 
penetrate developed markets. In 2007, SAIC started mass production of its first own 
luxury model, Roewe 750.1107 SAIC has set a target to sell more than 200,000 
passenger cars a year under its own brand by 2010.1108 The model is based on the 
design of the Rover 75 sedan, which the company purchased from UK's now-defunct 
MG Rover Group Ltd. 1109 FAW is also producing on a large scale together with its JV 
partner VW.1110 Independent manufacturer FAW sold more than 300,000 vehicles in 
total in 2006 (market share: 7.7 percent). Of the 343,000 cars produced, only 4,562 
vehicles, however, were of its own car brand Red Flag, but 47,265 Mazda 6 and 
164,792 Daihatsu C_harade sedan cars.1111 
Particularly noticeable is the dynamic development of independent local Chinese 
auto manufacturers. The biggest independent producers are Chery and Geely.1112 
Chery has little government ownership, and Geely is privately-owned. Chery and 
Geely have market shares of 6 percent and 5 percent respectively, and sales 
volumes of more than 200,000 passenger cars in 2006 (refer to Table 39). Neither 
has ever ventured with any foreign partner.1113 They sell own-brand cars and have 
1105 Independent manufacturers are the ones that operate without a foreign partner. 
1106 Shanghai-GM sold about 450,000 passenger cars and SVW and FAW-VW sold almost 350,000 
passenger cars each. 
1107 Global Insight expects that SAIC will produce about 11,000 cars of its own Roewe brand in 2007. 
Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 145. 
1108 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 140 and 
J.D. Power (2007), Global Truck and Car Forecast, Second Quarter 2007, p. 297. 
1109 Other Roewe vehicles will follow: the next one being the W2, based on the smaller Rover 25. 
111° FAW-VW sold 345,300 passenger cars in 2006 (market share: 7.9 percent). Refer to Table 39. 
1111 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, September 2007, p. 
149. 
1112 China Brillance and Harbin Hafei only had sales volumes of 73,100 and 65,400 passenger cars in 
2006, respectively. 
1113 Chery, based in Anhui province, transformed itself from an auto parts company into a car 
manufacturer. Geely, based in the south-eastern province of Zhejiang, was originally a motorcycle 
company. The expansion of the auto market provided various motorcycle companies with new 
business opportunities. Its experience of producing motorcycles was an advantage in making this 
transition. 
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major expansion plans.1114 They produce small, cheap cars and have about 50 
percent of this segment's market share. Independence does not necessarily mean 
isolation, however. Private companies are similarly integrated into guanxi networks, 
which incorporate companies, organizations and institutions. Moreover, they often 
enjoy the same support from local political authorities as state-run firms, because 
they are prime drivers of many local economies. 1115 
Table 39: Passenger car sales by manufacturer, 2006. 1116 
Sa lea of pa-nger cars Market Share 
(1,000 unl18) (%) 
Shanghai-GM 446.9 10.3 
svw 349.1 8.0 
FAW-VW 345.3 7.9 
FAW 333.8 7.7 
Bei'ina Hvundai 290.0 6.7 
Cherv 280.9 6.0 
Guangzhou Honda 260.1 6.0 
FAW-Tovota 219.2 5.0 
Dongfeng-Nissan 211.3 4.9 
Geelv Automotive 204.3 4.7 
Dongfena Peuaeot Citroen 201.3 4.6 
Changan Ford 135.6 3.1 
Donofeng Yueda Kia 115.0 2.6 
Chanaan Suzuki 112.1 2.6 
China Brlllance 73.1 1.7 
Harbin Hafel 65.4 1.5 
Dongfeno Honda 63.4 1.5 
Other 791.9 18.2 
Total 4,349.9 
Source: Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 32. Note: 
Passenger car sales now include all multi-purpose vehicles and all sports-utility vehicles. Others 
include CBU imports. Chery sales exclude exports. Due to rounding errors, percentage numbers add 
up to 1 03 percent. 
While no satisfactory evidence can be provided, one can conclude from the market 
shares and sales of Chinese passenger car manufacturers, that without brands and 
independent product technologies, the Chinese partners of the JVs lost their 
independence. They have few self-developed products. Domestic manufacturers' 
1114 In 2006, Chery sold 132,326 cars of its QQ model. Geely announced that it hoped to increase 
output to 750,000 units annually by 2010, half of which would be exported. Refer to Global Insight 
(2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 142 and Economist Intelligence 
Unit (2007), "China: Automotive Profile", Internet Edition, 14.01.2007, reviewed 15.07.2007. 
1115 Refer to Noble (2006), "Overcapacity, Contract Design and the Emergence of Independent Auto 
Firms in China", Internet Edition, reviewed 01.08.2007. 
1116 Domestic companies without foreign JV partner are marked bold. 
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prospects of producing their own-brand cars have been stifled by the dependence of 
their partners' technology and brand reputation. 1117 
Limiting the maximum equity stakes of the foreign partner in share holding 
companies does not achieve the objective of management control and technology 
enhancement set by the central authorities. These results are in line with Mansfield 
and Romeo (1980). They contend that parent firms transfer technology to wholly-
owned subsidiaries in developing countries one third faster, on average, than to JVs 
or licensees. 1118 Technology transfer is thus relatively limited under the pattern of JV. 
Nearly all foreign investors have tremendous influence on the operation of JVs, even 
though they only have minority equity shares. The foreign JV partner usually controls 
important management activities such as sales, purchasing and finances, as well as 
technology transfer, production control, and quality control. The spill-over effect is so 
far limited to the achievement of mastering production techniques and imitating 
designs. Foreign firms have fought for the protection of their key technologies, and 
have mostly relocated the manufacturing of simple products.1119 
Yet it is questionable, how successfully foreign manufacturers can protect their core 
technology. The past years have seen a sharp increase in IPR disputes in China's 
auto industry between domestic and foreign manufacturers. The following two 
examples illustrate some of the legal issues involved: 
• Toyota versus Geely for trademark infringement and unfair competition: At the 
end of 2002, Toyota filed a lawsuit against Geely for trademark infringement 
and unfair competition. Geely used terms such as "Toyota's power" and 
"equipped with Toyota engines" for sales promotion, because Geely's engines 
are manufactured by a third party with Toyota's authorization. Geely was 
China's first domestic car manufacturer to be sued for IPR infringement. The 
court did not sustain the claims raised by Toyota. Through the lawsuit, 
however, Toyota succeeded in distinguishing its trademark from Geely's 
trademark through media coverage. 
• GM versus Chery for unfair competition: In June 2003, GM's accusation was 
that Chery's QQ model was a copy of GM's Spark (known as Matiz in Korea), 
a model manufactured by GM's Korean subsidiary GM Daewoo. In 2004, the 
State Intellectual Property Office stated that, as GM Daewoo did not file for 
patents for its designs, these designs were not protected in China. In 
November 2005, the parties reached a settlement. GM Daewoo was not able 
to sue and win, because it did not have patents for its designs in China.1120 
1117 This conclusion is in line with Gallagher's research results. For further information refer to 
Gallagher (n.d.), p. 2, Internet Edition, reviewed 25.04.2007. 
1118 For further information refer to Mansfield and Romeo ( 1980). 
1119 Refer to Wang (2001), p.11 ff. 
1120 Refer to Ministry of Commerce (2006), "IPR disputes in China's automobile industry", Internet 
Edition, reviewed 23.07.2007. 
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While China's effort to address IPR problems must be recognized, IPR infringements 
remain widespread. Recent news on cyber-spies in German, British and US 
government institutions suggest that hackers have also infiltrated thousands of 
company computers with Trojan horses to acquire technology know-how. 1121 The 
TRIPS Agreement requires China to implement effective enforcement procedures, 
and to provide civil and criminal remedies that have a deterrent effect. However, IPR 
enforcement is weak (particularly at the local level) due to lack of coordination 
between Chinese government ministries and agencies, local protectionism and 
corruption, high thresholds for criminal prosecution, and weak punishments. 
In a reforming socialist economy like China, as in any other complex modern 
economy, the main progress of technical generation and innovation is the enterprise, 
in which in-firm or externally-generated new knowledge is applied to market-oriented 
production, and eventually commercialized. 1122 Indeed, Chinese auto manufacturers 
have started to set up their own R&D facilities. However, China's leading passenger 
car producer, SAIC, did not set up its first own R&D center before 2002, despite 
revenues of RMB 120 billion that year (and despite mass-producing with its JV 
partners since 1984).1123 
The long-term development of the industry is farticularly harmed by insufficient R&D 
investment by domestic auto companies. 11 4 The expenditure of Chinese auto 
companies on R&D usually accounts for less than 1 percent of their sales volume, 
whereas the amount is between 3-5 percent for foreign auto companies.1125 While 
GM invests USO 5-6 billion in R&D every year, the total development budget of the 
domestic auto industry is USD 0.27 billion.1126 In addition, the industry has been 
suffering from a severe shortage of R&D personnel. The R&D staff of FAW accounts 
for 2.6 percent of the total staff number. This is small compared to Toyota, where 9.8 
percent of the total staff are R&D. 1127 Out of ten independent Chinese passenger car 
manufacturers, with an investment of 6.8 percent of total sales revenues in R&D, 
1121 Refer to Spiegel (2007), "Prinzip Sandkorn", p. 18 ff. 
1122 Refer to Gabriele (2001 ), p. 23, Internet Edition, reviewed 01.05.2007. 
1123 A SAIC spokesperson said that the establishment of the Automotive Engineering Academy of 
SAIC signified the beginning of China's efforts to develop auto technology independently. Refer to 
People's Daily (2002): "China's Leading Car Producer Sets up R&D Center", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 03.09.2007. 
1124 Kokko and Blomstrom contend that the negative relationship between technology transfer 
requirements and technology inflows result from the deficiency of local content policy and 
accompanying protectionist measures. The combination of high domestic content requirements 
and the protected Chinese auto has reduced competition between domestic and foreign suppliers. 
In consequence, both domestic suppliers and carmakers might have less incentive to update their 
technology and continuously adjust their operations and technologies to changing market 
conditions. For further information refer to Kokko and Blomstrom (1995). 
1125 Refer to Beijing Review (2006), "Growing Pains or Growing Gains?", Internet Edition, reviewed 
16.07.2007. 
1126 Refer to Beijing Review (2006), "Getting out of first gear", Internet Edition, reviewed 08.08.2006. 
1127 Ibidem. Note: Calculation based on recent FERI exchange rates. 
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Chery invested the largest share of revenue to expand its R&D capabilities (Hafei 
Auto: 2.9 percent, Geely: 0.6 percent and Great Wall: 0.8 percent) (refer to Table 
40).1128 
Table 40: Key figures of independent passenger car manufacturers, 2004. 
Amount Chorv Auto ONIYAulo HalelAulo Great Wall Motor 
Net5alas RMB million 5110.7 3 425.4 6,101.6 3 408.2 
EXDOrt Value USO million 31.0 22.3 35.3 23.9 
Number of emclo- Persons 7 441 7 760 5 047 2 620 
Number of R&D Enalneers Persons 728 180 217 326 
R&DEvnanNS RMB million 348.16 20 177.74 27.64 
R&D ExpenNS/Net SIies Ratio Percent 6.8 0.6 2.9 0.8 
Source: FOURIN (2006), p. 9. 
The World Bank sample indicates that joint research with government institutions is 
less pronounced in the auto sector than in the electronics sector. While 9.9 percent 
(n=39) of the companies in the electronics sector had a contractual or long-standing 
relationship with government institutions to perform R&D, only 5.2 percent (n=11) of 
the auto sector had such a relationship with a state institute in 2000. The difference is 
significant (Pearson Chi-Square: 0.041, 2-sided) (refer Table 41, Table 42). The R&D 
requirements on foreign investors have had a negative impact on the government's 
effort to provide financing for state-run R&D institutes. 
Table 41: Descriptive Statistics: Contractual or long-standing relationship with a 
government research institution to perform R&D for the plant in the auto 
sector and in the electronics sector, 2000. 
Government research 
institution 
Yes No Total 
uroup_autosec_ Auto sec t..ount 11 202 213 
electronicssec % within Group_autosec_ 
electronicssec 5,2% 94,8% 100,0% 
Electronics sec Count 39 353 392 
% within Group_autosec_ 
9,9% 90,1% 100,0"/o electronicssec 
Tolal Counl so 555 605 
% within Group_autosec_ 8,3% 91,7% 100,0% electronicssec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
1128 Among the ten independent car manufacturers considered here are furthermore Tianjin FAW 
Xiali, Chang'an Auto, Brillance Jinbei, BYD Auto, Utan Auto and Beiqi Foton. 
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Table 42: Chi-Square Test: Contractual or long-standing relationship with a 
government research institution to perform R&D for the plant in the auto 
sector and in the electronics sector, 2000. 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided\ 
t"'earson vhi-::square 4,167" 1 ,041 
Continuity Correction a 3,560 1 ,059 
Likelihood Ratio 4,468 1 ,035 
Fisher's Exact Test 
Li near-by-Linear 
4,160 1 ,041 Association 
N of Valid Cases 605 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. O cells {,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
17,60. 
Exact Sig. Exact Sig. 
12-sided\ (1-sided\ 
,045 ,027 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Industrial collaboration and horizontal networking are also uncommon in China. In the 
National Industrial Statistics of the 2000 R&D Census, Chinese industrial firms 
reported that they spent 93 percent of their USO 2.7 billion total R&D outlay in-house, 
but only less than 1 percent on projects with other domestic firms. 1129 The 2001 
World Bank sample shows that 3.8 percent (n=8) of the auto companies and 5.3 
percent of the companies of the residual sectors (n=67) had long-standing joint R&D 
programs with private companies (refer to Table 43). There is no significant 
difference between the auto sector and the residual sectors. The numbers suggest 
that few Chinese firms develop alliances with, or invest in, companies in other 
provinces due to strong political ties to their local state officials. In consequence, 
firms and localities are "isolated" from the rest of the economy. 
Altogether, domestic auto companies are still depend on foreign OEMs' technology 
and brands. The foreign JV partners have granted SOEs only marginal insight into 
core technologies. It remains debatable how much help Chinese auto manufacturers 
will receive from their foreign partners in terms of developing their own brands, as 
this could turn partners into competitors. Accordingly, the domestic partners have 
made little progress in transferring technology and design know-how from their JV 
operations to (their wholly-owned) non-JV operations. The dynamic, autonomous 
develoriment has rather come from independent local firms such as Chery and 
Geely. 130 Realizing that JVs may not be the best way for Chinese auto makers to 
1129 China's research institutes are increasingly insular, too, especially since market reforms have 
forced them to commercialize their operations. In 2000, only 38 of China's 292 national industrial 
research institutes devoted more than one-third of total activities to collaborative projects, even 
though these institutes are specifically tasked with diffusing technology. Refer to Gilboy (2004), 
"The Myth Behind China's Miracle", Internet Edition, reviewed 16.10.2006. 
1130 Refer to Noble (2006), "Overcapacity, Contract Design and the Emergence of Independent Auto 
Firms in China", Internet Edition, reviewed 01.08.2007. 
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develop their product-development capability, the Chinese government is revisiting 
its policy, and calling for more self-developed products and self-owned technology. 
The government has urged the largest state-owned OEMs to establish internally-
driven product development. However, it will certainly take time until domestic OEMs 
are able to fully develop their own products, rather than imitate the products of 
MNCs. 
Table 43: Descriptive Statistics: Contractual or long-standing relationship with private 
companies to perform R&D in the auto sector and in the residual sectors, 
2000. 
Private comaanies 
Yes No Total 
uroup _au tosec _ressec Auto sec tiount 8 205 213 
% within Group_ 
3,8% 96,2% 100,0% aulosec rassec 
Residual sec Count 67 1208 1275 
% within Group_ 
5,3% 94,7% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Total Count 75 1413 1488 
% within Group_ 
5,0% 95,0% 100,0% autosec_ressec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
4.6.2.3 International competitiveness 
Neither foreign OEMs nor Chinese auto manufacturers export on a large scale. Given 
the size of the domestic market, foreign producers focus on domestic sales; and 
Chinese auto manufacturers cannot yet meet international production and design 
standards. 
The managers of German auto companies interviewed explained that, despite 
government export promotion measures, such as tax reliefs or majority ownership, 
foreign car manufacturers in China largely engage in marginal export activity with 
their JV partners, but rather focus on sales in the growing domestic market.1131 
DaimlerChrysler, VW, Bosch and ZF Friedrichshafen produce domestically solely for 
the Chinese market. The low quality of parts available in China, and business risks 
such as the high cost structure due to tariffs and nontariff barriers, unfavorable 
regulatory framework, insecure IPRs etc. discourage foreign OEMs and suppliers 
from exporting. In consequence, foreign auto OEMs still focus on the domestic 
market rather than on export from China. According to the foreign interviewees, 
OEMs suffer from overcapacity in the Chinese market, which pressures foreign 
1131 Interviews conducted with managers of OEMs in Beijing between 08.06.2006 and 14.06.2006. 
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OEMs to export in the mid- to long-run.1132 Exports will only increase when MNCs 
make China the global production hub for selected models. This is unlikely to happen 
in the current policy environment. Foreign OEMs and suppliers might export from 
China in the future, in order to improve their cost structures, and encounter 
increasing overcapacity in the Chinese market by using China as a low cost 
production base - not because of government export promotion incentives, such as 
loans from the Export-Import Bank, tax exemptions or majority ownership.1133 
The Chinese SOEs that have a foreign JV partner are not equipped to become 
international global players, although they are the backbone of the auto industry 
policy and are promoted by the state. FAW exported 13,903 units in 2005.1134 SAIC is 
still focussing on establishing itself in China, and consequently a major push in export 
markets is unlikely in the medium term. Most passenger car exporters are domestic 
manufacturers (refer to Figure 36), who produce small cars they sell for less than 
USD 10,000 (average price of exported cars from China in 2006: USD 7,400)1135• 
Among the top ten exporters are Chery, which exported 51,638 units, and Gealy, 
which exported 9,171 units. Both manufacturers started their exports soon after their 
first product launch in order to meet the challenge of competition and overcapacity in 
the domestic market.1136 Chery and Gealy proactively follow the path towards 
international competitiveness, and are looking to expand in export markets. 









Chery Harbin Great Wall Honda Changan FAW Jiangling Anhui Changhe Geety 
Halei Jianghuai 
Source: Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 57. Note: 
Data for FAW based on 2005 figure. 
1132 Interview conducted with a manager of a German OEM in Beijing on 09.06.2006. 
1133 In the near term, the main thrust of auto exports will be in the area of components, engines and 
transmissions. However, exports of built-up vehicles will grow more gradually. 
11 :i. Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, pp. 57-59. 
1135 Ibidem, p. 57. 
1136 Chery exported its first vehicles to Syria in October 2001; Gealy started exporting in November 
2003. 
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Moreover, car export volumes are low, because domestic companies cannot meet 
international production costs yet. First, total production costs in China are not 
competitive, due to high import tariffs on auto parts. Mostly due to quality reasons, 
about 70 f;ercent of passenger car manufacturing equipment in China is still 
imported.11 7 Second, as the state aimed to attract foreign companies to invest in 
China, it granted foreign OEMs tax exemptions which at the same time put domestic 
auto manufacturers at a disadvantage.1138 High tax rates reduced domestic auto 
manufacturers' international price competitiveness. Unlike domestic enterprises, 
foreign-owned enterprises were exempted from urban construction tax, regional and 
additional education tax, property tax, land-use tax and water conservancy fund. 
Moreover, foreign-owned enterprises enjoyed a reduced income tax rate of 15-25 
percent, while the income tax rate for a domestic enterprise such as Chery was 33 
percent in 2005 (refer to Table 44). Income tax from domestic enterprises accounted 
for more than 17 percent of the total income tax collected in China in 2006 -
compared with 4 percent from foreign invested enterprises. In order to establish a 
level playing field for foreign and domestic enterprises, the National People's 
Congress has passed a new Enterprise Income Tax Law which sets the income tax 
rate for domestic and foreign companies at 25 percent from January 2008 (refer to 
Chapter 3.3.5.4).1139 
Table 44: Tax rates of Chery Automobile Co., Ltd. and foreign-owned companies, 
2005. 
Items Chery Automobile Co., Ltd. Foreign-owned companies 
Urban construction tax (value-added tax + consumction tax + business tax) x 7% None 
Additional education tax lvalue-added tax + consumotion tax + business taxl x 3% None 
Prona.tvtax 12% None 
Land-use tax RMB 0.5 / sauare meter None 
Recional education tax tvalue-added tax+ consumotion tax + business tax) x 1 % None 
Water conservancv fund sales revenue x 0.0006 None or less 
Income tax 33% 15-25% 
Source: China Auto (2006), December 2006, p. 12. 
Global Insight (2007) reports that in 2006, around 1,175 manufacturers exported 
vehicles from China. However, over 669 of these exported fewer than 10 units, and 
204 companies exported just 1 unit.1140 The exporting domestic auto manufacturers 
mainly sell their cars to developing countries, for the most part to the Middle East and 
Africa. Of the vehicles that FAW exported in 2005, 21 percent were passenger cars 
1137 For example, over 80 percent of the robots used in auto production lines are imported. Refer to 
China Business Press, "China's dependence on imported manufacturing equipment up to 70%", 
reported in CANO (2007a}, p. 5. 
1138 Interviews conducted with experts of a Chinese government institution in Beijing on 13.06.2006. 
1139 Refer to Asia Times Online (2007), "Taxing times for China's foreign firms", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 12.10.2007. 
11 • 0 Ibidem. 
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exported to Syria, and 10 percent were trucks exported to North Korea. 1141 Domestic 
auto companies cannot yet fulfil the international safety and emission standards of 
developed countries. According to the J.D. Power Initial Quality Study - which 
measures product quality, using a metric called "PP100"1142 or problems per 100 
vehicles - China's industry average PP100 rating stands at 231, or almost twice the 
US average of 124. With domestic Chinese brands, quality problems are almost 
twice as frequent as with locally-built international brands (an average of 368 PP100 
for domestic brands, compared with 189 for international brands). These gaps are 
particularly significant in such critical components as powertrain, driving experience, 
and handling - areas that require heavy investment in R&D and production 
management systems. However, in 2000, when J.D. Power first started measuring 
initial quality in China, domestic brands reported more than 800 PP100, on average, 
and international or JV brands showed more than 400. In the past six years, the 
quality of cars has increased, resulting in a more than 50 percent reduction in quality 
defects for both domestic and international brands.1143 Recent landmark examples 
have, however, reinforced consumer doubt about potential design and quality issues 
with Chinese cars. The Jiangling Motors Group envisioned exporting its Landwind 
model to Europe. However, it had to stop exporting when the German ADAC rated 
the Chinese-made sBorts-utility vehicle as "not meeting European safety standards" 
in September 2005.1 44 The Landwind crash test delivered the worst result ever in the 
history of ADAC crash testing. The Brilliance BS6 also failed the German crash test 
in June 2007. The BS6 sedan won only one out of five possible stars in the crash test 
carried out in accordance with European New Car Assessment regulations. 1145 
In order to accelerate international competitiveness and overseas expansion, 
Chinese OEMs have taken different approaches. Some Chinese OEMs have 
recruited functional experts from MNCs experienced in international markets: 
• Chery employed a former DaimlerChrysler executive as its international 
business division head, and a former Ford Motor manager to lead its 
engineering institute. Moreover, the former director of the Production 
Optimization Technology Department of VW (China) Investment Co. has 
assumed the position of Vice General Manager at Chery.1146 
1141 Refer to Global Insight (2007), Asian Automotive Industry Forecast Report, April 2007, p. 59. 
1142 The smaller the rating of PP100 the better the quality of the car. 
1143 Refer to Businessweek (2007), "The Quality Drag on China's Car Industry", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 18.07.2007. 
11"" Refer to ADAC (2005), "Das erste chinesische Auto im ADAC-Crashtest", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 13.09.2006. 
1145 Most European-made cars win four or five stars in the crash test, so the result is not encouraging 
for the BS6, which aimed to compete against the likes of the VW Passat and Audi A6 when it was 
launched at the Geneva Motor Show in March 2007. Refer to Spiegel Online (2007), "Brilliance 
versagt im Crashtest", Internet Edition, reviewed 03.09.2007. 
1146 Refer to CAND (2007b), pp. 6-7. 
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• Geely hired a former Daewoo engineer to lead product development.1147 
• SAIC hired more than 150 British engineers. 
• Brilliance hired a former DaimlerChrysler executive to head its R&D center 
and focus on building its own indigenous car models.1148 
Chinese OEMs have also used global mergers and acquisitions to enter foreign auto 
markets. SAIC acquired Ssangyong to gain access to the Korean auto market.1149 
Chinese auto manufacturers, moreover, enter into cooperation with foreign auto 
producers, to use their expertise and sales and distribution networks to enter global 
auto markets. Chery is to produce small-cars for Chrysler. These low-cost cars under 
Chrysler brand names (Dodge and Jeep) will be exported to the USA and Europe 
starting in 2009.1150 Some of the Chinese OEMs are negotiating JVs with local 
partners to assemble pre-made CKD kits in developing markets such as Malaysia or 
lran.1151 Other manufacturers are hiring agents to establish networks for penetrating 
export markets. As more Chinese OEMs go international, management will become 
more experienced. This trend will be accelerated by the influx of returning talent from 
the sizable pool of Chinese working abroad.1152 
Overall, the promotion of exports by internationally competitive local Chinese 
producers has not advanced in the way expected by central leaders. Overseas 
expansion by domestic and foreign OEMs is still quite limited. Although the Chinese 
government announced that it would promote exports of motor vehicles, its policy 
focus has been import substitution. However, in the coming years, autos "made in 
China" by Chinese and foreign manufacturers will increasingly be oriented towards 
exports due to rising overcapacities. While the government pushes for more exports 
and overseas expansion in the near term, most OEMs consider that exporting from 
China is more of a long-term objective. 
1147 Reier to Sun (2006), p. 40. 
1148 Reier to Businessweek (2006), "China's Drive for Local Car Brands", Internet Edition, reviewed 
08.08.2007 and Businessweek {2006), "China Carmakers' Global Talent Hunt", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 08.08.2007. 
1149 Refer to Sun (2006), p. 40. 
1150 Refer to International Herald Tribune (2007), "Chrysler deal to help Chery enter US market", p. 14. 
1151 Since 2005, Chery has produced its QQ in Iran and announced plans to assemble sedans and 
sports-utility vehicles in Kaliningrad, Russia. Geely also plans to start building its Free Cruiser in 
Malaysia, and is plans to set-up factories in Russia and Mexico to eventually supply cars to 
Western Europe and the USA. Refer to Businessweek (2006), "China's Drive for Local Car 
Brands", Internet Edition, reviewed 08.08.2007. 
1152 Refer to Sun (2006), p. 40. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
Modelled on Korea's and Japan's industrial development, central leaders want to 
build up China's auto industry. The state has played an important role in the 
development of the auto industry in the transition period from a planned to a socialist 
market economy. As in the East Asian developmental states, China's industrial policy 
documents for the auto industry have set concrete goals and strategies for 
stimulating the growth of the industry, and focused on developing internationally 
competitive domestic companies. 
At the core of the East Asian developmental state concept was the idea that the state 
could help firms overcome the obstacles of late development. The question is 
whether China's development strategy for the auto sector has succeeded in building 
up strong Chinese firms. Chinese policy-makers have used various instruments of 
industrial policy to reach this target: regulation of trade, attraction and control of 
foreign investment, subsidies and credit quotas issued by the state-controlled 
financial system etc. The World Bank sample "Competitiveness, Technology and 
Firm Linkages in Manufacturing Sectors" (2001) indicates that the electronics sector 
has received less government attention than the auto sector although the central 
government declared both to be pillar industries in 1994. China has a strong 
comparative advantage in electronics assembly (high value parts manufactured at 
low labor costs) so that the government does not fear abandonment or 
marginalization. In this sense, as the empirical analysis revealed, auto companies 
received more bank loans and more government assistance in locating foreign 
technology and processes to license from foreign firms. This resembles the East 
Asian developmental state approach of granting preferential policies, particularly to 
industries and companies in need of state support. 
Even after China's WTO accession, government intervention and regulation has 
been central to the development of the auto sector. The government's policy for the 
auto sector has managed to prevent domestic manufacturers from being crowded out 
by large MNCs, which have been competing for market share since the 1990s. The 
MNCs have been willing to venture with domestic manufacturers, produce in large 
scale, source locally, introduce their latest products to the market, invest in R&D 
facilities, and spur the development of the domestic auto industry. Chinese 
companies have gained production know-how from foreign JV partners, and began to 
gain expertise in R&D and design after the introduction of the latest regulations on 
foreign investors. The sector's growth has, moreover, provided new jobs and 
contributed to overall economic growth. 
Despite the size of the auto market and intensive government support in developing 
domestic state-owned auto firms, the Chinese auto industry remains in the infancy 
stage of development. 1153 The domestic auto market is fragmented, and domestic 
manufacturers' technical skills are not yet fully developed - they are still dependent 
on their foreign partners for advanced technology. While evidence is limited, from the 
1153 For further information on five successive stages of development in the auto sector refer to 
Abrenica (1998), pp. 13-14. 
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analysis one can conclude that regulation of FDI for the benefit of state-owned auto 
manufacturers has reduced the incentive for indigenous Chinese technological 
innovation. Moreover, Chinese products face challenges in meeting international 
standards. In consequence, domestic auto manufacturers have failed to export on a 
large scale so far. 
It is too early, however, to be pessimistic about the central government's policy to 
develop its domestic auto industry. The major players of the Chinese auto industry 
(FAW, SAIC and Dongfeng) have large-scale J::roduction volumes and are seeking for 
independent brands and export expansion. 11 4 It took Japanese and Korean OEMs, 
such as Toyota and Hyundai, almost 30 years to build up and optimize their product-
development process to the point of launching self-developed products onto the 
global market. Given their current status, it might similarly take Chinese OEMs 
another 10 to 15 years before they can fully master the product development skills 
required to compete in European, US or Japanese markets.1155 
To sum up, the Chinese state has not been able to implement and enforce a 
consistent strategy for the ac~uisition of technological capabilities from foreign 
investors in the auto industry. 115 Besides, local authorities have a strong position in 
local economic policy-making. They own most of the Chinese auto companies, and 
have successfully resisted central-government intervention and regulation. 1157 State 
ownership in the auto sector, and government interference in business activities, has 
enabled ruling elites to convert their political feower into economic wealth and 
privilege at the expense of equity and efficiency. 11 8 
1154 It is though also premature to believe that Chinese OEMs are strong enough to challenge the 
major global OEMs today. 
1155 It might take "only" four to five years more for Chinese OEMs to increase their export volume from 
levels of thousands of units annually to hundred thousands of units that would justify a fully 
functioning global network. It might then take another five to seven years for those local OEMs to 
fully master the new product development know-how to launch new products into mainstream 
markets. 
1156 With the 1994 auto industry policy, an attempt was made by the Chinese government to articulate 
such a strategy, but the government had to gradually reverse its policies in the aftermath of WTO 
accession. For further information on how the Korean auto industry progresses technologically, 
refer to Amsden (1989b) and Lee and Lim (2001 ). 
' 157 Refer to Gallagher (2006), p. 24. 
1158 Refer to Pei (2006c), "The Dark Side of China·s Rise", Internet Edition, reviewed 04.11.2007. 
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5 Evaluation and lessons from China's model of economic development 
China's capability to leapfrog up the developmental hierarchy in its economic growth 
and industrial development since 1978 has been the central interest of this analysis. 
While previous studies analyzed different aspects of China's development approach 
with regard to the East Asian developmental state theory, this study "translated" the 
experiences of the three East Asian developmental states Japan, Taiwan and Korea 
into specific criteria (institutional setting and policy indicators) for successful 
economic transformation. An East Asian Developmental State Model was set up and 
used as a role model to systematically analyze China's development. The analysis, 
moreover, concentrated on the effectiveness of China's model of economic 
development, using the auto industry as a basis for empirical research. From the 
mixed-methods approach (analysis of secondary statistics, statistical evaluation of 
the World Bank sample and up-to-date expert interviews) new insights into state-
guidance in one of China's key sectors could be gained. From the results one can 
infer that Chinese auto manufacturers have benefited from the government's policy 
for the sector. However, continuous policy and government intervention in business 
activities, e.g. by state-ownership, local protectionism and strict requirements on 
foreign investors, has restricted competition and the sector's full development 
potential. 
5.1 China - the new developmental state 
The analysis of China's economic development rests upon the political economy 
approach of the developmental state theory, which is one of the most persuasive 
attempts to explain East Asian success. The developmental state model is based on 
continuous but selective state interventions in markets and firms to shape the course 
of economic development. The authoritarian developmental states' industrial 
guidance has enabled these late-industrializing economies to mount and sustain high 
levels of economic growth. The analysis confirmed that during the post-Mao 
economic reforms, China has evolved into a transforming state similar in most of its 
core characteristics to the East Asian developmental states: 
• Like the East Asian developmental states, China's central leaders undertook 
economic reforms prior to political reforms and have retained the authority to 
crush dissent. Bureaucratic reforms facilitated better educated leaders 
supportive of economic reforms. 
• From the beginning of its reform, China has strived to achieve economic 
growth and industrial transformation by a strong involvement of the 
government. 1159 The Chinese developmental state has followed the East Asian 
government-led development model in which industrial policy plays a central 
role in directing economic development. The central government has issued 
national industrial policies in the form of five-year and annual plans based on a 
1159 Refer to Nee (1992), pp. 24-25. 
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comprehensive long-term strategy. The elite bureaucracy in China, like that in 
the East Asian developmental states, has actively intervened in the economy 
by guiding, disciplining and coordinating the market in order to achieve its 
economic development goals. Despite the WTO principle of "national 
treatment", no level playing field for all economic subjects exists in China. As a 
result, the allocation of resources and therefore the industrial structures 
created are to a considerable extent not the outcome of market processes but 
rather the central government's industrial design.1160 The analysis showed that 
the Chinese developmental state has continuously modified its policies in a 
creative and innovative manner, in accordance with the prevailing 
development strategy as well as the changing domestic and international 
environment.1161 In this way, one strength of the Chinese model is its constant 
adaptation. 
• Like their East Asian counterparts, central leaders in China have used 
different industrial policy mechanisms (selected protection of, and preferential 
treatment for, specific "sunrise" industries, such as tax reliefs and credits at 
low interest rates) as well as trade policy (import substitution and export 
promotion) to develop the national economy. Policy support has consisted of 
the selective adoption of regulations in accordance with the appropriate pace 
and pattern of the transition towards a market economy. 
• As in the East Asian developmental states, Chinese enterprises have been 
supported by the government's "national champions" policy. Enterprises such 
as Lenovo have already reached a developmental stage where they are 
competitive in the global markets. 
• The Chinese state has constructed a positive economic and investment 
climate through the gradual liberalization of product and labor markets, 
increasing openness to foreign trade, infrastructure investments, property 
reforms and privatization. Its institutional reforms have provided economic 
agents with security for planning, investing and economic risk taking. The 
state has had the capacity to construct an institutional environment that 
provides positive incentives to entrepreneurs and managers at the firm level to 
invest in economic growth.1162 
Therefore, China's economic performance since 1978 can be attributed to the 
adoption of the development strategies previously implemented by Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan. The analysis of China's economic development, using the East Asian 
Developmental State Model as a role model, confirms that China's path of 
development makes it the latest member of the group of successful developmental 
1160 Refer to Taube (2005), pp. 5-6. 
1161 This has been the case, in particular, in the run-up to, and in the aftermath of, its accession to the 
WTO. Refer to UNCTAD, "Key Issues in China's Economic Transformation", Internet Edition, 
reviewed 12.02.2007. 
1162 Refer to Nee et al. (2007), p. 43. 
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states. This assertion is in line with previous works on China such as Nee (1992), 
Nee et al. f2005), Wu (2000), and Stiglitz (2002). 1163 This study in consequence 
reinforces their results by using a different research approach. Although the analysis 
proved that the Chinese reform experiment shares core characteristics with the 
developmental states in East Asia, one should not conclude from this that China is 
following a coherent strategy of emulating the East Asian Developmental State 
Model. 
5.2 Uniqueness of the Chinese development approach 
The analysis of the Chinese developmental state's approach towards restructuring its 
domestic industry, specifically the auto industry, exemplifies the uniqueness of the 
Chinese developmental state. The nation's distinct path of development is 
characterized by an innovative form of state-led growth. China's economic 
achievements over the past two decades have made its development experiences 
special in many ways. 
Unlike the East Asian Developmental State Model, the Chinese developmental state 
pursues an economic development path characterized by decentralization and 
foreign investment. China has successfully incorporated both criteria in its 
development strategy, in order to spur local entrepreneurship and advance to 
international technology standards. Both characteristics particularly shape the 
development of the auto industry that has been used for empirical analysis. The 
analysis also showed that state ownership of central and local auto companies, as 
well as far-reaching government intervention in business activities, have had 
negative economic consequences. 
(1) Decentralization: 
Crucial to China's economic success, decentralization has assigned local 
governments' considerable discretion over economic policy. In many areas, officials 
have used this authority to create markets and build up internationally active 
companies. 1164 With the introduction of fiscal federalism, the local officials' revenues 
became positively correlated with the prospering of local economic enterprises. 1165 
The incentives applied have induced a change in bureaucrats' behavior. Local 
governments have provided an entrepreneurial business environment. The municipal 
government in Shanghai (rather than its counterpart in Beijing), together with local 
business groups, fostered ties between auto firms and local university research 
institutes. They also attracted foreign investments in the auto sector, and supported 
1163 Refer to Nee (1992), Nee et al. (2005), p. 5, Wu (2000), p. 151 and Stiglitz (2002). 
1164 Refer to Weingast (1995), p. 23. 
1165 Refer to Li (1998), p. 39-397. 
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the establishment of a local supplier community. This development approach 
resembles active state-guidance in Japan and Korea. At the same time, the central 
government's loss of control over local officials has directly limited its ability to 
intervene adversely. Without political liberalization, China transformed its 
bureaucratic system substantially during its reform process, and introduced market-
based incentives at all levels of the bureaucracy. 1166 In this respect, China did not 
pursue top-down planning like the East Asian developmental states, but rather a 
bottom-up approach of local state-led economic growth. 
However, it was shown that this "Chinese-style federalism", as an intermediate 
institutional arrangement, is not perfect. While representing the interests of the 
central government as state agents, local governments simultaneously act in 
accordance with local interests in competition with other jurisdictions, thus 
questioning official budgetary boundaries.1167 Under economic and political 
pressures, they assume the role of local economic principals, manipulate national 
economic policies to pursue particular local goals and defend local interests.1168 The 
central government tolerates, and even rewards, officials who use any means to 
produce local investment and employment knowing that local economic growth 
promotes social and political order. The pursuit of independent policies at various 
government levels has frequently impeded a coherent policy approach. In the auto 
sector, economic (fiscal) decentralization has created incentives for local 
governments to support the development of local auto firms and sometimes flout the 
interest of the central government and its long-term policy approach. National import 
substitution for the auto sector in combination with local protective high tariffs and 
market restrictions have led local governments to launch new independent auto 
assembly projects in anticipation of high profits. 1169 While the central government 
aims to guide the development of the sector, its policy approach is impeded by 
various local bureaucracies that established provincial auto bases in order to 
stimulate local economic growth. This has provoked duplicate construction and 
fragmentation and has hindered the consolidation of the auto industry.1170 The 
Chinese economy is therefore characterized by politically monopolized and isolated 
local markets. 
1166 Refer to Tenev (2006), p. 24. 
1167 Refer to Gong (2006), p. 94. 
1166 Refer to Gilboy (2004), "The Myth Behind China's Miracle", Internet Edition, reviewed 16.10.2006 
and Gong (2006), p. 94. 
1169 The central government pursues import substitution for the auto industry rather than export 
promotion as in other sectors. In order to protect domestic firms and lessen foreign exchange 
outflows, the government imposed high tariff rates, quotas and import licenses on foreign-made 
motor vehicles. Protectionist measures and deterred international competition generated high 
prices and profits in the domestic market. The analysis showed that China has used local content 
and certification measures and imposed high tariff rates on vehicles and selected auto 
components even after the transition period of China's WTO accession. 
1170 The same applies for the domestic auto supply industry which is fragmented and uncompetitive 
compared with international norms, with little economy of scale. 
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Altogether, a key determinant of China's development strategy is the uncertain and 
unclear relationship between central and local authorities. The central government 
has increasingly been unable to force provincial authorities to adhere to central 
government policy directives. Until and unless this relationship is stabilized, it will be 
extraordinarily difficult to develop a coherent and cohesive national strategy for 
development: in Johnson's words, to facilitate "the national mobilization of a united 
people for economic goals".1171 China will need a strong, integrating central authority 
(like the pilot agency in the East Asian develo~mental states) to bring entrepreneurial 
initiatives into a rule-based national context.11 2 
(2) Foreign investment: 
Maybe the most defining feature of China's economic reform is its approach towards 
FDl.1173 In order to spur its national modernization drive, the Chinese developmental 
state has attracted foreign investment. China's FOi policies have been proactive, 
both at the central level and the provincial and municipal level.1174 The Chinese 
developmental state is more open towards foreign participation than its East Asian 
counterparts were at a comparable stage of development. By welcoming foreign 
investment, China has linked its domestic industry to international markets which is 
increasingly important in times of globalization. FDls that have entered China since 
the 1990s have clearly benefited China's modernization efforts and its global 
competitiveness. The analysis of the auto sector showed that the central government 
implemented a sector-specific policy, relying on foreign auto manufacturers to build 
JVs with selected local SOEs or cooperatives and collectives. In this way, domestic 
state-owned companies were to overcome their technology shortage and establish a 
modern car industry with the help of foreign OEMs. While in several post-socialist 
East and Central European countries, and in many other developing countries, the 
auto industry is dominated by MNCs, the central government has successfully 
prevented domination of auto production by foreign manufacturers with this 
regulation. 1175 Sino-foreign contract or venture agreements, as well as foreign high-
tech R&D investments, have caused positive spillover effects (e.g. job creation, local 
production and sourcing, and modernization of the domestic auto industry). 
Although foreign investment in the auto industry has contributed positively to the 
sector's modernization, in the segment of passenger cars, Chinese car 
manufacturing is not yet competitive in global markets. The strict regulation on FDI 
inputs has had negative effects by contributing to domestic auto manufacturers' 
dependence on foreign technology and know-how. While evidence is limited, the 
analysis provides indication that assistance from the state (and subsequently foreign 
1171 Refer to Johnson (1987), p. 139. 
1172 Refer to Taube (2005), p. 7. 
1173 Refer to Pei (2006a), p. 3. 
1174 Local governments even compete for foreign investments as their jurisdictions' financial well-
being (through fiscal federalism) and their own political career depend on local development. 
1175 For further information refer to Pavlinek and Smith (1998) and Swain (1998). 
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investors) has served as a substitute for domestic entrepreneurship, and weakened 
the competitiveness of Chinese auto firms. The most ambitious and innovative 
Chinese auto companies are private manufacturers, or manufacturers with little 
government participation, and outside the central government's center of attention 
such as Geely and Chery. 
Many domestic auto manufacturers concentrate on short-term gains, rather than on 
increasing operational efficiency and commitment to developing new technologies. 
Although the central government provides incentives for domestic companies to 
invest in long-term technology development, Chinese firms often focus on developing 
privileged relations with officials in the CCP hierarchy, and rely on guanxi, to realize 
short-term profit. State and private auto firms in China (whether in Beijing, Shanghai 
or other jurisdictions) lag behind foreign OEMs, because they have failed to invest in 
the type of long-term technological capabilities that their Japanese and Korean 
predecessors built during the 1970s and 1980s. This poses an ongoing dilemma for 
Chinese policy-makers: Not only do Chinese officials fear being cut off from foreign 
technology; they also fear becoming too heavily dependent on it.1176 This is a realistic 
concern, given China's still-limited indigenous high-tech capabilities in the auto 
industry, and foreign investors' engagement to gain market share in the domestic 
market. China's industry is left with inefficient but still-powerful Chinese SOEs, 
increasingly dominant foreign firms, and few profitable private auto firms. 
The capability to export can simply be used to evaluate the international 
competitiveness of firms. Industrial policy in the East Asian developmental states 
aimed at cost and price competitiveness in world markets. Subjecting domestic firms 
to international competition is generally considered to be a crucial concern to 
promote the development of them - certainly when the economy is integrated in the 
world economy and abides the rules of the WTO. Chinese auto manufacturers, 
however, are not yet internationally competitive and thus exports, of mostly small 
domestic manufacturers, only increase slowly. As long as domestic auto 
manufacturers are not capable of producing and selling cars on global markets, the 
central government will not give up its "infant industry" policy of assistance through 
protection and limited equity stakes of foreign investors. China's industrial policy, as 
highlighted by the analysis of passenger car industry, is not able to ensure 
competitive conditions in markets due to a specific combination of restrictive and 
regulatory policy measures, mainly reflected by entry restrictions. In the mid- to long-
run, protection must be gradually reduced and the domestic auto market must further 
open up to international com~tition in order to increase the competitiveness of its 
domestic auto producers.1177 Chinese companies must expand their R&D 
capabilities, including new product design and advanced manufacturing techniques 
to become global players. Besides, they will have to invest heavily in manufacturing 
facilities in order to accommodate new vehicle designs. 
1176 Refer to Walsh (2003), p. 116. 
, m The restrictions on auto imports and on the operations of foreign firms in China have already been 
reduced since China·s WTO entry. 
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(3) Government intervention in business activities and state ownership: 
While the governments of Korea and Taiwan, following the Japanese path, were 
deeply committed to market mechanism and private ownership, the Chinese party-
state remains in direct control of large parts of the economy through ownership of 
dominant enterprises in strategic sectors.1178 In the auto sector, state bureaucrats 
and SOEs exploit their bargaining power to influence the formulation of industrial 
policy and pursue further rents. Particularly SOEs, as targets of strong government 
support, have the strongest influential power for the formulation of the industrial 
policy. The analysis of the auto sector showed that state ownership of key auto firms 
and Chinese bureaucrats' direct intervention in free market mechanisms have 
caused economic inefficiencies. The high level of prices and profits has been 
evidence of the lack of competition in the industry, resulting in welfare losses. The 
protectionist model of regulation in the name of industrial policy persists, because of 
the special consideration of the government given to the strategically important and 
politically sensitive large-sized SOEs which are a guarantor of employment. 
Moreover, state bureaucrats in China did not have the power to demand from the 
high-priority auto sector to meet performance goals as in the East Asian 
developmental states. 
The withdrawal of government from business activities has happened only partially in 
China. Following the privatization of TVEs and small- and middle-sized SOEs in the 
early 2000s, local governments are less involved in influencing economic decisions 
within the firm as they attempt to improve the business environment to attract 
entrepreneurs and investments to their region. 1179 In the auto sector, however, state 
ownership and government interference in business activities is still widespread.1180 
The development of local governments' dual role as both state agents and local 
economic principals, has allowed local government officials to remain at the center of 
economic activities. Public power and private economic interests have become 
intimately connected.1181 When enterprises are owned and controlled by the state, 
economic decisions necessarily become political decisions, and price competition is 
supplanted by forms of personal competition driven by the quest for political power 
and privilege. Bribery and corruption then become the rule rather than the exception. 
The resulting uncertainty surrounding economic transactions destabilizes economic 
development.1182 Chinese authorities have so far refused to decontrol markets and 
prices in large segments of China's vast economic landscape. 
The state's economic dominance preserves systemic economic inefficiency, as 
scarce resources are funneled to local elites and bureaucratic constituencies. 
1178 Refer to Nolan (1993b), p. 206. 
1179 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 123. 
1180 In the electronics sector, by contrast, "regulatory capture" is less pronounced due to a relatively 
weak position of large SOEs owned by the central government. 
1181 Refer to Gong (2006), p. 99. 
1182 Refer to Dorn (1989), p. 564. 
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Tensions rise between economic modernization and the many institutional flaws of 
authoritarian rule (e.g. lack of political accountability, weak rule of law, and 
corruption). To activate the full potential of China's distinct developmental model, and 
overcome structural imbalances in the industrial economy, further progress toward 
instituting a market economy is needed. As in the capitalist East Asian 
developmental states, private property rights need to be put on an equal basis with 
other forms of ownership, creating legal norms and regulations - and the means to 
enforce them - that protect private property rights. 1183 In particular, a constitutional 
framework, which insulates economic life from political opportunism, appears to be a 
necessary condition for social and economic stability. In the following years, 
governments at every level need to be gradually r,hased out of economic activities, 
and to return to social and political management.11 4 
Ultimately, economic and political reforms are inseparable. As long as the ruling elite 
prevents the full expansion of free market mechanisms, the quest for economic and 
social stability will fail to be realized. Fearing that a more comprehensive approach 
would threaten the supremacy of the CCP,1185 the Chinese government has 
consistently resisted steps to further reduce the role of the state in the economy and 
increase judicial independence. In short, economic reform in this kind of political 
system will inevitably be piecemeal, and the transformation to a full market economy 
fail, as further reforms diminish the ruling regime's power and threaten its survival. 1186 
In the long run, reformers might buildup a modern polity with open electoral politics 
that moves China beyond an antiquated CCP dictatorship. The question remains as 
to whether China can, like many of its East Asian neighbors, evolve along a 
neoauthoritarian development path, and move eventually toward a more open 
society. 
To summarize, the analysis showed that China adapted the East Asian 
Developmental State Model to a particular Chinese type of developmental state, 
which is a hybrid form of strategies advocated by different streams of development 
thinking. The regulation mechanism of economic development in China is an 
1183 Refer to Nee (1992), p. 24 and Nee (2000), p. 87. 
1184 The CCP is aware of this situation. This becomes apparent when studying the latest policy 
document, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. The plan focuses strongly on social balance within the 
country. Of the 22 goals, only two relate to economic growth - total GDP and per capita GDP -
and four to changes in economic structure - share of services in the economy and in employment, 
spending on R&D, and the urbanization rate. The other 16 relate to population growth, use of 
resources, the environment, and standards of living. Refer to National Development and Reform 
Commission (2006), "Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic & Social 
Development of the People's Republic of China", Internet Edition, reviewed 14.11.2006. 
1185 To come into line with international norms, China has undertaken economic legal reforms, 
although questions remain as to the judiciary's independence from the CCP. 
1186 For further information refer to Pei (2006a), pp. 7-13 and p. 202. (22/76), Pei (2006b), "Has China 
Fallen into a Trapped Transition?", Internet Edition, reviewed 04.11.2007, Pei (2006c), "The Dark 
Side of China's Rise", Internet Edition, reviewed 04.11.2007 and Pei (2007), "Corruption 
Threatens China's Future", Internet Edition, reviewed 04.11.2007. 
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innovative combination of factors from the East Asian developmental states, the 
legacies of the past command economy as well as of the newly adopted market 
mechanism, including international capital flows. In implementing economic policy, 
China has adopted a gradual approach, with an emphasis on stability, reflecting the 
fact that it takes time to improve the infrastructure of the market-based system, 
including the legal and regulatory framework, banking s~stem, accounting standards, 
professional expertise, and institutional capacity. 118 Far-reaching government 
intervention in business activities, and the absolute rule of the CCP, however, hinder 
the full potential of the distinctiveness of the Chinese developmental state. China will 
approach a mature developmental state, though unique in its characteristics, once an 
independent legal system protects private economic agents from arbitrary state 
intervention.1188 
5.3 Lessons from China's new model of economic development 
China's experience highlights the principle that "institutions matter" in understanding 
the diverse economic performance of different countries. China is already becoming 
an exporter of economic know-how, providing lessons in growth-promotion to its 
neighbors. As Tenev (2006) states, India is examining China's experience with 
special trade and investment zones, and Vietnam is paying attention to China's 
experience with state-enterprise reform. 1189 Accordingly, the analysis intends to 
transform the results of the Chinese development strategy into specific criteria 
valuable for other transforming countries. These lessons, however, do not mean to 
provide a "blueprint" of economic transformation for developing countries. Different 
governments have different capacities to guide the market. Developmental objectives 
might not only differ from country to country, but require selective approaches for 
different sectors. While a highly interventionist policy might suit one sector best, it 
might be counterproductive in another, which needs a more laissez-faire 
approach.1190 
China's model of economic development is intertwined with its unique political model. 
Moreover, China occupies an unrivaled niche in the world's political economy - its 
vast populace and large geographical size alone accords it global influence. 
Accordingly, no lessons can reliably be extrapolated from China's distinctive 
development path.1191 From the analysis, it is possible to look at the Chinese 
experience and draw seven premises in the field of reform - which do not claim to be 
exhaustive - for transitional and late industrializing economies: 
1187 Refer to Hu (2007), p. 37. 
1188 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 123. 
1189 Refer to Tenev (2006), p. 23. 
1190 Refer to Wade (1988a), p. 130, Oi (1995), p. 1146 and Segal and Thun (2001), p. 582. 
1191 Refer to Tenev (2006), p. 23. 
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• State capacity and insulation from the political demands of society: The 
analysis showed the importance of the government's role, as an economy 
makes the transition from a command to a market-based economy. The 
central government elaborated and formulated the long-term development 
goals of China's development path, and clearly articulated its policy reforms. 
The analysis of the East Asian developmental states showed that strong state 
capacity is necessary for the development process, so that the regime retains 
sufficient power to control the course of reform. This should exist at both the 
central and local levels. Unlike weak authoritarian states such as Africa and 
Latin America, 1192 the Chinese central government maintained its ability to 
guide economic activity during the reform period. The state bureaucracy has 
persistently used its power to decide on the content and speed of reform, and 
actively guided the industrial development process. In China, however, state 
capacity and coherence have been impeded by the "solos" of local govern-
ments. State capacity is particularly necessary to ensure an institutional envi-
ronment conducive to private-sector investments and economic growth. 
• Decentralization and local incentives: Reform and transition in geographically 
vast countries do not have to be directed solely by a centralized, national 
government. In a large economy, decentralization serves as a good 
mechanism for creating appropriate incentives for productive private activities 
that foster economic prosperity. Fiscal decentralization increases the 
autonomy of local governments, and gives them the incentive to promote 
economic growth. The central government, however, must ensure that local 
governments operate with hard budget constraints, in order to guarantee that 
local authorities are accountable for their decisions. Transfers between levels 
of government must be rule-based, expenditure responsibilities must be 
clearly allocated, and the ability of local governments to borrow funds must be 
limited. In addition, the national government must be able to circumvent local 
protectionism, which would impede domestic competition and preserve a 
common domestic market.1193 Otherwise, effort and investment will continu-
ously flow toward activities that are characterized by low productivi-ty. 1194 As 
long as private-sector institutions are not developed sufficiently to fill the void 
left by government withdrawal, the complete removal of government from 
coordination activities (and thus a total reliance on market coordi-nation) might 
not be feasible. 1195 Accordingly, different government levels should have 
adequate incentives to perform.1196 
• Openness to foreign trade: The ability to graduate from import substitution to 
export promotion is a key factor in the successful pursuit of industrialization. 
1192 Also unlike the USSR, which undertook political reform before beginning the task of economic 
restructuring. 
1193 For further information refer to Burki et al. {1999). 
1194 Refer to Thun (2006), pp. 37-38 and p. 287. 
1195 Refer to Aoki et al. (1997), p. 13. 
1196 Refer to Oi (1995), p. 1147. 
284 
Nicola Meier - 978-3-631-75399-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:26:32AM
via free access
Evaluation and lessons from China's model of economic development 
The key to developing countries' export success is the early rejection of import 
substitution policies in favor of outward-looking policies.1197 Domestic 
companies' export expansion depends on the policy package which does not 
shelter the imports of competing industries, but gives priority to export oriented 
activities. Openness to foreign trade makes domestic companies measure 
their international competitiveness in foreign markets and prevents 
government officials from pursuing policy approaches that are no longer 
appropriate because it limits their ability to reduce the cost of mistake. 
Although import substitution is a necessary step to protect infant industries 
and to industrialize developing countries, there are serious problems 
associated with this strategy. The analysis of the Chinese auto industry shows 
that if protectionist measures such as tariffs are imposed for too long a period, 
protection may dampen the competitive edge of domestic firms. Protectionism 
may furthermore encourage new entry into the industry by domestic firms that 
aim to seek rents arising from high prices for locally produced vehicles. 1198 
The exposure of Chinese companies to international competition serves as a 
counterbalance to enliven nonprofitable companies by institutional incentives 
in the medium- to long-run. 1199 
• Attraction of foreign investments: China's open-door policy has spurred FDI in 
the country, linking the Chinese economy with international markets and 
importing technology and management know-how. Thus, domestic companies 
can adapt to international standards and become internationally competitive. 
This is particularly important in times of globalization and economic 
integration. China's decentralized development model, in combination with its 
reliance on inward FDI, is an example of how regional development could 
occur in a continental-sized market economy. However, the danger that 
domestic companies might become subservient to FDI, particularly foreign 
technology, and weaken domestic entrepreneurship, needs to be eliminated 
by encouraging domestic investment in potentially dynamic private Chinese 
firms which compete with international companies. 
• Financial system: The soundness and stability of the financial system is an 
essential ingredient of the appropriate macroeconomic framework for 
development.1200 In this regard, while policy loans may help to develop specific 
industrial sectors during the initial stage of economic reform, hard budget 
constraints on credit lending, and an independent financial supervisory body, 
are essential for the banking system once it has matured. Otherwise, crony 
capitalism might be the result. 
1197 Refer to Ng et al. (1992), pp. 225-226. 
1198 Berglas and Razin introduced the element of profits into the Stolper and Samuelson ( 1941) 
analysis of protection. They came to the conclusion that in the short run, protection is likely to 
increase profits. For further information on protection and real profits, refer to Berglas and Razin 
(1974). 
1199 Reier to Thun (2006), p. 287. 
1200 Refer to Elson (International Monetary Fund} (2006), p. 40. 
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• Legal system: China's path towards economic prosperity requires a modest 
legal infrastructure at a supra-individual level beyond social relationships, 
which is centered on the protection of property and contract rights. It is 
necessary for China to step up the establishment of a legal system, 
conforming to national conditions for opposing monopoly and guaranteeing fair 
trade. Developing countries need to make the transition from "rule by law" to a 
version of "rule of law".1201 The rule of law promises to move countries past the 
first phase of political and economic liberalization to a deeper level of reform. 
• Retreat of the state in the long run: Direct state intervention in free market 
mechanisms is likely to yield negative economic effects. While at the early 
stage of transition to a market economy, the "helping hand" of the government 
may be helpful or even necessary, 1202 the government is expected to gradually 
withdraw from direct involvement in the economy for the transition to be 
complete. As the economy evolves toward increased reliance on market 
mechanism, and as private property forms are backed by law and the state, 
the higher transaction costs of intervention by government bureaucrats act 
increasingly as a drag on economic performance.1203 Political interference in 
economic life should decline in industrial sectors and regions, to the extent 
that an emergent market economy replaces the centrally planned 
economy.1204 The state's functions should then concentrate on building market 
institutions, e.g., property rights, legal sr:stem and market structures, and 
realize the rational allocation of resources. 205 
The successes and failures of East Asia's and China's policy practices and their 
paths of technological progress indicate that as long as the economy is in a low state 
of development, the capabilities of firms are modest, and the efficiency of markets is 
hampered by poor integration and the underdevelopment of property-rights 
arrangements in the economy. Due to these unstable circumstances, the ability of the 
private sector to solve challenging coordination problems is suspect. During this time, 
government policy may successfully facilitate development. As the economy 
matures, however, the ability of the private sector improves, and the scope for policy 
becomes more limited.1206 Overall, a state should create an environment that 
encourages market-oriented investment, ensure that the economy's dominant 
resource steering mechanisms are sensitive to economic efficiency, and ''find" an 
engine of growth to generate dynamism and leadership. How these objectives are 
1201 As Hayek puts it, rule of law "means that a government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed 
and announced beforehand - rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one's individual affairs 
on the basis of this knowledge". Refer to Hayek (1976, reprinted in 1994), p. 80. 
1202 For further information refer to Frye and Shleifer (1997). 
1203 Refer to Nee (1992), p. 23. 
1204 For further information refer to Nee (1989, 1992). 
1205 Refer to Nee and Opper (2007), p. 95. 
1206 Refer to Aoki et al. (1997), p. 22. 
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best achieved in a particular economy depends on its own history as well as its 
external environment.1207 Economic development does not call for a particular policy 
recipe, but it does require a disciplined, balanced approach to policy-making in order 
to achieve fundamental goals. Further studies might examine industries in different 
developing countries, and with different degrees of industrial dynamics. In this 
regard, this study intends to stimulate academic and policy debate on this topic. An 
international comparative approach might be a sound strategy. 
1207 World markets today will not tolerate large export subsidies as in the East Asian developmental 
states, and many of the technologies required to participate aggressively in world markets cannot 
be acquired anymore by copying or reverse engineering. This argues for more import and 
investment liberalization than was the case with the economies that based their development on 
export promotion in the 1960s. 
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2 Oalml..Chrysler (Chll'\I.) Lid. Beijing OEM MalthlaS Wollenberg JOint Venture Projeet FOTON "'"' 12.06.200G China (Aflersalea) 
' OalmllltChrpl9f (China) Lid. Beijing OEM Thomas Nothdurfl SalHCV Senior Manager 16.06.2006 
• OaimlerChrysler (China) Lid. Beijing OEM Or.UlfAuspung CorpoJala Strale;y Northemt Senior Manage, 09.06.2006 .... 
5 OllmlerChrysler (China) Lid. Beijing OEM Yongqlng Ye Mat1ult ln1tllllgence Dept. Hoof 09.06.2006 
• MorcectM-Benz (China) Lid. Beijing OEM PeterHonegg Prnldtnt&CEO 14.06.2006 
7 VOikswagen (China) Investment BoliloO OEM Garald Schwarz Bulinen Planning """"" 14.06.2C06 Company Ltd. 
• Volkswagen (China) lnve1tmen1 Beijing OEM Prof. Jilyou Zhao Corporate Relati0n9 Olreclor 14.0S.2006 Company Ltd. 
• Bosell (China) ll"llrfnlmant Ltd. s,.,,.. Supplier Dr. Pits Kllgensleln 0r1g1n11 Elµpffltnt s11111 EKecullve Vice Pl'flldtnl 13.07.2006 
10 Boech (China) lrwtlm11nt Ud. Shangai Supplier Dr. logo Thomas 8ullrMISI Development ""'to, 20.06.2006 
11 ZF (ChN) hwutmenl Co .• Llcl. ·- Sui,plier Or. Guohong Ye Prulclen!&CEO 19.06.2006 
12 ZF (China) lrtvestmenl Co., Llcl Shangal Supplier Or. Roll Gall Engineering Cenler "'"' 1Sl.06.2006 
13 ACEA Beijing Association Or. Dominik Oeelerq Ctllel Repnenla»Ve 1e.0&.2006 
,. State tnlormalion Center .. ,.., Govemrnent Cl\lngmlngXu BUSlnNS Counsulllng Cenler """" 13.062006 
15 State Information Center Baijlng Govemmenl LumlngHuang Business Counsulllng Cenler VlceDlrvctor 13.06.2006 
16 CAAM Beijing Govemmen1 Jill Yao Deputy S.Cralary General 16.06.2006 
17 0.legallon ot Garman Industry & Beijing ..... Florian Kessler Legal and Bualne11 """ oa.oe.200& Commerce Blll~ng CCfPC)raUOn Conaulla1lon Services 
" Delegation ol O.rman kldultry & a.!Jlng ·- ChangUu L9gel and Bualnnl -- 08.06.2006 Commerce BlllJlng co,porallon Consullal:lon Servlca 
19 DetegaUon of German lnduatry I ··- PubllC Btmd Reitmeier Hea:I OI Olvillon lnvatmenl Deputy MIINglng Dlreclor 19.06.2006 Commerce Shanghai corporation SeMcn, Trade Promotions. Compa,y Pooll, 
Procurement Servtcee, Legal 
Services, IT Servicn 
Source: Own illustration. 
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DaimlerChrysler AG: 
Appendix 
DaimlerChrysler was formed in 1998 by the merger of the Daimler-Benz AG and the 
Chrysler Corporation. DaimlerChrysler is the fifth-largest auto producer in the world, 
with sales of 4.7 million units (behind GM, Toyota, Ford and VW) and 360,385 
employees worldwide as of end-2006.1208 DaimlerChrysler is divided into five 
divisions: the Mercedes Car Group, Chrysler Group, Truck Group, Financial Services 
as well as Van, Bus and Other Activities. The company produces cars and trucks 
under the brands Mercedes-Benz, Smart, Maybach, Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep, 
among others. 
All of DaimlerChrysler's business units are represented in China. DaimlerChrysler 
has sought to achieve growth in Asia by establishing JVs with local Chinese players: 
• DaimlerChrysler has had a long-standing JV with BAIC1209 for production of 
sports-utility vehicles since 1983.1210 Together with BAIG, a new JV called 
Beijing Benz-DaimlerChrysler Auto Ltd. (BBDCA) produces Mercedes-Benz E-
class sedans (and plans to produce the 2007 generation of C-class sedans) in 
a new facility at the Beijing Development Area. The two parties are investing 
Euro 1 billion in the assembly plant. 1211 The first locally produced Mercedes-
Benz rolled off the assembly line in the second half of 2006. Output will be 
gradually increased to around 25,000 units annually. 
• In partnership with Fujian Motor Industry Group and Taiwan-based China 
Motor Corporation, DaimlerChrysler set up a new JV named Fujian Daimler 
Automotive Co Ltd. in 2007. Fujian Motor holds a 50 percent stake in the JV, 
with DaimlerChrysler and China Motor holding the remainder. 1212 In December 
2006, the JV received government approval to produce up to 40,000 
Mercedes-Benz Sprinter, Vito and Viano multipurpose vehicles annually in a 
new facility in Fuzhou.1213 
• DaimlerChrysler now produces medium and heavy trucks with BAIC's Beiqi 
Foton following the project approval in January 2007. DaimlerChrysler is the 
second largest shareholder of Beiqi Foton with a 24 percent stake. 
1208 Refer to DaimlerChrysler AG (2007), "Annual Report 2006", Internet Edition, reviewed 
29.06.2007.0 
1209 BAIG also has a JV with Hyundai. 
1210 The Beijing Jeep JV was signed in January 1983 between state-owned BAIG and American 
Motors Corporation being the first auto JV to be established in order to produce light duty trucks. 
The American Motors Corporation was acquired by Chrysler in 1987 and merged with Daimler-
Benz later in 1998. 
1211 Plans also exist to relocate the current Jeep and Mitsubishi production to this new facility. 
1212 The 50 percent share of DaimlerChrysler and China Motor Corp. Taiwan is composed of the 
following: DaimlerChrysler: 67.5 percent, China Motor Corp. Taiwan: 32.5 percent. 
1213 Refer to CAND (2007b), p. 5. 
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• DaimlerChrysler Financial Services set up vehicle financing in China in 
September 2005. 
• At the beginning of 2007, DaimlerChrysler signed a letter of intent with Chery 
Automobile to distribute Chery-made vehicles in the North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) region, European region and possibly other global 
markets. This agreement provides the framework for how the two companies 
cooperate strategically and introduces a new business model that allows them 
to introduce all-new products more quickly, with less capital spending.1214 
VWAG: 
The German carmaker launched production of its first small car in 1945, and has 
established its reputation as a leading volume carmaker since then. The VW Group's 
activities center on two main businesses: auto and financial services. The auto 
division consists of the VW Group, the Audi Group, the commercial vehicles division 
and other companies. The VW Group consists of four major volume brands, namely 
Volkswagen, Audi, SEAT and Skoda, and a number of niche luxury brands, namely 
Bugatti, Bentley and Lamborghini. In addition, the German company produces a 
range of light commercial vehicles under the VW brand. In 2006, the VW Group sold 
a total of 5.7 million vehicles worldwide, making it the world's fifth largest 
carmaker. 1215 
The brand's second largest market is China where the VW Group has formed two 
JVs with two of the country's largest vehicle manufacturers: 
• SVW is a JV with SAIC. Both partners (VW and SAIC) have 50 percent of the 
equity stakes.1216 SVW operates two vehicle plants along with an engine 
plant. The company produces the market's leading Santana line of family 
cars, which includes 11 models as well as the VW GOL, Golf, Passat and 
Polo.1217 Output reached 345,000 units in 2006.1218 With many capital 
increases over time, the registered capital of SVW has reached RMB 10 
billion.1219 In 2005, the JV contract for SVW was extended for another 20 
years.1220 
• The VW Group has a 40 percent stake in a JV with FAW. Located in Jilin 
Province, FAW-VW produces the Audi A4 and AS models, along with the Golf 
Bora, Golf and Jetta models. Total production amounted to 361,000 units in 
1214 Refer to DaimlerChrysler AG (2005), "Facts - DaimlerChrysler in China", p. 3. 
1215 Refer to Volkswagen AG (2007), "Annual Report 2006", Internet Edition, reviewed 29.06.2007. 
1216 Refer to Shanghai Volkswagen (2005), Internet Edition, reviewed 29.06.2007. 
1217 VW introduced its Passat model into SVW in 1998, the Polo in 2001, the Gol in 2002, and the 
Bora and Golf into FAW-VW in 2001 and 2003, respectively. 
1218 Refer to Global Insight (2007), "Volkswagen Group Company Profile", Internet Edition, reviewed 
29.06.2007. 
121 • Refer to Shanghai Volkswagen (2005), Internet Edition, reviewed 29.06.2007. 
1220 Ibidem. 
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2006.1221 The VW Group has also established three JVs focusing on the 
production of engines and drive train components in China. The VW-FAW 
Platform Corporation in Changchun has produced running gear components 
including axles since 2006. At the VW-FAW engine JV, the German company 
is preparing for the production of an advanced low emission and low fuel 
consumption engine. 
VW plans to double the existing annual production capacity in the next five years to 
1.6 million vehicles. To reach this goal, VW intends to invest a further Euro 6.0 billion 
of its domestic operating profit in the country. 1222 
Robert Bosch GmbH: 
The Bosch Group is the world's largest auto parts and components manufacturer and 
one of the largest private companies in the world. Bosch primarily manufactures and 
sells auto technology, industrial technology products, consumer goods and building 
technology. Bosch designs and produces precision auto components and systems 
sold to vehicle and powertrain manufacturers. Auto operations generated around 62 
percent of Bosch's 2005 sales. The Group also has activities in a number of other 
areas, including power tools, household appliances, thermo-technology, automation 
technology, packaging machinery and communications technology. In 2006, Bosch 
employed around 258,000 people worldwide -149,000 of them in the auto sector. 1223 
The group had total auto sales in 2006 of EUR 27.2 billion.1224 
From 1909 to 2005, Bosch made a total investment of EUR 620 million and 
established 26 enterprises in China. Bosch's main operations in China are conducted 
by its auto components business.1225 The auto components segment represents over 
half of Bosch's business in China. As of 2006, Bosch planned to invest a total of EUR 
620 million in China until 2008 by expanding the company's ongoing activities. In 
2006, sales in China exceeded EUR 1.3 billion, with 13,800 people employed in 
China.1226 
In China, Bosch's auto production plants are located in Changsha, Shanghai, Suzhou 
and Wuxi. Between 2000 and 2005, the number of Bosch manufacturing facilities in 
China doubled, from 1 0 to 20.1227 Bosch's first engineering center in China was built 
in Shanghai in 1997 and makes parts for gasoline engines. In 2004, Bosch opened 
1221 Refer to Global Insight (2007), "Volkswagen Group Company Profile", Internet Edition, reviewed 
29.06.2007. 
1222 Refer to Weider (2004), p. 29. 
1223 Refer to Global Insight (2007), "Volkswagen Group Company Profile", Internet Edition, reviewed 
29.06.2007. 
1224 Refer to Robert Bosch GmbH (2007), "Annual Report 2006", Internet Edition, reviewed 
29.06.2007. 
1225 Refer to Robert Bosch GmbH (2007), "Bosch in China", Internet Edition, reviewed 29.06.2007. 
1226 Ibidem. 
1227 Refer to Robert Bosch GmbH (2007), "Business/Economy", Internet Edition, reviewed 29.06.2007. 
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an engineering center for diesel systems in Wuxi, east of Shanghai and in May 2005, 
it opened another in Suzhou. The center in Suzhou validates materials and 
components sourced in China for use in Bosch operations worldwide and will be able 
to release products for global use from China, speeding up the sourcing process. In 
December 2004, Bosch set up an auto parts company in central Hunan Province, 
taking over some of the assets owned by a local auto parts producer, CNAIC 
Changdian Co., one of its long-term licensees based in Changsha, Hunan's capital. 
The key auto companies make safety products, diesel fuel-injection systems, spark 
plugs and electronic systems. 
ZF Friedrichshafen AG: 
ZF Friedrichshafen, based in Germany, is a leading independent manufacturer of 
chassis components, transmissions, steering systems, axles and other auto 
components, as well as complete modules. In 2005, the auto business accounted for 
around 87 percent of sales. ZF Friedrichshafen employed 55,050 people at 125 
locations in 25 countries at the end of 2006. It is Germany's third-largest auto 
supplier and one of the top fifteen largest suppliers worldwide. In 2006, ZF 
Friedrichshafen's turnover amounted to Euro 11.659 million.1228 ZF Friedrichshafen is 
a supplier to all major vehicle manufacturers, including Ford, GM, BMW, 
DaimlerChrysler and VW. Among ZF Friedrichshafen's customers are also the largest 
Chinese OEMs, such as Dongfeng, FAWER Automobile Parts1229 and SAIC.1230 
ZF Friedrichshafen opened four companies in China in 2005, and a new Technical Center in 
Shanghai in 2006. The Asia-Pacific region accounted for around EUR 1.115 million of sales 
in 2006, which represents 10 percent of total group sales. In 2005, ZF Friedrichshafen 
employed about 1,900 people in the region. The company gained most new business from 
carmakers moving into new markets. China is the biggest market for ZF Friedrichshafen in 
the region, accounting for about two-thirds of the company's Asia-Pacific sales.1231 ZF 
Friedrichshafen is well-established there with a big manufacturing presence, as it entered the 
Chinese market more than a decade ago. Altogether, since the end of 2006, ZF 
Friedrichshafen has been operating 20 plants in China.1232 
Delegations of German Industry and Commerce in Beijing and Shanghai: 
The Delegations of German Industry & Commerce, and German Industry & 
Commerce Co. Ltd. belong to the worldwide network of 110 overseas German 
Chambers of Commerce, Delegations, Representative Offices and Service 
1228 Refer to ZF Friedrichshafen AG (2007), "Geschaftsbericht 2006", Internet Edition, reviewed 
29.06.2007. 
1229 FAWER is a wholly-owned subsidiary of FAW. 
1230 Refer to Global Insight (2006), "Bosch Company Profile", Internet Edition, reviewed 29.06.2007. 
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Companies in more than 70 countries under the umbrella of the Association of 
German Chambers of Industry and Commerce in Berlin. The offices and subsidiaries 
of the chamber of foreign trade and commerce, and GIC in Beijing and Shanghai 
support German companies in establishing and extending their activities in China on 
a bilateral basis. In addition, GIC helps Chinese companies to develop their business 
in Germany.1233 
Association des Constructeurs Europeens d'Automobiles: 
ACEA represents the thirteen major European car, truck and bus manufacturers, and 
is a key interlocutor with the EU institutions in Brussels and Strasbourg.1234 In Beijing, 
it bundles the interests of its European members, conducts research, and compiles 
information on the development of the Chinese auto industry for the European 
Commission and the Chinese central government. It lobbies for its members in 
Chinese institutions, and provides its members with information on regulations etc. of 
the Chinese auto market. 
China Association of Automobile Manufacturers: 
The CAAM promotes nationally and internationally the interests of the entire Chinese 
auto industry in all fields of the motor transport sector, e.g. in economic, transport 
and environmental policy, technical legislation, standardization and quality 
assurance, and participates in the central government's industrial planning. It is 
responsible for investigation and research work for industrial economic development, 
and makes proposals about economic policy and legislation to government 
departments. Located in Beijing, it conducts industrial statistics surveys, sets up data 
collection systems, and engages in data analyses, study and information release.1235 
State Information Center: 
The State Information Center, under the State Development and Reform Committee, 
provides comprehensive and basic economic information and consultant services. It 
is a Chinese government think tank located in Beijing. It has a thousand regional 
offices and information centers in the country. It carries out strategic economic 
development research, monitors the country's economic development, and provides 
consultant services for government departments.1236 
1233 Refer to German Industry of Commerce (n.d.), "About us", Internet Edition, reviewed 20.07.2006. 
1234 Refer to ACEA (n.d.), Internet Edition, reviewed 20.07.2006. 
1235 Refer to CAAM (n.d.), Internet Edition, reviewed 20.11.2006. 
1236 Refer to State Information Center (2006), Internet Edition, reviewed 20.11.2006. 
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Appendix Ill: Topic overview for interviewees 
May 22, 2006 
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, 
The focus of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Hohenheim, Germany, is on the 
Chinese automobile industry. I am analyzing how the central government and the 
governments of the municipalities in Beijing and Shanghai have promoted the 
development of this sector. In this respect, your assessment of the following 
categories is of great importance for my analysis. 
1. Company Information 
• Automotive business activities 
• German-Chinese partnership and government participation 
2. Location 
• Advantages of location 
• Government's investment incentives 
3. State - Industrial Polley 
• Investment and economic climate, Foreign participation (FDI) 
• Organization and coordination of central - local government policy/automotive 
industrial policy 
• Trade system (import substitution, export-oriented industrialization, WTO) 
4. Financial System 
Banking and financial services 
5. Bureaucracy 
• Structure and organization of the bureaucracy (central - local agencies involved in 
automotive business development) 
• Coordination of auto industry promotion 
6. State-Business Relationship 
Information sharing and institutionalized state-business cooperation (business 
associations etc.) 
am looking forward to seeing you in China. Thank you in advance for your 
participation! 
With kind regards, 
Nicola Meier 
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Appendix IV: Questionnaire for company representatives 
Name of the German company: ________________ _ 
Interviewees: _______________________ _ 
Date: 
I ABOUT YOUR COMPANY 
Automotive business activities: 
1. What percentage of your sales comes from the automotive business line? 
2. What are your automotive business activities in China (import, export, license 
contracts, representative office, production)? 
Information on the JV: 
3. How many JVs do you have in China? 
4. Where are they located and when did you set them up? 
5. What percentage of the JV is owned by the Chinese partner? 
6. Who are the main shareholders of your Chinese partner? 
7. How did you find the Chinese partner? 
Information on the location: 
8. What were the major factors that influenced the decision regarding your current 
production location? 
a) DaimlerChrysler: Why did you choose to produce the C- and E-Class in 
Beijing? 
b) VW: Why is your holding in Beijing while your production sites are located in 
other provinces /municipalities {Shanghai with SAIC and Changchung with 
FAW)? 
c) Bosch: Why is your holding located in Shanghai and not in Beijing, as many 
others are? Why do you produce locally in subsidiaries as well as in JVs with 
Chinese partners? 
d) ZF: Is there a reason why you are located in Shanghai, and not in Beijing? 
9. How many people does your company employ in China? 
10. What is the investment volume of your current projects in China? 
11. What are the challenges to your investment in China, and especially in 
Beijing/Shanghai? 
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12. Did your company receive any investment incentives or subsidies (tax breaks, 
cheap credit...) from the local or national government at the time the JV was 
built? 
13. Does your company currently receive any subsidies (e.g. tax breaks) from the 
local or national government? 
14. Are subsidies generally restricted to any requirements (such as exports, local 
content etc.)? 
15. Do government subsidies and tax breaks favor specific companies, activities, 
regions or industries? 
16. Does the government distort competition by granting subsidies to specific 
companies? 
Bureaucracy's engagement to set up JV: 
17. Was the central/local bureaucracy involved in your JV negotiations? 
18. How long did the negotiations with the local bureaucracy and the national 
partner take until the JV was finally set up (from the initial contact to the final 
approval)? 
19. Did you have to fulfil any requirements of the Chinese state to be able to set up 
the JV in China? 
I INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Investment climate: 
20. How content are you with the following aspects of the investment climate in your 
municipality and in China? 
a. Quality of the economic policy 
b. Economic and business climate 
c. Import/export restrictions 
d. Quality of the financial policy 
e. Possibility of raising local capital 
f. Timeframe and consistency of economic reform (and implementation) 
21. Has the investment climate in China and in your locality changed over the last 
years? 
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22. How content are you with the cooperation with public institutions at your 
locality? 
23. How content are you with the cooperation with financial institutions at your 
locality? 
Auto industry policies I Reforms: 
24. The automotive industry has been declared a "pillar" industry by the Chinese 
central government. Is the automotive industry given due consideration/priority 
compared with other sectors, when the government decides policy on 
investment and development? 
25. Is the government's policy direction consistent? Has the central/local 
government's auto industrial policy changed over the years? 
26. Are firms usually informed clearly by the government on changes in policies and 
regulations affecting your industry? 
27. Is the compliance with administrative requirements (permits, regulations, 
reporting) issued by the government burdensome? 
28. Do you think there are any important reform measures with regard to the 
automotive industry that have not been implemented so far? 
Effectiveness of policy-making In the auto Industry policy: 
29. Does industrial policy for the automotive sector effectively promote competition? 
30. What has caused your company the greatest competitive threat (SOEs; 
domestic large enterprises; foreign firms producing in the domestic market, 
imports etc.)? 
31 . How many competitors for your major product do you have in the domestic 
market? 
32. Is the central government's capacity to promote and direct the development of 
the auto industry impaired by conflicts between the central government and 
local governments or conflicts between local governments of different 
jurisdictions? 
Trade po/Icy- Import substitution and export promotion: 
33. To what extent do tariff and non-tariff barriers influence the conduct of your 
business and your competitiveness in the Chinese market? 
34. What percentage of your firm's sales are 
a. sold domestically 
b. exported 
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35. To which countries/regions do you export from China? 
36. Do central/local bureaucrats promote your business sector in exporting (e.g. 
with tax reductions, "cheap" credits, majority stakes in JVs etc.) today, and did 
they before WTO? 
I FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
State influence on the banking system I Credit allocation: 
37. How would you assess the state's intervention (central and local) in the banking 
system (state and private banks)? 
38. Does allocation of credit have a positive impact on economic development 
(future technologies)? 
39. Do you receive credit from local Chinese banks? 
40. Do the banks have certain state-initiated programs (such as special interest 
rates for credits) to support the development of the automotive industry? 
41. Has the credit policy of local banks for automotive projects changed over the 
years? 
42. Does the Chinese central government influence sales growth through its 
regulations for companies' leasing activities? 
43. Did the credit tightening measures imposed by the central government in 2003/4 
cause decelerating sales growth for the automotive industry, and particularly for 
your company? 
44. Which financing issues do you face that impact the conduct and growth of your 
business (e.g. lack of available money for banks to lend (low net equity), high 
interest rates, collateral requirements of banks and financial institutions, 
paperwork, necessity of special connections with banks, lack of access to 
foreign banks, corruption of bank officials, lack of access to export finance, lack 
of access to long term bank loans). 
I BUREAUCRACY 
Effectiveness I Depolitlzation I Meritocracy: 
45. How much time does your firm's senior management spend on obtaining and 
maintaining licenses, permits and regulatory requirements? 
46. How would you estimate the influence of the CCP on central/local bureaucrats? 
47. Do high-ranking/low-ranking bureaucrats strive to advance their career in the 
public or private sector? 
48. Do bureaucrats in your municipality usually have a high level of education? 
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Salaries (and illegal payments) in the private I public sector: 
49. How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including bribes or 
other extra-legal sources of income) of higher officials in relation to those of 
private sector managers with roughly comparable training and responsibilities? 
50. What was the development of legal income in these agencies compared with 
salaries in the private sector over the period in question (roughly 1980-2005)? 
51. Do other firms' illegal payments influence government policies, laws or 
regulations that negatively affect your firm? 
52. Are government officials usually neutral, or do they favor well-connected firms 
when they decide upon policies and contracts? 
Agencies responsible for the auto industry: 
53. Is the development of the auto industry in the locality coordinated and monitored 
by one agency responsible for the automotive industry, or by different agencies 
responsible for different aspects of the auto enterprises' engagement? 
54. Which organizations at the central or local level are responsible for the 
development of the automotive industry? 
55. ls the division of competence of central agencies (ministries, commissions etc.) 
and local ones organized well? 
I GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 
Bureaucrats posts In the private sector I Membership In business 
associations: 
56. How often do local bureaucrats occupy posts in the public and private sector at 
the same time? 
57. What channel do you typically use to affect the outcome of laws, rules, 
regulations and decrees that affect your business (business association, direct 
ties to public officials etc.)? 
58. Is your firm a member of a business association or chamber of commerce in 
China? 
59. What services do you receive from the association or associations to which you 
belong (lobbying government, market information, information on new laws ... )? 
60. How much influence does your firm/business association have on the central or 
local bureaucracy when a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being 
discussed? 
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Appendix V: Statistics of the 2001 World Bank survey 
Table A45: Descriptive Statistics: Reasons for location of plant for companies in the 
residual sectors, 2000. 
Reasons the plant was located here Advantages for locating plant here now 
when ctant was established 
Local Proximity to Low rents Fewer regulatory Local Proximity to Low rents Fewer regulatory 
market olher firms in or COSI of requirements and market other firms in the or cost of requirements and 
size the same line buying taxes based on size same line of buying taxes based on 
of business property government's business property government's 
assianments assinnments 
N Valid 473 256 518 362 455 262 481 242 
Missing 811 1021 761 92l 829 102l 803 104l 
Median l 2 l 1 2 2 2 1 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001). 
Table A46: Descriptive Statistics: Reasons for location of plant for companies in the 
electronics sector, 2000. 
Reasons the plant was located here Advantages for locating plant here now 
when Di. nl was established 
Local Proximity to Low rents Fewer regulatory Local Proximity lo Low rents Fewer regulatory 
market other tirms in orcosl of requirements and market other firms in the or cost of requirements and 
size the same line buying taxes based on size same line of buying taxes based on 
of business property government's business property government's 
ae.sianments assianments 
N Valid 111 78 149 129 108 79 137 78 
Missing 284 317 241 266 287 316 258 317 
Median 2 2.5 2 1 2 3 2 1 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Table A47: Descriptive Statistics: Reason for location of manufacturing plant in the 
auto and the electronics sector, 2000. 
Groun autosec electron icssec N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Proximity to other firms in the Auto sec 52 57.20 2974,50 
same line of business as an Electronics sec advantage for locating 79 71,79 5671,50 
manufadurlng plant here now Total 131 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Table A48: Mann-Whitney U-Test: Reason for location of manufacturing plant in the 
auto and the electronics sector, 2000. 
Pra,clmtty 10 aher lrms in1he seme 
ineof b.Jsiness as an ad.rartage for 
localim rrenubctninn nlant here row 
II/IOnn•vvnitiey U 1596.000 
Wit:oxonW 2974,000 
z ·2,213 
Asymp. Sig. (2-ailed) ,027 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
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Table A49: Descriptive Statistics: Government agency's or official's assistance in 
locating foreign technology to license in the auto sector and in the 
residual sectors, 2000. 
Government agency's or official's 
assistance in locating foreign 
technoloov to ticense 
Yes No N.A. Total 
Group_autosec_ressec Auto Count 13 172 30 215 
sec % within Group_ 
autosec ressec 6,0% 80.0% 14,0% 100,0% 
Resi Count 37 980 267 1284 
dual % within Group_ 
sec autosec_ressec 2,9°/. 76.3% 20,8% 100,0% 
Total Count 50 1152 297 1499 
% within Group_ 
3,3% 76,9% 19,8% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Table AS0: Chi-Square Test: Government agency's or official's assistance in locating 
foreign technology to license in the auto sector and in the residual 
sectors, 2000. 
Value 
t"earson vn-::;quare 10,2048 
Ukelhood Ratio 9,734 
Linear-by-Linear 
9,017 Association 
N or Valid Cases 1499 
a. O cells (,Cl¼) h1>1e B<pected court less than 5. The 






Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
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Table A51: Descriptive Statistics: Government agency's or official's assistance in 
identifying potential foreign clients in the auto sector and in the residual 
sectors, 2000. 
Govemmenl agency's or official's 
assistance in identifying potential 
foreinn dients 
Yes No N.A. Total 
uroup_ Auto sec Count 21 166 28 215 
autosec_ressec % within Group_ 
9,8% 77,2% autosec ressec 13,0"lo 100,0% 
Residual Count 88 941 255 1284 
sec % ~hin Group_ 
autosec ressec 6,9% 73,3% 19,9% 100,0% 
Total Count 109 1107 283 1499 
% wlhin Group_ 7,3% 73,8% 18,9% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001). 
Table A52: Chi-Square Test: Government agency's or official's assistance in 




Lkellllod Raio 7,334 
Linear-by-Linea-
7,004 Association 
N of Vaid Cases 1411! 
a. 0 eels ( ,0%) have expected court less than 5. The 






Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ), 
Table A53: Descriptive Statistics: Introduction of new products into the plant by 
licensing technology from a foreign firm in the auto sector and in the 
electronics sector since 1998. 
Licensed technology 
from foreinn finn 
Yes No Total 
{.jrol.J)_autosec_ Auto sec l,OUOI 40 93 133 
electronicssec % within Group_autosec_ 
electronics sec 30,1% 69,9'/o 100,0% 
Electronics sec Count 57 214 271 
% within Group_autasec_ 
21,0% 79,0% 100,0% electronics sec 
Total Count 97 307 404 
% within Group_autosec_ 
24,0% 76,0% 100,0"lo electronics sec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
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Table AS4: Chi-Square Test: Introduction of new products into the plant by licensing 
technology from a foreign firm in the auto sector and in the electronics 
sector since 1998. 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value di f2•sidedl 
Pearson lA'11-.:;quare 3,998" 1 ,046 
Continuity Correction a 3,518 1 ,061 
Likelihood Ratio 3,903 1 ,048 
Fisher's Exact Test 
Unear-by-Unear 
3,988 1 ,046 Association 
N of Valid Cases 404 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. O cells (,0'%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
31,93, 
Exact Sig. Exact Sig. 
f2-sidedl f1-sidedl 
,048 ,031 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001). 
Table ASS: Descriptive Statistics: Introduction of new process improvements into the 
plant by licensing processes from a foreign firm in the auto sector and in 
the residual sectors since 1998. 
Licensed process from 
foreian firm 
Yes No Total 
Group_autosec_ressec Auto sec <;ount 35 98 133 
% within Group_ 26,3% 73,7% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Residual sec Coun1 82 501 583 
% within Grcup_ 
14,1% 85,9% 100,0% autosec ressec 
Total Coun1 117 599 716 
% within Group_ 
16,3% B3,7•/o 100,0% autos ec re ssec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
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Table A56: Chi-Square Test: Introduction of new process improvements into the plant 
by licensing processes from a foreign firm in the auto sector and in the 
residual sectors since 1998. 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value di 12-sided\ 
"•arson vhi-:,quare 11,889° 1 ,001 
Continuity Correction a 11,009 1 ,001 
Likelihood Ratio 10,768 1 ,001 
Fishe(s Exact Test 
Li near-by-Linear 
11,872 1 ,001 Association 
N ol Valid Cases 716 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. 0 cells ( ,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
21,73. 
Exact Sig. Exact Sig. 
12-sided\ 11-slded\ 
,001 ,001 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Table A57: Descriptive Statistics: New process improvement by licensing processes 
from foreign firms in the auto and electronics sector since 1998. 
Licensed process from 
toreinn firms 
Yes No Total 
urwp_aut>sec_ Aut> sec Count 35 98 133 
eledronicssec % wi1hin Group_aut>sec_ 
electronicssec 26.3% 73,7% 100,0% 
Electronics sec Count 47 224 271 
o/e within Group_aut>sec_ 
17,3% 82,7% 100,0% electronicssec 
Total Count 82 322 404 
% witlin Group_au'Dsec_ 
20,3•;. 79,7% 100,0% electronicssec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
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Table ASB: Chi-Square Test: New process improvement by licensing processes from 
foreign firms in the auto and electronics sector since 1998. 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value di (2-sidedl 
Pears:, n Chi-Square 4,-MO" 1 ,035 
Cominuity Correction a 3,903 1 ,048 
Likelihood Ratio 4,308 1 ,038 
Fishe(s Exad Tesl 
Linear-by-Linear 
4,429 1 ,035 Association 
N of Valid Cases 404 
a. Computed only for a 2x2table 
b. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
27,00. 
Exact Sig. Exact Sig. 
(2-sidedl (1-sidedl 
,048 ,025 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors• (2001 ). 
Table A59: Descriptive Statistics: Days for consignments of a major input 
experienced before clearing local customs in the auto sector and the 
electronics sector, 2000. 
Group_autosec_ Std. Error 
electronicssec N Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Days for consignments Auto sec 
of a major imported 77 11,8312 19,08871 2,17536 
raw material to clear 
local customs Electronics sec 194 6,6649 8,96025 ,64331 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors• (2001 ), 
Table A60: Independent Samples T-Test: Days for consignments of a major input 
experienced before clearing local customs in the auto sector and the 
electronics sector, 2000. 
t.e ... n•·• T111I lor ·-· li"'nf"--'--- ... i::-··-llvnfu•--
95% Conld•rce 
nterval ol tte 
Moon Std Error 
.....,_ __ 
F Sin, I di ~- 2-tallld Oiler.-.ce Dilleun:e L- ·~-, 
uap ICU --~•..-nil t:qua vananco1 
20.291 .ooo 3,027 269 .003 5,16622 1,70665 1,80613 11,52631 ol a mapr tmporad raw Ulunod 
malarial 10 Cl•r IOcal Equal variances 
CUIIOmt not•IUmecl 2,277 119,604 ,025 5,16622 2.26149 ,65920 9,67324 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
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Table A61: Descriptive Statistics: Approximate shares of capital from different 
sources in the auto sector and in the electronics sector (in percent), 
2000. 
Group_autosec_ Std. Error 
electronicssec N Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Heta11ed earmngs/interna1 funds Auto sec 215 43,0372 37,48718 2,55860 
Electronics sec 390 51,4795 38,22459 1,93558 
Bank loans Auto sec 215 27,0!184 31,95816 2,17953 
Electronics sec 390 21,4974 27,78144 1,40677 
Loan from other financial instibJtion (e.g. Auto sec 215 2,4744 9,82692 ,67019 
cred~ union, finance company etc.) Electronics sec 390 ,9590 5,96376 ,30199 
Loan from parent <Y partner company Auto sec 215 5,2851 18,73149 1,27748 
Electronics sec 390 9,1821 25,93159 1,31310 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
Table A62: Independent Samples T-Test: Approximate shares of capital from 
different sources in the auto sector and in the electronics sector (in 
percent), 2000. 
Leven•·s Teti lo, 
e,..,111 or V•,_n,..• l••-t ·"'-·-•~. I Me••· 
95% Conl/dence 
lntervalollhe ..... Std.Errol' ""' F Sia, I di Sla.12-tlllkldl Ollerance OWlerence Lowe, ,_ 
neta1fftKI' fl8ffl9lg.,l'llem• cqua vanancas 
2" .620 ·2,618 603 ... ·11,44228 3,22481 •14,77550 ·2,10905 '"""' ·-Equal varlancas -2.63:J 44a.558 ,009 -8M2211 3.206M -14,74422 ·2,14033 notaaUITl8d 
Bank IOans Equal vartanc:es 
B,989 ,003 2244 603 "25 M9094 2,49153 ,69781 10,41407 -Equal vanancH 2,155 392,017 "32 5~9094 2.59410 ,49085 10.89102 notassurntel 
Loan from other llnanclal Equal var1anctt 
18,371 ,000 2,359 003 .,, 1,5154-4 ,84251 .25381 2.n12a lntlltutlan {e.g. cr9dll. aaumed 
union, Hnarce ~ny Equal vanances 
2,082 302.85'1 ... 1,515,44 ,73509 ,06892 2,98197 811::.) no1a111umed 
Loan lrom pa,901 or Equal valiances 
13,855 ,000 -1,952 003 "" -3,91694 2,00710 -7!5868 ,02481 pame,co~y '"'"'""' Eqal variances 
·2,138 560,737 ,033 ·3,91694 1,83199 -7,51533 ·.31854 nol aaumed 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001 ). 
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Table A63: Descriptive Statistics: Representation of members' views to the 
government as one function the most important business associations 
perform on a regular basis for companies in the auto sector and in the 
electronics sector, 2000. 
Representation cf members' view 
and concerns to the aovernment 
Yes No Total 
uroup_autosec_ Au1D sec Count 53 80 133 
electronicssec % witlin Group_autosec_ 
electronicssec 39,8% 60,2% 100,0% 
Electronics sec Count 109 115 224 
% wilhin Group_autosec_ 
48,7% 51,3'/o 100,0% electronicssec 
Total Count 162 195 357 
% within Group_autosec_ 
45,4% 54,6% 100,0% electronicssec 
Source: Data compiled from World Bank survey "Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages in 
Manufacturing Sectors" (2001). 
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